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Abstract 
Fault tree analysis is a method that describes all possible causes of a specified system state 
in terms of the state of the components within the system. Fault trees are commonly 
developed to analyse the adequacy of systems, from a reliability or safety point of view 
during the stages of design. The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to develop 
a method for diagnosing faults in systems using a model-based fault tree analysis approach, 
taking into consideration the potential for use on aircraft systems. 
Initial investigations have been conducted by developing four schemes that use coherent and 
non-coherent fault trees, the concepts of which are illustrated by applying the techniques to 
a simple system. These were used to consider aspects of system performance for each scheme 
at specified points in time. The results obtained were analysed and a critical appraisal of 
the findings carried out to determine the individual effectiveness of each scheme. 
A number of issues were highlighted from the first part of research, including the need to 
consider dynamics of the system to improve the method. The most effective scheme from 
the initial investigations was extended to take into account system dynamics through the 
development of a pattern recognition technique. Transient effects, including time history 
of flows and rate of change of fluid level were considered. 
The established method was then applied to a theoretical version of the BAE Systems fuel 
rig to investigate how the method could be utilised on a larger system. The fault detection 
was adapted to work with an increased number of fuel tanks and other components adding 
to the system complexity. The implications of expanding the method to larger systems 
such as a full aircraft fuel system were identified for the Nimrod MRA4. 
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Chapter 1 
Introd uction 
1.1 Fault Detection System Background 
Advances in technology have brought about increased system complexity, therefore making 
fault detection, diagnosis and rectification a more difficult task to perform. Any type of 
system, however well it is maintained, will at some point encounter component failures 
during the course of its life cycle. This can cause a change in system function, a reduction 
in system performance or worse still result in downtime from operation. A number of 
components could fail simultaneously changing the symptoms exhibited by the faults 
individually, which may further increase the time taken to obtain a successful diagnosis. 
Some faults may never be discovered until certain parts of the system are used. 
In the event of a failure, to lessen the impact on a system it is important that it is detected 
and the cause is diagnosed as soon as possible. Once a diagnosis has been made the problem 
can be rectified either by repairing or replacing the component, therefore returning the 
system to normal operation. Fast detection, diagnosis, and rectification in aircraft systems 
reduces the time taken for planes to be returned to service. In the case of autonomous 
robotic vehicles, detection and diagnosis of faults can aid the completion of successful 
missions. In chemical process plants the need to detect and diagnose causes of a safety 
critical failure in a system can be vital and an answer may be required within minutes, as 
a failure could result in an explosion, threatening the lives of workers and people living in 
the surrounding area. 
A fault can be defined as [lJ: 
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A fault is the identification of a non-permitted deviation of a characteristic properly which 
leads to the inability to fu/fill the intended purpose. 
Some faults may occur slowly over time due to wear on the components, or they may 
become apparent when the particular area of the system it is located in gets used. Other 
failures could cause significant changes in system operation, for example a blockage in a 
pipe. There may also be failures that occur intermittently within the system depending on 
certain conditions or patterns, which leads to a recurring failure. Any failure may cause 
serious damage if no action is taken, whether this be rectification or reconfiguration of the 
system so that that part is shut down. Once a deviation from normal operation is found 
a diagnosis can be performed to ascertain the cause of failure. This is the fault detection 
process. 
The process of diagnosing faults in a system has in the past been conducted by building up 
a knowledge base of faults through documenting failures and the methods carried out to 
repair them. The information was then available for use in the diagnosis of future failures. 
This is known as case-based reasoning. Today, a growing number of diagnostic systems are 
computer-based so history is documented in a computer database, making them quicker, 
easier and more efficient to use. 
Price [2] considers a number of important factors when measuring the effectiveness of 
a diagnostic system. These include efficient construction, reasonable maintainability, 
adequate coverage, accuracy, minimum effort from the user, appropriate response time 
and good cost/benefit ratio. The importance of each of these factors will be dependent 
upon the system that is being diagnosed. 
Efficient Construction 
A diagnostic system needs to be efficient, used at the lowest possible cost and in the shortest 
possible time frame in order to be effective in obtaining a diagnosis. The importance of 
these factors will depend on the type of system being diagnosed and requirements specified. 
Reasonable Maintainability 
Any diagnostic system has to be maintained in order to ensure it provides an efficient level 
of fault detection. The equipment being diagnosed may also change over time, therefore 
ideally a diagnostic system should be easy to update with any changes that could potentially 
affect diagnosis. 
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Adequate Coverage 
A diagnostic system should be able to detect a large proportion of the failures that can 
occur. However, the coverage of all faults may be a difficult process. For instance, a 
fault may occur in a part of a system that seldom gets used and would therefore remain 
undetected until required. The cost of development may also limit a full detection process. 
Accuracy 
Ideally a fault diagnostic system should be able to diagnose any possible failure correctly. 
In reality there may be numerous candidates for the cause of failure and in some cases the 
correct cause may not be present. 
Minimum Effort from the User 
A diagnostic system should only request information relevant to obtaining a correct 
diagnosis. A complex diagnostic system could require training to use adding to the cost 
and time investment, resulting in only a select number of workers knowing how to use it. 
Appropriate Response Time 
The time taken for a diagnostic system to perform a diagnosis will be dependent upon 
the system for which the diagnosis is being performed. Some systems such as chemical 
processing plants require a diagnosis within seconds of a fault becoming detected. For 
other systems the detection time is not as critical, but the faster a diagnosis is obtained 
the earlier work can begin to fix the problem and return the system to normal operation. 
Good Cost/Benefit Ratio for Diagnosis 
A cost/benefit ratio can be used to determine whether building a diagnostic system would 
be financially beneficial to a company. Costs incurred would be for running the tool, 
maintaining it and for its distribution. An efficient system would reduce the time taken 
to obtain a diagnosis, therefore increasing system availability and reducing downtime from 
normal operation. Some tools can continuously monitor a system for failures. These can 
detect failures as and when they occur, therefore enabling a faster diagnosis. The increased 
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cost of monitoring continuously would have to be compared with the benefit of knowing 
the cause of failure quicker. 
In the majority of cases fault detection systems are built after the development of the system 
they are designed for. In order to provide a more effective diagnostic strategy the design 
of a new system could take into consideration both 'design for diagnosability' (DFD) and 
'design for testability' (DFT). Diagnosability is a measure of the ease of isolating faults in 
a system [3,4]. DFD investigates each decision made throughout the process of the design 
stage of a system to see the effect it has on the system's diagnosability. DFT is a similar 
measure to DFD but focuses on how accessible a system is to test and maintain, which leads 
to the diagnosability of the system. DFT is also applied at each stage of the design phase, 
considering how maintainable a device is and if, or how, the testability can be improved. 
The drawback of both DFD and DFT are that they produce extra work during the design 
phase and may lengthen the time taken and increase the manufacturing costs [2]. These 
disadvantages can be justified by greater savings made later on during the system life cycle. 
A way of determining how effectively a system is performing is to use a set of sensors to 
determine the system health, performance and safety. The is known as 'system health 
monitoring' (SHM). SHM can be used to answer questions such as [5]; 'is the system 
functioning correctly?', 'what is wrong with the system?', 'is the state of the system as 
expected?', 'what needs to be fixed to ensure the system functions correctly?'. Notable 
capabilities that fall under SHM include fault detection and identification, failure prediction, 
modelling or tracking degradation, maintenance scheduling and error correction [6]. 
Condition based maintenance (CBM) is an example of SHM that identifies the requirements 
of a system based on its current operating conditions. It uses information gathered from a 
system to detect, analyse and correct equipment before a failure is displayed [6,7]. 
1.2 Types of Fault Detection System 
1.2.1 Rule-Based Diagnostic Systems 
A rule-based diagnostic approach traces the causes of a fault using a knowledge base devised 
by experts in the system domain for which the diagnosis is being performed. This knowledge 
is represented in the form of 'IF-THEN' rules, the 'IF' part being the condition and the 
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'THEN' part the consequence or action taken as a result of the condition being true. Each 
rule provides an independent piece of knowledge about the system behaviour that can 
assist in solving the overall problem. There can be multiple conditions specified using 
logical operators. Consider the following rules as discussed in [8]: 
IF A THEN B 
IF B THEN C 
IF C THEN D 
If A is true then it can be deduced or 'logically inferred' that D is also true using these 
three rules. They can be illustrated as shown in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1: Illustration of IF-THEN rules 
Each rule relates to a question or test for which the outcome is in a yes/no format. The 
answer determines which test to carry out next. This type of diagnostic system is simple 
to use and each rule gives the user more of an idea of what the problem is and how to 
solve it. Rules may also be implemented in any order. These qualities make rule-based 
expert systems one of the most successful products to emerge from artificial intelligence [8]. 
There are however a number of limitations. A system with a large set of rules may be 
slow in obtaining a diagnosis as there would be more testing to carry out. The rule-based 
system cannot learn from experience unlike an expert human, and also will not be able to 
automatically modify its knowledge base. It is often difficult to obtain a full correct set of 
rules for a system, either because the expert has no time to update the tool or due to the 
complexity of the system being diagnosed. 
1.2.2 Case-Based Diagnostic Systems 
Case-based reasoning is a methodology that solves a new current problem in a system using 
the solutions from similar past problems and experience rather than theory. Solutions can 
therefore be obtained quicker than having to solve a problem from the beginning. Each 
solution obtained can be used over and over again to solve other problems in the system. 
Once a failure has been identified there are four main stages of analysis; retrieve, reuse, 
revise and retain, as shown by Aamodt [9]. 
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Retrieve 
Obtain the case that is most similar to the new problem from the case-based memory of 
past solutions. The information gathered should include a problem description and details 
of exactly how the problem was solved. 
Reuse 
The solution of the case selected is adapted to meet the requirements for solving the new 
problem. Modifications made can be major or minor. 
Revise 
A solution to the new problem is obtained and an evaluation indicates how effective this 
is. If necessary, additional modifications to the solution can then be made. 
Retain 
Once a solution has been found it can be stored with the other past solutions as a case 
in the case-based memory. The information should include a description of the problem 
and details of how it was solved. This can then be used to help solve new problems in the 
future. 
Case-based reasoning is not as effective when making a diagnosis of large complex systems 
where there could be a large number of possible past solutions to choose from to obtain 
a new solution. Also, relatively new systems may not have a comprehensive case-based 
memory to solve the problems. More details about case-based reasoning can be found in 
Price [2], Kolodner [10] and Watson [8]. 
1.2.3 Model-Based Diagnostic Systems 
Model-based reasoning is a deductive approach in which faults are identified by comparing 
behaviour that is actually being observed from a system against an expected model. 
This model is generated depending on the operating conditions and compared to what is 
actually being observed in the system. Any differences between the observed and predicted 
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behaviour indicates that a failure has occurred. Diagnosis can then be performed to locate 
and determine the potential causes of this failure and obtain the most likely cause. The user 
would also need to decide which part of the system to model, whether it be the physical 
components or the processes of the system, and how to get a diagnosis from the observed 
information obtained. 
1.2.4 Real-Time Diagnostic Systems 
A system is monitored continuously in order to detect faults as and when they occur in real-
time. The diagnostic system is therefore automated to run alongside the system for which 
diagnosis is being performed. Once a deviation from normal system behaviour has been 
detected a diagnosis is performed to obtain the most likely causes of failure. Techniques 
used for diagnosis include case-based and model-based reasoning. Depending on the system 
it may be possible for the diagnostic tools to also repair certain faults automatically. The 
system could have built-in redundancy so that it is able to keep functioning whilst system 
repairs are carried out. For other real-time tools it may be enough to indicate that a fault 
has occurred in the system and leave it to the operator to deal with. 
Features that real-time systems can have include [2]: continuous monitoring and problem 
identification, changes in monitoring conditions, hard real-time constraints, reasoning about 
uncertainty and time and autonomous decision making. 
Continuous Monitoring and Problem Identification 
A feature of many continuously monitoring fault diagnostic tools is they can detect problems 
in a system while they develop rather than waiting for the failure to occur. Components can 
then be replaced as and when required prior to failure. Without monitoring, preventative 
maintenance is usually carried out and involves replacing components after so many hours 
of operation in order to reduce the likelihood of that part failing. This method can be very 
costly as components may be replaced with some life remaining and result in an increase 
in the overall maintenance. 
Changes in Monitoring Conditions 
In order to provide effective condition monitoring a diagnostic system must be able to 
differentiate between component states, which can be carried out using trends in system 
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data. A component that is about to fail will differ in the way it functions compared to 
one that is working as there would be a slight variation due to wear. In the latter case 
alterations in the system operation could be made to adapt to these changes. 
Hard Real-Time Constraints 
The required response time when a fault is detected in a system may vary depending on 
the type of system being diagnosed. In some cases the system may be able to carry on 
functioning with the failure present, although not as efficiently. The diagnosis time can 
depend upon the time it takes for the system to react to the failure and also the type of 
failure that has occurred. 
Reasoning About Uncertainty and Time 
System data can be analysed over time in order to develop a set of trends. A possible 
problem may be identified, but this could take time to develop before it is certain that an 
actual failure exists. A trend could be used to indicate the most likely outcomes to enable 
a fault to be identified as soon as possible. 
Autonomous Decision Making 
The diagnostic tool must be able to decide on the cause of action required for a detected 
failure as quickly as possible so to minimise its effect. This decision is made automatically 
without any operator intervention. Therefore, there must be confidence in the diagnostic 
system to identify failures. 
1.3 Diagnostic System Features 
There are a number of features that a diagnostic system should have, including: problem 
identification/fault detection, fault localisation, fault identification and fault diagnosis 
capabilities. The significance of each of these may vary depending upon the system use. 
Once a fault has been diagnosed a decision as to whether to repair/replace the component or 
allow the system to continue running in an alternative operation through system redundancy 
can be made. 
Other desirable diagnostic characteristics include the ability of the system to provide quick 
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detection and diagnosis, the isolability of failures, system robustness and the adaptability 
of a system to a change in conditions as defined by Venkatasubramanian [1l]. 
Problem Identification/Fault Detection 
The first step before trying to obtain a diagnosis is to identify that a problem has occurred. 
A problem may be identified using readings from sensors. The time at which the failure 
first occurred may also be recorded. The readings can be compared with those expected 
and thus identify any deviations encountered. Another way of identifying a problem could 
be by human observation. 
Fault Localisation 
Once a problem has been recognised as being present in the system the potential area in 
which the deviation has occurred is located in order to restrict the possible causes of failure. 
Fault Identification 
Once the potential fault area is located, the next phase is to identify the possible causes of 
failure. This may carried out using a fault detection method. 
Fault Diagnosis 
The next step is to identify the component or components in the system that have caused 
the actual failure to occur from the list of possibilities. In the majority of cases a system 
failure will be the result of one faulty component. However, the possibility of multiple 
failures cannot be dismissed, especially within more complex systems. 
Once a diagnosis is made the decision to repair/replace the faulty components or allow the 
system to run in an updated mode of operation has to be made. This will be dependent 
upon whether the fault or faults are tolerable or intolerable within the system. If tolerable 
then the system can carry on with the failure present through use of redundancy. This type 
of failure may also be repaired whilst the system is in operation. If intolerable the system 
would have to be shut down and the problem rectified before returning to a working status. 
A flow diagram of the process of diagnostic system features is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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No 
Figure 1.2: Diagnostic process flow chart 
1.4 Deficiencies in Diagnostic Systems 
The following are possible deficiencies that could occur in diagnostic systems: 
• The time taken to perform a diagnosis - a diagnostic system that takes a long time 
to perform a diagnosis is not very efficient. 
• Some diagnostic methods are not equipped to deal with the increasing complexity of 
systems. 
• The accuracy of the diagnosis obtained - diagnostic tools may not always produce 
accurate results. 
- Some diagnostic tools only generate a list of possible failures to a certain 
likelihood of occurrence. 
Some diagnostic tools only diagnose single failures in systems, when there may 
be multiple failures that have occurred in order to cause system failure. 
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- Some diagnostic tools do not take into consideration the components that are 
known not to have failed - working component states. These could be used to 
eliminate possible causes of failure. 
- There may be erroneous causes of the symptoms listed. 
- There may be incomplete causes of the symptoms listed. 
1.5 Research Project Objectives 
Fault trees are commonly developed and analysed to check the adequacy of systems, from 
a reliability or safety point of view, at the design stage. Since they express the causes 
of system failure the aim of the research is to develop a method for diagnosing faults in 
systems using a model-based fault tree analysis (FTA) approach. This will initially consider 
aspects of system performance observed at specified points in time and then be extended to 
consider dynamics. The following objectives have been listed in order to achieve this aim: 
• Review the existing fault diagnostic techniques applied to systems. 
• Develop a fault diagnostic method for steady-state conditions and demonstrate its 
capability on a simple water tank level control system in order to predict single and 
multiple failures that cause a system fault. 
• Develop a fault detection demonstrator that, given a set of sensor readings, can 
compare these with the model behaviour for the system and generate a set of potential 
causes of failure for the system. 
• Incorporate dynamics into the analysis to take into consideration system transient 
effects. 
• Once a method is established apply it to a larger system example - the BAE Systems 
fuel rig physical model will be utilised for this purpose. Refine the fault detection 
process as needed to cope with the increased system complexity. 
• Identify the implications of expanding the method to larger systems such as a full 
aircraft fuel system. 
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Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
There are a number of types of fault detection system, including rule-based, case-based, 
model-based and those using real-time analysis, as introduced in Section 1.2. It would be 
difficult to develop a diagnostic method using case-based reasoning that could be used on 
any type of system as this strategy depends on previous history of failures to diagnose 
faults. As one of the objectives is to develop a diagnostic method for use on large and 
complex systems case-based reasoning will not be investigated further. Rule-based and 
model-based diagnostic systems are discussed in more detail in this chapter, including real-
time qualities. A number of the techniques contain aspects of more than one type of fault 
detection system, therefore these have been placed into the most appropriate category.· 
2.2 Rule-Based Diagnostic Systems 
2.2.1 Introduction to Rule-Based Systems 
Rule-based reasoning uses a knowledge base developed by experts in that area in order to 
diagnose any faults the system may encounter. The rules for the system are used to direct 
this knowledge to ascertain a cause of failure. A number of diagnostic systems investigated 
have been built using a rule-based strategy. These are now described in order to illustrate 
how this system type has been utilised. A variety of analysis techniques have been used 
including sequential testing, signed directed graphs (SDGs), FTA and Bayesian networks. 
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2.2.2 Sequential Testing 
Sequential testing is a method that can be used to perform system diagnosis by generating 
a sequence of tests that lead to a series of potential causes. Each test carried out incurs an 
associated cost. The aim is to obtain a diagnosis at the lowest cost possible, and therefore 
acquire an optimal solution to the problem. Solutions have been derived using numerous 
optimisation algorithm techniques [12-21]. 
The test sequencing problem [17,21] can be described as the four-tuple (S,p, T, c) where S 
is a finite set of system states, p is an 'a priori' probability of the system being in state Si 
before diagnosis takes place, T is the finite set of available binary tests, tj, and Cj are the 
associated test costs. 
Each test carried out divides the list of potential faults into two subsets: tests that pass, 
and those that fail. The tests and states can be interpreted using decision trees, with 
branches representing the test outcome (pass/fail), states are represented by the square 
terminal nodes and circular nodes are the tests carried out, as shown in Figure 2.1. Left-
hand branches in decision trees illustrate the tests that have passed (' P') and right-hand 
branches are those which have failed ('F'). 
F 
P F 
So S3 
Figure 2.1: An example decision tree 
There are a number of different types of test that can be carried out, the main ones being 
symmetrical and asymmetrical testing. Symmetrical tests can either be definitely passed 
or failed, and so An B = 0, (where A represents the tests passed and B those failed). At 
least one state will occur in both subsets A and B in asymmetrical testing. Therefore the 
system state could have failed a test but still be listed as a potential cause of the next test 
that takes place, and so in this case, AnB oF 0. Asymmetrical testing leads to multi-valued 
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testing, in which case the tests have an arbitrary number of possible outcomes [21]. 
Pattipati and Dontamsetty [22] have presented a sequential approach that identifies a faulty 
module in a system rather than the individual faults themselves. The testing algorithm 
branches to a subset of states belonging to the same module and then ceases when it has 
found the module in which rectification is required. The modular approach also offers the 
option of replacing a whole module within a system rather than the exact failure. This is 
only cost-effective if the cost of replacing a faulty module is less than applying more tests 
to obtain the exact cause of failure. 
The sequential diagnostic tool [21] carries out a series of tests to determine the system 
status at a certain point in time using information about which symptoms are exhibited 
when faults are present. This determines the best sequence to conduct the tests in order 
to locate the fault condition in the cheapest (or quickest) way. 
Consider a car braking system [21] with 7 possible system failure states and a fault-free state 
as shown in Table 2.1. These are represented by S = {80, 81, ... ,87}, with 80 being the fault-
free state. System status can be indicated by testing 9 failure symptoms, T = {t l , t2"'" t g }. 
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Failures 
" 
Lack of brake fluid • • 
., Air in the brake lines • • 
., Worn pads • 
" 
Wet or oily pads • • • • 
" 
Error in the control mechanism • • • 
" 
Damaged wheel bearings • • • • • 
., Damaged wheel cylinder • • • • • • 
Table 2.1: Car braking system 
Table 2.1 indicates where a test is used in a path leading to the identification of the system 
state. For instance, the failure 'lack of brake fluid' would be identified through the failure 
symptoms 'fading brake pedal' and 'low brake pedal', represented by'.'. Each test tj that 
leads to a system state incurs a cost, Cj, which in this particular example are all assumed 
equal to 1. The information from Table 2.1 can therefore be written in matrix form, as 
shown in Table 2.2, where '1' in the matrix corresponds to '.'. Fault probability 'p(8i)' 
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in the right-hand column of the matrix is the probability of the system being in state 'Si' 
before diagnosis takes place. 
System State Tests Fault Probabilities 
., t, t, t3 t, t, t, t, t, t, pes;) 
•• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.95 
" 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005 
" 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 
'3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.02 
., 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.00375 
'3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.00375 
" 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.00375 
" 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.00375 
Costs Cj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 2.2: Braking system matrix 
The order in which tests are carried out in a procedure can be illustrated using a diagnostic 
decision tree, as shown in Figure 2.2. The average cost J of a procedure can be obtained 
from the equation: 
m n 
J = L L D:ijP(Si)Cj, (2.1) 
i=O j=! 
where D:ij is 1 if test tj is used in the path leading to the identification of system state 
Si, and zero otherwise (represented in a binary format). The aim is to minimise J, i.e: to 
obtain the lowest possible or optimal cost. 
So 
Figure 2.2: Optimal sequential diagnostic decision tree for the 
brake system with symmetrical tests 
There can be more than one solution obtained to the problem. These may vary in cost 
depending on the ordering of the tests. The optimal solution to the problem is one that 
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yields the lowest cost, of which there may also be more than one possibility. Substituting 
the values for Figure 2.2, which illustrates an optimal solution, into Equation 2.1 and gives 
J = 2.9875. 
The methods described by Pattipati [17], Pattipati and Dontamsetty [22], Zuzek et al. [18, 
19,21] and Biasizzo et al. [20] are limited to situations where only a single fault is expected 
to exist at any point in time; they do not take into consideration multiple component 
failures. Instead it is assumed that the system tests would be applied frequently enough 
to ensure that only one component failure has occurred. There is still the chance however 
that two failures could occur within the time frame that the system is checked, which 
makes diagnosis difficult. In the situation where two failures reveal only the symptoms of 
one failure this masks the faults, leading to incorrect diagnosis. Once the visible failure is 
rectified the tool would have to be used again to try and ascertain if any other failures are 
present. 
The sequential testing approach has been extended to deal with the occurrence of multiple 
failures in systems using the single fault strategy as a building block for the expansion. 
The first step made by Shakeri et al. [23] considered extending the single fault strategy by 
isolating fault candidates in the sequential diagnostic tree, resulting in the identification 
of single or multiple failure possibilities. The idea of the multiple failure strategy is that 
a faulty component is replaced when identified. The system is checked again to see if the 
problem has been rectified by testing the system with the test that failed and all remaining 
tests not yet carried out. This continuous testing will identify whether the correct fault 
has been obtained or if a failure has been masked. It also identifies if there are any other 
failures with the system. There is however a high probability that some of the components 
replaced may not be faulty resulting in higher costs. The system could also encounter 
reduced system functionality for longer periods of time or even downtime from operation 
because of time taken to diagnose and rectify the problem. Also, this method is still only 
checking for single failures, just the process of testing for failures is carried out again once 
a failure has been rectified. 
The investigations of continual testing for single failures to obtain multiple possibilities 
led to the development of a set of strategies that can isolate multiple definitely failed 
components at the same time. Each test can automatically indicate a failure of some kind 
in the system and more than one failure state for each test can be obtained in order to 
allow for the occurrence of multiple faults. Each test has an associated action that is carried 
out, therefore if a test fails then a failure state can be identified before the bottom of the 
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decision tree is reached. This allows numerous failures to be identified. One of the main 
problems with this method is the large computational complexity that is encountered when 
dealing with multiple failures in a system and it has been suggested that to overcome this 
problem the test strategy should be generated 'on-line' as stated in Shakeri et al. [23J. Tests 
carried out in the analysis have been assumed to be perfectly reliable but in reality this 
may not be the case. Unreliable test sequencing problems have been considered in previous 
work carried out by Raghavan et al. [24], but only for single component failures. Finally, 
the failure signature (indicates all tests tj that monitor a state Si) of a multiple fault was 
assumed to be the union of failure signatures for individual faults, but this is not always 
the case [23J (Le. failure states are independent). 
A diagnostic system can be built to represent and automatically traverse diagnostic fault 
trees [2], which have the same structure as a sequential diagnostic tree, as shown in 
Figure 2.3. A diagnostic fault tree can be constructed in either an expert system shell or in 
a conventional programming language. This makes it easier to handle large complex trees 
that may spread over numerous pages if drawn out by hand, thus reducing the possibility of 
operator error. Automation enables the diagnostic system to follow the traversal progression 
and store detailed information with regards to each test and repair procedures to be carried 
out once a diagnosis has been ascertained. 
Yes No 
Outcome 1 Yes No 
Outcome 2 Outcome 3 
Figure 2.3: Simple diagnostic fault tree 
An automated diagnostic system containing a diagnostic fault tree can be easily 
implemented and any alterations to the tree can be carried out in a straight forward 
manner, making the strategy reasonable to maintain. Automation also makes the more 
complex branches in the tree easier to illustrate, for instance the user may wish to have 
more than two possible outcomes from the questions asked. Should a tree become too large 
it can be split into appropriate tree sections in order to make it more user friendly. 
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The implementation phase of diagnostic fault trees can be a lengthy process and brings with 
it the risk of introducing possible errors into the trees. These problems can be omitted from 
the analysis by using a tool that automatically develops the diagnostic trees, giving the user 
a graphical output. The tool then creates a computer program from the diagnostic fault 
tree information and lessens the possibility of the user introducing programming errors into 
the system. Three examples of tools that generate a diagnostic system from diagnostic 
fault trees are GRAF2, TestBench™ and GRADETM. 
There are a number of disadvantages to using diagnostic fault trees. A tree may have to be 
updated on a regular basis in order to meet the demands and changes made in a system, 
for instance if a new component is added to a system then this could incur a failure that 
would need to be registered in the trees. Diagnostic fault trees could also get very large, 
making them more difficult to handle and maintain. There may be a difficulty in drawing 
a diagnostic fault tree for a new system that has no listed fault diagnostic history. The 
diagnostic fault tree approach is best employed in situations where a failure has caused a 
system to stop working and needs to be repaired in order to get back to its normal operating 
mode. The technique would not be as suitable for continuously monitored systems or ones 
that reconfigure their operation with the presence of a failure as the trees cannot account 
for this. 
2.2.3 Signed Directed Graphs 
Signed directed graphs (SDGs) can be used to illustrate the propagation of failures through 
a system and are most noted for their use in the chemical processing industry. A SDG 
consists of a set of vertices or nodes and edges. Each node represents a system process 
variable or the failure of a component. In the event where one variable has an affect on 
another an edge can be drawn to define a relationship between the two nodes. Edges are 
always directed from the independent variable to the dependent one, as indicated by the 
direction of the arrow. When there are a number of edges connecting the same two nodes, 
only one edge can be true at any time as they are mutually exclusive. 
SDGs use signs (+) or (-) on the arcs to indicate whether the cause or effect change in the 
same or opposite directions respectively. Each node in the graph is also assigned one of 
three values, these being normal, higher or lower and (0), (+) or (-) are used to represent 
these respective results. SDGs can also contain conditional arcs that only become active if 
this condition is met. An example of a simple SDG is shown in Figure 2.4. 
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A 0----'-+--, 0 B 
+ + 
Figure 2.4: A simple signed directed graph 
A method was devised by Kramer and Palowitch, Jr. [25] to identify the possible causes 
of process disturbances by creating SDGs in order to show interactions within a system. 
SDGs are used to develop a fault model, resulting in a set of directed trees that branch out 
from a given root node. Each node is representative of the origin of a fault and the branches 
indicate the propagation of the failure. Once the fault origin is located, in order to reduce 
the analysis, any nodes that do not represent a sensor - unless they are a potential root 
node - are removed and replaced by a single edge in order to leave the branches of interest 
for the diagnosis. 
The reduced SDG is converted into a set of logical statements or 'rules' to ascertain the 
failure. For a branch A ...±.., B 'if A is 1 then B will be 1 or 0', 'if A is 0 then B must be 0' 
and finally 'if A is -1 then B is -1 or 0'. Similar results can be obtained for A ~ Band 
A ....:.... B. Logical functions can be defined for each type of branch and these are evaluated 
to obtain a diagnosis. Kramer and Palowitch, Jr. concluded that only single failures could 
be identified using this technique and numerous possibilities were ascertained, some of which 
were incorrect. In other cases the true failure was not included in the list of possibilities, 
which often was encountered in control loops due to the presence of non-single transitions 
(changes of sign). Correct diagnosis is only guaranteed in the case where all variables use 
a single transition [25]. 
The method was extended by Chang and Yu [26] to try and overcome the problems 
that were identified by Kramer and Palowitch, Jr. The SDGs are simplified additionally 
considering results from steady-state analysis to improve the diagnostic solution. System 
state information is used to create arcs between certain nodes in order to depict the 
movement of a system from one state to another, therefore creating modularity. Additional 
process knowledge is sometimes required to indicate the effect most dominant in the fault 
transmission. The problem of obtaining a diagnosis for non-single transients is considered 
for the case of control loops by developing a set of rules for use during a transition. 
Tarifa and Scenna [27,28] present a rule-based method for diagnosing faults in systems using 
SDGs, adapted from the technique used in Kramer and Palowitch, Jr. [25]. Qualitative 
modelling of a system is conducted using SDGs and from this a set of rules - for each of 
the sectors it is divided into - are created off-line. The on-line stage is executed by the 
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system detecting an abnormality in sensor outputs. Fuzzy logic (takes into consideration 
partial truth as well as values that are completely true or completely false as in Boolean 
logic) is used to evaluate the set of rules obtained from the SOG. This type of logic was 
found to be better for evaluating the rules as less information was lost. The method was 
used on a larger system in [28J by building the SOG in sectors to deal with the size. There 
is still a heavy computational cost involved, especially in large examples with more rules 
to evaluate. 
2.2.4 FTA 
FTA is a deductive technique used in the safety and reliability assessment of systems to 
identify the causes of a specified system failure mode using a 'what can cause this' approach. 
The idea was first developed in the early 1960s by H. Watson [29J at Bell Telephone 
Laboratories and has become one of the most widely used reliability modelling techniques. 
Fault trees have also been noted for use in the development of diagnostic systems. 
A fault tree can provide a symbolic representation of a failure mode that has been identified 
in a given system. This specified failure mode is called the 'top event', located at the 
top of the tree. The branches from this event lead to the possible causes of this failure 
(intermediate events) until component failure (basic) events are reached, terminating the 
logical development. More than one failure mode may be encountered in a system, therefore 
a fault tree should be drawn for each. 
Madden and Nolan [30J and Nolan et al. [31J have investigated the notion of diagnosing 
failures within a system through inductively learning from previous examples. The approach 
uses a 'black-box model' of the system containing a knowledge base of what faults arise in 
components for given conditions, therefore no detailed description or analysis of the system 
to which it is applied is needed. An algorithm has been developed comprising of two 
main components, these being a fault tree induction module and a fault diagnosis module. 
The fault tree induction module uses example case data for both undesired events and for 
normal system behaviour that has been obtained using training data in the form of sensor 
recordings in order to generate fault trees. The algorithm builds a set of fault trees from 
this data for each identified system state. The trees are then translated into rules for use 
in the fault diagnosis module. This module takes a sensor recording that is supplied from 
the system and returns a set of possible states that the system could be in to the operator. 
The diagnostic method uses aspects of both case-based and rule-based reasoning techniques 
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and has been tested on an example system containing a variety of potential failures. The 
results obtained were compared with those based on an approach using neural networks [31] 
and the fault tree technique was found to be more effective. The method was extended to 
take into consideration multiple failures [32] by modifying the training data. Multiple 
failures are assumed to occur when either a failure that has already happened is not 
repaired and another materialises or if a known failure is in the system and another occurs 
intermittently. The technique learns overall from previous system experience, therefore it 
cannot be guaranteed to successfully diagnose all conditions obtained in the system in the 
future. The fault trees contain AND and OR logic, therefore there is no consistency check 
present within the trees. 
Performing diagnosis using FTA will result in either one or a number of potential causes 
of failure. These potential causes are the minimal cut sets for the system. A method for 
diagnosis using a fault tree based approach to obtain minimal cut sets and repair information 
is described by Takahashi et al. [33]. Diagnosis takes place after a system has failed. A list 
of minimal cut sets or potential causes of failure are originally identified using FTA, which 
is used to indicate any deviations in the system behaviour from normal operation. 
The actual cause of failure is identified by inspecting each component within the minimal 
cut sets. This part of the analysis is rule-based in structure as each component is checked 
to see if it is functioning or if it has failed. The method assumes there is a possibility 
the system failure can be caused by more than one minimal cut set as not all the failures 
may be identified within this. However, this implies that the method has not identified the 
actual failure cause in its list of possible causes, as the overall cause should be present in 
one possibility. 
Information from fuzzy FTA and uncertainty along with imprecision of data is used by 
Yang et al. [34] in the creation of a diagnostic system. A knowledge of causal relationships 
in the operation process and system control is represented by a fault tree. Fuzzy logic is 
used to take into consideration possible uncertainty information and data. The knowledge 
base stores qualitative information from a fault tree in the form of production rules and 
quantitative information obtained. The diagnostic tool identifies any deviations in the 
system by comparing the system data with the production rules. The method is presented 
on a small system and would have to be extended to a larger example in order to show how 
effective it can be. Also, only AND and OR logic is present in the fault trees used in the 
analysis, therefore the method does not take into consideration component working states. 
Dynamic fault trees provide special constructs for modeling sequential failure modes in 
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addition to standard combinatorial gates in FTA. Assaf and Dugan have developed a 
method to evaluate the possible cost of diagnosing a given network system when it 
fails [35-37J. A dynamic fault tree is created to illustrate the system model and for use 
in the diagnosis. This fault tree is then analysed and diagnosis performed by Automatic 
Diagnosis based on Reliability Analysis (ADORA), a diagnosis tool [36J. ADORA obtains 
diagnostic importance factors for each component within the system along with the cost 
and diagnostic importance factors (diagnostic information per unit cost of testing). The 
cost and diagnostic importance factor results are then used to order tests to be carried out. 
The tests are chosen depending on the symptoms given from the system. This information 
is used by ADORA in order to create a diagnostic decision tree [37J - which is similar 
in structure to the sequential diagnostic tree - to be evaluated for obtaining the cost of 
performing a diagnosis and to identify the potential causes of failure. The method is only 
used on a small real system configuration, therefore investigations need to be conducted in 
order to find out how effective it is on a larger system. 
2.2.5 Bayesian Networks 
The diagnosis of a failure can be described in terms of reasoning of the relationships between 
cause-effect and/or fault-symptom within a system. A fault may be the result of a number 
of different symptoms, whereas a number of failures may be the cause of just one symptom 
within a system. In many cases a fault-symptom relationship is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic, therefore there may only be a probability of a symptom occurring for a given 
failure [38J. Probability theory is able to contend with uncertain knowledge or rules and 
fuzzy input data along with functional mappings and simple thresholds from a system for 
the application in system diagnosis. This is achieved through the use of tools such as 
Bayesian networks. A Bayesian network consists of a set of variables or 'nodes', each of 
which has a finite set of mutually exclusive states and a set of directed edges [39J, as shown 
in Figure 2.5. 
A , 
c 
Figure 2.5: A simple Bayesian network 
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For each variable X that has parents Yj, ... , Yn there exists a conditional probability table 
P(XIYj , ••• , Yn). If a variable A has no parents then there would just be the probability 
P(A). In figure 2.5 P(A) and P(B) are 'a priori' probabilities which must be specified. The 
other probabilities to specify are P(ClA, B), P(EIC), P(DIC), P(FIE) and P(GID, E, F). 
The information from the Bayesian network can be used to build a simple conditional 
probability table to indicate the probabilities of occurrence of failure. 
It is often hard to specify all the necessary node probabilities and this has been identified 
as a difficulty when using Bayesian networks for fault diagnosis. Kirsch and Kroschel [38] 
addressed this problem. This is carried out by obtaining the probabilities through solving a 
series of non-linear equations developed from known probabilities. The method was found 
to be very complex even for the simplest of real world examples. Numerical methods were 
found to provide some solutions for solving parts of the general non-linear equation system, 
but more investigations were found to be required. 
Wolbrecht et al. [40] have developed an approach that uses Bayesian networks for monitoring 
and diagnosis of a multi-stage manufacturing process. The methodology is demonstrated 
for the cap alignment process - the manufacturing of a product during which a cap is 
aligned to a base and joined together - for the identification of single and multiple failures. 
Monitoring of the system is performed on-line in real time to identify any sensor deviations 
and obtain a diagnosis as soon as possible to reduce system down-time. 
A Bayesian network model is developed for each cap and base part that collectively 
represent the probabilistic relationships between inspection data, alignment position and 
alignment process components. A network is constructed with a set of nodes with causal 
relationships present between nodes. Each node also has an associated conditional and 
'a priori' probability. The part models are combined to generate a process model for the 
current overall system, which was implemented as a Visual C++ program. This is used 
to determine the 'a posteriori' probabilities of the alignment process components using the 
observed data from the basic inspection points. 
The real-time application allows failures to be detected on-line. In some cases once a fault 
is highlighted in a specific section this can be shut down and then the component is replaced 
or repaired. The precision of the diagnostic results with the approach is however dependent 
upon the accuracy of the configuration parameters. Large numbers of components in certain 
system sections have made the actual failure cause more difficult to ascertain, but at the 
very least the system still indicates that a failure has occurred. Another limitation is that 
the algorithm used to update the' a posteriori' probabilities will not completely scale to 
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larger processes in its current state due to the large complexity. 
Bayesian networks are applied to a power network system for fault diagnosis on a 
distribution feeder by Chien et al. [41] using expert system knowledge and historical data. 
From this information a Bayesian network is developed to model the causal relationships 
between the fault(s) in the system and observations from feeder outages. The expert system 
knowledge and historical data includes information records of the occurrence of past failures 
(such as date, time, location and equipment type), causes of incidents, along with records of 
prior and conditional probabilities. A Bayesian network for fault location was constructed 
and evaluated by an expert in order to indicate the suitability. This was then validated 
by comparing the results obtained for a selection of likely scenarios with those from the 
historical data. The method is only used for diagnosis of single failures in the system and 
needs further research in order to indicate the scalability to larger systems. 
Application of Bayesian networks for use on the bleed air control system (BA CS) of a 
Boeing 737NR aircraft is carried out by Paasch and Durgi [42] in order to develop a tool 
for troubleshooting a complex electromechanical system. The objective was to ascertain 
a fault in the system using a sequence of actions that minimised costs and resulted in 
a functioning system. The BACS has numerous sensors, which are used to indicate the 
presence of a deviation. During the diagnostic process the tool takes inputs from the sensors 
and is designed to suggest the most appropriate test to be carried out or the component to 
replace. 
Due to the computational complexity and use of memory it was found to be impractical 
to apply Bayesian networks to obtain optimal troubleshooting and were not as accurate 
as decision analysis because of the assumption of conditional independence. They were 
however useful in the decision making process and can be used to improve the efficiency of 
the diagnosis procedure in an electra-mechanical system. 
2.3 Summary of Rule-Based Diagnostic Systems 
• A rule-based system uses a knowledge base developed by experts in order to diagnose 
any faults the system may encounter . 
• The knowledge is collated into a set of rules, each drawn up in an 'IF-THEN' 
structure, the 'IF' giving a condition for the rule to be true and the 'THEN' being 
the consequence or action taken as a result. 
24 
Literature Review Advantages of Rule-Based Diagnostic Systems 
• The rules can be used in any order as they are mutually exclusive. 
• In general a depth-first forward chaining method is used in which the action taken 
in turn becomes the condition for the rule to be true until the chain ceases and the 
cause is obtained. This can be used in cases where a deviation has occurred and the 
cause is deduced by working through a subset of rules. 
• A number of the systems use a method to obtain information and then use a set of 
rules to analyse this information to obtain a diagnosis. 
2.4 Advantages of Rule-Based Diagnostic Systems 
• A rule-based method is a structured approach that utilises the knowledge base of a 
system. 
• In the event of any modifications made to the system the knowledge base can be easily 
up-dated, making this type of method straightforward to maintain. 
• Rules can be implemented in any order. 
• Each rule gives the user potentially more of an idea of the problem and how to solve 
it. 
• The rules can be made to be as clear and concise as possible, allowing a simple root 
to diagnosis. 
2.5 Disadvantages of Rule-Based Diagnostic Systems 
• A rule-based system cannot learn from previous experience, unlike a human expert, 
therefore will not automatically modify its knowledge. Also it cannot up-date itself 
in the event of any modifications made to the system structure. 
• In general a larger system will have a bigger set of rules that may make the diagnosis 
more complex and slower in obtaining a diagnosis. 
• It could be difficult to provide coverage for all faults in the system with the method, 
depending on the complexity of the system it is being used on. 
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• Rule-based methods in general deal with finding single failures when in some situations 
there may be multiple faults exhibited. 
2.6 Model-Based Diagnostic Systems 
2.6.1 Introduction to Model-Based Systems 
Model-based reasoning is a deductive process that uses a model of system behaviour to 
indicate how it should be working and compares this against what is actually being observed 
to highlight any abnormal activities. Figure 2.6 shows the relationship between the model 
of expected behaviour and the actual activity observed from the system. 
Physical 
System 
Observed Expected 
-1 Model I 
-- Behaviour Behaviour 
JI 
I Deviation I 
Figure 2.6: Diagnosis of system failure comparing 
expected and observed behaviour 
The model of system behaviour is generated depending on the normal operating conditions. 
The observed system activity is then compared to that expected. Any difference between 
the two indicates that the system has deviated from its normal mode of operation, implying 
that a failure of some kind has occurred. When a deviation between the model and actual 
behaviour is encountered potential causes of failure are obtained and the most likely cause 
determined by performing system diagnosis. 
The model is only an approximation to the real system, and so may not provide all possible 
information, (more details can be found in Shrobe [43]). In the majority of cases a model 
will not be able to be reused on a new system. Model-based reasoning works from the 
symptoms exhibited and traces the steps back to the underlying failure in the system. 
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2.6.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is an inductive or 'forward' qualitative reliability analysis tool that uses a 'what 
happens if' approach in order to identify potential system failure modes, their causes and the 
effect they can have on system operation. It provides a structured procedure for evaluating 
the severity of the failure modes for a system, subsystem or function. The knowledge of a 
system in a FMEA format has proved to be constructive in the development of diagnostic 
systems. The formation of a FMEA can however be very time consuming and human errors 
and inconsistencies are often likely as they are usually developed by hand. Also only single 
failures are normally considered in the analysis, which is a significant drawback. 
Price and Taylor [44] and Price [2,45] demonstrated the use of automated FMEA to generate 
reports that could be used in a diagnostic tool, 'AutoSteve', for diagnosing multiple faults 
in systems using qualitative model-based reasoning. The tool is used by several automotive 
manufacturers for FMEA generation. A FM EA report is produced by obtaining the normal 
system behaviour and recording the operating functions. The possible failures that could 
occur can then be identified along with the functional behaviour of the system when each 
of these faults occur. The faulty and normal behaviour is compared and any discrepancies 
in the function are recorded in the FMEA report in order to indicate that a system has 
been affected by a failure. 
Once the area in which a failure is situated has been located from the functional information 
the diagnostic system determines a list of possible component failures, which are ordered 
by likelihood. A series of tests, represented in the form of a diagnostic fault tree, can be 
employed to indicate whether the most likely cause is the actual fault. These will either 
show that this is the cause or will rule it out of the possibilities. 
The information generated in the FMEAs can be verified by the engineers, which provides 
an extra beneficial level to analysis checking. A system can be divided into subsystems 
enabling the method to focus in on a smaller problem area. The method is also able to 
reduce the amount of time taken in drawing up a FMEA, which is normally developed by 
hand. The failures from the FMEA are only generated to a chosen degree of likelihood of 
occurrence - the system cannot generate failures containing four or more faults; therefore all 
possible outcomes for a system scenario may not be obtained. This is due to the amount of 
time taken to perform calculations. Also in some cases the tests carried out are not specific 
enough to obtain failures that develop gradually within a system. Building diagnostic trees 
using automated FMEA has decreased the construction time but this could still be improved 
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if costs of tests were considered. 
Atkinson et al. [46, 47] investigate the notion of automating FMEA for fault analysis on 
hydraulic system circuits. A model of the system is established and the behaviour collated 
in a library containing component models and their faults in a computer program. These 
can be used to simulate a required circuit. Each component model contains a description of 
its behaviour when in normal operation and when failed. Faults in the system are modelled 
by knowledge of the expected system behaviour and the possible failure modes for the 
system. 
A circuit specification is input into the program in the circuit definition file, which will 
set up a new network of objects within the computer's memory in order to simulate this. 
Variables monitored within the system are pressure and flow. A qualitative simulation 
of the circuit is executed in order to determine the correct circuit operation. Faults can 
then be input into the simulation and once the faulty operation is located by the system 
sensors the possible effects are recorded in the FMEA. This is used to build up the affects 
that all faults in components in the circuit can have upon the system. Fault diagnosis is 
performed by inputting a fault into the system and allowing this to be detected and the 
FMEA to diagnose the cause and effects. Only single faulty components can be input into 
the program, therefore the method does not take into consideration multiple failures in the 
analysis. 
A number of investigations carried out by Paasch et al. into development of mechanical 
system diagnosis have incorporated FMEA and fault trees [3,4,48-52]. The work is aimed 
at developing a method that can indicate how easily failures can be detected in a system 
so that improvements can be made to the diagnosability (the ease at which faults in a 
system are isolated [3,4]). A method is presented by Ruff and Paasch [48] that uses 
structural functions to map visible indications of whether an operation is or is not being 
performed (performance measurements) to the components within the system (parameters) 
in order to gauge the system diagnosability. The method uses the relationships between the 
observed behaviour of the system and the potential causes of failure of the components. The 
normal operation of the system is determined at the conceptual phase of design and FTA is 
performed to identify any failed components for visible indications that have deviated from 
the expected system behaviour. The effects of these potential failures are collated into a 
FMEA to indicate the relationships between operations and components. Analysis is begun 
by the presence of abnormal behaviour, indicated as a discrepancy in the system model. 
The potential causes of failure are linked to this deviation using a set of rules to identify 
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appropriate candidates. Clark and Paasch [49] extend this work to take into consideration 
unreliable failure indications and system components. The system modelling is carried out 
on conceptual, partially defined and defined mechanical systems. 
Henning and Paasch [4] develop a diagnosability model that is initially built from system 
data in a FMEA and FTA in the same way as described by Ruff and Paasch [48]. The 
component-indication mapping methodology is also used to determine the relationships 
between components and observed system behaviour. The information from the FMEA and 
FTA is used to construct a series of matrices in order to describe the diagnosability model 
mathematically. These are then used in order to determine the rate at which components 
need to be replaced. 
The work carried out by Henning and Paasch is extended by Mocko and Paasch [52] to 
include imperfect indications or sensors into the diagnostic model. The model is developed 
further using Bayes' formula in order to determine the truth of an event that is based on 
prior knowledge and current observations. A limitation to the research described is that 
only single failures are taken into consideration in the analysis and also indications are 
binary, therefore only yield a pass or fail whereas in reality they could be any value. 
2.6.3 FTA 
The notion of automating FM EA for fault analysis on hydraulic system circuits was 
described by Atkinson et al. in [46,47]. Hogan et al. [53] use this program as a basis 
to automate the output of FTA. At the start of the analysis each possible failure in the 
system is assessed and a FMEA generated listing the local and global effects of the given 
fault. In order to generate an automated FTA a top level event is indicated for the system 
and then each FMEA containing this effect is investigated. Any faults found to have this 
effect are potentially the cause of the top level event in the system. 
Multiple failures can be considered by injecting each failure separately into the system to 
allow the effect of each fault to be indicated. The problem with this strategy is that in 
some cases two failures input together may give different results to the same two failures 
input separately. The fault trees are analysed and a list of cut sets are obtained to indicate 
the potential failure causes for the system. The automated fault trees produced from the 
system do not contain success states and there is no provision for checking the potential 
causes of failure against working components. 
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Papadopoulos presents a model for on-line monitoring and diagnosis using fault trees to 
determine the causes of system failure [54-56]. The model consists of two parts, the first 
being a structural model that is developed from system information including the physical 
structure of the system, any subsystems present and the types of components within the 
system, their functions and possible failures. The second part of the model monitors the 
behaviour and contains knowledge of expected operations for the system and its subsystems. 
The model can identify any transitions made to deviated states in the system operation. 
Abnormalities are obtained through a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. Identified 
failure transitions from the behavioural model correspond to the top events in the fault 
trees that are developed using the structural information. The model records the sequence 
in which failures happen and accounts for failures in their chronological order of occurrence 
within the fault trees. 
NOT logic is excluded from the fault trees; therefore only component failures are taken into 
account to obtain a system diagnosis. As a result, some faults that occur simultaneously 
have required conflicting remedial procedures. This has been shown to cause unpredictable 
and potentially hazardous effects [56]. The work also indicated the need for better validation 
of the readings. 
The use of fuzzy set theory as a diagnostic tool has been investigated by Gmytrasiewicz et 
al. [57]. Component failures within a system are diagnosed using the observed behaviour 
of 'fuzzy' or uncertain symptom information, which is stored in a fault tree structure. All 
gates within the fault tree are treated as symptoms and basic events are prospective failure 
modes. The method is divided into two parts. In the first part failure modes are diagnosed 
using causal reasoning - in order to establish the relationship between the cause of a failure 
and its effect - in the form of minimal cut sets that are obtained from the fault trees. Fuzzy 
set theory and fuzzy logic are used in order to account for any uncertainties or 'fuzziness' 
in measured symptoms from the system thus allowing for possible imprecision. Fault trees 
are generated for the observed system symptoms and an algorithm has been developed for 
diagnosing the failures that are represented by these trees. 
In the second part, the actual failed components are identified based on the diagnosed 
failure modes using the list of possibilities obtained from the first part of the analysis. 
These are acquired by solving a series of equations generated from information in the first 
part of the analysis in order to relate the failure mode to the cause. The main limitation to 
this work is that the fault trees used only contain AND and 0 R logic, therefore there is no 
consideration of checking for consistency. The method has been tested on small systems, 
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so further work involves testing the method on more complex examples. 
Yangping et al. [58] have developed a method that utilises genetic algorithms, classical 
probability and characteristic fault diagnosis procedures for the diagnosis of multiple faults 
in nuclear power plants using the knowledge base of a system. Genetic algorithms are 
search routines based on Darwin's idea of 'survival of the fittest' [59]. They work with a 
population or 'colony' of candidate solutions or 'chromosomes' that are typically encoded 
as binary strings. The search is performed using a fitness function based around the actual 
function of the problem. It attempts to simulate the rules of the biological evolutionary 
process using reproduction (natural selection), crossover and mutation; the 3 main genetic 
operators within the algorithm. 
A colony of strings are created in order to simulate the set of possible faulty component 
states within the system for a given set of sensor signals. The length of every string in the 
analysis is equal to the number of possible system failures, with 'O's representing working 
components and 'l's depicting failed components. The knowledge base is constructed from 
a combination of FTA and event tree analysis that considers only component failures. This 
information is used to calculate the fitness of each string and indicates how well each fits 
to the given system status. Diagnosis is terminated when either the pre-determined fitness 
value of a string is met, or the difference between the average fitness in several continuous 
colonies and the difference of strings in every colony is less than the pre-determined value. 
Therefore either the diagnosis is obtained or a number of possibilities within a certain 
range are obtained and need further analysis in order to get an overall result. There are 
a number of limitations with the described method. Genetic search is slow in obtaining 
solutions for large and complex systems and there can be problems determining when a 
global rather than a local diagnosis has been obtained. The initial strings are produced 
randomly, therefore if the character of a string is bad then this will be difficult to improve 
and obtain the actual failure cause. Work also needs to be carried out into obtaining a 
more effective fitness function for the system. 
2.6.4 Digraphs and SDGs 
Iri et al. [60] proposed a method for obtaining faults in chemical processing plants by 
applying graph theory for the diagnosis of single failures using SDGs to model system 
behaviour. The approach uses actual sensor readings obtained, which are compared to 
that expected in the system in order to indicate any deviations. The overall state of the 
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system is determined by the state of each variable within it. These can be in one of 
three categories: high, normal and low that are defined by '+', '0' and '-' respectively. 
Therefore the system state is identified by a set of signs obtained from each state that are 
represented by nodes in the SDGs. The approach generates a cause-effect graph from the 
system SDG that contains nodes representing abnormal behaviour and edges illustrating 
fault propagation. Any nodes from the SDG exhibiting normal behaviour are excluded from 
the cause-effect graph. Process variables within the SDG are monitored and any deviations 
lead to the creation of the graph and then the potential causes of failure are determined 
through pattern propagation. 
The approach was found to effectively identify single failures with single origins. The 
assumption of having systems that contain only single failures is however unrealistic. 
Multiple failures, although less likely than single failures, may still occur in systems. There 
could also be numerous areas of a system that indicate a deviation from a single fault, so 
this may also need to be taken into consideration. The research was extended by Iri et al. 
to take into consideration failed and working nodes in the failure identification [61] because 
it was found that eliminating the working nodes lead to a loss of information in some cases. 
This was carried out by developing an SDG with a partial pattern (signs are only placed on 
nodes where required). Within the analysis it has been assumed that there is only a single 
origin of system failure. 
A SDG based algorithm for diagnosing multiple faults III systems was developed by 
Vedam and Venkatasubramanian [62]. A model of expected behaviour is determined by 
inspecting the system during normal operation. Failures can then be obtained through the 
identification of deviated process variables, for instance too much or too little mass flow 
at a certain point in the system. Single fault diagnosis is performed by identifying the 
propagations made through the process variables in the SDG. The strategy was modified 
to take into consideration multiple failures by identifying combinations of root nodes that 
lead to abnormal behaviour. A list of cut sets are obtained containing all possible failure 
outcomes. These are minimised so that each potential failure cause contains the smallest 
number of component failures such that if they all occur then so does the failure symptom. 
Analysis has been found to be computationally intensive and therefore multiple faults are 
explored only on an 'as needed basis' in order to reduce this. There is a problem of poor 
outcomes in certain system conditions, along with the identification of failures that cause 
conflicting arguments, which strengthens the need of some kind of consistency checking 
mechanism. 
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The directed graph or 'digraph' is similar to the SDG, but it uses numbers as well as 
signs on the arcs to indicate whether the cause or effect change is in the same or opposite 
directions respectively, and there are no signs associated with the actual nodes. Consider 
the example digraph shown in Figure 2.7. Edges in the digraph are depicted as lines and 
nodes as circles [63,64]. 
-1: Condition B 
ec:~1 ~ 
0: Condition A 
Figure 2.7: A simple digraph 
Each node is labelled with the process variable and location number. The process variables 
in Figure 2.7 are mass flow rate at locations 1 and 2. Other possible process variables 
include pressure, temperature and sensor signals that can be represented by P, T and S 
respectively. Ml is an independent variable, and M2 is a dependent variable since the 
arrows on each edge are pointing from Ml to M2. 
Each edge in the digraph is given a number indicating its associated gain that defines the 
relationship between two variables. The gain is signified using five numerical values: + 10, 
+1, 0, -1, and -10. These represent the discrete categories strong high, moderate high, 
null, moderate low and strong low respectively. An edge that only consists of a number 
represents the relationship between two process variables that is usually true. Referring to 
Figure 2.7 the edge that has a gain of + 1 is the normal edge. The other two edges are 
conditional, which indicates that each of these relationships can be true when the given 
condition is satisfied. 
The same five discrete values +10, +1, 0, -1, and -10 are also used to indicate disturbances 
or failures in the process variables. A disturbance of zero shows that a variable has yielded 
its normal expected value. A value of 1 indicates a moderate disturbance in the system that 
can be controlled, and the sign determines whether this is above or below that expected. 
Larger disturbances are represented by an absolute value of 10 and cannot be put right 
by the system itself. A digraph can therefore be constructed to show the normal system 
function and the impact component failures and deviations from inputs can have. 
In general a deviation in the dependent process variable caused by a deviation in the 
independent one is obtained by multiplying the disturbance from the independent variable 
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by the gain. Referring to Figure 2.7, if the disturbance at M1 is +1, then M2 will also 
have a +1 deviation. The maximum deviation that can occur has an absolute value of 10, 
therefore if the gain was +10 and M1 +10 then this can only result in +10 at M2 also. 
Ulerich and Powers [65] have developed a method for on-line hazard aversion and fault 
diagnosis for use in chemical process using digraphs and fault trees. A digraph model of 
the system is developed and used to generate fault trees to analyse the system faults. FTA is 
a reputable technique for use in the safety and reliability assessment of engineering systems. 
However, if two engineers were given the same system and undesired event then it would be 
most likely that they develop fault tree, comprising of different structures. Developing fault 
trees from digraphs provides an intermediate step that enables a more structured approach 
to be taken. 
A digraph model is developed for the system. From this a causal fault tree describing the 
given identified disturbance is generated. This tree is expanded for fault detection to take 
into consideration consistency by adding verification gates to basic events to make sure that 
certain system conditions are met in order for the given event to possibly exist. Potential 
causes of failure are then obtained from the analysis in the form of a list of cut sets. The 
most likely cause is determined using real-time data. The fault trees may verify that certain 
system conditions are met, but they do not take into consideration components that are 
working successfully within the system. Further work is also required to investigate how 
the approach would scale to a larger system example. 
Fault diagnosis using digraphs to model error propagation has been considered by Chessa 
and Santi [66] for systems containing single or multiple failures. A model of normal system 
behaviour is described by a set of sensor readings and compared to those actually occurring 
in order to indicate the presence of failure within the system. Sensors actively sound an 
alarm when an abnormal condition is indicated and remain silent when there is no failure at 
that particular location. This information is then used to analyse the digraph and obtain a 
set of potential failure sources, which are then tested in order to ascertain the actual failure 
cause. 
Two separate algorithms were investigated: D-FAULTS and S-DIAG. Each algorithm 
searches the digraph for the location of the deviated sensors. The D-FAULTS algorithm 
could be used to diagnose a maximum of two failures at the same time within a system. 
Multiple failures could be identified by S-DIAG, which is a sequential diagnosis algorithm, 
but a drawback with this method is the time taken to obtain a diagnosis and repair the 
damage. This technique was further developed by Tu and Pattipati [67] to diagnose multiple 
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failures in systems through the use of sensor alarms, but the method does not take into 
consideration faults that immediately affect the status of a system when they occur. System 
redundancy is also not addressed in the analysis. 
The issue of diagnosing multiple failures in systems using digraphs is also addressed by 
Iverson and Patterson-Hine [68]. The use of an AND gate within the digraphs as depicted 
in Figure 2.8 enables both single and multiple failures to be identified and also provides a 
means of modelling system redundancy. Each AND gate can only have two inputs and one 
output, therefore to identify more than two failures multiple gates must be used. 
The method uses a model of expected behaviour to highlight any deviations or failures at 
process variables (nodes). The digraph nodes are 'marked' true or false to identify whether 
a failure at that node has occurred. A marked deviation propagates through the digraph 
to the node's adjacent edges and determines other nodes that have failed as a result of the 
failure. If a node that is already marked is found the search ceases. A problem identified 
with this method is the computational time taken to identify the failures. 
Figure 2.8: A digraph AND gate 
Most recent investigations into developing a digraph fault diagnostic strategy have been 
carried out by Kelly and Bartlett [69,70]. The method developed uses digraphs to diagnose 
single and multiple faults in systems from observed sensor deviations. A digraph model is 
generated in which nodes representing system parameters are linked together with arcs that 
indicate the relationships between the nodes. System diagnosis is performed by comparing 
a set of sensor readings of actual behaviour to that expected in order to highlight any 
deviations. Failures are then obtained by back-tracing through the digraph. The method 
has been successfully applied to a fuel rig system. Investigations have yet to consider system 
redundancy and the possibility of improving results by increasing the number of sensors 
used in the analysis in order to 'home in' on more probable failures. 
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2.7 Summary of Model-Based Diagnostic Systems 
• Model-based reasoning is a deductive process that uses a model of system behaviour 
to indicate how it should be working. Information regarding the system is obtained 
from the knowledge base for use in developing the model. 
• The model of system behaviour is created and compared with that actually observed 
to highlight any abnormal activities. Any difference between the two indicates that 
the system has deviated from its normal mode of operation, implying that a failure 
of some kind has occurred. 
• In some cases models can be automatically generated for fault detection. 
• A model-based method can take into consideration what is occurring in the system 
as a whole rather than just through one test. 
• The deviations obtained can provide a starting point as to the location and diagnosis 
of the failure. 
2.8 Advantages of Model-Based Diagnostic Systems 
• Information for a model can be supplied from the knowledge base built up from the 
system design or modified from existing data, therefore making the model easy and 
efficient to build. 
• Model-based techniques use what is expected out of the system during its normal 
operation. It therefore utilises knowledge of the overall system in order to find out 
any deviations. 
2.9 Disadvantages of Model-Based Diagnostic Systems 
• Models are dependent on the data available from the system knowledge base and 
description. However, this information has become more accessible through the use 
of computers in the system development and during the design and manufacturing 
process stages. 
• The model would have to be updated in the event of a modification in the system. 
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• In the majority of cases a model will not be able to be reused on a new system. 
• There will always be minor discrepancies between the model and the physical system 
being diagnosed, although most of these will not cause any large effect on the results. 
• It may be difficult to provide coverage of all types of fault within a system, but this 
will be dependent upon the structure. 
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Fault Tree Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
However reliable a system is made it is likely to experience a failure of some kind during its 
life cycle. FTA is a deductive or 'backward' analysis technique that uses a 'what can cause 
this' approach in order to identify the causes of a system failure mode. The technique is 
widely used in the safety and reliability assessment of systems. The main objectives in the 
analysis procedure are to determine the possible causes of a specified system failure mode 
and then assess if the risk of failure is small enough to achieve an acceptable level of safety. 
A system can be comprised of numerous components, each of which will at some point play 
a key part in its function. These components may also experience failure. A fault tree can 
symbolically represent the potential component failure events or events performed by an 
operator that could result in a particular system failure mode. This system failure mode 
is the 'TOP event', located at the top of the fault tree diagram, with branches below it 
leading to the possible causes of this undesired event. The probability for the occurrence of 
the TOP event may then be calculated if the probabilities for the component failure events 
are known. There may be more than one failure mode in a system, therefore a fault tree 
would need to be drawn for each. 
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3.2 Fault 'free Background 
The first significant research into the reliability of systems was brought about by the aircraft 
industry wanting to improve the reliability of planes after the First World War. Initial 
investigations used trial and error techniques. Later developments were able to make use of 
data collected in order to make improvements and develop the reliability techniques used 
today. 
The FTA concept was first introduced by H. Watson at Bell Telephone Laboratories in 
the early 1960s for use on the Minuteman missile system [71 J. This was further developed 
during the 1960s and 1970s and is now one of the most widely used reliability modelling 
techniques. 
3.3 Fault 'free Symbols 
Fault tree diagrams are made up of 'gates' and 'events'. The two main types of event are 
intermediate and basic events. Each event in a fault tree is representative of an element of 
a system that can change state. Gates allow or restrict the passage of fault logic up through 
a fault tree, and indicate the causal relationships between the events that eventually lead 
to the occurrence of the top event. 
Basic events in a fault tree are those where the limit of resolution has been reached, therefore 
the branch does not need to be developed any further. A basic event is depicted using a 
circle as shown in Table 3.1. Data for these events can used to formulate probabilities 
for the quantitative analysis of the fault tree. Another type of event is the house event, 
represented by a house symbol. These have probabilities of either 0 or 1, therefore can 
be used to turn parts of fault trees on and off in order to model two state events that do 
or do not occur. Intermediate events are represented in the fault trees using rectangles. 
This type of event can be further developed by a logic gate to other lower resolution events 
depending on causal relations. All event symbols are shown in Table 3.1. 
The transfer in and out symbols are used to indicate the development of that particular 
part of the fault tree somewhere else in the diagram or on another page. This enables large 
fault trees to be broken down into sub-trees. 
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Event Symbol Event Name and Meaning 
6 Basic Event 
6 House Event 
9 Intermediate Event (developed further by agate) 
~ TI Transfer In and Out Symbols 
Table 3.1: Event symbols in fault trees 
A 'gate' is a logical operator that allows or restricts the passage of logic through a tree. The 
main types of gate in FTA are 'AND', 'OR' and 'NOT', shown in Table 3.2. These are used 
to combine events in the same way as the Boolean operators 'Intersection', 'Union' and 
'Complementation' respectively. The 'VOTE' gate is another example gate. This allows 
the output event to occur if at least k inputs out of n occur and can reduce the overall size 
of the fault tree. 
Gate Symbol Gate Name Casual Relation 
0 AND The output event occurs if all of the input events occur. The number of inputs are 2:: 2. 
Q OR The output event occurs if at least one of the input events occurs. The number of inputs are 2:: 2. 
* 
NOT The output event occurs if the input event does not 
occur. 
@ kin The output event occurs if at least k of the n input VOTE events occur. The number of inputs are 2:: 3. 
Table 3.2: Main gate symbols in fault trees 
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3.4 Fault Tree Construction 
The first step in the construction of a fault tree once information about components in the 
system has been gathered is to identify the system failure mode. If there can be more than 
one failure mode in a system then fault trees must be constructed for each. The specific 
system failure mode or 'top event' of the fault tree is defined and developed using branches 
leading to intermediate events. These intermediate events are redefined in terms of lower 
resolution events until all of the branches have been terminated by a basic event. 
4--- Top Event 
4--- ORGm 
4--- Intermediate Event 
4---ANDGa", 
Basic Even!: 
Figure 3.1: An example fault tree structure for the top event 'No water out of valve' 
An example fault tree structure is shown in Figure 3.1 for the top event 'No water out 
of valve' for a simple system containing a tank, valve, pipe and water supply. The causal 
relationships in this fault tree are represented by three OR gates and an AND gate. The 
top event can occur either because the 'valve fails closed', resulting in a basic event, or 
because there is no water available at the valve, which is an intermediate event that can be 
developed further. Water may not be available because either it cannot pass through the 
pipe, or there is no water available to be drawn from the tank. 'Water cannot pass through 
the pipe' could be caused by the pipe being fractured or blocked. These are basic events 
that terminate the logical development. Finally, water may not be available because the 
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tank has ruptured, AND there is no water available from an alternative main supply, which 
feeds the system. 
There are two types of fault trees that can be constructed for analysis; coherent and non-
coherent. A coherent fault tree is constructed from AND and OR logic, therefore only 
considers basic component failure events. A non-coherent fault tree expands this allowing 
the use of NOT logic, therefore the existence of both component failure and success events 
are taken into account. 
Two types of analysis can be performed once a fault tree diagram has been constructed, 
these being 'qualitative' and 'quantitative'. Qualitative analysis is used to find all the 
possible causes of system failure by obtaining the basic component failure events that could 
contribute to the occurrence of the top event. Quantitative analysis is used to predict a 
system's failure parameters relating to both the availability and reliability in terms of the 
basic event failure probabilities. 
3.5 Qualitative Analysis 
3.5.1 Obtaining Minimal Cut Sets of Coherent Fault 'frees 
Qualitative analysis of a coherent fault tree can be used to logically express a system failure 
mode in terms of its basic component failure events. A potential cause of system failure 
can consist of an individual component failure event or a combination of failures. These 
can be defined as a 'cut set': 
A cut set is a list of component failures such that if they all occur then the top event also 
occurs. 
Large systems tend to be very complex, so in general they will produce a very large number 
of cut sets. Some of these, however, may contain events that are not necessary to cause the 
system failure mode. For example, the cut set {C, D} would cause system failure if both 
basic events C and D were to occur. However, if there was another cut set {Cl, then only 
the occurrence of C would be required to cause system failure, and whether D has failed or 
not would become irrelevant. This leads to the notion of a 'minimal cut set': 
A minimal cut set is the smallest list of component failures such that if they all occur then 
the top event also occurs. 
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The order of a minimal cut set is the number of basic component failure events contained 
within the set. In general the lower order minimal cut sets are more likely to contribute to 
causing system failure. If two fault trees produce the same minimal cut sets then they are 
'logically equivalent'. 
The top event, T, of a fault tree can be expressed in terms of its minimal cut sets: 
(3.1) 
where, Ci (i = 1, ... , ne) are the minimal cut sets for the top event and the '+' represents 
logical OR. 
Each minimal cut set can be made up of one or more basic component failure events. 
Therefore in general, a minimal cut set of order k can be expressed as: 
(3.2) 
where, Xi (i = 1, ... , k) are the basic component failure events and the '.' is representative 
of logical AND. 
Consider the following logical expression for the top event, T, 
T=A+B+C.D. (3.3) 
There are three minimal cut sets obtained for this top event; two of order one, {A} and 
{B}, and {C, D}, which represents a combination of two failures. 
3.5.1.1 Boolean Laws of Algebra 
Minimal cut sets of a fault tree can be obtained by converting the logical expression for 
the top event, T, into its disjunctive normal or 'minimal sum-of-products' form [29]. This 
can be calculated using either the 'top-down' or the 'bottom-up' approaches for fault tree 
evaluation. These differ in where the expansion process is begun on a fault tree. 
The approach most commonly used to obtain minimal cut sets is 'top-down'. The process 
begins at the top of the fault tree. This event is expanded by substituting in the Boolean 
events that appear lower down the tree until the expression only contains basic events. 
Another approach that can be used to obtain minimal cut sets is 'bottom-up'. This approach 
uses the same substitution, expansion and reduction methods as in 'top-down', but in this 
case the process begins at the bottom of the fault tree and works up towards the top event. 
Only equations containing basic events are substituted into each gate. 
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Boolean laws of algebra are used to remove any redundancies from the expression so that 
it ends up in its simplified minimal form. Note that AND is represented by the product 
symbol '.' and OR by the summation sign '+'. (These are also equivalent to the union and 
intersection operations). 
1. Commutative Laws: 
2. Associative Laws: 
3. Distributive Laws: 
4. Identities: 
5. Idempotent Laws: 
6. Absorption Laws: 
A+B - B+A 
A.B 
- B.A 
(A+B) +C - A+ (B+C) 
(A.B).C A.(B.C) 
A.(B+C) A.B+A.C 
A + (B.C) (A + B).(A + C) 
A+l - 1 
A+O - A 
A.l 
- A 
A.O 
- 0 
A+A - A 
A.A A 
A+A.B A 
A.(A+B) - A 
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(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
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7. Complement at ion: 
A+A - 1 
A.A 
- 0 
(A) A 
8. De Morgan's Laws: 
A.B - (A+B) 
(A. B) A+B 
3.5.1.2 Example of Obtaining Minimal Cut Sets 
Qualitative Analysis 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
The top-down approach is now illustrated using the fault tree in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: An example coherent fault tree 
The process begins by starting at the top gate, 'TOP' in the fault tree. This is an OR gate 
with two inputs - two gates G1 and G2. 
The top event, TOP, can be expressed as: 
TOP = G1 +G2. (3.23) 
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Gates G1 and G2 can be written as: 
G1 F + G, 
G2 - G3.E.G4. 
These can be substituted into the top event from Equation 3.23: 
TOP = F + G + G3.E.G4. (3.24) 
Gates G3 and G4 can be written as: 
G3 G5 + G6, 
G4 - A + B. 
Therefore the top event, TOP in Equation 3.23 becomes: 
TOP = F+ G + (G5 + G6) .E. (A+ B). (3.25) 
Gates G5 and G6 can be written as: 
G5 B + C, 
G6 A + C. 
Substituting these into the top event gate in Equation 3.23 gives, 
TOP = F + G + ((B + C) + (A + C)) .E. (A + B). (3.26) 
Removing the brackets in the summations gives: 
TOP = F + G + (B + C + A + C) .E. (A + B). (3.27) 
Expanding Equation 3.27 gives, 
TOP = F+G+B.E.A+C.E.A+A.E.A+C.E.A+B.E.B+C.E.B+A.E.B+C.E.B. (3.28) 
Using the Idempotent Laws, A + A = A and A.A = A (Equations 3.14 and 3.15), the 
expression for TOP can be simplified to: 
TOP = F + G + B.E.A + C.E.A + E.A + B.E + C.E.B + A.E.B. (3.29) 
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Now, using the Associative Law, A. (B.C) = (A.B).C (Equation 3.7) and also the 
Absorption Law, A + A.B = A (Equation 3.16) gives, 
TOP = F + G + A.E + B.E. (3.30) 
This is the minimal disjunctive normal or 'sum-of-products' form. There are four minimal 
cut sets obtained, two of order one and two of order two. These are {F}, {G}, {A, E} 
and {B, E}. 
3.5.2 Use of NOT Logic 
The fundamental types of gate used in FTA are 'AND', 'OR' and 'NOT'. A fault tree is 
said to be non-coherent if NOT logic is used in the structure. A system failure mode in this 
case can consist of individual basic component failure or working events, or a combination 
of these events. These can be defined as an implicant set: 
An implicant set is a list of component failures and working states such that if they all occur 
then the top event also occurs. 
A prime implicant set contains a list of events that are both sufficient and necessary to 
cause the top event: 
A prime implicant set is the smallest list of component failures and working states such that 
if they all occur then the top event also occurs. 
The use of NOT logic in fault trees for system quantification can increase the complexity of 
the analysis and provide only a small amount of extra information about system behaviour. 
Also, from a logical point of view, the implication is that a working component could 
contribute to the cause of system failure, which is an irrational argument. A system could 
be functioning but contain one or more component(s) that have failed. The argument is 
that repairing this/these component(s) could cause the system to fail. There are therefore 
a number of problems when using NOT logic in an analysis. 
However, a system that can perform more than one task can benefit from the use of NOT 
logic to include the working states of components, as shown in Andrews [72]. Its use is also 
important in Event Tree Analysis [73] and since it provides a more complete description of 
the causes of system failure it is expected to play an important role in the use of fault trees 
for diagnostic purposes. 
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3.5.3 Evaluating Prime Implicants of Non-Coherent Fault Trees 
3.5.3.1 Obtaining Prime ImpJicants 
The first step in evaluating a non-coherent fault tree is to identify its prime implicants. 
These can be obtained by restructuring the fault tree using De Morgan's Laws (see 
Equations 3.21 and 3.22) so that any NOT logic is pushed down the tree resulting in 
complemented basic events. Consider the non-coherent fault tree shown in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3: An example non-coherent fault tree 
De Morgan's Laws can be applied to gate G3 in Figure 3.3 to give, A + B = A.B. The 
equivalent fault tree obtained using De Morgan's Laws is shown in Figure 3.4: 
Figure 3.4: Equivalent non-coherent fault tree to that in Figure 3.3 
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The top-down approach can now be applied to the fault tree in Figure 3.4. The top event 
'TOP' can be expressed as: 
TOP = G1 +G2. 
Gates G1 and G2 can be re-written as: 
G1 G3.O (G3 = A.B) 
G1 
- A.B.G 
G2 
- G4+G5 (G4 = A.D) 
(G5 = E.F) 
G2 = A.D + E.F. 
Therefore, the top event TOP is: 
TOP = A.B.O + A.D + E.F. (3.31) 
Since this is in minimal form three prime implicant sets - {A, B, G}, {A, D} and {E, F} -
can be identified. 
3.5.3.2 The Consensus Law 
The expression for the top event given by Equation 3.31 has not, however, identified all of 
the possible prime implicant sets for this example. The top event could also be caused by 
component B not failing along with components C and D failing without considering the 
state of component A. This therefore gives a fourth prime implicant for this example. The 
additional possibility can be obtained using the Consensus Law: 
XY + X Z = XY + X Z + Y z. (3.32) 
Applying the Consensus Law to the example in Figure 3.4, the first prime implicant in 
the top event structure (see Equation 3.31) contains A and the second contains A. The 
Consensus Law indicates that regardless of the state of A the top event could occur if 
B.G.D occurs. Therefore the consensus of A.B.G + A.D is B.G.D. The top event structure 
in Equation 3.31 can now be written as: 
TOP = A.B.G + A.D + E.F + B.G.D. (3.33) 
The Consensus Law should be applied to each pair of prime implicants containing a normal 
and negated state for the same basic component. There are no other such cases in this 
particular example. This law can be applied easily to small fault trees but application can 
become very complex when dealing with large fault trees. 
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3.5.3.3 The Coherent Approximation 
Analysis of a non-coherent fault tree will in general produce more prime implicants than 
the number of minimal cut sets identified for the equivalent coherent fault tree. Also, the 
prime implicants obtained are normally of a higher order than for minimal cut sets as both 
component failure and working states are taken into consideration. This therefore can make 
the analysis of a non-coherent fault tree a more complex process and significantly heavy on 
computer processing power. 
In order to reduce the complexity of the problem a coherent approximation can be taken 
during qualitative analysis of a system by assuming that any of the working states in the 
prime implicants are true (so have a probability of one). Any working states from the 
prime implicants can therefore be removed resulting in a list of cut sets. These can then be 
minimised to give a list of the failure events that cause the top event. Therefore a coherent 
approximation can be obtained for the top event in the example in Figure 3.4: 
TOP A.B.G + A.D + E.F + B.G.D, 
TOP ~ G+A.D+E.F+G.D, 
TOP ~ G+A.D+E.F. 
(removing working states) 
( minimising) 
Three minimal cut sets are obtained from the analysis after taking the coherent 
approximation and using Boolean reduction: {G}, {A,D} and {E,F}. These are the 
potential causes of failure for the top event. In large fault trees the usage of the coherent 
approximation reduces the logic expression. 
Notice that in performing the coherent approximation the extra term identified from the 
Consensus Law disappears from the analysis once Boolean reduction has taken place on the 
cut sets. Only the component failure events obtained from the top event will be required 
for the purpose of this study. Therefore the Consensus Law will not be used in any further 
work carried out. 
3.6 Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative analysis is used to predict a systems failure parameters relating to both the 
availability and reliability in terms of the basic event failure probabilities. The probability 
and frequency for a top event is used along with the analysis of component or minimal cut 
set importance in order to gain a greater understanding of the system. 
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The original methodology for fault tree quantification is Kinetic Tree Theory developed by 
Vesely [74]. It allows time-dependent analysis in system evaluation and plays a key part 
in many of the commercial FTA packages. There are however a number of limitations in 
Kinetic Tree Theory resulting in the use of approximations in the analysis of top event 
quantification. 
3.6.1 Maintenance Policies 
The way a component is maintained can have a significant impact on its unavailability. 
Three different types of maintenance policy - no repair, unscheduled maintenance and 
scheduled maintenance - are discussed in the following sections. 
3.6.1.1 No Repair 
In this case repairs cannot be carried out and once a component is failed it will remain so. 
This type of situation is appropriate for remote controlled systems such as satellites, and 
on 'one-shot' machines, for example spacecraft. 
For constant failure rate devices the system unavailability, QSys(t) is defined as: 
QSys(t) = F(t) = 1 - e-"t, (3.34) 
where oX is the conditional failure rate (the probability that a component fails per unit time 
at t given that it was working at time t and at t = 0). As time t increases the system 
unavailability tends to 1 (t->oo, QSys(t)->1). 
3.6.1.2 Unscheduled Maintenance 
Repairs in this case are carried out as soon as a failure is detected in the system. 
Unscheduled maintenance is used for components that are continuously being monitored 
or on systems where a failure will become apparent because it causes a noticeable change 
in how the system is functioning. The time to repair a failure in this case does not include 
detection time. 
For constant failure and repair rate devices, 
(3.35) 
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For unscheduled maintenance, as t->oo, QSys(t)-> '\~v. 
3.6.1.3 Scheduled Maintenance 
Maintenance or inspection takes place at fixed, scheduled time intervals. This type of 
maintenance is used in standby systems or safety protection systems that are not operated 
all the time. A failure in the system will not become apparent until a maintenance inspection 
is carried out. The time a system is shut down during scheduled maintenance will be 
dependent upon whether any failures are detected and if so how much time is required to 
repair it. 
The unavailability of the system is: 
QSys(t) = 1 - e-,\[t-(n-l)OJ, (3.36) 
where, (n - 1)0 ::; t ::; nO, 0 is the inspection interval and n = 1,2, ... , is the number of 
inspections. The system is inspected at intervals of 0 time units. 
The average unavailability is: 
QAV=A G+T), (3.37) 
where the inspection period is usually greater than the mean repair time, 0 > > T. 
3.6.2 Top Event Probability 
The probability of the top event, T, is also known as the system unavailability, QSys(t). 
There are several methods that can be used to calculate the top event probability of a fault 
tree. These include the Structure Function Method [29], Shannon's Theorem [75] and the 
Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion Principle. The inclusion-exclusion expansion principle will 
be described here. 
3.6.2.1 The Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion Principle 
The inclusion-exclusion expansion principle is the method utilised for calculating the top 
event probability. This approach may be used on fault trees that contain repeated events 
and can be directly obtained from the minimal cut sets. The top event in a fault tree will 
occur if at least one of the minimal cut sets exist. 
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Consider a fault tree that has ne minimal cut sets Ci , where i = 1, ... , ne. The top event, 
T, in the fault tree occurs if at least one minimal cut set occurs. Therefore: 
(3.38) 
Therefore using Equation 3.38 the top event probability is: 
P(T) = P(C! + C2 + ... + CnJ = P (Q Ci) = QSys(t). (3.39) 
Expanding this result gives the inclusion-exclusion expansion: 
ne ne i-1 
P(T) = LP(Ci) - LLP(CinCj ) + ... + (-l)n,-!p(c! nC2 n ... nCnJ. (3.40) 
i=l 1=2 j=l 
If this expansion is evaluated fully it will give the exact probability of the top event. 
For example, consider the following top event, TOP, constructed from four components 
a,b,c,d: 
TOP=e+~+~, (3.41) 
C, C, C3 
where, Ch C2 and C3 are minimal cut sets. The top event, TOP, is given in Equation 3.41. 
The probability of the top event occurring can be written as: 
QSys(t) = P(TOP) = P(a.b + a.c + c.d). (3.42) 
Using the inclusion-exclusion expansion in Equation 3.40 and letting q. = qb = qc = qd = 
0.1, gives: 
QSys(t) - [P(a.b) + P(a.c) + P(c.d)]- [P(a.b.c) + P(a.b.c.d) + P(a.c.d)] 
.. ' .. ' 
..... v 
FirstTerm 
+ [P(a.b.c.d)], 
~
ThirdTerm 
SecondTerm 
- [q.qb + q.qc + qeqd]- [qa%qe + q.qbqcqd + q.qcqd] + [q.qbqcqd] , 
- [0.01 + 0.01 + 0.01]- [0.001 + 0.0001 + 0.001] + 0.0001, 
- 0.03 - 0.0021 + 0.0001, 
0.028. 
(3.43) 
Even though the inclusion-exclusion expansion yields an exact result for the system 
unavailability, evaluating each term can be very computationally intensive. The example 
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shown contains only three minimal cut sets. Larger examples could have hundreds or 
thousands of minimal cut sets. This would make the evaluation of the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion very heavy on computer processing power, even with the capability of the fastest 
of modern day computers. Therefore, although an accurate result is obtained, evaluation 
of the full expansion is often impractical, so an approximation is required. 
All terms in the expansion play a part in the convergence to the exact probability. However, 
as can be seen from the last but one line of Equation 3.43 each term is less significant 
than the one before it. The method adds odd numbered terms and subtracts even ones. 
Therefore, if the expansion is truncated on an odd number of terms an upper bound for the 
top event probability will be obtained, and on an even number will provide a lower bound. 
3.6.2.2 Approximation Methods 
There are three main approximation methods for calculating the top event probability: the 
lower bound, the rare event upper bound and the minimal cut set upper bound. 
3.6.2.2.1 The Lower Bound 
A lower bound, QLB, for the top event probability is obtained if the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion is terminated after an even number of terms. For example, using the first two 
terms gives: 
ne ne i-I 
LP(C;)- LLP(c;ncj ) ::; QSys(t). (3.44) 
;=1 1=2 j=1 
, 
3.6.2.2.2 The Rare Event Upper Bound 
The rare event upper bound, QRE, for the top event probability contains just the first term 
of the inclusion-exclusion expansion. This is also known as the Rare Event Approximation 
because it is accurate if the component failure events are rare. 
n, 
QSys(t) ::; LP(C;), 
i=l 
'--v--' 
QRE 
(3.45) 
Note also that an odd number of terms in a bound will always result in an upper bound. 
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Therefore, the upper and lower bounds for QSys(t) are: 
ne ne i-I ne L P(Ci ) - L L P(Ci n Cj) ::; QSys(t)::; L P(Ci ). 
i=l 1=2 j=1 
, 
3.6.2.2.3 The Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound 
i=l 
'-v--' 
QRE 
Quantitative Analysis 
(3.46) 
The minimal cut set upper bound, QMCSU, is a more accurate upper bound to the exact 
solution. The top event will occur if at least one minimal cut set occurs. Therefore, 
P(T) P(At least one minimal cut set occurs) 
- 1 - P(No minimal cut set occurs). (3.47) 
In view of the fact that: 
P(No minimal cut set occurs) = P(C1.C2 ••••• CnJ, 
no 
> IT P(Minimal cut set i does not occur). 
i=l 
(Equality occurs when all the minimal cut sets are independent). 
The expression for P(T) in Equation 3.47 can now be written as: 
n, 
P(T) ::; 1 - IT P(Minimal cut set i does not occur). 
i=l 
Therefore, the minimal cut set upper bound, QMCSU, is: 
n, 
Qsys(T) ::; 1 - IT (1- P(Ci )). (3.48) 
i=l 
• 
QMCSU 
3.6.2.2.4 Relationships to the Exact Top Event Probability 
The following expression illustrates the relationship between QSys(t) and its approximations. 
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3.7 Importance Measures 
The contribution made by a component or minimal cut set to cause the top event is defined 
as its importance [29]. The importance analysis of a system is a sensitivity study that can 
identify weak areas, which is especially useful at the design stage. 
Fault tree quantification using a measure of importance can be carried out if there is data 
known for the components. An importance measure will assign each component or minimal 
cut set with a numerical value from 0 to 1, where a 1 indicates the highest contribution to 
failure and 0 no contribution at all. 
Importance measures can either be deterministic or probabilistic. Probabilistic measures 
can be broken down again into those that can be used in system availability (the fraction of 
the total time that a system (or component) is able to perform its required function) 
assessment and those in system reliability (the probability that a system will operate 
without a failure for a stated period of time under specified conditions) assessment. 
3.7.1 Deterministic Measures 
Deterministic measures can be used to assess the importance of a component to a system 
without taking into consideration the probability of occurrence of the component. An 
example of such a measure is the structural measure of importance. More details about 
this measure are given in Andrews and Moss [29]. 
3.7.2 Probabilistic Measures 
Probabilistic measures of importance are in general of more use than deterministic measures 
when assessing practical reliability problems. These measures take into consideration the 
component failure probabilities and intensities, therefore providing more information about 
a system and its components. 
Two examples of measures concerned with system unavailability used for assessing minimal 
cut set importance are the Pussell- Vesely Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance and the 
Fussell- Vesely Measure of Component Importance. Again, more details about these and 
other probabilistic measures can be found in Andrews and Moss [29]. 
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3.7.2.1 Fussell-Vesely Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance 
The Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance, le" ranks the minimal cut sets 
rather than the components and is defined as the probability of occurrence of cut set Ci 
(P(Ci )) given that the system has failed. This measure of importance can be expressed as: 
le = P(Ci ) • 
• QSys(q(t)) (3.49) 
For example, if the minimal cut sets of the system are {a, b} and { c} then the corresponding 
importance is: 
(3.50) 
and, 
(3.51) 
The advantages of using measures of importance are that it will enable the most likely 
cause of failure to be determined depending upon component unavailability in the event 
that there is more than one possible outcome. This will allow investigations to commence 
in the area with the most probable cause rather than having to go through each possible 
outcome to see if that is the failure. 
3.7.2.2 Fussell-Vesely Measure of Component Importance 
The Fussell-Vesely measure of importance, 1;, is defined as the probability of the union of 
the minimal cut sets containing i, given that the system has failed. 
/. _ P(UkliECk Ck) 
• - QSys(q(t)) . 
The results obtained by this importance measure are very similar to the rankings given by 
the criticality measure of component importance [29]. 
Using the same example as for the Fussell-Vesely Measure of Cut Set Importance in 
Section 3.7.2.1 gives: 
(3.52) 
(3.53) 
and, 
(3.54) 
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3.8 Summary 
• The fault tree method enables possible causes of a system failure mode to be presented 
in a failure logic diagram. 
• There are two types of fault trees that can be constructed for analysis; coherent and 
non-coherent. 
1. A coherent fault tree is constructed from AND and OR logic, therefore only 
considers basic component failure events. 
2. A non-coherent fault tree expands on the coherent fault tree construction by 
allowing the use of NOT logic, therefore the existence of both basic component 
failure and success events are taken into account. 
• Two types of analysis can be performed once a fault tree diagram has been 
constructed, these being 'qualitative' and 'quantitative'. 
1. Qualitative analysis is used to find all the possible causes of system failure by 
obtaining the basic component failure and success events that could contribute 
to the occurrence of the top event in the fault tree. 
2. Quantitative analysis is used to predict a system's failure parameters relating 
to both the availability and reliability in terms of the basic event failure 
probabilities. 
• Measures of importance can be used to determine the most likely cause of system 
failure should there be more than one possibility. 
3.9 Reasons for Further Research into a Model-Based 
Strategy Incorporating FTA 
The following are a list of reasons why an approach that utilises the strengths of a model-
based strategy incorporating FTA to perform fault diagnosis forms the basis for the research 
conducted in this project. 
• Systems usually contain sensors and faults give out symptoms. A physical system 
can be used to develop a model of behaviour through the information from the sensor 
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readings as described in Chapter 2. Expected behaviour can be determined along 
with possible deviations, which can be investigated further. 
• Potential multiple failure locations could be identified through a model-based 
technique using the sensor readings within the system. Deviated readings from the 
sensors could potentially indicate a number of different faults. 
• Fault trees can be drawn for each system failure mode as indicated within this 
Chapter. A system failure mode is identified through determining the reading from 
each sensor located within the system. A failure logic diagram can be drawn for each 
deviated reading. These can then be used to indicate the overall system status or 
'scenario' . 
• The fault tree logic is such that it would enable multiple failures (through the use 
of the AND gate) to be identified within a system when analysis is performed for a 
given scenario. 
• The use of non-coherent fault trees, I.e. those that contain AND, OR and NOT 
logic may enable the successful component behaviour in the system to be taken into 
consideration. Any potential causes of failure that conflict with those working as 
expected could then be removed. 
• There may be potential to use the information from sensors that are reading true to 
the system operating mode. These could be included by using success trees for those 
that are working as required. 
• A check of consistency of results obtained against those parts of the system that are 
working is often not present in the methods reviewed. This check would potentially 
allow the non-deviated sensor readings to be included in the analysis. 
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Application of Fault Tree Analysis for 
Fault Detection 
4.1 Introduction 
It is possible that system failures are not the result of one single fault. Therefore the ability 
to diagnose multiple faults is important in a successful fault detection system. This chapter 
introduces four fault tree based schemes for detecting faults or combinations of faults and 
discusses the efficiency of each method [76,77]. The schemes described are applied to a 
simple water tank level control system to demonstrate their features. 
4.2 The Simple Water Tank Level Control System 
The simple water tank system is illustrated in Figure 4.1. It aims to maintain the level of 
water between two pre-determined limits. In the normal operating mode water flows out 
of the system through valve V2. The level control system monitors when water is flowing 
from the tank and then refills it from the main supply by opening valve VI until the desired 
tank level is reached. If the amount of water in the tank reaches an undesired high level 
the control system will open the safety outlet valve V3 allowing the water an alternative 
route out of the tank. The overspill tray, located underneath the tank collects any spillages 
that may occur due to a failure in the system. 
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Figure 4.1: Water tank system 
4.2.1 System Component Description 
The water tank system shown in Figure 4.1 consists of three valves labelled VI, V2 and 
V3, two level sensors represented by 81 and 82, two controllers Cl and C2, and an overspill 
tray denoted TRAY. There are six sections of pipes identified by the labels PI to P6. 
VI is an air-to-open (A/O) inlet valve controlled by Cl. The level sensor 81 detects the 
height of the water in the tank. In the normal operating mode if the water in the tank falls 
below the required level (as indicated by the sensor 81), the controller Cl opens valve VI 
allowing water into the tank. Conversely, if the water in the tank rises to the required level 
then Cl closes VI. 
V2 is a manual (MAN) valve, controlled by an operator in response to demand. Finally 
valve V3 is an air-to-close valve (A/C) that operates as a safety valve controlled by C2. 
Normally this will only become operational when a component failure occurs that causes 
a very high level of water in the tank. A signal from 82 would cause the controller C2 to 
open valve V3 to reduce the level of water in the tank. 
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The overspill tray located beneath the tank collects water if the tank has ruptured, if water 
has leaked out through a crack or hole, or if the water level overflows from the top of the 
tank. 
4.2.2 System Operating Modes 
4.2.2.1 Volume Flow Rate and Overspill Tray Sensor Locations 
The status of the system is determined using measurements provided by flow sensors 
situated next to each of the three valves in the system. The sensors are denoted by VFl, 
VF2 and VF3 for locations at VI, V2 and V3 respectively. These each detect the presence 
or absence of flow of water, which can be denoted as flow 'F', or no flow 'NF'. Initially to 
develop the features of each method it is assumed that these sensors are perfectly reliable. 
A fourth sensor denoted by SPl is located in the overspill tray (TRAY) to indicate if any 
water has escaped from the tank. Its reading is interpreted as water 'W', or no water 'NW'. 
All these sensor locations are called the system observation points. 16 different potential 
scenarios are evident for the system and are listed in Table 4.1. In the early stages of 
analysis it was sufficient to investigate the four fault tree based diagnostic techniques using 
just these sensors. 
Scenario VI V2 V3 TRAY Scenario VI V2 V3 TRAY 
1 F F F W 9 NF F F W 
2 F F F NW 10 NF F F NW 
3 F F NF W 11 NF F NF W 
4 F F NF NW 12 NF F F NW 
5 F NF F W 13 NF NF F W 
6 F NF F NW 14 NF NF NF NW 
7 F NF NF W 15 NF NF NF W 
8 F NF NF NW 16 NF NF NF NW 
Table 4.1: System scenarios 
4.2.2.2 System Operating Assumptions 
A number of assumptions have been made regarding the operation of the system: 
• The system is always initialised with the required level of water in the tank. 
• In the ACTIVE operating mode it can be assumed that the flow rate into the tank 
through VI has the capability to be the same as the flow out at V2 (which varies 
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depending on the height of water in the tank). Therefore the required water level in 
the tank can always be maintained when water is being drawn out of the system in 
this way. 
• The areas of pipes P5 and P6 are larger than those of the other pipes in the system 
so that water can be drained quickly from the tank in the event of the level rising too 
high. Flow out of V3 therefore has the potential to be greater than flow in at VI. 
• When a 'rupture' occurs in the tank (TR) this indicates that the liquid flow through 
the rupture will be greater than the maximum flow into the tank through valve VI. 
Therefore replenishment is not possible. It is assumed that a rupture can only occur 
in the bottom of the tank. 
• Maximum flow into the tank through valve VI will be greater than flow out through a 
'leak' in the system (TL). A leak out of the system is also smaller than the maximum 
flow out at V2. For simplicity it is initially assumed that a leak will occur at the 
bottom of the tank. 
4.2.2.3 ACTIVE and DORMANT Operating Modes 
The system has two operating modes; these being 'ACTIVE' when the operator opens valve 
V2, or 'DORMANT' when V2 is closed. In the ACTIVE operating mode water is taken 
out of the system through valve V2 and the tank is refilled by water coming in through 
valve VI from the main water supply. Water would not exit the system through valve V3 
and there would be no water in the overspill tray. The sensor readings for the system when 
ACTIVE should be those given in scenario 4, Table 4.1. In the DORMANT operating 
mode the system is effectively on standby with all three valves remaining closed and the 
overspill tray empty. This should yield the sensor readings given in scenario 16, Table 4.1. 
The expected sensor readings are those that, under steady-state conditions, represent the 
model of how the system should behave when ACTIVE and DORMANT respectively. Given 
that the system is in either the ACTIVE or DORMANT state any sensor readings that 
deviate from those expected are regarded as being indicative of some fault or faults within 
the system. 
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4.2.2.4 Possible Component Failures 
In order to apply FTA to a system the faults that could occur for each of the system 
components need to be defined. Table 4.2 contains a list of possible component failures and 
their corresponding code. 
System diagnosis is required in both the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes. 
Therefore these must also be represented in the fault trees. ACTIVE signifies the operator 
has attempted to open valve V2. DORMANT is used to indicate that the operator has 
tried to close V2. It should be noted that this is a two mode system and so only one of the 
variables ACTIVE or DORMANT can be true at any time. 
Code Component Failure Code Component Failure 
PiB (1 ~ i ~ 6) Pipe Pi is Blocked CiFH (1 ~ i ~ 2) Controller Ci Fails High 
PiF (1 ~ i ~ 6) Pipe Pi is Fractured CiFL (1 ~ i ~ 2) Controller Ci Fails Low 
ViFC (1 ~ i ~ 3) Valve Vi Fails Closed TR Tank Ruptured 
ViFO (1 ~ i ~ 3) Valve Vi Fails Open TL Tank Leaks 
SiFH (1 ~ i ~ 2) Sensor Si Fails High NWMS No Water from the Main Supply 
SiFL (1 < i ~ 2) Sensor Si Fails Low 
Table 4.2: Potential component failures 
It has been assumed that a component can only be failed in one state at a time during the 
analysis, so for example pipe PI being blocked and fractured at the same time (PlB.PIF) 
is an invalid result. This is similar for the valves, sensors, controllers and the tank. 
A blockage in pipes PI and P2 will stop flow into the system and in pipes P3 to P6 will 
cause no flow out. A fracture in pipe PI will result in no flow into the system, but in P2 
there will be flow in, and similarly a fracture in P4 or P6 will still result in flow out of the 
system. Finally, a fracture in P3 or P5 will cause flow out of the system, but this flow will 
not be registered on the volume flow rate sensors VF2 and VF3 respectively. 
4.3 Sensor Deviation Models 
In the application of FTA to system fault diagnostics a series of failure logic diagrams are 
produced representing the causes of any sensor readings at the observation points. These 
are developed in a fault tree in terms of the just component failure (coherent) and both 
component failure and success (non-coherent) conditions of the system operating state. The 
list of all possible sensor readings for the system is shown in Table 4.3. 
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Abbreviation 
FTVI 
FTV2 
FTV3 
Sensor Readings 
Flow Through Valve Vl 
Flow Through Valve V2 
Flow Through Valve V3 
Abbreviation 
NFTVI 
NFTV2 
WOST 
Table 4.3: Sensor readings 
Sensor Deviation Models 
Sensor Readings 
No Flow Through Valve VI 
No Flow Through Valve V2 
Water in the Overspill Tray 
Two other possible sensor readings for the system are 'no flow through valve V3' and 'no 
water in the overspill tray'. However these sensor readings would occur under normal 
operational conditions (Le. without any failures occurring) in both the ACTIVE and the 
DORMANT operating modes. 
4.3.1 Fault 'free Construction 
Fault trees for the water tank system were initially constructed by hand for each of the 
sensor readings listed in Table 4.3. FaultTree+ is a fault tree software package that enables 
the user to construct and analyse fault tree diagrams [78]. The fault trees developed by 
hand were later verified by inputting them into FaultTree+ and checking the outcomes 
expected with those give from the software package. The construction of the coherent and 
non-coherent fault trees for the sensor reading NFTV2 is now described in Sections 4.3.1.1 
and 4.3.1.2 respectively. 
4.3.1.1 Coherent Fault Trees 
4.3.1.1.1 No Flow Through Valve V2 
The sensor reading 'No flow through valve V2' (NFTV2) is presented in the coherent fault 
tree in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Referring to the water tank system illustrated in Figure 4.1 
NFTV2 can occur either because V2 is closed or if there is no water available at V2. The 
valve could have failed closed (V2FC) or the system may be in a no flow phase and therefore 
in the DORMANT operating mode, represented by a house event, (DORMANT). This can 
be turned 'on' and 'off' (set to true or false) depending on the operational status. 
Water may not be available at V2 either due to a problem stopping the flow out of the 
tank, or because there is no water in the tank. Flow could be restricted out of the tank due 
to a blockage in pipes P3 or P4 (P3B, P4B), or a fracture in P3 (P3F). No flow through V2 
may also be caused by no flow out at valve VI once the level of water in the tank becomes 
empty. This can be caused by a blockage in pipes PI or P2 (PlB, P2B), a fracture in PI 
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(P1F) or no water from the main supply (NWMS). Additionally a failure in the VI control 
loop could occur: VI failing closed (V1FC), Cl failing high (C1FH) or SI reading a high 
water level (SlFH)). 
NFTV2 could also have been caused by there being a flow out at valve V3 that has drained 
the tank. However, if there is no water in the tank for this reason then there would also be 
no flow at V3 indicated at the VF3 sensor. If there is enough water to flow out at V3 then 
there will also be flow out at V2. Hence this potential cause would never become apparent. 
The failures that could cause flow out at V3 are therefore not included in this fault tree. 
Valve V2 Fails No Flow Phas~ 
Closed Through Valve 
V2 
Pipe P3 is 
Blocked or 
Fractured 
Pipe P4 is 
Blocked 
Figure 4.2: Coherent fault tree for no flow through valve V2 
In total there are 13 possible causes of there being no flow at V2, and each of these are of 
single order. One of the results is a no flow phase through valve V2 (when the system is 
DORMANT) resulting in a non-failure. The remaining 12 are potential causes of failure 
for 'no flow through valve V2', and are listed in Table 4.4. 
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No Flow in at 
Valve Vl 
Sensor Deviation Models 
Figure 4.3: Coherent fault tree for no flow through valve V2 - transfer 1 
Number Potential Cause Number Potential Cause 
I) V2FC 7) CIFH 
2) P3B 8) SIFH 
3) P3F 9) PIB 
4) P4B 10) PIF 
5) TR 11) P2B 
6) VIFC 12) NWMS 
Table 4.4: Potential causes of no flow through valve V2 
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4.3.1.1.2 Summary of Coberent Fault Trees 
The coherent fault trees for the remaining sensor readings are shown in Appendix A. 'Flow 
through valve VI', shown in Figures A.l and A.2 can occur either because the valve has 
spuriously opened, or if the level of water is lower than that required (as indicated by sensor 
SI in the tank). This can be as a result of flow through valve V2 or V3, through the tank 
or via a pipe. There are 12 potential causes of failure for this reading, each of first order. 
The only possible potential cause of failure for 'flow through valve V2' is that this valve 
has failed open (V2FO). The other possibility shown in the fault tree in Figure A.3 is that 
the system is in a flow phase and is therefore in the ACTIVE operating mode, represented 
by the house event 'ACTIVE'. 'Flow through valve V3', shown in Figures A.4 to A.5 can 
occur either because the safety valve has spuriously opened, or if the water level is higher 
than required (as indicated by sensor 82 in the tank). A high level of water in the tank 
could be caused by flow in at VI and no flow out at V2. If the system is ACTIVE then 15 
potential causes of failure are obtained, 3 of single order and 9 second order. There are 6 
potential causes if the system is in the DORMANT mode, all of first order. 
The coherent fault tree for 'no flow through valve VI' (NFTVl) is shown in Figures A.6 
and A.7. NFTVl can occur either because there is no water available at VI or if there is 
no flow out of the system at V2. Water may not be able to pass through VI either because 
there is a problem restricting the flow, or because there is no water available. No flow out 
of the system at valve V2 would be the result of either the system being in the DORMANT 
operating mode or a failure causing V2 to remain closed. There are 10 possibilities in this 
case when the system is ACTIVE, all of order 1. Finally, 'water in the overspill tray' can 
occur either through a problem with the actual tank itself or because the level of water 
in the tank is high enough to spill over the sides, as illustrated in Figures A.8 to A.l1. 
Problems with the water tank could have been caused either by a rupture resulting in a 
catastrophic system failure or due to a leak. A high level of water in the tank would be 
caused by flow into the system and no flow out of the system. There are 74 potential 
causes of failure when the system is ACTIVE, 2 of single order and 72 of order 3. In the 
DORMANT operating mode there are 20; 2 of order 1 and 18 of order 2. 
4.3.1.2 Non-Coherent Fault Trees 
The information described. by the coherent fault trees in Section 4.3.1.1 can now be 
expanded to include everything in the system that is known not to have failed. The non-
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coherent fault trees show that the introduction of NOT logic significantly increases the 
amount of information known about the system behaviour. 
4.3.1.2.1 No Flow Through Valve V2 
Causes of the sensor reading 'no flow through valve V2' (NFTV2) are presented in the 
non-coherent fault tree in Figures 4.4 to 4.7. 
Figure 4.4: Non-Coherent fault tree for NFTV2 
NFTV2 can be the result of there being a no flow phase at V2, so the system is in the 
DORMANT operating mode. In this case the system is not ACTIVE (ACTIVE) and V2 
cannot have failed open (V2FO) (a bar over the basic event means 'NOT that event'). If 
the system is ACTIVE then this can be caused by no water being available at the valve. 
Therefore either water cannot pass through pipes P3 or P4, or there is no water available 
in the tank. 
Water may not be available in the tank either because the water cannot pass into the 
system, or because of a rupture in the tank. If the tank has ruptured (TR) then it is not 
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leaking (TL). 
'Water cannot pass through pipes P3 or P4', shown in Figure 4.5, can be caused by valve 
V2 failing closed (V2FC) and not open (V2FO), by a blockage in either of the two pipes 
(P3B, P4B), or a fracture in P3 (P3F). If pipe P3 is blocked then it cannot be fractured 
(P3F), and if fractured then it cannot be blocked (P3B). Similarly for P4 if the pipe is 
blocked then it is not fractured (P4F). 
Water Cannot 
Pass Through 
Pipes P3 or P4 
Figure 4.5: Non-Coherent fault tree for NFTV2 - transfer 1 
Water may not be able to pass into the system at VI, causing no flow out at V2, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.6. No flow into the system at VI may occur because water is unable 
to pass through the valve. This can be the result of either a problem restricting the flow, 
or because there is no water available. The flow may be restricted due to a blockage in pipe 
PI or P2 (PIB, P2B), or a fracture in PI (PI F). If pipe PI is blocked then it cannot be 
fractured (PIF), and if fractured then it cannot be blocked (PIB). Similarly for P2 if the 
pipe is blocked then it is not fractured (P2F). Finally water may not be available to the 
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system because of a problem at the main supply (NWMS). 
Water will not be available at the valve if it is closed, or because water is not able to pass 
through, as shown in Figure 4.7 . Valve VI could be closed if controller Cl has failed high 
(C1FH), sensor SI has failed reading a high level of water in the tank (SlFH), or if the 
valve itself has failed closed (V1FC). If VI has failed closed then it has definitely not failed 
open (V1FO). If Cl has failed high then it cannot have failed low (C1FL) and VI has not 
failed open. Finally if SI has failed reading a high level of water in the tank then to cause 
no flow into the system it cannot be reading low (SlFL), Cl cannot be low and VI not 
open. 
Pipe P1 is 
Blocked or 
Fractured 
Pipe P2 is 
Blocked and 
NOT Fractured 
Figure 4.6: Non-Coherent fault tree for NFTV2 - transfer 2 
The prime implicants for 'NFTV2' when the system is ACTIVE are listed in Table 4.5. 
There is 1 of single order, 9 of order 2, 1 of order 3 and 1 order 4. After performing the 
coherent approximation the results obtained for 'NFTV2' are the same as those obtained 
in Table 4.4, Section 4.3.1.1.1. When the system is in the DORMANT operating mode no 
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flow through valve V2 is expected. In this case the prime implicant 'V2FO' is obtained. 
Performing the coherent approximation gives no potential causes of failure in this case, 
therefore this is omitted from the table. 
4.3.2 
Figure 4.7: Non-Coherent fault tree for NFTV2 - transfer 3 
Number 
I) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Prime Implicants Number Prime Implicants 
NWMS 7) P3F.P3B 
PIB.PIF 8) P4B.P4F 
PIF.PIB 9) TRTL 
P2B.P2F 10) VIFC.VIFO 
V2FC.V2FO 11) CIFH.VIFO.CIFL 
P3B.P3F 12) SIFH.VIFO.ClFL.SIFL 
Table 4.5: Prime implicants for NFTV2 
when the system is ACTIVE 
Summary of Non-Coherent Fault Trees 
Non-coherent fault trees for the other sensor readings listed in Table 4.3 are shown in 
Appendix A. In the same way as for 'NFTV2' the coherent fault trees are expanded to take 
into consideration the occurrence of component success states. In all cases after performing 
the coherent approximation the potential causes of failure for the non-coherent fault trees 
are the same as those obtained from the coherent ones. 
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Each non-coherent fault tree is larger than its equivalent coherent tree. For instance, for 
the sensor reading 'flow through valve VI' presented in Figures A.12 to A.15 to occur there 
must be water available into the tanle This indicates that no failure preventing flow can 
exist. If a component has failed in a certain way then it cannot be failed in any other or 
there must not be any other failure occurring that could contradict this. 
4.4 System Fault Detection 
Four schemes, each of differing complexity were developed to detect faults in the water 
tank system. The general principle was to devise a method to compare the observed and 
expected system behaviour and from this determine any faults that could have occurred. 
Fault trees were constructed from the scenarios generated using the system observation 
points (see Table 4.1 in Section 4.2.2.1). The four schemes have been implemented using 
FaultTree+ by developing the scenarios from the fault trees for the sensor readings (at the 
system observation points) that were originally input for verification. It has been assumed 
that the system was in a steady-state operating condition. In investigating the four schemes 
the aim is to identify the scheme with the least complexity that provides a good degree of 
accuracy. 
4.4.1 Scheme 1 
In this scheme coherent fault trees were used to develop causes of sensor deviations. At 
any given time the sensors must indicate one of the 16 scenarios listed in Table 4.1. If 
the system is ACTIVE the sensors are expected to show the readings as in scenario 4 of 
Table 4.1. In the DORMANT state they should show the readings in scenario 16. When the 
actual readings do not match the pattern of the system model it suggests a fault exists with 
at least one of the system components. To find all possible causes, a top event structure 
can be constructed from the information given by the system observation points. In this 
scheme only the observation points giving sensor readings that deviate from the normal 
operating mode of the system are considered. These are constructed by combining the 
causes of sensor readings (see Section 4.3.1.1), which deviate from that expected using an 
AND gate. This scheme is now demonstrated assuming the system is ACTIVE and the 
sensor readings from scenario 1 in Table 4.1 are observed. 
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Table 4.6 contains sensor readings expected when the system is in the ACTIVE operating 
mode (scenario 4) and the actual reading corresponding to scenario 1. The table shows that 
the sensor reading for valve V3 is 'flow', when in the ACTIVE operating mode it should be 
'no flow'. Also the sensor SP1 at the observation point in the overspill tray should read 'no 
water' but it is indicating water is present. Hence there are two sensors that have deviated 
from their expected readings in the normal operating mode (highlighted in bold type). 
Scenario VI 
Expected Behaviour 4 ACTIVE F 
Observed Behaviour I F 
V2 V3 TRAY 
F NF NW 
F F W 
------------------------
Table 4.6: ACTIVE operating mode with expected 
and actual sensor readings 
In scheme 1 coherent fault trees for the deviated sensor readings are combined as inputs to 
an AND gate to form the scenario's top event structure. This is shown in Figure 4.8. 
Scenario 1 
ACTIVE 
/""""\ 
Flow Through Water in the 
ValveV3 Overspill Tray 
Figure 4.8: Top event structure for scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode 
containing just deviated sensor readings 
A qualitative analysis of this fault tree will produce its minimal cut sets. These are a list of 
all the combinations of component failures that would cause the sensor readings obtained. 
Analysis of the fault tree structure given in Figure 4.8 produces 102 potential causes in 
total; 6 of order 2 and 96 of order 3. From closer inspection though only 15 of these will 
result in the occurrence of the top event (3 being of order 2 and 12 of order 3). The 
remaining 87 are incorrect; the causes of this are now discussed. The 15 valid potential 
causes are listed in Table 4.7. 
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Number 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
Potential Causes Number Potential Causes 
TL.S2FH 9) SIFL.TL.P3F 
TL.C2FH 10) SIFL.TL.P4B 
TL.V3FO 11) SIFL. V2FC. TL 
VIFO.TL.P3B 12) CIFL.TL.P3B 
VIFO.TL.P3F 13) CIFL.TL.P3F 
VIFO.TL.P4B 14) CIFL.TL.P4B 
VIFO.V2FC.TL 15) CIFL.V2FC.TL 
SlFL.TL.P3B 
Table 4.7: Potential causes of scenario 1 in the 
ACTIVE operating mode using scheme 1 
In order for water to be present in the overspill tray there must be a leak in the tank as 
indicated by the results in Table 4.7, which have 'TU in each fault combination. Flow out 
of the system at valve V3 can occur either due to a failure at the valve or because the level 
of water has got too high in the system and it has opened to reduce this. 
In considering why the analysis has produced incorrect results, the coherent fault trees 
for the sensor readings 'flow through valve V3' and 'water in the overspill tray' are both 
valid when analysed individually. However, one of the reasons for obtaining 'water in the 
overspill tray' is that no flow through valve V3 occurs, contradicting the sensor reading 
'flow through valve V3'. Without NOT logic present in the fault trees to indicate the 
component working states conflicting potential causes are not removed. For example, one of 
the incorrect minimal cut sets is VIFO.P3B.P5B. This minimal cut set would give water in 
the overspill tray, however pipe P5 is blocked so water cannot get through V3, contradicting 
the top event structure. Therefore, coherent fault trees representing sensor deviations do 
not contain enough information about system behaviour, with the resulting implication 
that scheme 1 is not a very accurate method. 
In addition to the problem of invalid potential causes the number of valid possibilities listed 
in Table 4.7 for scenario 1 is quite large. This has also been the case for a number of the 
other scenarios. A method is required to reduce this number of potential causes to as few 
as possible. Scheme 1 does not take into account the sensor readings from the observation 
points in the scenario that are correct for the chosen operating mode. Only the first 3 
potential causes actually produce scenario 1 when the sensor readings from the observation 
points at valves VI and V2 are taken into account. The other potential causes are all valid 
for the sensor reading flow through VI, but would result in no flow through valve V2. This 
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issue is addressed in scheme 2 to try and improve the diagnostic capability. Information 
from the sensors that are operating correctly is used to evaluate which parts of the system 
must be functioning with the deviated sections, hence discounting them from the list of 
potential failures. 
4.4.2 Scheme 2 
Coherent fault trees for sensor readings are also used in scheme 2. In this case though a 
consistency check is introduced into the model by including information from all sensor 
readings obtained from the analysis in the construction of the top event for the observed 
system state. Expected readings from sensors are included as NOT failed events in the 
top event structure. (For example, if the sensor reading for valve VI were 'flow' then this 
would be equivalent to saying that there is 'NOT no flow'. This therefore produces a list 
of working states for flow through valve VI). Writing them in their equivalent negated 
form now includes sensor readings not considered in scheme 1 that are true to the chosen 
operating mode. Hence the strategy for scheme 2 is for the fault trees for a given set 
of sensor readings to be combined including both deviations and those expected in their 
equivalent negated form using an AND gate. Scheme 2 is now demonstrated using the 
observed sensor readings of scenario 1. 
Table 4.8 below contains the ACTIVE operating mode for the system (scenario 4) and 
scenario 1 with the sensor readings for valves VI and V2 written in negated form (the bar 
over the deviated sensor reading means 'NOT that deviated sensor reading'). 
Scenario VI V2 V3 TRAY 
Expected Behaviour 4 ACTIVE F F NF NW 
Observed Behaviour I NF NF F w 
---------------------
Table 4.8: ACTIVE operating mode and scenario 1 
Fault trees for these negated sensor readings can now be obtained and included in the model 
along with those for the deviated sensor readings in order to check consistency. The trees 
are combined with an AND gate, as shown in Figure 4.9. 
The cause of NOT no flow through valve VI is: 
PIB.PIF.P2B.SIFH.CIFH.VIFC.NWMS.P3B.P4B.V2FC 
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Scenario 1 
ACTIVE 
/'""\ 
I I 
NOT No Flow NOT No Flow Flow Through Water in the 
Through Valve Through Valve ValveV3 Overspill Tray 
V1 V2 
X X 
I 
No Flow No Flow 
Through Valve Through Valve 
V1 V2 
Figure 4.9: Top event structure for scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode 
containing both deviated sensor readings and consistency checks 
The cause of NOT no flow through valve V2 is: 
TR.NWMS.P3B.P3F.P4B.V2FC.P1B.P1F.P2B.S1FH.C1FH.V1FC 
These combined (ANDed) together with the potential causes listed in Table 4.7 from scheme 
1 shows that scheme 2 produces 3 prime implicants representing the potential causes of 
scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode; these are listed in Table 4.9. These potential 
causes include the working components. Removing these produces a list of the potential 
causes containing only failed components, as shown in the 'Coherent Approximation' 
column. 
These are all valid potential causes of scenario 1. This shows that for this particular scenario 
scheme 2 is a better model at pinpointing the actual cause compared to scheme 1, reducing 
the correct number of potential causes from 15 to 3 with the inclusion of working sensors. 
However, scheme 1 showed that coherent fault trees do not contain enough information 
about system behaviour to obtain a reliable list of potential causes. Scheme 2 uses the 
same fault trees, so invalid results from combining the deviated sensor readings can still 
occur, for example in the situation where all sensors in the system are deviated. This 
problem can be alleviated by using non-coherent fault trees that contain NOT logic. These 
trees are introduced into the analysis for each sensor reading in scheme 3 in order to indicate 
which components are working. 
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Number Potential Causes Coherent Approximation 
I) NWMS.TR.P2B.PIF.PIB.V2FC.TL.P4B.P3B.P3F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.82FH TL.S2FH 
2) NWMS.TR.P2B.PIF.PIB.V2FC.TL.P4B.P3B.P3F.VIFC.CIFH.8IFH.C2FH TL.C2FH 
3) NWMS.TR.P2B.PIF.PIB.V2FC.TL.P4B.P3B.P3F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.V3FO TL.V3FO 
Table 4.9: Potential causes of scenario 1 in the 
ACTIVE operating mode using scheme 2 
4.4.3 Scheme 3 
In scheme 3 system behaviour is modelled using non-coherent fault trees. As in scheme 1 
the observed system sensor readings are obtained from the observable points. A fault tree 
structure is constructed using only the sensor readings that have deviated from the normal 
system operating mode. Therefore it does not include a consistency check. To illustrate 
scheme 3 the top event structure (assuming, as before, the sensor readings represented 
by scenario 1 have been obtained), can be constructed in the same way as for scheme 1 
(see Figure 4.8), but using non-coherent fault trees for the deviated sensor readings 'flow 
through valve V3' and 'water in the overspill tray'. 
Analysis of the faults, as in scheme 2, produces prime implicants. 15 potential causes of 
scenario 1 are produced by scheme 3. After removing the working state events these are 
the same as those obtained by scheme 1 that are valid for the deviated sensor readings 
(see Table 4.7). Scheme 3 therefore shows that introducing NOT logic into the fault trees 
indicates which components are working for each deviated sensor reading and removes any 
conflicting potential causes (namely the previous 87 incorrect causes obtained in scheme 1). 
There are again quite a large number of alternatives and it would be difficult to determine 
which one could be the actual cause. This is also the case for some of the results for 
other scenarios. In the same way as for scheme 1, scheme 3 does not take into account the 
sensor readings from the observation points in the scenario that are correct for the chosen 
operating mode. Some of the potential causes listed in the example may be invalid given 
the functionality of the other areas of the system. This scheme has failed to differentiate 
between the potential causes and so scheme 4, which contains the additional complexity 
of non-coherent sensor deviations with consistency checks, may provide a better analysis 
option. 
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4.4.4 Scheme 4 
Scheme 4 models system behaviour using non-coherent fault trees for sensor deviations. The 
top event structure for scenario 1 using scheme 4 is shown in Figure 4.8. Analysis of the 
faults, as in schemes 2 and 3 produces prime implicants. Removing the working component 
states gives the coherent approximation. There are 3 potential causes of scenario 1, listed 
in Table 4.10. 
Number Potential Causes 
1) TL.S2FH 
2) TL.C2FH 
3) TL.V3FO 
Table 4.10: Potential causes of scenario 1 in the 
ACTIVE operating mode using scheme 4 
The potential causes of scenario 1 in Table 4.10 are the same as those obtained using scheme 
2 after removing the working components (see Table 4.9). This shows that schemes 2 and 
4 are better models than 1 and 3 at pinpointing the actual cause of scenario 1. Compared 
to the result obtained from scheme 3 the model in scheme 4 strengthens the belief that not 
enough information is being obtained by only considering sensors that have deviated from 
their expected readings. 
4.5 Discussion of the System Fault Detection Method 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Four fault tree based schemes for detecting faults or combinations of faults in systems have 
been introduced. Each scheme was demonstrated using the water tank level control system 
example. Each of the scenarios listed in Table 4.1 were constructed in FaultTree+ for the 
four schemes in the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes. The top events for each 
of the scenarios were constructed by hand using the given expected behaviour from each 
mode to determine the fault trees required for each of the sensor readings. This enabled the 
construction of single and multiple symptom top events depending on the chosen scenario. 
The automation of the fault trees for each of the sensor readings enabled analysis for each 
of the possible scenarios for the four schemes and their given operating modes to be carried 
out more quickly than could be done by hand. Once results were obtained the potential 
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causes of failure were verified by hand and compared with those expected for each scenario. 
Expected potential causes of failure for each scenario were identified by comparing what 
was happening in the system with that expected by visual inspection. This enabled the 
results obtained from FaultTree+ to be verified. The performance of the four schemes has 
been investigated to evaluate their potential to identify the causes of all 16 scenarios, both 
in the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes. The results for each of the schemes are 
now discussed. 
4.5.2 Tank System Results 
Schemes 1 to 4 were applied to produce the causes of the 16 scenarios of possible sensor 
readings listed in Table 4.1. An index to indicate the scheme effectiveness is calculated. 
4.5.2.1 Effectiveness Index for the Schemes 
An index has been applied to each of the schemes to give some indication of their relative 
merit. For each scheme the number of possible causes of each scenario is recorded, along 
with a list of causes obtained and how many of the correct causes are included in this 
list. The index is used on each scheme to indicate how effective it has been at obtaining 
correct potential causes of failure over the 15 scenarios for each of the operating modes 
(ACTIVE/DORMANT) that contain at least one deviated sensor reading (one of the 
scenarios represents the symptoms of a fully functioning system). 
4.5.2.1.1 Definition of Effectiveness Index 
The Effectiveness Index le;k used is defined as: 
where, 
le = ~ ~(nCi).(nCi) 
,k N L...J n· na· 
i=l t t 
N - The number of scenarios investigated. 
ni - The number of potential causes of failure identified by the scheme 
for scenario i. (These were obtained using FaultTree+). 
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nCi = The number of correct potential causes of failure obtained by the 
scheme for scenario i. (These identified by visual inspection). 
nai - The number of actual potential causes of failure that should have 
been obtained by the method for scenario i. (These were identified by hand). 
j - The scheme number. 
k ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes (represented by an 'A' 
and 'D' respectively). 
The index has a range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a scheme that is not effective and 1 
the most effective possible. Note that in the ideal situation the fault detection system will 
identify only one cause of each scenario and it will be correct, producing an effectiveness 
index of 1. Indices not equal to 1 are expected in practice because there will never be 
enough sensors to provide sufficient information to diagnose each fault. The index is used 
because it is easy and fast to calculate and is indicative of the benefit of each scheme. 
4.5.2.2 Results for Scheme 1 
Results obtained for scheme 1 in the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes are shown 
in Table 4.11. The table contains, for each scenario, the number of possible causes produced 
by the scheme, ni, and the number of these that are correct causes of the symptoms 
observed, ne; for the respective mode. The actual number of causes, nai, that would 
have been produced if the scheme gave a perfectly correct list is also indicated in the final 
column of each mode section of the table (this takes into account the functionality of the 
whole system). The actual possibilities have been calculated by hand. 
The results for scheme 1 show that in many cases entries in the list of potential causes 
obtained for the scenarios did not cause the symptoms shown. For example, this has 
occurred in scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode, where the number of possible 
causes produced by the scheme is 102, but the number valid for the deviated readings is 
15. The number actually correct - if considering the readings that are true to the operating 
mode - is only 3. Scenarios 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 15 in the ACTIVE operating mode and 
in 1, 5, 9 and 13 in the DORMANT mode (Table 4.11) also contain failures that are not 
valid for the given deviated readings. Fifteen of the results as shown in Section 4.4.1 for 
scenario 1 will produce the deviated sensor readings 'flow through valve V3' and 'water in 
the overspill tray'. However, taking into consideration all readings including those expected 
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for the operating mode 12 of these readings that are valid for the deviated sensor readings 
are invalid when considering the readings true to the operating mode. This example, along 
with other results shown in Table 4.11 indicates that a check of some form is required in 
order to consider readings of the non-deviated sensors. 
Scenario VI 
1 F 
2 F 
3 F 
4 F 
5 F 
6 F 
7 F 
8 F 
9 NF 
10 NF 
11 NF 
12 NF 
13 NF 
14 NF 
15 NF 
16 NF 
ACTIVE DORMANT 
V2 V3 TRAY Results from Number of Results from Number of 
Scheme 1 Actual Possibilities Scheme 1 Actual Possibilities 
n; ne; nai n; ne; nai 
F F W 102 3 3 30 3 3 
F F NW 15 3 3 6 3 3 
F NF W 74 1 1 20 1 1 
F NF NW 
-
-
- 1 1 1 
NF F W 132 24 24 30 6 6 
NF F NW 48 24 24 6 6 6 
NF NF W 84 77 77 20 20 20 
NF NF NW 12 4 4 11 5 5 
F F W 300 21 21 30 3 3 
F F NW 60 21 21 6 3 3 
F NF W 200 7 7 20 1 1 
F NF NW 10 7 7 1 1 1 
NF F W 300 0 84 30 3 3 
NF F NW 60 0 84 6 3 3 
NF NF W 200 14 14 20 2 2 
NF NF NW 10 10 10 
- - -
Effectiveness Index fEtA = 0.293 fEtD = 0.444 
Table 4.11: Results obtained for scheme 1 in the ACTIVE 
and DORMANT operating modes 
The fault trees used in this scheme are coherent, and when analysed individually they are 
valid. The trees are combined to give the causes of unexpected readings and they may 
contain conflicting potential causes of failure. Without the use of NOT logic in the fault 
trees these conflicts will still exist in the results, and therefore cannot be eliminated from 
the list of possibilities. 
The validity of some results were found to be dependent upon the amount of water in the 
tank, which strengthened the need for the consideration of transient effects. For instance the 
results for scenario 16 are: {{PlB}, {PIF}, {P2B}, {VIFC}, {CIFH}, {SIFH}, {NWMS}, 
{P3B}, {P4B}, {V2FC}}. The first 7 potential causes are valid if there is no longer any 
water in the tank and the remaining 3 are valid if no water has left the tank and the level 
is at that required. This shows that transient effects within the system must be considered 
in order to develop the fault diagnostic method further. 
The results have shown that there is not enough information about the system behaviour 
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in coherent fault trees to yield an accurate list of potential causes, therefore scheme 1 is not 
a very good fault diagnostic method. This is reflected in the Effectiveness Index, which was 
calculated as IEIA = 0.293 for the ACTIVE mode and IEw = 0.444 for the DORMANT 
mode, giving an average of IEl = 0.368. 
As well as the problem of invalid potential causes of failure scheme 1 does not take into 
consideration the sensors that are indicating the expected value for the operating mode. 
Correct potential causes obtained by considering only the deviated sensor readings may 
be valid for those readings, but it is not valid when considering the overall system and 
the additional information provided by the sensors with expected readings. The ability to 
consider all information would reduce the number of potential causes of failure and therefore 
give a more accurate list of possibilities. The sensors reading as expected for the operating 
mode are introduced into the analysis in scheme 2. 
4.5.2.3 Results for Scheme 2 
Table 4.12 lists the potential causes of failure for scheme 2 in the ACTIVE and DORMANT 
operating modes, after removing the working components (the Coherent Approximation). 
Scenario VI 
1 F 
2 F 
3 F 
4 F 
5 F 
6 F 
1 F 
8 F 
9 NF 
10 NF 
11 NF 
12 NF 
13 NF 
14 NF 
15 NF 
16 NF 
ACTIVE DORMANT 
V2 V3 TRAY Results from Results from Number of Results from Results from Number of 
Scheme 2 Scheme 2 Actual Scheme 2 Scheme 2 Actual 
(I) (11) Possibilities (I) (I1) Possibilities 
"' 
nc. n, nCi nB. ", nq 
"' 
nCi nai 
F F W 3 3 3 3 3 30 3 30 3 3 
F F NW 3 3 3 3 3 6 3 6 3 3 
F NF W 1 1 1 1 1 20 1 20 1 1 
F NF NW 
- - -
-
-
1 1 1 1 1 
NF F W 30 3 111 2. 24 30 6 30 6 6 
NF F NW 6 6 24 2. 24 6 6 6 6 6 
NF NF W 20 20 11 77 71 20 20 20 20 20 
NF NF NW 1 1 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 5 
F F W 0 0 21 21 21 0 0 6 3 3 
F F NW 0 0 21 21 21 0 0 3 3 3 
F NF W 0 0 1 7 1 0 0 2 1 1 
F NF NW 0 0 1 7 1 0 0 1 1 1 
NF F W 300 0 300 0 84 0 0 6 3 3 
NF F NW 60 0 60 0 84 0 0 3 3 3 
NF NF W 200 14 200 14 14 0 0 2 2 2 
NF NF NW 10 10 10 10 10 
- - - - -
Effectiveness Index 1 E2(1)A 0.323 and iE2(II)A _ 0.752 iE2(I D 0.323 and 1 EUII)D 0.690 
Table 4.12: Results obtained for scheme 2 in the ACTIVE 
and DORMANT operating modes 
Two ways of performing consistency checks were investigated in the analysis and shown in 
the Table. The first, labelled 'scheme 2(I)', includes the sensor readings that are expected 
for the operating mode in their negated form in the top event structure. These checks may 
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include symptoms that change in time, for example, 'flow through valve V3' may be caused 
by V3 failing open, controller C2 failing high or sensor S2 reading a high level of water in 
the tanle This may also be the result of uncontrollable flow into the system through VI 
and no flow out at V2. This latter situation does not cause the effect immediately. Initially 
it results in an increasing water level and as a result the safety valve opening. The second 
consistency check is labelled 'scheme 2(II)', and in this case only the immediate causes of 
the effects predicted by the sensors reading true to the operating mode are included in the 
fault trees. Therefore working states where the symptoms change in time are not taken 
into consideration. 
'Scheme 2(1)' shows that the results for the ACTIVE operating mode have not improved 
compared to those obtained by scheme 1, and this is reflected in the effectiveness index 
result. Results for scenarios 1, 2 and 3 in the ACTIVE operating mode (in the ACTIVE 
column in Table 4.12) have all improved compared to those from scheme 1. There are 
however a number of scenarios that have either resulted in the method obtaining no potential 
causes of failure or no valid ones, for example scenarios 9 to 14 in the ACTIVE operating 
mode. This has also occurred in the results for the DORMANT operating mode in scenarios 
9 to 15 (Table 4.12). The majority of these scenarios have flow out of the system but no 
flow in. For example, if the sensor readings indicate that the system is in scenario 9 in 
the ACTIVE operating mode, then the deviated sensor readings are 'no flow through valve 
VI', 'flow through valve V3' and 'water in the overspill tray'. In scheme 1 these deviated 
sensor readings gave a list of 300 possible potential causes of failure (see Table 4.11). 
The extra information for the flow sensor at V2 'Flow through valve V2' is equivalent to 
saying there is 'NOT no flow through valve V2', which produces a list of working states 
causing the expected flow through V2. However, 'no flow through valve V2' could be caused 
by the tank being empty as a result of no water coming into the system through valve VI. 
The point at which there is no flow through valve V2 would be dependent on the amount 
of water originally in the tank, and the rate at which it is decreasing. The flow through V2 
symptom therefore changes in time. Flow out at V2 and V3 indicates that there must be 
water in the tank, else the system would not be in scenario 9. This is in conflict with the 
sensor indicating 'no flow through valve VI', leaving no potential causes of failure when 
there should be 21 possibilities. 
'Scheme 2(II)' uses a consistency check that only takes into consideration the symptoms that 
would cause an immediate effect on the system when checked against the deviated sensor 
readings. For example, in scenario 9 in the ACTIVE operating mode 'no flow through 
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valve V2' would immediately occur if V2 suddenly failed closed, pipe P3 became blocked or 
fractured, P4 became blocked, or the tank ruptured. No flow into the system through VI 
may take time to cause no flow through V2, therefore it is not checked against the three 
deviated sensor readings. This gives 21 potential causes of failure for the scenario. 
The effectiveness index of I E2(Il)A = 0.752 for the ACTIVE mode and I E2(Il)D = 0.690 for 
the DORMANT mode in scheme 2(II), giving an average of I E2(Il) = 0.721 shows that 
there is an improvement in comparison to the indices produced by scheme 1. However, 
scheme 1 illustrated that coherent fault trees do not contain enough information about the 
system behaviour to obtain reliable results. Scheme 2 also uses coherent fault trees and 
invalid results have still occurred in (II), for example in the DORMANT operating mode 
in scenario 1 (which contains all deviated sensor readings, so is equivalent to scenario 1 in 
scheme 1), 5, 9 and 13. As concluded in scheme 1, without the use of NOT logic in the 
actual fault trees conflicts may still occur between causes of the sensor readings. 
4.5.2.4 Results for Scheme 3 
The use of NOT logic is introduced into the fault trees in this scheme. Therefore when 
the deviated sensor readings are considered together, any conflicting potential causes of 
failure should be removed from the list of possible causes. Results obtained for scheme 3 
in the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes are shown in Table 4.13. The top event 
structure only contains deviated sensor readings, as in scheme 1. 
The results obtained for both the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes have shown 
that the use of NOT logic in the fault trees has removed all of the the invalid potential causes 
of failure that were present in some scenarios for both schemes 1 and 2 when combining just 
the deviated sensor readings. As a result, in the majority of cases, the number of potential 
causes of failure obtained is less than compared to those in scheme 1. 
The effectiveness index value is IE'A = 0.459 and IE'D = 0.837 for the ACTIVE and 
DORMANT modes respectively, with an average of lE, = 0.648. This is an improvement 
on scheme 1, which had an average of 0.368, but not to that for scheme 2 (II), which was 
I E2(Il) = 0.721. As is consistent with scheme 1, not taking account of the readings from 
the sensors giving expected readings for the operating mode has resulted in an inaccurate 
list of potential causes for some scenarios, for example in scenarios 1 to 8 in the ACTIVE 
operating mode (see Table 4.13). The sensors reading expected values for the operating 
mode are introduced in scheme 4. 
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Scenario VI 
1 F 
2 F 
3 F 
4 F 
5 F 
6 F 
7 F 
8 F 
9 NF 
10 NF 
11 NF 
12 NF 
13 NF 
14 NF 
15 NF 
16 NF 
ACTIVE DORMANT 
V2 V3 TRAY Results from Number of Results from Number of 
Scheme 3 Actual Possibilities Scheme 3 Actual Possibilities 
n, nq nai n, ne; nai 
F F W 15 3 3 3 3 3 
F F NW 15 3 3 3 3 3 
F NF W 74 1 1 1 1 1 
F NF NW 
- - - 1 1 1 
NF F W 45 24 24 6 6 6 
NF F NW 45 24 24 6 6 6 
NF NF W 84 77 77 20 20 20 
NF NF NW 12 4 4 11 5 5 
F F W 30 21 21 3 3 3 
F F NW 30 21 21 3 3 3 
F NF W 20 7 7 1 1 1 
F NF NW 10 7 7 1 1 1 
NF F W 30 0 84 6 3 3 
NF F NW 30 0 84 6 3 3 
NF NF W 20 14 14 20 2 2 
NF NF NW 10 10 10 
- - -
Effectiveness Index IEsA - 0.459 IEsD - 0.837 
Table 4.13: Results obtained for scheme 3 in the ACTIVE 
and DORMANT operating modes 
4.5.2.5 Results for Scheme 4 
Table 4.14 lists the potential causes of failure for each scenario as established by scheme 4 in 
the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes, after removing the working components. 
As in the third scheme, the fourth scheme also uses non-coherent fault trees in the system 
analysis. A consistency check was introduced as in scheme 2 to allow the sensors reading 
true to the operating mode to be included. As in scheme 2, two checks were investigated. 
Investigations using negated non-coherent fault trees to include the information provided 
by those sensors that have the expected readings in the top event structures gave some 
inaccurate results. This was because some 'NOT' events in the fault trees were becoming 
potential causes of failure as a result of being negated twice. Using non-coherent fault 
trees in the consistency check (scheme 4 (I)) gave no additional input into the analysis, 
but increased the complexity. Therefore a consistency check was carried out by taking 
the results obtained when considering just the deviated sensor readings and checking them 
individually against the sensors reading true to the operating mode. Any results that lead 
to a contradiction were then removed from the list. These results are shown in Table 4.14 
under the column heading 'Scheme 4 (II)' for ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes. 
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Scenario VI 
I F 
2 F 
3 F 
4 F 
S F 
• F 
7 F 
8 F 
• NF 
, 10 NF 
II NF 
12 NF 
13 NF 
14 NF 
IS NF 
I. NF 
ACTIVE DORMANT 
V2 V3 TRAY Results (rom Results from Number o( Results from Results (rom Number of 
Scheme 4 Scheme 4 Actual Scheme 4 Scheme 4 Actual 
(I) (11) Possibilities (I) (11) Possibilities 
n, ne, n, ne, na. n, nq n, nq na, 
F F W 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
F F NW 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
F NF W I I I 1 I I I I 1 I 
F NF NW -
-
-
- -
1 I I I I 
NF F W IS IS 24 24 24 6 • • • • NF F NW IS IS 24 24 24 • • • • • NF NF W 107 73 77 77 77 20 20 20 20 20 
NF NF NW 88 I 4 4 4 2. 2 S S S 
F F W 0 0 2I 21 21 0 0 3 3 3 
F F NW 0 0 21 21 2I 0 0 3 3 3 
F NF W 0 0 7 7 7 0 0 I I I 
F NF NW 0 0 7 7 7 0 0 I I I 
NF F W 30 0 30 0 84 21 0 3 3 3 
NF F NW 30 0 30 0 84 23 0 3 3 3 
NF NF W 14 14 20 14 20 14 0 2 2 2 
NF NF NW 10 10 !O 10 10 
- - - -
Effectiveness Index I E4(I)A - 0.460 and [E4(1l)A _ 0.847 I E111lP - 0.469 and I E4(II)D - 1.000 
Table 4.14: Results obtained for scheme 4 in the ACTIVE 
and DORMANT operating modes 
Results in the ACTIVE operating mode from scheme 4(1) - which takes into consideration 
all possible symptoms - gave an index of Ie4(I)A = 0.460. This shows that there is an 
improvement in scheme 4 compared to results for schemes 1 and 2(1), as indicated in the 
effectiveness index values, which are IEIA = 0.293, I E2(I)A = 0.323, but the result was not 
as good as that for scheme 3, which was IE3A = 0.459. As in scheme 2(1) where there are a 
number of scenarios that have either resulted in the method obtaining no potential causes 
of failure or no valid ones, this has also occurred in the DORMANT mode. Again this was 
found to be because the check being carried out checked the list of potential causes against 
all symptoms true to the operating mode. 
As in scheme 2(Il), scheme 4(Il) checks for consistency using only failures that would have 
an immediate affect on the system. The effectiveness index in this case was I E4(II)A = 0.847 
for the ACTIVE and I E4(II)D = 1.000 for the DORMANT operating modes, giving an 
average of I E4(II) = 0.924. This average is an improvement compared to all of the other 
three schemes. 
Therefore, the usage of non-coherent fault trees and a consistency check that considers 
failures that immediately affect the system as shown in scheme 4 (Il), is the most accurate 
of the schemes 1 to 4 for modelling behaviour of the water tank system. 
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4.5.3 Discussion 
4.5.3.1 Overview of Results 
A summary of the results obtained for schemes 1 to 4 applied to the simple tank system 
operating in the ACTIVE and DORMANT modes, and their respective effectiveness indices 
are shown in Tables 4.15 and 4.16. 
The performance of the four schemes has been investigated to evaluate their potential to 
identify the causes of all 16 scenarios, both in ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes 
for the system. Schemes 1 and 2 have produced potential causes that are invalid to the top 
event structure, both for scenario 1 and a number of others. This is the case even though 
the fault trees for each of the sensor readings are correct when analysed individually. For 
example, for scenario 5 in the ACTIVE operating mode schemes 1 and 2 produce 132 and 
111 potential causes respectively for their top event structures. Only 24 of these results 
for the two schemes are actually valid even though the fault trees for the sensor readings 
are correct when analysed individually. For certain scenarios scheme 2 has also removed 
potential causes that are valid for the top event structure. This implies that there is not 
enough information in the coherent fault trees to explain the system behaviour. 
Scenario 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
VI V2 V3 TRAY Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Number of 
Actual Possibilities 
n, ne; n, nCi n, nCi n, ne; nai 
F F F W 102 3 3 3 15 3 3 3 3 
F F F NW 15 3 3 3 15 3 3 3 3 
F F NF W 74 1 1 1 74 1 1 1 1 
F F NF NW 
- - - - - - - - -
F NF F W 132 24 111 24 45 24 24 24 24 
F NF F NW 48 24 24 24 45 24 24 24 24 
F NF NF W 84 77 77 77 84 77 77 77 77 
F NF NF NW 12 4 4 4 12 4 4 4 4 
NF F F W 300 21 21 21 30 21 21 21 21 
NF F F NW 60 21 21 21 30 21 21 21 21 
NF F NF W 200 7 7 7 20 7 7 7 7 
NF F NF NW 10 7 7 7 10 7 7 7 7 
NF NF F W 300 0 300 0 30 0 30 0 84 
NF NF F NW 60 0 60 0 30 0 30 0 84 
NF NF NF W 200 14 200 14 20 14 20 14 14 
NF NF NF NW 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Effectiveness Index lE. 0.293 0.752 0.459 0.837 
Table 4.15: Results obtained for schemes 1 to 4 in the ACTIVE 
operating mode and effectiveness index 
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Non-coherent fault trees were introduced into schemes 3 and 4. These have eliminated any 
invalid potential causes of failure from combining the deviated sensor readings. Scheme 
3 still does not consider readings that are true to the operating mode. Scheme 4, which 
includes all sensor readings, is the best scheme for modelling the system. 
For each scheme and each scenario the table contains the number of possible causes produced 
by the scheme, ni, and the number of these that are correct causes of the symptoms 
observed, nei. The actual number of causes, nai, that would have been produced if the 
scheme gave a perfectly correct list is indicated in the final column of the table. 
When the working states are considered as in scheme 2 the effectiveness is improved as 
indicated by the average index for ACTIVE and DORMANT system operating states 
increasing from 0.368 in Scheme 1 (IElA = 0.293 + IEw = 0.444 divided by 2 to give 
the average IEl = 0.368) to 0.721 in Scheme 2 (Ie2(II)A = 0.752 + IE2(II)D = 0.690 divided by 
2 to give the average IE2(II) = 0.721). Even with this improvement overall the results imply 
that coherent fault trees do not contain enough information about the system behaviour to 
produce an accurate list of potential causes. 
Scenario 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
VI V2 V3 TRAY Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Number of 
n, nCi n, nCi n, ne; n, nCi Actual Possibilities 
F F F W 30 3 30 3 3 3 3 3 3 
F F F NW 6 3 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 
F F NF W 20 1 20 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F F NF NW 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F NF F W 30 6 30 6 6 6 6 6 6 
F NF F NW 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
F NF NF W 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
F NF NF NW 11 5 5 5 11 5 5 5 5 
NF F F W 30 3 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 
NF F F NW 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
NF F NF W 20 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NF F NF NW 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NF NF F W 30 3 6 3 6 3 3 3 3 
NF NF F NW 6 3 3 3 6 3 3 3 3 
NF NF NF W 20 2 2 2 20 2 2 2 2 
NF NF NF NW 
- -
-
- - - -
-
-
Effectiveness Index lE. 0.444 0.690 0.837 1.000 
Table 4.16: Results obtained for schemes 1 to 4 in the DORMANT 
operating mode and effectiveness index 
The use of NOT logic to indicate the working component states is introduced into the fault 
trees in scheme 3. This has eliminated all of the invalid potential causes of failure that were 
produced by combining the fault trees for the deviated sensor readings. The results show 
an improvement compared to scheme 1, but not to scheme 2. This is because scheme 3 
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does not take into consideration the sensors reading true to the operating mode. The fourth 
scheme uses non-coherent fault trees to develop causes of both deviated sensor readings and 
sensors reading expected values and combine these to form the top event structure. The 
causes obtained in this way are more accurate than those obtained by the other schemes. 
Two consistency checks were used in schemes 2 and 4. Results have shown that only taking 
into consideration the symptoms that would cause an immediate affect on the system is the 
better of the two checks. This is an indication of a limitation of the approach developed in 
that it is not capable of dealing with situations where the symptoms change in time. The 
introduction of a consistency check in schemes 2 and 4 has resulted in a net improvement 
compared to schemes 1 and 3 respectively. The effectiveness index values together with the 
information obtained from the analysis in schemes 1 to 3 has shown that scheme 4 is the 
best model for obtaining potential causes of the 16 scenarios in ACTIVE and DORMANT 
modes for the water tank system in steady state. 
4.5.3.2 Scalability and Consistency Checks 
The four methods presented for diagnosing faults in systems use FTA to explain the 
deviations from normal values observed in the sensed variables. The effectiveness of the 
methods has been investigated using a simple example containing only a small number of 
components. Application to a larger system is required in order to show how effective the 
methods would be when used on real systems. 
The computational expense of processing a large number of sensors would not enable the 
schemes considered so far to be applied directly to a real system. Even when only checking 
immediate symptoms the NOT logic used in scheme 4 would be computationally intensive. 
The consistency check used in this scheme involves taking the potential causes obtained 
from only the deviated sensor readings and checking these individually against the causes 
of sensors reading true to the operating mode. Any potential causes of the deviated sensor 
readings that lead to a contradiction in the expected sensor readings can then be removed 
from the list. 
The consistency check aspect would be fine for larger systems. The qualitative analysis of 
a top event constructed of the non-coherent fault trees for causes of the deviated sensors 
would, however, be a problem. A means of resolving the issue needs to be found in the 
future work. 
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4.5.3.3 Imperfect Sensors 
The method illustrated in this chapter has been applied to an example that does not 
account for the possibility of sensor failures in the system. One method to accommodate 
these sensor failures is to incorporate failed sensor events into the fault trees for each sensor 
reading and the analysis performed in the same way. Another approach could be to try to 
establish the validity of sensor readings at the start of the analysis and only consider data 
on system symptoms that is known to be reliable. For the simple tank system the validity 
of the flow sensor readings could be established by considering information provided by the 
level sensors 81 and 82. A comparison can be made of these together with the tank level 
calculated from the volume flow rate and spill tray sensors, VFl, VF2, VF3 and 8Pl, in 
order to identify any defective readings. 
4.5.3.4 Obtaining the Exact Cause of Failure 
Ideally the fault detection scheme would be perfect and would determine the exact cause of 
each scenario. However, in reality this would require a great deal of information about the 
system provided by many sensors. From a practical point of view the cost of these sensors 
along with their maintenance would not be contemplated and so the fault detection system 
must cope with a list of more than one possible cause. 
One possible method to help establish which of the list of potential alternatives has caused 
the system failure is to consider a probability for each component and to deduce which is 
the most likely failure cause combination. This addition to the procedure would require 
the calculation of importance measures [29] for each failure combination. 
4.5.3.5 Dynamic Effects 
At present for the water tank system the consistency checks are considered at the point the 
system is immediately observed. Due to this, it is not possible, since it does not take into 
account transient effects, for some of the 16 scenarios to occur. For example, none of the 
four schemes described have been able to correctly identify the potential causes of failure 
for scenarios 13 and 14 in the ACTIVE operating mode, as shown in Table 4.15. However, 
if dynamics were taken into consideration then depending on the state of the system these 
scenarios may occur, albeit for a short period of time. 
As an example, when the system is ACTIVE and in scenario 13, all the sensor readings 
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indicate a deviation from the expected sensor readings. Therefore there is 'NFTVl', 
'NFTV2', 'FTV3' and 'WOST'. No flow at V2 can be caused by the valve itself failing 
closed, a blockage in pipe P3 or P4, a fracture in P3, the tank rupturing, or by a failure 
preventing water flowing into the system through VI. Combining the fault trees for both 
'NFTVl' with 'NFTV2' and minimising the results leaves only the potential causes offailure 
caused by no flow at VI, making the results incorrect as in order for the system to be in 
scenario 13 there must be water in the tank because there is flow out at V3. Therefore no 
flow out at V2 cannot be the result of no water coming into the system at VI. However 
when the deviated sensor readings are combined and minimised using scheme 4 the potential 
causes of failure produced do not indicate that there is a failure preventing no flow at V2. 
This is an example of a situation where one failure has become hidden. A similar situation 
occurs in scenario 14. Taking account of, for example, the time it takes the water level to 
drop in the tank could help to overcome this problem. Therefore, considering the effects of 
dynamics on the water tank would provide a more realistic model of the system behaviour. 
The validity of some of the results was found to be dependent upon the amount of water 
present in the tank. For instance scenario 16 in the ACTIVE operating mode could be 
caused by {{PlB}, {P1F}, {P2B}, {V1FC}, {C1FH}, {SlFH}, {NWMS}} if the water 
in the tank has been used up and no water has been allowed into the system to replenish 
that taken. This scenario could also be caused by {{P3B}, {P3F}, {P4B}, {V2FC}} if 
the level of water in the tank is as required and no water can exit the tank. A similar 
ambiguous situation occurs for scenario 8 in the ACTIVE mode. Taking into consideration 
transient effects in the system would help to alleviate this problem. 
Some failures are dormant failures and may occur in the system and never be revealed until 
that part of the system is used or tested. For example, a blockage in pipe P5 would cause 
no flow through valve V3, but this would not become apparent until the safety part of the 
system was required, as shown in results from the simulation in Chapter 5. These types of 
failures will not be highlighted until that part of the system is used. This indicates that 
the fault detection system may need to consider revealed and dormant failure modes in 
different ways. Other failures may occur whilst a component is working as expected for a 
particular mode and only become visual when the expected operation for the component 
is changed. For instance, in ACTIVE operating mode valve V2 could fail open, but this 
failure would not become apparent until the the operator tried to close the valve to put the 
system in the DORMANT mode. 
At present the two operating modes each have only one expected model of system behaviour 
92 
Application of Fault Tree Analysis for Fault Detection Summary 
as all monitored variables have only two discrete states; scenario 4 and 16 for the ACTIVE 
and DORMANT modes respectively. Taking dynamics in the tank into consideration these 
models will need to consider the actual value of the sensed variable, for example flow rate. 
The model will then need to account for the level of water in the tank and the rate of 
change of its height. 
4.5.3.6 Two Phased System 
The water tank system is assumed to be in one of two phases; these being the flow phase 
through valve V2 when in the ACTIVE operating mode and the no flow phase through V2 
in the DORMANT operating mode. However, V2 could be partially open indicating an 
intermediate flow phase through the valve. Further analysis could therefore consider the 
behaviour of the system with partial failure modes. 
4.6 Summary 
• This chapter has introduced four fault tree based schemes for detecting faults or 
combinations of faults in systems. 
• Fault tree analysis can be used to identify multiple faults in a systems fault diagnostic 
capability for steady state. 
• Each scheme is demonstrated using the water tank level control system example and 
a brief comparison of results is made. 
• Scheme 1 uses coherent fault trees to develop the causes of sensor readings. This 
method has been found to yield unreliable results because the fault trees do not 
contain enough information about the behaviour of the system. Also the method 
only considers the sensors that are not reading true to the operating mode, therefore 
causing more inaccuracies. 
• A consistency check is introduced into scheme 2 by including information from all 
sensor readings obtained from the analysis. However, as shown in scheme 1 coherent 
fault trees do no contain enough information about the behaviour of the system to 
obtain a reliable list of potential causes. Scheme 2 uses the same fault trees, so invalid 
results can still occur. 
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• The system is modelled using non-coherent fault trees in Scheme 3. The introduction 
of NOT logic into the fault trees indicates which components are working for each 
of the deviated sensor readings and removes any conflicting potential causes. As in 
scheme 1 only sensor readings that have deviated from the normal system operating 
mode are taken into consideration in the analysis, therefore it does not include a 
consistency check. 
• Non-coherent fault trees to represent the causes of sensor outputs provide more reliable 
results compared with those obtained using the coherent fault trees. 
• The introduction of consistency checks with the information provided by all sensors 
is required in order to produce an accurate list of all potential causes of the current 
system state. 
• Scheme 4 (Il) uses non-coherent fault trees and includes both deviated sensor readings 
and those that are true to the operating mode in the analysis. The method checks 
for consistency by using information from all the observation points, and is the most 
accurate of schemes 1 to 4 for modelling behaviour of the water tank system. 
• System dynamics must be taken into consideration to improve the method and obtain 
more accurate results. The dynamics should include the calculation of the level of 
water in the tank from the volume flow rate and spill tray sensors along with the 
introduction of more discrete height categories. Also, the rate of change of height 
should be calculated and timing taken into consideration. 
• It may be necessary to consider different approaches in the fault diagnostics method 
to reveal dormant failure modes of components. 
• In applying the fault tree based diagnostics technique the system sensors as described 
are sufficient, without any additional complexity. In a real system additional sensors 
could be added in order to provide a more complete picture of its operating state. 
The level control sensors SI and S2 could also be used. 
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Development of a Simulation Model 
and Fault Detection Demonstration 
5.1 Introduction 
Four fault tree based schemes for detecting faults or combinations of faults in systems were 
introduced in Chapter 4. Each scheme was demonstrated using the water tank level control 
system. This chapter describes the development of a computer program to simulate the 
system and implement the four fault detection schemes. 
The program has been coded in the C programming language and consists of two main parts. 
The first is a model of the water tank and its components as described in Section 4.2. The 
state of each component can be set and changes to operation (non-failures) and/or faults 
may be introduced at any point in time. The simulation of the system reacts to any changes 
introduced in similar way to a real water tank. For instance, if pipe P2 is set to 'blocked' 
then water will not flow into the tank, just as in a physical system with a blockage at this 
point. 
System status is determined using readings provided by the flow sensors VFl, VF2, and VF3 
situated after each of the three valves, and the overspill tray sensor SP1. Flow measurements 
obtained from the simulation are fed into the second part of the program that demonstrates 
the fault detection method. System diagnosis is obtained by comparing the actual sensor 
readings from the simulation to the expected model behaviour, which will differ depending 
on whether the system is in the ACTIVE or DORMANT modes. 
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Analysis is carried out for each of the four schemes that were introduced in Chapter 4. 
Sensor readings that have deviated from their normal operation should result in the 
indication of a failure within the system. All potential causes of failure obtained are listed 
for each scheme with the most likely cause(s) of failure. 
5.2 Water Tank System Model 
The volume of water held in the tank at time t is dependent upon the amount of water in 
the tank at time t - 1 and the volume flow rate of water into and out of the tank at time 
t - 1. This can be obtained using Euler Integration [79], which leads to an equation of the 
form: Xk = Xk-l + Xk_l.dt. The volume flow rate into the tank system is calculated from 
the velocity of the inflow and the radius of pipe P2. The outflow depends on three factors: 
the amount of water exiting the tank through valves V2 and V3, and any leakages present 
within the walls of the tank. The volume flow rates at VF2, VF3 and water loss via a leak 
depends upon the head of water in the tank above their locations. 
Water transition within the tank system is modelled with equations for the volume flow 
rate into and out of the tank along with the water height. The equations used are described 
in Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.2. 
5.2.1 Volume of Water in the Tank 
5.2.1.1 Volume Flow Rate at Sensor VFl 
The volume flow rate at VFl, VI(t), at time t is assumed to be constant, therefore is 
expressed as: 
(5.1) 
where Al is the cross-sectional area of pipes PI and P2, and UI(t) is the velocity of flow 
into the tank at VFl at time t. 
5.2.1.2 Volume Flow Rate at Sensor VF2 
The volume flow rate at VF2, V2(t), at time t is expressed as: 
(5.2) 
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where, A2 is the cross-sectional area of pipes P3 and P4, and U2(t) is the velocity of flow 
out of the tank at VF2 at time t. Using Torricelli's Law [80], U2(t) can be written as: 
(5.3) 
where 9 is acceleration due to gravity and h(t) is the height of water in the tank at time 
t. The height of water in the tank can be expressed in terms of the volume of water in the 
tank and its cross-sectional area, AT. Therefore, h(t) can be written as: 
Equation 5.3 becomes, 
h(t) = v(t), 
AT 
GW U2(t) = y 2gTr , 
Therefore Equation 5.2 can be expressed in terms of Torricelli's Law, 
5.2.1.3 Volume Flow Rate at Sensor VF3 
The volume flow rate at VF3, V3(t), at time t can be expressed as: 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
where, A3 is the cross-sectional area of pipes P5 and P6, and U3(t) is the velocity of flow 
out of the tank at VF3 at time t. Assuming that pipes P3, P4, P5 and P6 are at the same 
height in the tank, 
(5.8) 
Equation 5.7 becomes, 
(5.9) 
Also, if the cross-sectional area of both pipes P5 and P6, A3 , is twice that of pipes P3 and 
P4, A2 (as flow out at V3 can be twice the amount out at V2), then, 
(5.10) 
Therefore, Equation 5.9 can be expressed as, 
(5.11) 
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Substituting for U2(t) = V29 j; gives, 
(5.12) 
5.2.1.4 Overspill Tray Sensor SP! 
A leak in the tank system has been modelled assuming that the height and cross-sectional 
area of the leak are known. The size of the leak can be varied by changing the cross-sectional 
area, and the effect of the location of a leak investigated by changing the height at which 
it is situated. 
The volume flow rate out at a leak, V4(t), at time t can be used to calculate the amount of 
water in the overspill tray, as indicated by sensor SPI. This can be expressed as: 
(5.13) 
where, A4 is the cross-sectional area of the leak and U4(t) is the velocity of flow out of the 
tank at the leak at time t. In order to calculate V4 (t) the height of water above and below 
the leak has to be considered. The height of water in the tank can be expressed as: 
h(t) = j(t) + k(t), 
where, j(t) is the height of water above the leak in the tank and k(t) is the height of 
water below the leak, as shown in Figure 5.1. The volume flow rate out of the leak will be 
dependent upon the head of water above it. 
j(t) 
Level of leak 
h(t) ----------- ... 
k(t) 
Figure 5.1: Water tank heights for an example leak 
The velocity U4(t) can be expressed as: 
U4(t) = ..j2gj(t), (5.14) 
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where, j(t) = h(t) - k(t). Once the level of water in the tank drops below the hole that is 
causing the leak, flow out from it will cease and so j(t) = 0 (therefore h(t) = k(t)). Also if 
the leak is located at the bottom of the tank then k(t) = 0, hence h(t) = j(t). 
The height of water above the leak in the tank can be expressed in terms of the volume of 
water above the leak and the cross-sectional area. Therefore the height j(t) can be written 
as: 
j(t) = Vj(t), 
AT 
where Vj (t) is the volume of water in the tank at time t for the height j. 
Equation 5.14 becomes, 
Therefore, substituting this into Equation 5.13 gives: 
5.2.2 Equation for Volume of Water in the Tank 
(5.15) 
The volume of water in the tank at time t can be found using Euler Integration [79]: 
V(t) = v(t - 1) + [VI (t - 1) - (V2(t - 1) + V3(t - 1) + V4(t - 1))] dt, (5.16) 
where Vl(t -1), V2(t -1), V3(t -1) and V4(t -1) are the flow rates at VFl, VF2, VF3 and 
SP1 respectively, at time t - 1, and dt is the time increment. 
Substituting equations 5.1, 5.6, 5.12 and 5.15 into 5.16 gives: 
[ ( 
v(t - 1) 
v(t) = v(t -1) + A,u,(t -1) - 3A2 29 AT + A4 29 Vj~~ 1) ) ] dt. (5.17) 
5.2.3 Equation for Height of Water in the Tank 
The height of water in the tank at time t can be expressed in terms of the volume of water 
in the tank, and the tank's cross-sectional area, as shown in Equation 5.4. Substituting 
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Equation 5.17 into Equation 5.4 gives: 
v(t -1) + [A1Ul(t -1) - (3A2V29V(~~1) + A4V29Vi~;1))] dt 
h(t) = AT (5.18) 
The rate of change of the height of water in the tank can also be obtained using Equation 5.4: 
2 v(t-1) A 
9 AT + 4 
5.3 Fault Detection Demonstration 
This section describes the construction of the water tank simulation and fault tree capability. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates how the data flows between the fundamental elements of the simulation 
and these are described in more detail in Section 5.3.1 to 5.3.5. 
Configuration 
Faults L-_SY't_'m---,~ ...--___ --./.-_Ind_u,_,d---, Description Water Tank Program File 
EJ Fault Tree Branch 
File 
Fault 
'fr~ 
Capability 
-
Data File in .CSV 
Format 
\[£J 
Figure 5.2: Data flow between major components of water tank simulation 
Information regarding the system status is input into the simulation through the system 
description and fault tree branch files. This will update the system behaviour and then 
any deviations obtained are used in the fault tree capability. The system outputs a file 
containing the system configuration and any faults induced in the system, also system data 
from the simulation and any potential failures present. More information regarding the 
input and output files for the system are shown in Appendix B. 
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The following list contains an overview of how the program works: 
• Changes to the system tank model status and the fault trees are input into the 
program. 
• The changes made to the system are output to a file. 
• The simulation is executed for a given amount of time steps. 
• At each print step information from the system is output to a file. 
• The actual and expected sensor readings are compared at each check step for the 
given mode of operation. 
• A scenario for the system is identified. 
• A TOP event structure is constructed for the identified system scenario for each of 
the four schemes. 
• Cut sets/prime implicants are obtained and minimised. 
• The coherent approximation is performed and the list of potential causes for each 
scheme re-minimised. 
• The potential causes of failure for each scheme are output to a file. 
• The most likely cause of failure is ascertained through the use of importance measures. 
The water tank simulation has been verified as representative of a real system by the 
comparison of its results against those results identified for each of the schemes using 
FaultTree+. These have also in turn been compared to those expected, which were identified 
by hand. More information regarding the use of FaultTree+ and the identification of actual 
possible causes of failure can be found in Chapter 4. 
5.3.1 Input Pars er 
The input parser processes the contents of the system description file and the fault tree 
branch file. It tokenises each line, removing spaces and commas. For instance, an input 
line in the system description file could be 'VALVE! STATE FAILED OPEN 0.00' and this 
becomes 'VALVE!' 'STATE' 'FAILEDOPEN' '0.00'. 
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The program parses the tokens of each of these files to check if each line input is a 
representative of a valid state change, variable assignment or random failure. If the tokens 
do not form a valid statement an error is generated informing the user of the number of 
the invalid line. 
5.3.2 Simulation Model 
The model of the water tank system is represented using a series of C data structures. 
Each structure contains information about a particular system component. Figure 5.3 is a 
simplified class diagram showing the attributes of components within the model. 
Sensor valve Conlroller Valve 
.... 
nurrber: int ~ mode: int ..... number: int 
trlggerLevel : double 
number: int slale: Int 
state: int sensor 1)\ slate: Int 
manualValue 
2' \ 
controllers MainSupply 
otray !OverSpi11Tray 
slate: int .,-
" TankSystem state: Int Inflow: double ~ 
vars 
msupply 
"-
.- Variables 
phase timeStar! : doubl 
pipes tank tlmeEnd : double \11 \1/ 6 \11 timelnc : double 
!SystemPhase 
Pipe Tank 
checkStep : int 
Istate : Int I printStep : int 
radius: double plpeLevel : double rProbStep : int 
number: Int waterLevel : double 
length: double radius: double 
area: double height: double 
state: Int capacity: double 
state: int 
Figure 5.3: Class diagram showing the component attributes 
Each component has attributes defined by a structure with associated functions declared in a 
corresponding module. For instance, a pipe structure has attributes number, length, radius, 
state and area. Functions that operate with the pipe include 'pipelnitO', 'pipe8etstateO' 
and 'pipeWaterCanFlowO'. 
The level control in the simulation takes into account the state of the components that 
direct the flow of water. These are namely the control loop containing valve VI, controller 
Cl and sensor 81 for water flowing into the tank and the loop with valve V3, controller C2 
and sensor 82 controlling the amount of water leaving the tank through the safety valve. 
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When the components are working normally the sensors will indicate that the water level 
is as required. Flow into the system will occur when the level sensors are reading low and 
Cl in this case will keep VI open to allow the water level to be replenished. If the sensors 
indicate a high level of water C2 will open V3 in an attempt reduce this. 
If either of the controllers has failed the simulation will ignore the reading from the 
corresponding level sensor and will instruct the appropriate valve to open or close based on 
the failed state. Likewise a failed valve will ignore requests from the controller to open or 
close as required and continue in its current state. 
Within the simulation each controller has been given a mode to enable the same code to 
be used to model both. The mode allows them to take different actions depending on the 
readings from the sensors. Cl is said to be in an 'inverted mode' so will keep VI open when 
the sensors are low. C2 is in a 'normal mode', therefore opens V3 when the sensors are 
reading a high water level. 
5.3.3 State Change Mechanism 
The state change mechanism causes changes to the states of the model's components either 
by user request or random generation via the system description file. Each change occurs at 
the end of the time interval at which it is stated to start from. The name of the component 
to be changed, a new state for the component and an optional time for this change to take 
place is required to cause the occurrence of a change in state. All changes are sorted and 
stored in order of time and component, and these are output to the configuration file as 
described in Section B.3.1. 
5.3.4 Main Loop of the Simulation 
At the core of the simulation is a 'loop' that iterates from the start to end time of the 
analysis. At each time step the current time is increased by the time increment dt. A 
flowchart illustrating the operations performed by the main loop is shown in Figure 5.4. 
Before the loop commences the time variables are initialised and state changes that have 
been set to occur at the start are induced. After this intialisation the current time is 
incremented and the program enters a while loop that cycles whilst the current time is less 
than or equal to the end time. 
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Figure 5.4: Flow Chart for the main loop of the water tank simulation 
The first time point to involve any calculation is the 'start time +dt'. For this and every 
increment until the end time the body of the loop is executed. Each time round the loop the 
counters for the print, check, and random failure time steps are incremented. The level and 
flow rates are then calculated and the controllers are operated depending on the readings 
from the level sensors throughout the system operation. The print and check counters 
within the system are then compared to see if they indicate the need to output data or 
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check for failures. 
In order to constantly monitor for failures, the program has been set to check the sensor 
readings for any deviations at every time step. Before the next iteration commences the 
state changes are applied to the current time step and written out to the configuration file. 
The value of the current time step is incremented by dt and the loop iterates again. 
5.3.5 Fault Tree Capability 
The identification of the potential causes of failure and the prediction of the most likely 
cause, when there is more than one possibility, is conducted in the second part of the 
program. This section uses the sensor readings for VFI, VF2, VF3 and SPI along with the 
identification of the system operating mode that are supplied by the simulation model. 
The failure logic diagrams produced for the water tank system represent the causes of 
any sensor readings and are outlined in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. The trees for each sensor 
reading are input into the program and used when indicated by the given system scenario. 
All possible causes of a scenario are obtained by constructing a TOP event structure from 
the information given by the observation points within the system. The fault trees for 
the obtained sensor readings are combined using an AND gate. The program constructs a 
TOP event structure for each of the four schemes described in Section 4.4 to illustrate their 
individual results. In the event that the system is working as required no fault tree will be 
generated for schemes 1 and 3 as these do not take into consideration consistency. 
5.3.5.1 Fault Tree Generation 
The fault trees are represented in the program's code using an "n-tree structure'. Each 
tree node can contain up to n branches. The structure is illustrated in Figure 5.5. Basic 
events in the fault trees are built into the code as 'terminal nodes' and each of these has a 
'component name' and 'state'. Intermediate events are represented by 'non-terminal nodes' 
and each has a related AND, OR or NOT gate. A NOT gate will only ever contain a single 
branch. The coherent and non-coherent fault trees for each of the deviated sensor readings 
are loaded from the fault tree branch file and this information is used to generate the fault 
trees. 
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Figure 5.5: Fault tree structure 
5.3.5.2 Combining of Fault Trees for Given Sensor Readings 
At any given time the sensors must indicate one of the 16 scenarios listed in Chapter 4, 
Table 4.1. If the system is ACTIVE the sensors should show the readings listed in scenario 
4 of Table 4.1. When the system is DORMANT sensor readings should correspond to 
scenario 16. When the readings do not match the model behaviour it suggests a fault exists 
in at least one of the system components. Potential causes of system failure can be obtained 
by constructing a top event structure from the information provided by VF1, VF2, VF3 
and SP1. A top event structure can be constructed from 0 (if there are no failures) to 4 (if 
all sensors fail or consistency checks are used) sensor readings, depending on the scenario, 
phase and scheme. Fault trees for the sensor readings are combined to form a top event 
structure for the scenario using an AND gate. This fault tree is built by the program and 
output to the fault file (see section B.3.3). Figure 5.6 illustrates how the status of each 
sensor is used to form the TOP event structure. 
TOP 
Event 
~ 
I 11 I 
Status of Volume Status of Volume Status of Volume Status of 
Flow Rate Flow Rate Flow Rate Overspill Sensor 
SensorVFl SensorVF2 SensorVF3 SP1 
Figure 5.6: Typical TOP event structure built by the water tank simulation program 
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5.3.5.3 Cut Set Extraction 
Cut sets are obtained for the given sensor readings by recursively traversing the fault trees 
and applying the operations described by the non-terminal nodes. A cut set is made up of 
terminals, which represent the basic events in the program code. Each cut set is represented 
using a non-balanced 'binary-search-tree' structure. Sets of cut sets are represented using 
a dynamic array, each element of which is a pointer to a cut set's binary search tree, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.7. This dynamic array consists of n cut sets for a given fault tree. 
The first cut set in the example (entry 0 in the array) is of order two and the second (entry 
1) of order three. 
Each of the terminals in these cut sets would have a component name, state and negated flag 
(to indicate a working component). Using the binary tree structure means that a terminal 
can appear at most once in each cut set, which aids the minimisation procedure. A cut set 
may appear more than once in the dynamic array, however in each cut set there will not be 
any repeated component failures. Any branches of the fault tree that are negated can also 
be recursively traversed, the cut sets extracted, minimised and placed into the dynamic 
array along with the rest of the cut sets. 
Dynamic Array of Cut Sets 
(r ______________ ~A~ ____________ ~, 
o 1 2 n-l 
T T T 
Figure 5.7: Structure of binary search trees in the dynamic array 
5.3.5.4 The Minimisation Procedure 
The first part of the minimisation procedure occurs when the cut sets are extracted and 
placed into the dynamic array. The second part of the procedure process involves removing 
any cut sets from the dynamic array that are not minimal. Each cut set is compared with 
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each other to ensure that no cut set is a subset of or exactly the same as another. 
For two cut sets A and B, if A ~ B where A contains fewer elements than B then cut set 
B would be removed from the list. Also, there is the possibility that A = B, so in this 
case one of the copies of the same cut set will be removed. The removal of duplicated cut 
sets is implemented using a similar procedure to that used by the MOCUS algorithm [29J. 
The time complexity of the algorithm is non-linear and therefore a more efficient solution 
to minimisation needs to be found. This does however limit the use of this software in a 
real time application, and therefore a more efficient solution to minimisation needs to be 
found. 
5.3.5.5 The Coherent Approximation Procedure 
Some of the cut sets in the dynamic array may contain negated terminals. Once the cut 
sets have been extracted and minimised for the dynamic array, the negated terminals from 
the sets may be removed. Minimisation takes place again as the cut sets may no longer 
be minimal. This procedure ensures that all minimised cut sets are only made up from 
potential causes of failure and not working state modes. 
5.3.5.6 Measures of Importance 
In the majority of cases more than one potential cause of failure will be obtained, as 
discussed in Section 4.5.3.4 and shown from the results obtained. In order to deduce the 
most likely outcome reliability theory can be utilised to rank the potential failure causes 
obtained. The unavailability for each component failure is given by Equation 3.35. Is has 
been assumed that the repair rate is O. The Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set 
importance [29J is used to rank the cut sets obtained from the analysis and is shown in 
Equation 3.49. QSYS in this equation is calculated using the Rare Event approximation, as 
shown in Equation 3.45. 
5.4 Simulation Results 
There are three ways in which failures can be generated for the water tank system: through 
manually inducing a failure at a specified point in time for a selected component, by 
randomly generating a specified number of components to fail at a given point in time, 
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or through use of the unavailability of each component (See Appendix B). 
Example Induced System Failure 
The first example shows the results obtained for a failure induced into the system at a 
specific point in time. A component state change can be induced at any specified time 
in the simulation and does not necessarily have to be a system failure. For instance, the 
system can be switched to ACTIVE from DORMANT at a specified time without a failure 
taking place. 
Two failures - sensor S2 fails high (S2FH) and tank leaks (TL) - were induced into the 
system at the same time in the ACTIVE operating mode. The simulation identified that 
there was flow leaving the system at VF3 and water was detected in the overspill tray at 
SPl, indicating that the system was in scenario 1 in Table 4.1. There were 102 potential 
causes of failure identified using scheme 1 in this case. However, only 15 of these were 
actually valid for the top event. The potential causes of failure obtained for each of the 
four schemes are listed in Table 5.1. 
Results from Results from Results from Results from 
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 
Valid Obtained Correct Obtained Correct Obtained Correct Obtained Correct Actual 
Potential Potential Potential Potential Potential Potential Potential Potential jpossibilities 
Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes 
1) S2FH.TL S2FH.TL S2FH.TL S2FH.TL S2FH.TL S2FH.TL S2FH.TL S2FH.TL S2FH 
2) C2FH.TL p2FH.TL p2FH.TL p2FH.TL C2FH.TL C2FH.TL C2FH.TL p2FH.TL C2FH 
3) V3FO.TL ,,3FO.TL ,,3FO.TL jv3FO.TL V3FO.TL iv3FO.TL V3FO.TL iv3FO.TL V3FO 
4) VIFO.P3B.TL VIFO.P3B.TL 
5) VIFO.P3F.TL VIFO.P3F.TL 
6) VIFO.P4B.TL VIFO.P4B.TL 
7) VIFO.V2FC.TL !vlFO.V2FC.TL 
8) SIFL.P3B.TL SlFL.P3B.TL 
9) SIFL.P3F.TL SlFL.P3F.TL 
10) SlFL.P4B.TL SlFL.P4B.TL 
11) SlFL.V2FC.TL SlFL.V2FC.TL 
12) CIFL.P3B.TL CIFL.P38.TL 
13) CIFL.P3F.TL CIFL.P3F.TL 
14) CIFL.P4B.TL CIFL.P4B.TL 
15) CIFL.V2FC.TL CIFL.V2FC.TL 
Table 5.1: Results obtained for schemes 1 to 4 when the system is induced with 
the failure V2FC.TL in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Only the potential causes valid (those that can actually occur) for the given top event 
obtained in scheme 1 are shown. The most likely cause of failure obtained using Fussell-
Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance measure was found to be S2FH. TL, which in 
this case is correct. However, this measure may not always be this accurate. For instance, 
the same most likely cause of failure would have occurred if valve V3 had failed open and 
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the tank could leak resulting in the same scenario. 
Example Random Failure 
The random component failure feature is enables the generation of a fixed number of random 
component failures at a specified time. Any failures in the system may not always have 
an immediate effect on the system functionality. For example, a failure randomly induced 
into the system was valve VI failing closed (VIFC) at time t = 120s in the DORMANT 
operating mode. In this case the fault was not detected by the fault tree capability for any 
of the four schemes because valve VI is expected to be closed in this mode. Therefore it 
would not be indicated until the system became ACTIVE or through a change in scenario. 
This highlights a restriction in the analysis. 
Example Failure Based on Unavailability 
Valve V3 fails open (V3FO) was an example failure input into the system depending upon 
the unavailability of each component. The fault was detected by the fault tree capability 
for each of the four schemes, the results from which are listed in Table 5.2. 
Results from Results from Results from Results from 
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 
Obtained Correct Obtained Correct Obtained Correct Obtained Correct Actual 
Potential !potential Potential [potential Potential Potential Potential !potential !Possibilities 
Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes CSU8eS Causes Causes 
1) S2FH S2FH S2FH S2FH S2FH S2FH S2FH S2FH S2FH 
2) C2FH C2FH C2FH C2FH C2FH C2FH C2FH C2FH C2FH 
3) V3FO V3FO V3FO V3FO V3FO V3FO V3FO V3FO V3FO 
4) VIFO.P3B VIFO.P3B 
5) VIFQ.P3F VIFO.P3F 
6) VIFO.P4B VIFO.P4B 
7) VIFO.V2FC VIFO.V2FC 
8) SlFL.P3B SlFL.P3B 
9) SlFL.P3F SIFL.P3F 
10) SlFL.P4B SlFL.P4B 
11) SlFL.V2FC SlFL.V2FC 
12) CIFL.P3B CIFL.P3B 
13) ClFL.P3F CIFL.P3F 
14) CIFL.P4B CIFL.P4B 
15) CIFL.V2FC CIFL.V2FC 
Table 5.2: Results obtained for schemes 1 to 4 for the occurrence of V3FO 
through unavailability in the ACTIVE operating mode 
At each specified time step within the analysis the components are checked for failure and 
for the type of failure that has occurred. The system scenario are determined to be number 
2 in Table 4.1. The most likely cause of failure obtained using Fussell-Vesely measure of 
minimal cut set importance measure was found to be S2FH, which in this case is incorrect, 
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however, this failure is in the list of possibilities identified. 
5.5 Summary 
• This chapter has described the development of a computer program to simulate the 
system and implement the four fault detection schemes introduced in Chapter 4. 
• The program consists of two main parts. The first is a model of the water tank and 
its components. The second part of the program demonstrates the fault detection 
method. 
• System status is determined using readings provided by the flow sensors VF1, VF2 
and VF3 situated after the three valves, and the overspill tray sensor SP!. 
• Component state changes can be induced to occur at a specific point in time, randomly 
or depending on the unavailability. 
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Consideration of Dynamics 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 contained a discussion of the results obtained for the four fault tree based schemes 
that were described. It was found that scheme 4, which uses non-coherent fault trees, and 
checks for consistency by using information from all the observation points is the most 
accurate at modelling system behaviour. 
An important issue highlighted was the need to consider dynamics in the analysis in order to 
improve the method and obtain more accurate results. Transient effects are now discussed 
in more detail in this Chapter. This will include investigating time history, rate of change 
of height and the level of water in the tank. The simple water tank level control system 
introduced in Chapter 4 is used to demonstrate the dynamic features of the method. The 
system has two operating modes, these being ACTIVE and DORMANT, each of which 
identify the expected system behaviour depending on the exact flow of water in and out of 
the system. 
Another factor to consider is the scalability of the method and how well it could be applied 
to a larger system. The size and number of fault trees analysed will need to be reduced when 
used on a bigger system. In addition bounds are required on the fault tree development 
to restrict the causal relationships to those of the control systems on each stream. The 
results in Chapter 4 showed that a consistency check is required to produce an accurate list 
of potential causes of system failure. The use of a check against those parts of the system 
known to be working in the dynamic method is also considered in this chapter. 
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6.2 System Stages 
The fault detection and identification process is performed in two stages. The first is the 
modelling and preparation stage, during which information required concerning the causes 
and consequences of failures in the system's sections is gathered. This information is stored 
and used in the application stage to identify component failures that cause the observed 
symptoms. The stages are described in more detail in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 respectively. 
6.2.1 System Modelling and Preparation Stage 
The modelling and preparation stage is the part of the analysis in which all available 
information about a given system is collected and used in preparation for application. 
1. The first task is to divide the system up into sections or subsystems. These should 
be parts of the system that can change the process variables by either normal control 
action or through the occurrence of a component failure. 
2. The subsystem process variables that are to be measured, such as flow, temperature, 
pressure or level are identified. Sensors can then be incorporated into the system in 
order to monitor these variables if not already present for control purposes. 
3. All the possible modes of system operation are identified. Assumptions to be made 
that can affect the operation of the system are also listed. 
4. All system scenarios are developed. The scenarios consider all possible deviations in 
the process variables on each section. They may be failed high, low or be working 
as normal. On sections where there is a control system, the deviations may be due 
to control system failures. Deviations can also occur due to the failure of passive 
components such as pipes or wires. Some sections may contain only passive elements 
of the system in which case changes in the related process variable will only happen 
when a failure mode occurs or changes in section inputs and outputs. 
5. For each of the system operating modes identified, a set of potential patterns from 
the readings obtained from each section are developed. Only the shape of the sensor 
reading pattern is required. 
6. Fault trees for causes of the process variable deviation at each of the sensor locations 
used to define the scenarios are drawn. Each fault tree is developed down to the 
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component failures in the system. Fault trees may be drawn for absolute values or 
rates of change, depending on what information is considered useful for the particular 
system. For any normal system behaviour causes of sensor readings are developed 
using success trees, which describe all the components in the system that must be 
working correctly in order for that outcome to occur. 
These stages are now demonstrated using the water tank system. 
6.2.1.1 System Division 
The water tank system can be split into five sections as shown in Figure 6.1. Each section 
is indicated in the diagram by the dashed lines, three of which contain a valve, the fourth 
includes the tank along with its level and the fifth section contains the overspill tray. 
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Figure 6.1: Water tank system sections 
6.2.1.2 Identification of System Sensors 
The flow in and out of the system is observed using 3 flow sensors that are situated next 
to each valve to measure the flows, as described in Chapter 4. The sensors are denoted 
by VFl, VF2, VF3 for the locations VI, V2 and V3 respectively (see Figure 6.1 for an 
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illustration of the water tank system). It is now assumed that each of these sensors can 
measure the exact flow rate at their particular location in the system. A fourth sensor 8Pl 
is located in the overspill tray (TRAY) to detect if there is any loss of containment of water 
in the tank. 
6.2.1.3 Identification of Process Variables 
The overall aim of the system is to control the water level in the tank, therefore this is the 
key system variable in this example. The flows in and out of any part of the system are 
dynamic factors that affect the level of water in the tank, which can be calculated from 
the measurements taken by the 4 sensor readings and also obtained directly from the level 
sensors 81 and 82. The height of water is now considered in 6 discrete categories: empty 
(E), low (L), normal (N), high (H), very high (VH) and full (F), as shown in Figure 6.2. 
The tank is expected to stay within the 'normal' level threshold under normal operating 
conditions. 
Very High 
High 
Normal 
Low 
Full 
Required Level 
Empty 
Figure 6.2: Discrete height categories 
The system will start out at the normal level, which it aims to maintain throughout the 
operation. If any other level is obtained this indicates that a failure of some kind has 
occurred in the tank system. For instance, an empty or low water level implies that there 
has been more flow out of the system than is going in. In this case, flow in would be 
expected in order to try and replenish the system. A high level is caused by more flow into 
the system than out and indicates that the level is over the normal threshold in the tank. 
If the level becomes very high or full the safety valve would normally operate in an attempt 
to reduce the water level. 
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6.2.1.4 System Scenarios 
The valves at the sensors VFI, VF2 and VF3 can be working (WK) , be providing unrequired 
or high flow (HF) or not allowing flow when needed, resulting in 'low flow' (LF). The 
conclusion that a control valve system is working indicates that the valve at this point 
is opening and closing as and when required by the system, therefore providing flow and 
no flow on demand for the chosen operating mode. If high flow occurs one of the valves 
is causing uncontrollable water flow into or out of the system. Low flow will result in 
uncontrollable no flow occurring, therefore at this point in the system there is no water flow 
when required. The two latter possibilities are the result of a failure occurring somewhere 
in the system. The sensor in the overspill tray SPI can indicate that the tank is working 
(WK), or that a failure has occurred causing water to accumulate in the tray (TF). From 
the flow sensors at VI, V2, V3 and in the TANK there are 54 different potential scenarios 
that can possibly occur, as listed in Table 6.1. 
Scenario VI V2 V3 TANK Scenario VI V2 V3 TANK 
WK WK WK WK 28 HF HF HF TF 
2 WK WK WK TF 2' HF HF LF WK 
3 WK WK HF WK 30 HF HF LF TF 
4 WK WK HF TF 31 HF LF WK WK 
5 WK WK LF WK 32 HF LF WK TF 
• WK WK LF TF 33 HF LF HF WK 
7 WK HF WK WK 34 HF LF HP TP 
8 WK HP WK TF 35 HF LP LF WK 
, WK HP HF WK 3. HP LP LF TP 
10 WK HP HF TF 37 LF WK WK WK 
11 WK HF LF WK 38 LP WK WK TF 
12 WK HF LF TF 39 LF WK HF WK 
13 WK LF WK WK 40 LF WK HF TF 
14 WK LF WK TF 
" 
LF WK LF WK 
15 WK LF HF WK 42 LF WK LF TF 
I. WK LF HF TF 43 LF HF WK WK 
17 WK LF LF WK 44 LF HF WK TF 
I. WK LF LF TF 45 LF HF HF WK 
19 HF WK WK WK 4. LF HF HF TF 
20 HF WK WK TF 47 LF HF LF WK 
21 HF WK HF WK 4. LF HF LF TF 
22 HF WK HF TF 49 LF LF WK WK 
23 HF WK LF WK 50 LF LF WK TF 
24 HF WK LF TF 51 LF LF HF WK 
25 HF HF WK WK 52 LF LF HF TF 
2. HF HF WK TF 53 LF LF LF WK 
27 HF HF HF WK .. LF LF LF TF 
Table 6.1: System Scenarios 
The working state includes situations where a failure has occurred on a component causing 
a valve to operate in a certain way to try and rectify the problem. For instance, if the level 
of water in the tank rises too high the safety valve is expected to open. This indicates that 
a failure has occurred in the system, but this valve has acted correctly in order to rectify 
the problem. Any drop in the level of water in the tank will cause valve VI to open and 
this will stay open until the level is replenished, regardless of the system operating mode, 
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as the level of water in the tank is always expected to be normal. 
6.2.1.5 Modes of System Operation and System Assumptions 
6.2.1.5.1 Modes of System Operation 
The water tank's two modes of operation are ACTIVE and DORMANT. If ACTIVE, water 
is taken out of the tank through valve V2 and replaced by water coming into the system 
through VI from the main supply. There is no flow out of V3 and no water exiting the tank 
to the overspill tray. When in the DORMANT mode valves VI, V2 and V3 would remain 
closed and the overspill tray would be empty. 
Taking dynamics into consideration, if the system is ACTIVE then in addition to flow in 
at VI and flow out at V2 a 'normal' water level will be expected. The level of water in the 
tank may fluctuate but should not rise above or fall below the normal threshold shown in 
Figure 6.2. In the DORMANT operating mode the level of water in the tank is expected 
to again be 'normal', with zero rate of change. 
6.2.1.5.2 System Operating Assumptions 
In addition to the assumptions made in Chapter 4: 
• Originally it was assumed that a rupture in the tank would cause no flow out of any 
of the valves in the system. However it would take time for the tank to empty and 
this is now identified in the analysis . 
• Flow out at the subsection containing valve V2 or V3 and a leak in the tank cannot 
be compensated for by flow into the system. 
6.2.1.6 Potential Patterns 
The flow rate measurements taken from the sensors VFI, VF2, VF3 and SPI can be used 
to build up a flow rate history at these particular locations in the tank over a period of 
time. From these a pattern of the history can be identified and used to obtain a list of 
scenarios that the system can potentially be in from the 54 possibilities listed in Table 6.1. 
117 
Consideration of Dynamics System Stages 
The level of water in the tank and the rate of change can be calculated from the readings. 
In a similar way as described for the sensors these two pieces of information can be used 
to build up a history of the level of water in the tank over a period of time. Tables 6.2 
and 6.3 show the expected patterns for the system when in the ACTIVE and DORMANT 
operating modes respectively. 
Scenarios VI V2 V3 TANK 
1,5,7, 11, 19, 23, 25, 29 
.C .le .L .L 
Scenarios 
Table 6.2: Expected readings when the system is 
in the ACTIVE operating mode 
VI V2 V3 TANK 
1,5,13,11,31,41,49,53 
.L .L .L .L 
Table 6.3: Expected readings when the system is 
in the DORMANT operating mode 
Level 
±= 
Level 
±= 
Each table indicates patterns in the sensor readings taken over a period of time from the 
start of the current operating mode, i.e. from when the system became ACTIVE or when it 
became DORMANT. These are for the four locations in the system, indicating the amount 
of flow at the volume flow rate sensors and the amount of water in the overspill tray. The 
level pattern illustrates how the reading has changed over time, from which the rate of 
change can be determined. Any pattern of results that is different from those set out for 
the system in the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes will indicate that a failure 
must have occurred somewhere in the system. Failure conditions within the system can 
exist at the start of and may also occur during an operation. 
There are a number of scenarios for the system that indicate the expected system behaviour 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode, as listed in Table 6.2. Scenario 1 however, is the only 
one where the system is working correctly producing the 4 given sensor readings and level 
pattern. The remaining 7 possibilities all contain an unrevealed failure of some kind whose 
symptoms are masked. Flow in and out of the system could be occurring as expected, 
but there could still be a hidden failure somewhere in the system. A way of checking 
the system for unrevealed failures would be to switch the operating mode from ACTIVE 
to DORMANT. In this case failures in scenarios 7, 11, 19, 23, 25 and 29 would become 
apparent. Failures would not be identified in scenario 5, which indicates a problem at valve 
118 
Consideration of Dynamics System Stages 
V3, unless the level of water in the tank rises to or above very high, at which point the 
safety valve should open. Similarly any failure linked to V3 in scenarios 11, 23 and 29 will 
also remain undetected. 
For the DORMANT operating mode, Table 6.3 shows the sensor readings for the expected 
behaviour. Scenario 1 is again the only one which indicates the system is working correctly; 
all other scenarios having the same symptoms contain at least one unrevealed failure. 
The system could be seemingly working as expected, with all three valves closed and no 
water in the spill tray, however one of the valves could be closed due to a DORMANT 
component failure. This will not be identified until either the system is switched into the 
ACTIVE operating mode, or another failure occurs causing that particular valve to be 
open. Switching modes would reveal failures in scenarios 13, 17, 37, 41, 49 and 53. This 
will not reveal any failures in scenario 5, nor a failure causing a problem at V3 in scenarios 
17, 41 and 53. 
When a control valve system is deemed to be working in a scenario it can only be assumed 
that those component states which would cause a counter result cannot be valid. For 
instance, if there is flow at VI then anything that could cause no flow can be eliminated 
from the list of possibilities, and if the reading is no flow then anything that could cause 
immediate flow can be omitted. Any readings in a scenario that are true to the operating 
mode are indicated using success trees. 
Regardless of whether the system is ACTIVE or DORMANT, if the level of water drops to 
low or even empty, flow is expected into the tank in order to try and replenish that lost. 
This drop into a discrete level category away from normal will indicate that a failure has 
occurred in either of the two operating modes. If the water level rises to very high then 
flow out of the safety valve will be expected. Both of these kinds of flows are ones that are 
potentially the result of a failure located elsewhere in the system. 
If the level of water in the tank rises to high, there should be no flow at VI, regardless of 
the operating mode. Flow into the system when the level is high can only be the result of 
a failure at valve VI causing it to open. If the level in the tank is below normal and there 
is no flow, then the failure stopping flow can only be something at that particular control 
valve system in the tank preventing flow in. 
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6.2.1.6.1 Identification of Potential Scenarios 
The flow sensor and level patterns are used to obtain an overall list of potential scenarios 
that the system could be in. Analysis is also performed looking just at flow sensor patterns 
as a comparison of results. A technique similar to the decision tree approach used by 
Novak [18-21] is used to establish a list of scenarios for each set of patterns obtained for 
the chosen operating mode. A tree of this kind can be used to identify the operating mode, 
and the flow patterns at the flow sensors, in the overspill tray and the level of water in the 
tank. The 54 different potential scenarios for the system listed in Table 6.1 have been sorted 
into tables depending on the patterns and system operating mode as shown in Tables 6.4 
and 6.5. An example tree is illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
Y., No (ACTIVE) 
Figure 6.3: An example decision tree for the water tank system 
6.2.1.6.2 Identification of Potential Scenario Causes 
A method was developed in Chapter 4 that compared the expected system behaviour with 
that observed in order to reveal any potential faults in the system. This technique is now 
extended to consider the dynamics of the system. A fault tree has been constructed for each 
of the deviated sensor readings from the observation points by taking into consideration the 
pattern history. Symptoms that indicate an observation point to be working are included in 
the analysis using success trees. Both fault and success trees are non-coherent in structure. 
At any given point in time the patterns from the sensors must indicate that the system is 
potentially in at least one of the 54 possible system scenarios listed in Table 6.1. 
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TOP Event Scenario VI V2 V3 TANK Level 
ACTIVEl 4, 10, 22, 28 
.le .~ .~ k::::= L 
ACTIVE2 3, 9, 21, 27 
.le .~ .~ .L :L 
ACTIVE3 2, 6, 8, 12, 20, 24, 26, 30 
.le .~ .L I~ L 
ACTIVE4 1,5,7,11, 19, 23, 25, 29 lc= .le L .L ±= 
ACTIVES 1,5,7, 11, 19, 23, 25, 29 lc= .C .L .L :L 
ACTIVE6 16,34 
.le .L .~ k::::= L 
ACTIVE7 15,33 
.le .L .~ .L L 
ACTIVE8 14, 18, 36 lc= .L .L k::::= ±= 
ACTIVE9 14, 18, 32, 36 
.le .L .L k::::= L 
ACTIVEI0 32 
.le .L .1.LIA k::::= ~ 
ACTIVE11 3. 
.le L .L k::::= C 
ACTIVE12 3. 
.le .L .L L C 
ACTIVE13 13, 17,31,35 lc= .L .L .L ±= 
ACTIVE14 13, 17, 31, 35 
.le .L .L .L L 
ACTIVE15 31 
.le .L .1.LIA .L ~ 
ACTIVE16 40, 46 
.L .~ .~ I~ L 
ACTIVE17 39,45 
.L .~ .~ .L L 
ACTIVE18 38, 42, 44, 48 
.L .~ .L k::::= :L 
ACTIVE19 37,41,43,47 
.L .~ .L .L L 
ACTIVE20 52 
.L .L .~ k::::= L 
ACTIVE21 51 
.L .L .~ .L :L 
ACTIVE22 50, 54 
.L .L .L k::::= L 
ACTIVE23 13,17,49,53 L L L L ±= 
ACTIVE24 49,53 
.L .L .L .L L 
Table 6.4: Possible system readings and their potential scenarios 
when the system is ACTIVE 
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TOP Event Scenario VI V2 V3 TANK 
DORMANT1 10,28 
.le .~ .~ L-::: 
DORMANT2 9,27 
.le .~ .~ .L 
DORMANT3 8, 12, 26, 30 
.le .~ .L L-::: 
DORMANT4 7, 11, 25, 29 
.C .C .L .L 
DORMANT5 7, 11, 25, 29 
.le .~ .L .L 
DORMANT6 4, 16, 22, 34 
.le .L .~ L-::: 
DORMANT7 3, 15, 21, 33 
.le .L .~ .L 
DORMANT8 2, 6, 14, 18 1= .L .L L-::: 
DORMANT9 2, 6, 14, 18, 24, 32, 36 
.le .L .L L-::: 
DORMANTlO 20,32 
.le .L .iiW. L-::: 
DORMANTII 24,36 
.le .L .L L-::: 
DORMANT12 23, 24, 36 
.le .L .L L 
DORMANT13 1,5,13,17,31,35 
.C .L .L .L 
DORMANT14 1,5, 13, 17,31,35 
.le .L .L .L 
DORMANT15 19, 31 
.le .L .iiW. .L 
DORMANT16 46 
.L .be. .be. L-::: 
DORMANT17 45 
.L .~ .be. .L 
DORMANT18 44,48 
.L .be. .L L-::: 
DORMANT19 43,47 
.L .be. .L .L 
DORMANT20 40,52 
.L .L .be. .L:::: 
DORMANT21 39,51 
.L .L .be. .L 
DORMANT22 38, 42, 50, 54 
.L .L .L .L:::: 
DORMANT23 1,5,13, 17,37,41,49,53 
.L .L .L .L 
DORMANT24 37,41,49,53 
.L .L .L .L 
Table 6.5: Possible system readings and their potential scenarios 
when the system is DORMANT 
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Level 
L 
L 
L 
±:= 
L 
L 
L 
±:= 
L 
.~ 
r= 
r= 
±:= 
L 
~ 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
t= 
L 
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A list of possible scenarios that the system could be in is obtained for each set of sensor 
patterns, which are shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 for the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating 
modes respectively. Under normal operating conditions the system is expected to exhibit 
the sensor and level patterns for the ACTIVE4 operating mode as shown in ACTIVE and 
DORMANT23 for the DORMANT mode. 
6.2.1.7 Fault Tree Development 
Initial investigations showed that non·coherent fault trees, which are constructed using 
both working and failed components, provide more reliable results compared to analysis 
performed using coherent fault trees (see Chapter 4). Therefore only non-coherent fault 
trees were used when considering the system dynamics. 
6.2.1.7.1 Fault 'free Construction 
Each fault tree is drawn by taking into consideration the potential causes of failure for each 
unit in order to restrict these to their own part of the system and inputs and outputs to that 
section. As an example the fault tree for low flow in section 2 (V2), labelled, 'Section 2 (V2) 
Low Flow', is described in this Section, the remaining fault trees are given in Appendix C. 
Causes of failure observed from the level of water in the tank can also be considered in 
the analysis. Fault trees are drawn for each of the failure modes. The level pattern for 
the system can either be within the normal threshold (expected behaviour), decreasing, 
increasing to very high and then decreasing when the safety valves opens (oscillating), or 
increasing uncontrollably to full. The tank section contains the level, which is a key factor 
within in the analysis. The level pattern from the tank takes into consideration all system 
behaviour as it is affected by all other sections within the system. Therefore the fault trees 
for the level patterns are as complex as those that were drawn for the original analysis. 
Regardless of the level of water in the tank, it has been assumed the system can compensate 
for flow out through valve V2. Any flow greater than this will result in a decreasing level. A 
leak in the tank is assumed to have a smaller flow out than that at V2, so a failure causing 
flow into the system alongside a leak would result in a rising water level. Originally it was 
assumed that a rupture in the tank would cause no flow out of any of the valves in the 
system. However it would take time for the tank to empty and this is now identified in the 
sensor and level patterns. 
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Low Flow in Section 2 (V2) 
The non-coherent fault tree presenting the causes of low flow in section 2 (V2) is shown in 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5. No flow at V2 can either be because the system is DORMANT and 
NOT ACTIVE, so a no flow phase is expected at the valve (DORMANT, ACTIVE), hence 
failures indicating no flow at V2 cannot be detected under normal operating conditions, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.4. The only piece of information known is that the valve has not 
failed open (V2FO), else flow would occur. 
Figure 6.4: Non-coherent fault tree for low flow in section 2 (V2) 
If the system is ACTIVE and there is water flow at V2 then there must be a failure 
preventing flow out (ACTIVE, DORMANT), as shown in Figure 6.4. Therefore V2 could 
be failed closed (V2FC) and not open (V2FO) or there could be a failure in pipe P3 or 
P4. Pipe P3 could be blocked (P3B) and not fractured (P3F), or fractured (P3F) and not 
blocked (P3B). Lastly, pipe P4 could be blocked (P4B) and not fractured (P4F), as shown 
in Figure 6.5. 
The prime implicants for 'low flow in section 2 (V2)' are listed in Table 6.6. There are 4 
in total, all order 2. Table 6.7 lists the potential causes of failure for 'low flow in section 
2 (V2)' obtained after performing the coherent approximation, each of which are of single 
order. 
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Figure 6.5: Non-coherent fault tree for low flow in section 2 (V2) - transfer 1 
Number Prime ImpJicants 
1) V2FC.V2FO 
2) P3B.P3F 
3) P3F.P3B 
4) P4B.P4F 
Table 6.6: Prime implicants for low flow in section 2 (V2) 
Number Potential Causes of Failure 
1) V2FC 
2) P3B 
3) P3F 
4) P4B 
Table 6.7: Potential causes of failure for low flow in section 2 (V2) 
after performing the coherent approximation 
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6.2.1.7.2 Success nee Construction 
Success trees are comprised of all the component states in the system that cannot have failed 
for the given sensor reading that is deemed to be working as required. A failure of any of 
these component states would lead to a contradiction with the top event. Success trees for 
the water tank system are described in detail in Sections C.2.1 to C.2.6 of Appendix C. 
There is no success tree for 'water in the overspill tray' as this reading will always result 
from a failure in either operating modes for all level patterns in the system. 
The success trees are only drawn using working states that would have an immediate affect 
on that particular part of the system and not those where the symptoms that change over 
time may not be valid for the duration of a level pattern and depend on other sensor 
readings in the system in order to be true. 
Fault trees will therefore need to be built depending on the level pattern of water in the 
tank and the patterns from the flow readings. These will also be able to identify failures 
depending on a change in height identified by the level pattern. 
Working Low Flow in Section 2 (V2) 
Figure 6.6 presents the non-failures of the sensor reading 'Working Low Flow in Section 
2 (V2)'. For this sensor reading valve V2 cannot have failed open (V2FO) and as the 
reading is expected the system must be in the DORMANT operating mode, therefore is 
'not ACTIVE' (ACTIVE). 
No Flow Phase 
Through Valve 
V2 
Section 2 (\12) 
Working· Low 
Flow 
n.. Syst.m i. 
DORMANT and 
Wlt.r is NOT 
AVlllabllltV2 
Figure 6.6: Success tree for working low flow in section 2 (V2) 
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6.2.1.7.3 Possible Component Failures 
Table 6.8 lists the possible faults for each of the components in the system and their related 
code. The failures are the same as in the original system (see Chapter 4), except the level 
sensor can fail for each height category. As in the steady state conditions, the ACTIVE 
operating mode indicates that the user has tried to open valve V2 and DORMANT shows 
the user has attempted to close V2. 
Code 
PiB (1 ~ i ~ 6) 
PiF (1 ~ i ~ 6) 
ViFC (1 ~ i ~ 3) 
ViFO (1 ~ i ~ 3) 
SiFF (1 ~ i ~ 2) 
SiFVH (1 ~ i ~ 2) 
SiFH (1 < i < 2) 
Component Failure 
Pipe Pi is Blocked 
Pipe Pi is Fractured 
Valve Vi Fails Closed 
Valve Vi Fails Open 
Sensor Si Fails Full 
Sensor Si Fails Very High 
Sensor Si Fails High 
Code 
SiFL (1 ~ i ~ 2) 
SiFE (1 ~ i ~ 2) 
CiFH (1 ~ i ~ 2) 
CWL (1 ~ i ~ 2) 
TR 
TL 
NWMS 
Component Failure 
Sensor Si Fails Low 
Sensor Si Fails Empty 
Controller Ci Fails High 
Controller Ci Fails Low 
Tank Ruptured 
Tank Leaks 
No Water from the Main Supply 
Table 6.8: Potential component failures 
As in Chapters 4 and 5 the fault and success trees created for each of the sensor readings in 
the dynamic method were originally drawn by hand and then verified by automating them 
in FaultTree+. Each of the 54 scenarios listed in Table 6.1 were constructed in FaultTree+ 
for the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes. 
6.2.2 Fault Identification - The Application Stage 
1. Pattern recognition techniques are used to identify the actual patterns obtained for 
system sensor readings. These are then compared to those for the expected behaviour. 
If these patterns match this indicates the system is working as it should be for the 
given mode or sub-mode. Any pattern that does not match is indicative of a failure 
of some kind within the system. There may be hidden failures, but these would only 
become apparent through a change in expected behaviour during system operation, 
or by switching the operating mode. 
2. Sections of the overall system with the potential to have caused the observed 
symptoms resulting in the incorrect patterns from the key variable transmitters are 
identified. 
3. Each identified section is then investigated in turn and the actual patterns from 
readings for all the transmitters in that section are checked against those expected. 
Fault trees are combined for both the deviated and successful patterns for the section 
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using an AND gate with the status of certain basic events being determined by the 
transmitter patterns. 
4. A list of prime implicants will be obtained from the combined fault tree for each 
subsystem. A coherent approximation is then made by assuming that all working 
states are TRUE in order to obtain a list of cut sets. 
5. The cut set list obtained is then minimised in order to produce a list of the potential 
causes of failure for the specified subsystem. 
6. If there is more than one potential cause of failure then importance measures can 
be used to rank the failure modes using their probability of occurrence in order to 
determine the most likely outcome. 
The application stages are now demonstrated for an example from the water tank system. 
6.2.2.1 Identification of Actual Patterns 
The causes of each scenario is constructed by combining the fault trees for both the deviated 
and expected readings with an 'AND' gate. The method is now illustrated assuming the 
system is DORMANT and the patterns obtained are those for DORMANT1 shown in 
Table 6.9. 
Observed 
Behaviour 
Behaviour 
Expected 
TOP Event Potential VI V, V3 TANK 
Scenarios (Level in TRAY) 
DORMANT1 10,28 
.le=: h .~ k:::: 
DORMANT23 1,5,13,17 
.L .L .L .L 37,41,49,53 
Table 6.9: DORMANT operating mode with expected 
and actual sensor readings 
Level Pattern 
L 
:t= 
Table 6.9 shows the expected flow and level patterns when the system is in the DORMANT 
operating mode and the corresponding scenarios that could lead to these patterns. The table 
also lists an example for the actual sensor and level patterns recorded for the system along 
with their possible scenarios. Each of the 54 scenarios listed in Table 6.1 were constructed 
in FaultTree+ for the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes, so in this particular 
example scenarios lO and 28 in the DORMANT mode would be required. The scenarios were 
then used to develop the overall top events constructed from the system sensor patterns, 
all of which are shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 for the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating 
modes respectively. 
128 
Consideration of Dynamics System Stages 
6.2.2.2 Identification of Deviated Key Variables 
The results show that in this instance more water is leaving the tank than being replaced, 
hence the level is decreasing. Flow out at valves V2 and V3 indicate that they are causing 
high flow when there should be no flow at this point and water in the overspill tray shows 
that there must be a leak or rupture in the tank. Valve VI is open because water has 
been taken out of the system and this always opens in order to replenish any water lost. 
Another possibility is that a failure could have occurred causing VI to be open. Hence the 
two possible scenarios for the system with the given sensor and level patterns are 10 and 
28. 
6.2.2.3 TOP Event Structure Construction 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the structure for scenarios 10 and 28 respectively together with 
the corresponding level pattern. Not all level patterns are valid for each set of flow sensor 
scenarios. 
Scenario 10 in 
DORMANT1 
~ 
I III I 
Section 1 (V1) Section 2 (V2) Section 3 (V3) Section 4 Tank Level 
Working. Hi gh H"gh Flow High Flow (TANK) Decreas'lng 
Flow Tank Failure 
Figure 6.7: Structure for scenario 10 in the DORMANT operating mode 
Scenario 28 in 
DORMANT1 
~~ 
I III I 
Section 1 (V1) Section 2 (V2) Section 3 (V3) Section 4 Tank Level 
High Flow High Flow High Flow (TANK) Decreasing 
Tank Failure 
Figure 6.8: Structure for scenario 28 in the DORMANT operating mode 
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Both deviated and working readings are included in the diagrams. The scenarios for each 
set of patterns are then combined using an 'OR' gate to form the overall TOP event for 
the sensor and level patterns, as shown in Figure 6.9. 
TOP Event 
DORMANT1 
Scenario 10 in Scenario 28 in 
DORMANT1 DORMANT1 
Figure 6.9: TOP event structure for DORMANTl 
6.2.2.4 Prime Implicants 
A qualitative analysis of the fault tree in Figure 6.9 will produce prime implicants indicating 
the potential causes of the TOP event DORMANT1. An example of a prime implicant 
obtained is: 
V2FO.V3FO.TL.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.8IFVH.8IFF.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.V2FC.P3B.P3F.P4B.V3FC.P5B.P5F.P6B.TR. 
This prime implicant is of order 21. In total 10 prime implicants are obtained, 2 of order 
21, 2 of order 22 and 6 order 26. 
6.2.2.5 Potential Causes of System Failure 
Performing the coherent approximation removes any working component state from the 
prime implicants and yields a list of the potential causes of failure. These are shown for 
the given example in Table 6.10. 
Number Potential Causes Number Potential Causes 
1) V2FO.V3FO.TL 6) V2FO.S2FH.TR 
2) V2FO.V3FO.TR 7) V2FO.S2FVH.TL 
3) V2FO.C2FH.TL 8) V2FO.S2FVH.TR 
4) V2FO.C2FH.TR 9) V2FO.S2FF.TL 
5) V2FO.S2FH.TL 10) V2FO.S2FF.TR 
Table 6.10: Potential causes of failure for the TOP event DORMANTl 
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All 10 of the potential causes of failure obtained for DORMANT1 are valid and the method 
has correctly identified all possibilities. Analysis has also been performed using just the flow 
sensor readings, the results obtained for this particular example were the same as for using 
flow and level readings, as shown in Table 6.10. Using just the flow sensor readings would 
have therefore reduced the complexity of the analysis and obtained the same outcome in 
this instance. In both cases importance measures would be used to identify the most likely 
potential cause of failure as there is more than one possibility obtained from the analysis 
as the list cannot be reduced down any further. 
6.2.2.6 Ranking of Failure Modes 
Table 6.11 shows the unavailability of each component, assuming that the deviation 
occurred at t = 600s. 
Component Failure Conditional Failure Rate Unavailability Failure Rate Importance 
V2FO l.5xlO 7 8.9995949x 10 5 1.000 
V3FO l.5xlO-6 8.9959512xl0-4 0.0867873 
S2FH-S2FF 2.8xlO-6 l.678589587x 10-3 0.485819412 
C2FH 7.4x10-6 4.430151777x 10-3 0.427393286 
TL l.OxlO-8 5.999981 x 10-6 0.0038434507 
TR 2.6xlO-6 1.558783831 x 10-3 0.996165616 
Table 6.11: Component failure rate and unavailability 
QSYS is determined using the Rare Event Approximation and for this example was found 
to be QSYS = 1.45971626 x 10-9 • The Fussell-Vesely measure of component importance (see 
Section 3.7.2.2) has been used to indicate which components are most likely to contribute to 
the failure of a system through identifying the occurrence of a minimal cut set containing a 
given component. The importance for each component is shown in Table 6.11. The results 
indicate that valve V2 has failed open, it is likely that the tank has ruptured and also sensor 
S2 has failed causing flow out at valve V3. 
Using the Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance (see Section 3.7.2.1) has 
shown that there are 3 most likely causes of failure: V2FO.S2FH.TR, V2FO.S2FVH.TR, 
V2FO.82FF.TR. There are three results due to the component failure rate of sensor 82 
being the same for each of the three given failure possibilities. In two of these valve V2 
has failed open causing a failure in section 2 and the tank has ruptured resulting in a 
catastrophic leak in the tank. 
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6.3 Results 
Results obtained for the water tank system are shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 for the 
ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes respectively. Effectiveness Index lE. (where k 
denotes ACTIVE or DORMANT operating modes), shown in Section 4.5.2.1 is calculated 
for the TOP event structures. In this case N is the number of level patterns investigated, 
ni is the number of potential causes of failure identified by the method for TOP event T, 
nei is the number of these that are correct causes of the observed symptom behaviour for 
T and nai is the actual number of correct possible causes for T. 
TOP Event Scenarios Used to Results Results Number of 
Build TOP Event With Level Without Level Actual Possibilities 
n, ne; n, ne; 
ACTIVEI 4, 10, 22, 28 IQ 10 IQ IQ IQ 
ACTNE2 3, 9, 21, 27 5 5 5 5 5 
ACTIVE3 2, 6, 8, 12, 20, 24, 26, 30 2 2 2 2 2 
ACTNE4 1,5, 7, 11, 19, 23, 25, 29 
- - - - -
ACTNE5 1, 5, 7, 11, 19, 23, 25, 29 I I 0 0 I 
ACTNE6 16,34 40 40 40 40 40 
ACTNE7 15,33 20 20 20 20 20 
ACTNE8 14, 18, 36 4 3 8 3 3 
ACTNE9 14, 18, 32, 36 8 8 8 8 8 
ACTIVEIO 32 12 12 32 12 12 
ACTlVEll 36 72 72 224 72 72 
ACTlVEI2 36 72 72 224 72 72 
ACTIVEI3 13,17,31,35 4 I 4 I 1 
ACTIVEI4 13,17,31,35 4 4 4 4 4 
ACTIVEI5 31 12 12 16 12 12 
ACTIVEI6 40,46 90 90 90 90 90 
ACTIVEI7 39,45 45 45 45 45 45 
ACTNEI8 38, 42, 44, 48 18 18 18 18 18 
ACTIVEI9 37, 41, 43, 47 9 9 9 9 9 
ACTNE20 52 360 360 360 360 360 
ACTNE21 51 180 180 180 180 180 
ACTNE22 50,54 72 72 72 72 72 
ACTIVE23 13, 17, 49, 53 4 3 4 3 3 
ACTNE24 49,53 36 36 36 36 36 
Effectiveness Index rEACTIVE 0.946 0.788 (to 3 decimal places) 
Table 6.12: Results and effectiveness index obtained when the system 
is in the ACTIVE operating mode 
The range of the effectiveness index is from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating the method is not 
effective and 1 indicating that it is completely effective. An index less than 1 is expected 
as some failures in the system may be unreachable. Results from the analysis have been 
obtained for with and without the tank level patterns. 
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TOP Event Scenarios Used to Results Results Number of 
Build TOP Event With Level Without Level Actual Possibilities 
n, ne; n, ne; 
DORMANTl 10,28 10 10 10 10 10 
DORMANT2 9,27 5 5 5 5 5 
DORMANT3 8, 12, 26, 30 2 2 2 2 2 
DORMANT4 7, 11, 25, 29 1 1 1 1 1 
DORMANT5 7, 11, 25, 29 1 1 1 0 1 
DORMANT6 4, 16, 22, 34 10 10 10 10 10 
DORMANT7 3, 15,21, 33 5 5 5 5 5 
DORMANT8 2,6, 14, 18 1 1 2 1 1 
DORMANT9 2, 6, 14, 18, 24, 32, 36 3 3 2 1 3 
DORMANTlO 20, 32 4 4 8 4 4 
DORMANTll 24,36 24 24 56 24 24 
DORMANT12 24,36 24 24 56 24 24 
DORMANT13 1, 5, 13, 17, 31, 35 0 0 0 0 1 
DORMANT14 1,5,13,17,31,35 1 1 0 0 1 
DORMANT15 19,31 4 4 4 4 4 
DORMANT16 46 90 90 90 90 90 
DORMANT17 45 45 45 45 45 45 
DORMANT18 44,48 18 18 18 18 18 
DORMANT19 43,47 9 9 9 9 9 
DORMANT20 40,52 90 90 90 90 90 
DORMANT21 39,51 45 45 45 45 45 
DORMANT22 38, 50, 54 18 18 18 18 18 
DORMANT23 1, 5, 13, 17, 37, 41, 49, 53 
- - - - -
DORMANT24 37, 41, 49, 53 18 18 18 18 18 
Effectiveness Index IEDORMANT 0.942 0.740 (to 3 decimal pI"" .. ) 
Table 6.13: Results and effectiveness index obtained when the system 
is in the DORMANT operating mode 
In the majority of cases the method has correctly identified the possible number of potential 
causes of failure for both the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes when using tank 
level sensor patterns, This is reflected in the Effectiveness Index for each mode, which 
is lEACTIVE = 0,945652173 and lEoORMANT = 0.942028985 for ACTIVE and DORMANT 
respectively. These scores give an average of lE = 0.944 (to 3 decimal places), and indicates 
that although the method is not perfect (the effectiveness index would be lE = 1.000) it is 
very effective at obtaining the potential causes of system failure for the water tank. 
In the ACTIVE operating mode there are three TOP events that do not yield the correct 
potential failure causes when the tank level patterns are included in the analysis, these 
being ACTIVE8, ACTIVE13 and ACTIVE23. ACTIVE8 indicates that there is flow into 
the system through VI, no flow out at V2 and V3, and water in the overspill tray. 
As there is a normal tank level pattern water in the spill tray can only be caused by a leak 
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in the tank (TL) because a rupture would result in a decreasing level, and water overspilling 
the sides would show that the tank was full. If the tank is leaking then no flow out of V2 
cannot be caused by a fracture in pipe P3 as this together with the tank leaking would 
cause the water level to decrease. Therefore either V2 has failed closed (V2FC), or pipes 
P3 or P4 are blocked (P3B, P4B). The potential causes of failure obtained are TL.V2FC, 
TL.P3B or TL.P4B. The method also indicates that TL.P3F is a possibility, which is an 
invalid result as they should only occur together for a decreasing tank level. Similarly for 
ACTIVE13 the potential causes of failure obtained are pipe P3 is fractured (P3F), V2FC, 
P3B or P4B. With a normal level and flow in through VI only P3F is a valid result. For 
ACTIVE23 there is no water going out of the system or coming into the system through VI 
indicating that either pipe P3 or P4 is blocked or V2 has failed closed. When the level is 
normal it is difficult to identify if pipe P3 is fractured because the level fluctuates within the 
required threshold. DORMANT13 is the only TOP event for the DORMANT operating 
mode that has failed to identify the correct potential causes of failure. This TOP event 
fails to indicate that pipe P3 could also be fractured along with the tank leaking to create 
a third potential cause of failure for this scenario. 
The use of fault trees that are restricted to the control systems on each stream has reduced 
the complexity of the approach. The dynamic method now needs to be scaled up by carrying 
out further investigations on larger systems in order to test its feasibility. 
Original analysis was carried out in steady state, without including the level of water in the 
tank. The extended analysis has also been carried out without the tank level patterns, these 
results are shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 for the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes 
respectively in the column headed 'Results Without Level'. The method is less complex 
compared with that which includes the tank level patterns 
The results show that the method is less effective at obtaining the exact list of potential 
failure causes for each TOP event compared to those including the tank level. This is 
reflected in the Effectiveness Index, which is, lEACTlvE = 0.788819875 and lEDORMANT = 
0.740165631 for the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes respectively. This gives an 
average of lE = 0.764 (to 3 decimal places). In some instances the method has obtained 
potential failure causes for a number of TOP events that are known to be incorrect, 
along with those which could cause the TOP event to occur. Incorrect readings have 
occurred in ACTIVE5, ACTIVE8, ACTIVE13 and ACTIVE23, along with DORMANT5, 
DORMANT8 to DORMANT14 and DORMANT24. This strengthens the need to include 
the tank level within the analysis. 
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The method is not able to identify any hidden failures of components that have the same 
symptoms as when they are working as required. For instance if the system is ACTIVE and 
the level patterns are as shown in Table 6.2 then it is assumed that the system is working 
normally. However, there may be a failure at valve V3 causing it to stay closed. This will 
not be identified until this part of the system is used. In DORMANT3 shown in Table 6.13 
the potential causes of failure is either V2FO.TL or V2FO.TR. In this case though there 
could be flow out at V3 through a fracture in pipe P5. This could be identified by using 
the exact flow information in the analysis rather than just flow patterns. 
Valve V2 failing open or closed can be identified by switching the operating mode of the 
tank. If the valve is allowing water out of the system when ACTIVE, switching the mode 
to DORMANT should close the valve as the system moves into a no flow phase at V2. If 
it remains open then V2 has failed open. Similarly if the system is DORMANT V2 should 
be closed and if the valve remains closed after moving into the ACTIVE mode then it has 
failed in that way. 
6.4 Consideration of Dynamics Within the Fault 
Detection Demonstration 
A detailed discussion of the results obtained for the four fault tree based schemes were 
described in Chapter 4. Scheme 4 containing an immediate consistency check was 
concluded to be the most accurate for obtaining the potential causes of failure for given 
system behaviour. It was highlighted that dynamics would need to be considered in 
order to improve the overall accuracy. Transient effects were therefore accounted for in 
Chapter 6 through the use of a simple pattern recognition technique. The fault detection 
demonstration has been extended to show this. 
The simulation models the behaviour of the water tank system as previously described 
for the four schemes. The pattern of the results at each of the sensors in the system is 
now obtained from the simulation and compared against the expected behaviour in the 
given operating mode. There are 24 possible flow patterns for each of the modes, as shown 
in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for ACTIVE and DORMANT respectively. The patterns from the 
sensors indicate that the system is in at least one of the 54 possible system scenarios listed 
in Table 6.1. A list of possible scenarios is therefore obtained for the system from the given 
set of sensor patterns. The program takes the identified pattern from the given set of results 
and compares this with the expected patterns in order to determine the possible system 
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scenarios. The sensor readings for each scenario are combined with an AND gate and the 
scenarios for each set of flow patterns are combined with an OR gate to give the overall 
TOP event structure, as shown in general in Figure 6.10. 
Figure 6.10: General TOP event structure 
The fault induced into the system was valve VI fails closed. Analysis is performed as before, 
giving a list of potential causes of failure for the given flow patterns. 
Dynamic Example 
The expected flow and level patterns when the system is in the ACTIVE operating mode 
and the corresponding scenarios that could lead to these patterns are shown in Table 6.14. 
An example for the actual sensor and level patterns recorded for the system along with 
their possible scenarios is also shown. 
Observed 
Behaviour 
Behaviour 
Expected 
TOP Event Potential VI V2 V3 TANK 
Scenarios (Level in TRAY) 
ACTIVE19 31,41,43,47 L h L L 
ACTIVE4 1,5,1,11 
19, 23, 25, 29 .le .~ .L .L 
Table 6.14: ACTIVE operating mode with expected 
and actual sensor readings 
Level Pattern 
L 
:t= 
The example indicates that water is leaving the tank, but it is not being replaced by flow 
through valve VI, leading to a decrease in the water tank level. The possible scenarios 
for the system in this case are 1, 5, 7, 11, 19, 23, 25 or 29. Performing analysis results in 
potential causes of failure for the system, as shown in Table 6.15. 
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Number Potential Causes Number Potential Causes 
I) VIFC 6) PIB 
2) CIFH 7) PIF 
3) SIFH 8) P2B 
4) SIFVH 9) NWMS 
5) SIFF 
Table 6.15: Potential causes of failure for the TOP event DORMANTl 
Measures of importance were used as in the steady-state examples. Valve VI failing closed 
was found to be the most likely cause of failure in this particular example. 
6.5 Summary 
• Consideration of the system dynamics has improved the method and obtained more 
accurate results. In the majority of cases the method has correctly identified the 
possible number of potential causes of failure for both the ACTIVE and DORMANT 
operating modes, which is reflected in the Effectiveness Index. 
• The use of fault trees that are restricted to the control systems on each stream has 
reduced the complexity of the approach and should enable the method to be scaled 
up for use on larger systems. Further investigation of this will follow using the BAE 
Systems fuel rig. 
• The analysis needs to include the tank level patterns in order to obtain accurate 
results about the system behaviour. The level of water in the tank is the key variable 
in the system. A deviation with this reading in the system will affect the overall 
ability of the system to maintain the amount of water between the cllOsen limits. 
• The method is not able to identify any hidden failures of components that have the 
same symptoms as when they are working as required. This is a restriction in the 
analysis that cannot be resolved. 
• The program has been extended to demonstrate the method when considering 
transient effects. 
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Application of the Dynamic Method 
to the Fuel Rig 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the extension of the dynamic method by applying it to a model 
based on a fuel rig from BAE Systems. The fuel rig system is a model that symbolises the 
functions of a real aircraft system, using water to simulate fuel flow. Fluid is fed from a 
wing and main tank into a collector tank, which then outputs to the engine. This features 
redundancy and is a larger system than the previously considered simple water tank level 
control system. 
7.2 Dynamic Fault Detection and Identification Process 
The dynamic fault detection and identification process is categorised into two stages, these 
being 'modelling and preparation' and 'application' as shown previously in Chapter 6. These 
are now modified in light of having applied the method to a system of increased complexity 
and featuring redundancy. The modelling and preparation stage is the part of the analysis 
in which all available information about the system is collected. This information is then 
used in the application stage in order to ascertain the cause of failure from symptoms 
exhibited on the system. The updated stages are described in more detail in Sections 7.2.1 
and 7.2.2 respectively for a general system. 
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7.2.1 Modelling and Preparation Stage 
1. The system is first divided into sections or subsystems. These are parts that can 
change the system process variables by either normal control action or through the 
occurrence of a component failure. Subsystems should provide a single function in the 
system, providing inputs to or being outputs from other sections within the system. 
The overall system must have a key function and one of the sections must be associated 
with this key process variable so to determine the outcome of the system. Sections 
will show a natural decomposition or breakdown of the whole system. The way to 
identify these would be to look at the input/outputs and identify the key ones of 
these, which will then indicate the main areas in a system. 
2. The subsystem process variables that are to be measured, such as flow, temperature, 
pressure or level are identified. Sensors are then incorporated into the system to 
monitor these variables if not already present for control purposes. 
3. Key locations of the measured process variables in each section are identified. These 
locations will be those points where a change in normal control action will initially 
become apparent. This output of information can then be used to alter the status of 
other parts of the system if required. The locations of these will be determined by 
the system sectioning carried out in Stage 1. 
4. All the possible modes of system operation at any point in time are listed. Modes 
of operation may also be divided further into appropriate 'sub-modes' in the event 
that its complexity is too difficult to deal with on its own. The sub-modes will be 
determined by the size of the system and how the sectioning has been carried out. 
Assumptions to be made that can affect the operation of the system are identified. 
5. All system scenarios are developed. The scenarios consider all possible deviations in 
the process variables on each section. They may be failed high, partial, low or working 
as normal. On sections where there is a control system, the deviations may be due 
to control system failures. Deviations can also occur due to the failure of passive 
components such as pipes or wires. Some sections may contain only passive elements 
of the system in which case changes in the related process variable will only happen 
when a failure mode occurs or through changes in section inputs and outputs. 
6. For each of the system operating modes identified, a set of potential patterns from 
the readings obtained for the key measured variables are developed. Any potential 
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behaviour for individual sub-modes if used in the analysis of a specified mode is also 
included. 
7. For each section the potential pattern behaviour for any other transmitter readings 
that can be taken are identified. Again, if sub-modes are used then identify the 
possible behaviour for each of these. Only the shape of the sensor reading pattern is 
required. 
8. Fault trees for causes of the process variable deviation at each of the sensor locations 
used to define the scenarios are drawn. Each fault tree is developed down to the 
component failures in the system. Fault trees may be drawn for absolute values or 
rates of change, depending on what information is considered useful for the particular 
system. For any normal system behaviour causes of sensor readings are developed 
using success trees, which describe all the components in the system that must be 
working correctly in order for that outcome to occur. 
7.2.2 Application Stage 
1. Pattern recognition techniques are used to identify the actual patterns obtained for 
system sensor readings. These are then compared to those for the expected behaviour. 
If these patterns match this indicates the system is working as it should be for the 
given mode or sub-mode. Any pattern that does not match is indicative of a failure 
of some kind within the system. There may be hidden failures, but these would only 
become apparent through moving into a different sub-mode during system operation, 
or by switching the operating mode. 
2. Sections of the overall system with the potential to have caused the observed 
symptoms resulting in the incorrect patterns from the key variable transmitters are 
identified. 
3. Each identified section is then investigated in turn and the actual patterns from 
readings for all the transmitters in that section are checked against those expected. 
Fault trees are combined for both the deviated and successful patterns for the section 
using an AND gate with the status of certain basic events being determined by the 
transmitter patterns. In the case of the fuel rig system each section is representative 
of a tank subsystem. 
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4. A list of prime implicants will be obtained from the combined fault tree for each 
subsystem. A coherent approximation is then made by assuming that all working 
states are TRUE in order to obtain a list of cut sets. 
5. The cut set li st obtained is then minimised in order to produce a list of the potential 
causes of failure for the specified subsystem. 
6. If there is more than one potential cause of failme then importance measures can 
be used to rank the failme modes using their probability of occurrence in order to 
determine the most likely outcome. 
The process described is now demonstrated by apply ing it to a representation of an aircraft 
fuel supply system. This system exists as an experimental fuel rig, located at BAE Systems. 
7.3 The Fuel Rig System 
The aim of any aircraft fuel system is to provide an adequate supply of clean fuel at an 
appropriate pressme level throughout the flight phase to all the engines. The fuel rig system, 
illustrated in Figm e 7.1 , is a model representing a real aircraft fuel system that llses water 
to simulate the fuel flow. The rig consists of tluee tank. ; main, wing and collector in which 
water is distributed to the engine feed . 
; 
Wing 
Tank 
---- ----
......... ...... . .................................. . ... . 
. . 
... ----------~ 
, 
Main 
Tank 
--- - - - -----
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7"1 
,.-__ ...L.. __ ---, : I 
Engine : I 
; I 
: I 
: I 
···················· ·· ····· 1 
. . . . . . ......... Fuel rug Refilling Line 1 
__ _____ __ ___ ~r~~~p~lT~ ____________ I 
Figure 7.1: The fuel rig system 
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A photo of the actual fuel rig sy tem is shown in Figme 7.2, com tesy of BAE Systems. 
Figme 7.2: Photo of the fuel rig system 
7.3.1 System Component D escription 
Each tank has two pump train , each conta ining a peri taltic pump (PP****), pressure 
sprung relief valve (PSV****), powered isolation valve (TVP**** ) cont rolled by a controller 
(CT****), back pressm e valve (BP****) and connecting pipe work (P****) 1 These are 
shown in Figme 7.3 for the main tank. In total the tank uni t contains seven valves; 3 
powered i olation valves, 2 pre sure relief valve and 2 back pre ure valve. Each powered 
isolation valve ha an associated controller. In total each uni t con ists of 23 sections of 
pIpe. 
The two fuel line streams out of each tank are labelled ' Line L1 ' and 'Line L2 ' in this 
diagram. These join up to become the main outflow line of the tank. Either of the two 
lines can be used when fuel is required , but fuel is only ch'awn out of one line from each 
tank at any point in time, the second is left in a standby mode and u ed in t he event of a 
failure in the first, thus providing the system with redundancy. 
When the engine is switched on a ll peristaltic pump turn on, including those on lines that 
are on standby. When fuel is not required from a line the powered isolation valve remains 
closed, and the water is re-circulated back into the tank via the recycle line, as shown in 
I '****' represents the component code. 
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more detail for a single tank section (this being for the main tank (TK****)) in Figure 7.3. 
The fluid flow along each recycle line is regulated by a pressure relief valve. 
TO LT0310 
---TO CT0410 I (COLLECTOR TANK SECTION) 
(REFUEL ____ .J... - -- - - - --- ---- - -- -- -- -- -1CT~110I"""""""""""""'" 
SECTION) ~ ________ __________ ~CT01201.... . .............................. ~ 
P0409 
REFUEL 
LINE 
I : 
FTOl11 
RECYCLE 
LINE LI P0117 P0116 
RECYCLE 
LINE L2 
TKOllO 
P0121 
IVP0130 
P0123 
DRAINAGE 
LINE 
Figure 7.3: Main tank from the fuel rig system 
Water is fed only to the engine from the collector tank (Figure 7.1). Both main and wing 
tanks are used to feed the collector tank when the level of water drops below a designated 
threshold. The wing tank, which simulates the auxiliary fuel storage in the system, is used 
for replenishing the collector tank when the level of water drops to or below threshold 
T i . Once the supply of water from the wing tank has been used and/or the level in the 
collector tank drops to or below threshold T2 fluid will then be fed from the main tank, 
which simulates the main fuel storage in an aircraft system. It is assumed that under 
normal operating conditions water is pumped into the collector tank at the same rate as it 
is pumped out into the engine. Therefore the water level in the collector tank will increase 
only as a result of a failure causing flow into the tank from another part of the system. The 
engine in the fuel rig system is represented by a large tank located at the base of the rig. 
The main, wing and collector tanks each have a powered isolation valve for drainage 
controlled by a controller, which may be used to represent the dumping of fuel from an 
143 
Application of the Dynamic Method to the Fuel Rig The Fuel Rig System 
aircraft. In this case the main and wing fuel lines are shut down and both these tanks are 
drained of water to pump shut off. The collector tank is also drained to a low level, leaving 
enough fuel for landing. The water from all the tanks is drained into the engine tank in 
the rig so that it can be redistributed back into the system. Each of these tank units are 
comprised of six flow transmitters (FT****); one after each of the powered isolation valves 
on the main lines out of the tank, one where the two main lines join, one on each of the over 
flow lines and finally one on the drainage line to detect when the system is being drained. 
Finally a level sensor is located inside each tank (LT****). 
The wing and collector tanks in the fuel rig system contain the same type of components as 
those described for the main tank, the only disparity being that the numbers in the codes 
for these tanks start '02' and '03'respectively (for the main tank they begin with '01'). 
7.3.2 Level Transmitter Thresholds 
The readings from the level transmitters in the main, wing and collector tanks are: 'empty' 
(E), 'pump shut off' (PSO), 'low' (L), 'adequate section' (AS), 'required level' (RL), 'high' 
(H) and 'full' (F) as shown in Figure 7.4. When the system is dumping fuel the main and 
wing tanks are both drained to PSO, and the collector tank is drained to L so that only a 
minimal amount of fuel is left for the simulation of an aircraft landing. 
Full_ 
High 
Required Level = 
Adequate 
Section 
Low _ 
Pump shut off -
-----~-----
_ 100% 
====~===: _ 91% 
- 90% 
_____ 'c _____ 15% 
---------- - 8% 
Empty ...... ----...... 0% 
Main, Wing and Engine 
Tank levels 
Full_ 
High 
Required Level = 
-----~-----
_ 100% 
===:~==== -
Tl ., ..................... . 
Adequate 
Section 
T2 
Low ______ v _____ _ 
Pump shut off - ---------- -
Empty - ...... ____ ..J-
Collector 
Tank level 
91% 
90% 
66% 
33% 
15% 
8% 
0% 
Figure 7.4: Tank levels for the fuel rig system 
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In addition to these the adequate section in the collector tank is divided up depending on 
the thresholds TJ and T2 • If the level in the collector tank is above threshold TJ then there 
is no flow into the tank from the main or wing tanks. Once the level drops below this, 
if there is water above pump shut off in the wing tank then the powered isolation valve 
on either of the stream lines is opened (as pre-determined before analysis commences) to 
allow fluid flow into the collector tank in order to keep the tank replenished with a stock of 
fuel. Once the level in the collector tank drops to threshold T2 the powered isolation valve 
on either of the stream lines in the main tank section opens to allow fluid from the main 
tank to refill the collector tank. The pumps will automatically switch off as soon as the 
level in that specific tank drops to PSO to prevent them from becoming damaged, which 
leads to a breakdown of part or even the whole system. In the event that fluid flow does 
not commence out of a tank, the controller on the redundant line will then be expected to 
open the respective powered isolation valve. This will either allow the system to function 
as required or in the event of a failure on this line cause a break down in the whole tank 
section. 
7.4 System Stages 
7.4.1 System Modelling and Preparation Stage 
The sub-stages 1 to 7 described in Section 7.2.1 are now described for the fuel rig system. 
7.4.1.1 System Division 
The fuel rig has a total of 26 flow and 4 level transmitters. It is too complex to account for 
all this system knowledge at the same time. The size of the problem therefore needs to be 
reduced and this is carried out by modularising the analysis. This involves identifying the 
area or areas in which a deviation has occurred and then focusing in on each one individually 
to determine the possible causes of failure for that particular section. The fuel rig is divided 
into 4 'subsystems' as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 7.1. Three of the subsystems 
contain the main, wing and collector tanks, and the fourth contains the refuelling part. 
These sections have been identified from a schematic of the whole fuel rig. 
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7.4.1.2 Identification of System Sensors 
Information regarding the status of the system is obtained using two different types of 
transmitter or 'observable points'; these being able to measure either flow or level. The 
main, wing and collector tank subsystems each possess a level transmitter within the tank 
itself, which is labelled LTOllO in Figure 7.3 for the main tank. There are also six flow 
transmitters; one after each of the powered isolation valves on L1 and L2 out of the tank 
(FTOllO, FT0120), one where these lines join up on the main outflow line (FT0130), 
one on each of the recycle lines (FTOll1, FT0121) and finally one on the drainage line 
(FT0100). Therefore these sensors are all monitored in order to highlight the occurrence of 
any deviations. 
7.4.1.3 Identification of Key Process Variables 
The key process variables in the overall system are the level in the collector tank (LT031O) 
and the flow on the main outflow line of each of the three tanks (FT0130, FT0230 and 
FT0330). The level in both the main and wing tanks (LTOllO and LT0210) are also 
important factors to the system functionality as these could lead to the identification of a 
problem in an individual tank section. 
7.4.1.4 Modes of System Operation and System Assumptions 
7.4.1.4.1 Modes of System Operation 
The system has two main modes of operation; these being 'ACTIVE' when all pumps are 
on and fluid is pumped from the collector tank to the engine, or 'DORMANT' when all 
the pumps are shut down and there is no fluid transfer. In the ACTIVE operating mode 
as the transfer of water between the collector tank and the engine takes place the level of 
water in the collector tank decreases. This is replaced by water being transferred, initially 
from the wing and then later on from the main tank. 
7.4.1.4.2 System Operating Assumptions 
A number of assumptions have been made regarding the operation of the fuel rig system: 
• A blockage in a pipe or valve will prevent any flow of fluid through this component. 
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Similarly a partial blockage will reduce the amount of fluid flow in a pipe or through 
a valve, but not stop it completely. 
• A fracture in a pipe will result in fluid leaving the system at this point, preventing any 
flow of fluid further into the system. A leak in a pipe or valve will cause partial flow 
and result in some loss of fluid from the system. All fluid losses cannot be replenished. 
• A rupture in one of the tanks results in a loss of fluid out of the system that cannot 
be replenished. A rupture in the collector tank will lose fluid faster than it can be 
refilled from its supply. 
• For simplicity, the system will always start off with the required level of fuel in the 
main, wing and collector tanks. 
• The system sensors are assumed to be reliable in this case. 
A tank deviation will result in failure to indicate the required fluid level in that particular 
tank. In the water tank example the system had a tray beneath the tank to catch any fluid 
lost through a leak, rupture or from overfilling. This was used to distinguish whether the 
tank was working or had failed. The tanks in this example do not have trays, therefore the 
possibility of a tank failure cannot be ruled out from the possible causes of system failure. 
7.4.1.5 System Scenarios and Patterns for the Key Process Variables 
The sensors for the key process variables are used to generate a set of scenarios that the 
system could potentially be in. These are defined firstly for the key process variables in the 
system and then for the other sensors within a section. 
7.4.1.5.1 System Scenarios 
The flow from each tank section can be indicated as functioning normally (WK), failed in a 
mode that causes high flow (HF) (eg: valve open), failed resulting in partial flow (PF) (eg: 
valve failed partially open) or failed in a mode that causes low flow (LF) (eg: valve closed). 
If a section of the system is working this indicates that fluid is being provided from that 
part as and when required in response to the system state and operating mode. There are 
64 different potential scenarios that can occur in the system as shown in Table 7.1. 
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Scena.rio MAIN WING COLLECTOR Scenario MAIN WING COLLECTOR 
SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION 
1 WK WK WK 33 PF WK WK 
2 WK WK HF 34 PF WK HF 
3 WK WK PF 35 PF WK PF 
4 WK WK LF 36 PF WK LF 
5 WK HF WK 37 PF HF WK 
6 WK HF HF 38 PF HF HF 
7 WK HF PF 39 PF HF PF 
8 WK HF LF 40 PF HF LF 
9 WK PF WK 41 PF PF WK 
10 WK PF HF 42 PF PF HF 
11 WK PF PF 43 PF PF PF 
12 WK PF LF 44 PF PF LF 
13 WK LF WK 45 PF LF WK 
14 WK LF HF 46 PF LF HF 
15 WK LF PF 47 PF LF PF 
16 WK LF LF 48 PF LF LF 
17 HF WK WK 49 LF WK WK 
18 HF WK HF 50 LF WK HF 
19 HF WK PF 51 LF WK PF 
20 HF WK LF 52 LF WK LF 
21 HF HF WK 53 LF HF WK 
22 HF HF HF 54 LF HF HF 
23 HF HF PF 55 LF HF PF 
24 HF HF LF 56 LF HF LF 
25 HF PF WK 57 LF PF WK 
26 HF PF HF 58 LF PF HF 
27 HF PF PF 59 LF PF PF 
28 HF PF LF 60 LF PF LF 
29 HF LF WK 61 LF LF WK 
30 HF LF HF 62 LF LF HF 
31 HF LF PF 63 LF LF PF 
32 HF LF LF 64 LF LF LF 
Table 7.1: Fuel rig system scenarios 
Each scenario listed in the table is examined and the patterns recorded from the sensor 
readings for the flows on the outflow lines of each of the tank sections and the level in each 
tank (see Section 7.4.1.5.2). The system scenarios for the key variables are used in the 
analysis to identify the section or sections in which a failure has occurred. 
7.4.1.5.2 Potential Patterns [or Key Variables 
The measurements from the flow transmitters in the system are used to build up a flow 
rate history at their particular locations over a period of time. These can be used to 
identify overall system pattern behaviour. Readings from the level transmitters in each of 
the tanks are also used in this analysis. The level patterns obtained are used to determine 
the amount of fluid flow or rate of change of height of fluid in each tank and illustrates how 
the reading has changed over time, from which the rate of change can be determined. Each 
flow transmitter on the fuel rig can measure the exact flow rate at that particular point in 
the system. The readings from the transmitters are used to build up a pattern to indicate 
what type of flow or level change is occurring, if any. 
Due to the complexity of the problem, the number of possible combinations of different 
patterns for all of the sensors is too large to deal with in the ACTIVE operating mode. 
This mode is divided into 'phases' that are defined depending upon the level of fluid in the 
collector tank in order to overcome this, as shown in Table 7.2. 
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Scenarios MAIN MAIN WING WING COLLECTOR COLLECTOR 
LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL 
FT0130 LTOllO FT0230 LT0210 FT0330 LT0310 
ACTIVEPHASEl 1, 2, 13, 14, L RLL L RLL 1= RLt:: T> (Tt < Le < RL) 49,50,61,62 
ACTIVEPHASE2 1, 2,5,6, L RLL Q. RL~ 1= RLe T> (Le = Tt> 49, 50, 53, 54 " PS 
ACTIVEPHASE3 1, 2, 13, 14, L RLL L psL 1= RL t:::: T> (T2<Le<Tt) 49, 50, 61, 62 " 
ACTIVEPHASE4 1, 2, 13, 14, Q. RL~ L psL 1= RLb TI (Le = T2) 17,18,29,30 T2 PS 
ACTIVEPHASE5 1, 2, 13, 14, L p,L L psL Q. RLL TI (PSO < Le < T2) 49, 50, 61, 62 T2 PS 
ACTIVEPHASE6 1,4, 13, 16, L psL L "L L "L (Le = PSO) 49,52,61,64 
Table 7.2: Expected sensor patterns for outflow lines and level in each tank 
in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Note that only the overall shape of the trend in each pattern is investigated rather than 
the exact match of results. When ACTIVE I the operating mode is split into six phases 
defined by the level of fluid in the collector tank. These phases each have a set of expected 
sensor readings for the key process variables. The expected plots for the transmitters on 
the outflow lines of each of the tanks are shown in Table 7.2 (Le indicates the level of water 
in the collector tank). The expected plots from these are compared with actual patterns 
obtained in order to highlight any initial deviations. Main and wing tank levels are also 
included in order to aid in pinpointing any deviations that may otherwise be missed within 
these tanks themselves. 
Expected plots for the DORMANT mode are shown in Table 7.3. When DORMANT all 
flow transmitters should be indicating Ino flow' and levels should remain constant. There 
is only one expected outcome for this particular operating mode. 
Scenarios MAIN MAIN WING WING COLLECTOR COLLECTOR 
LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL 
FT0130 LTOllO FT0230 LT0210 FT0330 LT0310 
DORMANT 1, 4, 13, 16, L RLL L RLL L RLL (Le = RL) 49,52,61,64 
Table 7.3: Expected sensor patterns for outflow lines and level in each tank 
in the DORMANT operating mode 
Expected behaviour can be obtained through a number of scenarios for each set of expected 
readings. In each case, however, it is scenario 1 that is the only one in which the system can 
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be working correctly producing the expected readings and level patterns. The remaining 
possibilities all contain unrevealed failures, the symptoms for which are masked, but flow 
within the system carries on as required. 
7.4.1.5.3 Identification of Scenario Causes for Key Variables 
At any given point in time the set of patterns from the sensors for the key variables must 
indicate that the system is in at least one of the 64 scenarios listed in Table 7.1. A list 
of scenarios can be obtained for each of the sets of valid sensor patterns identified for the 
system and given phase. Scenarios can be used to identify more than one set of sensor 
patterns. Example plots that can indicate the scenarios 1, 17 and 49 are shown in Table 7.4 
for phase 1. 
Scenario l(a) is the expected set of patterns when in ACTIVE phase 1. Scenario l(b) 
illustrates that the same scenario can be valid for a different set of patterns - in this case 
the level in the main tank is non-linearly decreasing indicating that there is a problem with 
the main tank itself. This is a similar case for 17(a) and 17(b) in which a non-linearly 
decreasing level in the wing tank indicates a problem with this tank. For some scenarios, 
for instance 1(a) and 49(a) or 1(b) and 49(b), the observed sensor reading patterns are the 
same. 
Scenario MAIN MAIN WING WING COLLECTOR COLLECTOR 
LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL 
FT0130 LTOllO FT0230 LT0210 FT0330 LT0310 
l(a) (WK, WK, WK) L RLt= L RLt= t= n RLt::: 
l(b) (WK, WK, WK) L RLL. L RLL. t= ~it::: 
17(a) (HF, WK, WK) Q. :~ L RLt= t= n RLt::: 
Q. RL~ L RLL. t= nt::: 17(b) (HF, WK, WK) PS 
49(a) (LF, WK, WK) L RLL L RLL t= n RLt::: 
49(b) (LF, WK, WK) L RLL. L RLL. t= n RLt::: 
Table 7.4: Possible system readings and their potential scenarios 
when the system is in the ACTIVE operating mode 
There are 508 unique valid combinations of sensor reading patterns when the system is 
ACTIVE (for each phase) and 829 when in the DORMANT operating mode for the key 
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variables. 
7.4.1.6 System Scenarios and Potential Patterns for Other Process Variables 
The information from the scenarios and the patterns for the key variables are used in the 
analysis to indicate the sections of the system in which a failure has occurred. Once 
this/these sections have been identified the analysis can then focus on obtaining the 
actual cause. This is carried out by investigating each section with a potential deviation 
individually. The process of identifying the possible system scenarios is now repeated for 
each section. 
7.4.1.6.1 System Scenarios for Other Process Variables 
A set of scenarios applicable to each of the system sections has been developed. As before 
each flow sensor gives a set of readings indicating the flow at that point in the section. A 
plot of the results can be determined from these reading, which can be used to match the 
sensor plot to the possible system scenarios. The sensor plot can indicate whether that 
part of the system is functioning normally (WK), failed in a mode that causes high flow 
(HF), failed resulting in partial flow (PF) or if it is failed in a mode that causes low flow 
(LF). There are 2276 different potential valid scenarios that can occur within a section 
when investigating both lines within a section - 676 when a section is WK, 356 possibilities 
for HF, 568 possibilities for PF and 676 LF indicated from a section outflow. The scenarios 
for HF on the outflow line are shown in Tables 7.5 to 7.7. When investigating just one line 
there are 204 valid potential scenarios. These are shown - for all section outflows WK, HF, 
PF and LF - in Tables 7.8 and 7.9. 
System Scenarios - Both Lines 
;:,ccnari ._~~IN F~~~\i~ MA N ECYCL MAIN RAIN ECTlor; INE Lt LINE L2 INE L2 LINE .::>ccnad MAIN L~~~vLJ..t MAIN ~,:,.~CL L ~~A~~ L~~~~ ECTIOl' INELl LINE L2 
677 ~~ :::~ :::~ WK :::~ ~~ 678 WK ~~~ ~~ :::~ WK :::~ ~~ ~: WK 
679 HF WK WK WK WK PF 691 HF WK WK WK LF PF 
680 HF WK WK WK WK LF 692 HF WK WK WK LF LF 
681 HF WK WK WK HF WK 693 HF WK WK HF WK WK 
682 HF WK WK WK HF HF 69' HF WK WK HF WK HF 
683 HF WK WK WK HF PF 695 HF WK WK HF WK PF 
68. HF WK WK WK HF LF 696 HF WK WK HF WK LF 
685 HF WK WK WK PF WK 697 HF WK WK HF LF WK 
686 HF WK WK WK PF HF 698 HF WK WK HF LF HF 
687 HF WK WK WK PF PF 699 HF WK WK HF LF PF 
668 HF WK WK WK PF LF 700 HF WK WK HF LF LF 
Table 7.5: Fuel rig system scenarios for a tank section - both lines - 1 
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Scenari MAIN ECYCL ~::.IN ECYCL MAIN ~~!N 
ECTION LINE Ll INE Ll LINE L2 INE L LINE 
Scenari MAIN EC_~CL MAIN ECYC~.I:. ~~~ RAIN ECTION LINE Ll INE Ll LINE L2 LINE 
701 HF WK WK PF WK WK 
702 HF WK WK PF WK HF 
784 HF WK PF ~~ WK LF 785 HF WK PF HF WK 
703 HF WK WK PF WK PF 786 HF WK PF WK HF HF 
704 HF WK WK PF WK LF 787 HF WK PF WK HF pF 
705 HF WK WK PF PF WK 788 HF WK PF WK HF LF 
706 HF WK WK PF PF HF 789 HF WK PF LF WK WK 
707 HF WK WK PF PF PF 790 HF WK PF LF WK HF 
708 HF WK WK PF PF LF 791 HF WK PF LF WK PF 
70. HF WK WK PF LF WK 792 HF WK PF LF WK LF 
710 HF WK WK PF LF HF 793 HF WK PF LF HF WK 
7ll HF WK WK PF LF PF 794 HF WK PF LF HF HF 
712 HF WK WK PF LF LF 795 HF WK PF LF HF PF 
713 HF WK WK LF WK WK 796 HF WK PF LF HF LF 
714 HF WK WK LF WK HF 797 HF WK LF WK WK WK 
715 HF WK WK LF WK PF 798 HF WK LF WK WK HF 
716 HF WK WK LF WK LF 799 HF WK LF WK WK PF 
717 HF WK WK LF HF WK 800 HF WK LF WK WK LF 
718 HF WK WK LF HF HF 801 HF WK LF WK HF WK 
71. HF WK WK LF HF PF 802 HF WK LF WK HF HF 
720 HF WK WK LF HF LF 803 HF WK LF WK HF PF 
m HF WK WK LF PF WK 804 HF WK LF WK HF LF 
722 HF WK WK LF PF HF 805 HF WK LF PF WK WK 
723 HF WK WK LF PF PF 806 HF WK LF PF WK HF 
724 HF WK WK LF PF LF 807 HF WK LF PF WK PF 
725 HF WK WK LF LF WK 808 HF WK LF PF WK LF 
726 HF WK WK LF LF HF 809 HF WK LF LF WK WK 
727 HF WK WK LF LF PF 810 HF WK LF LF WK HF 
728 HF WK WK LF LF LF 811 HF WK LF LF WK pF 
729 HF WK HF WK WK WK 812 HF WK LF LF WK LF 
730 HF WK HF WK WK HF 813 HF WK LF LF HF WK 
731 HF WK HF WK WK PF 814 HF WK LF LF HF HF 
732 HF WK HF WK WK LF 815 HF WK LF LF HF PF 
733 HF WK HF WK HF WK 816 HF WK LF LF HF LF 
734 HF WK HF WK HF HF 817 HF HF WK WK WK WK 
735 HF WK HF WK HF PF 818 HF HF WK WK WK HF 
736 HF WK HF WK HF LF 819 HF HF WK WK WK PF 
737 HF WK HF WK PF WK 820 HF HF WK WK WK LF 
738 HF WK HF WK PF HF 821 HF HF WK WK HF WK 
739 HF WK HF WK PF PF 822 HF HF WK WK HF HF 
740 HF WK HF WK PF LF 823 HF HF WK WK HF PF 
741 HF WK HF WK LF WK 824 HF HF WK WK HF LF 
742 HF WK HF WK LF HF 825 HF HF WK LF WK WK 
743 HF WK HF WK LF PF 826 HF HF WK LF WK HF 
744 HF WK HF WK LF LF 827 HF HF WK LF WK PF 
745 HF WK HF HF WK WK 828 HF HF WK LF WK LF 
746 HF WK HF HF WK HF 829 HF HF WK LF HF WK 
747 HF WK HF HF WK PF 830 HF HF WK LF HF HF 
748 HF WK HF HF WK LF 831 HF HF WK LF HF PF 
74, HF WK HF HF LF WK 832 HF HF WK LF HF LF 
750 HF WK HF HF LF HF 833 HF HF LF WK WK WK 
75l HF WK HF HF LF PF 834 HF HF LF WK WK HF 
752 HF WK HF HF LF LF 835 HF HF LF WK WK PF 
753 HF WK HF PF WK WK 836 HF HF LF WK WK LF 
754 HF WK HF PF WK HF 837 HF HF LF WK HF WK 
755 HF WK HF PF WK PF 838 HF HF LF WK HF HF 
756 HF WK HF PF WK LF 839 HF HF LF WK HF PF 
757 HF WK HF PF PF WK 840 HF HF LF WK HF LF 
758 HF WK HF PF PF HF 841 HF HF LF LF WK WK 
759 HF WK HF PF PF PF 842 HF HF LF LF WK HF 
760 HF WK HF PF PF LF 843 HF HF LF LF WK PF 
761 HF WK HF PF LF WK 844 HF HF LF LF WK LF 
762 HF WK HF PF LF HF 845 HF HF LF LF HF WK 
763 HF WK HF PF LF PF 846 HF HF LF LF HF HF 
764 HF WK HF PF LF LF 847 HF HF LF LF HF PF 
765 HF WK HF LF WK WK 848 HF HF LF LF HF LF 
766 HF WK HF LF WK HF 849 HF PF WK WK WK WK 
767 HF WK HF LF WK PF 850 HF PF WK WK WK HF 
768 HF WK HF LF WK LF 851 HF PF WK WK WK PF 
76. HF WK HF LF HF WK 852 HF PF WK WK WK LF 
770 HF WK HF LF HF HF 853 HF PF WK WK HF WK 
m HF WK HF LF HF PF 854 HF PF WK WK HF HF 
772 HF WK HF LF HF LF 855 HF PF WK WK HF PF 
773 HF WK HF LF PF WK 856 HF PF WK WK HF LF 
774 HF WK HF LF PF HF 857 HF PF WK LF WK WK 
775 HF WK HF LF PF PF 858 HF PF WK LF WK HF 
776 HF WK HF LF PF LF 859 HF PF WK LF WK PF 
777 HF WK HF LF LF WK 860 HF PF WK LF WK LF 
778 HF WK HF LF LF HF 861 HF PF WK LF HF WK 
779 HF WK HF LF LF PF 862 HF PF WK LF HF HF 
780 HF WK HF LF LF LF 863 HF PF WK LF HF pF 
781 HF WK PF WK WK WK 864 HF PF WK LF HF LF 
782 HF WK PF WK WK HF 865 HF PF PF WK WK WK 
783 HF WK PF WK WK PF 866 HF PF PF WK WK HF 
Table 7.6: Fuel rig system scenarios for a tank section - both lines - 2 
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Scenari MAIN ECYCL MAIN ~,:.yCL MAIN RAIN 
ECTION LINE L1 INE Ll LINE L2 INE L LINE 
Scenari MAIN r:.ECYCL MAIN r:.ECYCL MAIN lJL~~N ECTIC)N LINE L1 INE Ll LINE L2 INE L 
867 HF PF PF WK WK PF 
868 HF PF PF WK WK LF 
950 HF ~~ HF ~~ WK HF 951 HF HF WK PF 
869 HF PF PF WK HF WK 952 HF LF HF WK WK LF 
870 HF PF PF WK HF HF 953 HF LF HF WK HF WK 
871 HF PF PF WK HF PF 954 HF LF HF WK HF HF 
872 HF PF PF WK HF LF 955 HF LF HF WK HF PF 
873 HF PF PF LF WK WK 956 HF LF HF WK HF LF 
874 HF PF PF LF WK HF 957 HF LF HF WK PF WK 
875 HF PF PF LF WK PF 958 HF LF HF WK PF HF 
876 HF PF PF LF WK LF 959 HF LF HF WK PF PF 
877 HF PF PF LF HF WK 960 HF LF HF WK PF LF 
878 HF PF PF LF HF HF 961 HF LF HF WK LF WK 
879 HF PF PF LF HF PF 962 HF LF HF WK LF HF 
880 HF PF PF LF HF LF 963 HF LF HF WK LF PF 
881 HF PF LF WK WK WK 964 HF LF HF WK LF LF 
882 HF PF LF WK WK HF 965 HF LF HF HF WK WK 
883 HF PF LF WK WK PF 966 HF LF HF HF WK HF 
884 HF PF LF WK WK LF 967 HF LF HF HF WK PF 
885 HF PF LF WK HF WK 968 HF LF HF HF WK LF 
886 HF PF LF WK HF HF 969 HF LF HF HF LF WK 
887 HF PF LF WK HF PF 970 HF LF HF HF LF HF 
888 HF PF LF WK HF LF 971 HF LF HF HF LF PF 
889 HF PF LF LF WK WK 972 HF LF HF HF LF LF 
890 HF PF LF LF WK HF 973 HF LF HF PF WK WK 
891 HF PF LF LF WK PF 974 HF LF HF PF WK HF 
892 HF PF LF LF WK LF 975 HF LF HF PF WK PF 
893 HF PF LF LF HF WK 976 HF LF HF PF WK LF 
894 HF PF LF LF HF HF 977 HF LF HF PF PF WK 
895 HF PF LF LF HF PF 978 HF LF HF PF PF HF 
896 HF PF LF LF HF LF 979 HF LF HF PF PF PF 
897 HF LF WK WK WK WK 980 HF LF HF PF PF LF 
898 HF LF WK WK WK HF 981 HF LF HF PF LF WK 
899 HF LF WK WK WK PF 982 HF LF HF PF LF HF 
900 HF LF WK WK WK LF 983 HF LF HF PF LF pF 
901 HF LF WK WK HF WK 984 HF LF HF PF LF LF 
902 HF LF WK WK HF HF 985 HF LF HF LF WK WK 
903 HF LF WK WK HF PF 986 HF LF HF LF WK HF 
904 HF LF WK WK HF LF 987 HF LF HF LF WK PF 
905 HF LF WK WK PF WK 988 HF LF HF LF WK LF 
906 HF LF WK WK PF HF 989 HF LF HF LF HF WK 
907 HF LF WK WK PF PF 990 HF LF HF LF HF HF 
908 HF LF WK WK PF LF 991 HF LF HF LF HF PF 
909 HF LF WK WK LF WK 992 HF LF HF LF HF LF 
910 HF LF WK WK LF HF 993 HF LF HF LF PF WK 
911 HF LF WK WK LF PF 994 HF LF HF LF PF HF 
912 HF LF WK WK LF LF 995 HF LF HF LF PF PF 
913 HF LF WK HF WK WK 996 HF LF HF LF PF LF 
914 HF LF WK HF WK HF 997 HF LF HF LF LF WK 
915 HF LF WK HF WK PF 998 HF LF HF LF LF HF 
916 HF LF WK HF WK LF 999 HF LF HF LF LF PF 
917 HF LF WK HF LF WK 1000 HF LF HF LF LF LF 
918 HF LF WK HF LF HF 1001 HF LF PF WK WK WK 
919 HF LF WK HF LF PF 1002 HF LF PF WK WK HF 
920 HF LF WK HF LF LF 1003 HF LF PF WK WK PF 
921 HF LF WK PF WK WK 1004 HF LF PF WK WK LF 
922 HF LF WK PF WK HF 1005 HF LF PF WK HF WK 
923 HF LF WK PF WK PF 1006 HF LF PF WK HF HF 
924 HF LF WK PF WK LF 1001 HF LF PF WK HF PF 
925 HF LF WK PF PF WK 1008 HF LF PF WK HF LF 
926 HF LF WK PF PF HF 1009 HF LF PF LF WK WK 
927 HF LF WK PF PF PF 1010 HF LF PF LF WK HF 
928 HF LF WK PF PF LF 1011 HF LF PF LF WK PF 
929 HF LF WK PF LF WK 1012 HF LF PF LF WK LF 
930 HF LF WK PF LF HF 1013 HF LF PF LF HF WK 
931 HF LF WK PF LF PF 1014 HF LF PF LF HF HF 
932 HF LF WK PF LF LF 1015 HF LF PF LF HF PF 
933 HF LF WK LF WK WK 1016 HF LF PF LF HF LF 
934 HF LF WK LF WK HF 1017 HF LF LF WK WK WK 
935 HF LF WK LF WK PF 1018 HF LF LF WK WK HF 
936 HF LF WK LF WK LF 1019 HF LF LF WK WK PF 
937 HF LF WK LF HF WK 1020 HF LF LF WK WK LF 
938 HF LF WK LF HF HF 1021 HF LF LF WK HF WK 
939 HF LF WK LF HF PF 1022 HF LF LF WK HF HF 
940 HF LF WK LF HF LF 1023 HF LF LF WK HF PF 
941 HF LF WK LF PF WK 1024 HF LF LF WK HF LF 
942 HF LF WK LF PF HF 1025 HF LF LF LF WK WK 
943 HF LF WK LF PF PF 1026 HF LF LF LF WK HF 
944 HF LF WK LF PF LF 1027 HF LF LF LF WK PF 
945 HF LF WK LF LF WK 1028 HF LF LF LF WK LF 
946 HF LF WK LF LF HF 1029 HF LF LF LF HF WK 
947 HF LF WK LF LF PF 1030 HF LF LF LF HF HF 
948 HF LF WK LF LF LF 1031 HF LF LF LF HF PF 
949 HF LF HF WK WK WK 1032 HF LF LF LF HF LF 
Table 7.7: Fuel rig system scenarios for a tank section - both lines - 3 
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System Scenarios - One Line 
Scenll.ri MAIN RECYCLE '!.".IN ID.RAIN 
ECTIOf>. INE Ll/L'.< INE Ll/L LINE 
:Scenari MAIN R~~YCLE MAIN RAIN 
ECTIOr- INE Ll/L INE Li";L2 LINE 
1 WK WK WK WK 86 HF LF WK HF 
2 WK WK WK HF 87 HF LF WK PF 
3 WK WK WK PF 88 HF LF WK LF 
4 WK WK WK LF 89 HF LF HF WK 
5 WK WK HF WK 90 HF LF HF HF 
6 WK WK HF HF 91 HF LF HF PF 
7 WK WK HF PF 92 HF LF HF LF 
8 WK WK HF LF 93 HF LF PF WK 
9 WK WK PF WK 9' HF LF PF HF 
10 WK WK PF HF 95 HF LF PF PF 
11 WK WK PF PF 96 HF LF PF LF 
12 WK WK PF LF 97 HF LF LF WK 
13 WK WK LF WK 98 HF LF LF HF 
14 WK WK LF HF 99 HF LF LF PF 
15 WK WK LF PF 100 HF LF LF LF 
16 WK WK LF LF 101 PF WK WK WK 
17 WK HF WK WK 102 PF WK WK HF 
18 WK HF WK HF 103 PF WK WK PF 
19 WK HF WK PF 10' PF WK WK LF 
20 WK HF WK LF 105 PF WK HF WK 
21 WK HF LF WK 106 PF WK HF HF 
22 WK HF LF HF 107 PF WK HF PF 
23 WK HF LF PF 108 PF WK HF LF 
24 WK HF LF LF 109 PF WK PF WK 
25 WK PF WK WK 110 PF WK PF HF 
26 WK PF WK HF III PF WK PF PF 
27 WK PF WK PF 112 PF WK PF LF 
28 WK PF WK LF 113 PF WK LF WK 
29 WK PF LF WK 114 PF WK LF HF 
30 WK PF LF HF 115 PF WK LF PF 
31 WK PF LF PF 116 PF WK LF LF 
32 WK PF LF LF 117 PF HF WK WK 
33 WK LF WK WK 118 PF HF WK HF 
34 WK LF WK HF 119 PF HF WK PF 
35 WK LF WK PF 120 PF HF WK LF 
36 WK LF WK LF 121 PF HF LF WK 
37 WK LF HF WK 122 PF HF LF HF 
38 WK LF HF HF 123 PF HF LF PF 
39 WK LF HF PF 124 PF HF LF LF 
40 WK LF HF LF 125 PF PF WK WK 
41 WK LF PF WK 126 PF PF WK HF 
42 WK LF PF HF 127 PF PF WK PF 
43 WK LF PF PF 128 PF PF WK LF 
44 WK LF PF LF 129 PF PF PF WK 
45 WK LF LF WK 130 PF PF PF HF 
46 WK LF LF HF 131 PF PF PF PF 
47 WK LF LF PF 132 PF PF PF LF 
48 WK LF LF LF 133 PF PF LF WK 
'9 HF WK WK WK 134 PF PF LF HF 
50 HF WK WK HF 135 PF PF LF PF 
51 HF WK WK PF 136 PF PF LF LF 
52 HF WK WK LF 137 PF LF WK WK 
53 HF WK HF WK 138 PF LF WK HF 
54 HF WK HF HF 139 PF LF WK PF 
55 HF WK HF PF 140 PF LF WK LF 
56 HF WK HF LF 141 PF LF HF WK 
57 HF WK PF WK 142 PF LF HF HF 
58 HF WK PF HF 143 PF LF HF PF 
59 HF WK PF PF 144 PF LF HF LF 
60 HF WK PF LF 145 PF LF PF WK 
61 HF WK LF WK 146 PF LF PF HF 
62 HF WK LF HF 147 PF LF PF PF 
63 HF WK LF PF 148 PF LF PF LF 
64 HF WK LF LF 149 PF LF LF WK 
65 HF HF WK WK 150 PF LF LF HF 
66 HF HF WK HF 151 PF LF LF PF 
67 HF HF WK PF 152 PF LF LF LF 
68 HF HF WK LF 153 LF WK WK WK 
69 HF HF LF WK 154 LF WK WK HF 
70 HF HF LF HF 155 LF WK WK PF 
71 HF HF LF PF 156 LF WK WK LF 
72 HF HF LF LF 157 LF WK HF WK 
73 HF PF WK WK 158 LF WK HF HF 
7' HF PF WK HF 159 LF WK HF PF 
75 HF PF WK PF 160 LF WK HF LF 
76 HF PF WK LF 161 LF WK PF WK 
77 HF PF PF WK 162 LF WK PF HF 
78 HF PF PF HF 163 LF WK PF PF 
79 HF PF PF PF 164 LF WK PF LF 
80 HF PF PF LF 165 LF WK LF WK 
81 HF PF LF WK 166 LF WK LF HF 
82 HF PF LF HF 167 LF WK LF PF 
83 HF PF LF PF 168 LF WK LF LF 
84 HF PF LF LF 169 LF HF WK WK 
85 HF LF WK WK 170 LF HF WK HF 
Table 7.8: Fuel rig system scenarios for a tank section - one line - 1 
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l:>cenari MAIN RECYCLE fo.!,A}N ID.RAIN 
ECTION INE L1/L INE LI/L LINE 
Scenari MAIN RECYCLE 
.• ~AIN P.RAIN 
ECTION INE LI/L INE Ll/L LINE 
171 LF HF ~~ PF 172 LF HF LF 188 LF PF LF LF 189 LF LF WK WK 
173 LF HF LF WK 190 LF LF WK HF 
174 LF HF LF HF 191 LF LF WK PF 
175 LF HF LF PF 192 LF LF WK LF 
176 LF HF LF LF 193 LF LF HF WK 
177 LF PF WK WK 194 LF LF HF HF 
178 LF PF WK HF 195 LF LF HF PF 
179 LF PF WK PF 196 LF LF HF LF 
180 LF PF WK LF 197 LF LF PF WK 
181 LF PF PF WK 198 LF LF PF HF 
182 LF PF PF HF 199 LF LF PF PF 
183 LF PF PF PF 200 LF LF PF LF 
184 LF PF PF LF 201 LF LF LF WK 
185 LF PF LF WK 202 LF LF LF HF 
186 LF PF LF HF 203 LF LF LF PF 
187 LF PF LF PF 204 LF LF LF LF 
Table 7.9: Fuel rig system scenarios for a tank section - one line - 2 
7.4.1.6.2 Potential Patterns for Subsystem Variables 
As for the key variables the system pattern behaviour is identified from the flow and level 
sensors. Deviated readings from the key variables are examined in more detail. These are 
used to highlight any problems within each tank section and once a deviation is indicated 
an investigation of the appropriate subsystem variables can take place. This will indicate 
any inconsistencies within the appropriate section. It may be concluded that more than 
one section has a deviation, therefore these would need to be investigated separately for 
each. 
To investigate the patterns for the main tank section knowledge of those expected are 
required. These are shown in Tables 7.10 to 7.13 for the ACTIVE mode for phases 1 to 6, 
and for the DORMANT mode respectively, for both lines. 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW 
LTOllO FTOl30 FTOlll FTOllO FTOl21 FT0120 FTOlOO 
ACTIVEPHASEI/2/3 RLL L 1= L 1= L L 
---------- - - - -- - - - -- ------ ------ ------ ------ --------1,4,13,16,17,20,21,24,157,160,169,172,173,176, 177, 180, 209, 212, 221, 224, 225, 228, 229, 232, 
Scenarios 261,264,273,276,277,280,281,284,1609,1612,1621, 1624, 1625, 1628, 1629, 1632, 1765, 1768, 1777, 
1780,1781,1784,1785,1788,1817,1820,1829,1832, 1833, 1836, 1837, 1840, 1869, 1872, 1881, 1884, 
1885, 1888, 1889, 1892 
Table 7.10: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the ACTIVE operating mode when in phases 1, 2 and 3 - both lines 
These tables include the expected patterns when using the redundant line in the main tank 
section. In the event of failure occurring in the main stream line the system functionality 
is such that it will switch to the redundant line, therefore the system will be able to carry 
on working as required with the failure present. The redundant line is only used in the 
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event of a failure causing no flow out of the subsystem as a result of an unexpected key 
flow variable pattern for the given tank section. Therefore the expected patterns for the 
system will also change, as shown in the second line Table 7.11. The scenarios when using 
the redundant line will be dependent upon the set of patterns exhibited from the main line. 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Lt FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 
ACTIVEPHASE4 -~- Q. L Q. Q. L L -------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -------1,4,13,16,17,20,21,24,53,56,65,68,69,72,73,76, 469, 472, 481, 484, 485, 488, 489, 492, 521, 
Scenarios 524,533,536,537,540,541, 544, 677, 680, 689, 692, 693, 696, 697, 700, 129, 732, 741, 744, 745, 748, 
749,752,905,908,917,920,921,924,925,928,957,960, 969, 912, 973, 976, 977, 980 
Operating Using _~lJ~1-:_=1=JJ-~-=J_~ __ L. Redundant Line 
--------Scenarios Dependent upon patterns on Line Lt. 
Table 7.11: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the ACTIVE operating mode when in phase 4 - both lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Lt FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOlI0 FT0121 FTOI20 FTOI00 
ACTIVEPHASE5/6 psL L L L L L L 
---------
- - - -- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -------1,4,13,16,37,40,49,52,157,160,169,172,193,196, 205, 208, 469, 412, 481, 484, 505, 508, 517, 
Sc:enarlos 
520,625,628,637,640,661,664,673,676,1609,1612, 1621, 1624, 1645, 1648, 1657, 1660, 1765, 1768, 
1777, 1780, 1801, 1804, 1813, 1816,2077,2080,2089,2092, 2113, 2116, 2125, 2128, 2233, 2236, 2245, 
2248, 2269, 2272, 2281, 2284 
Table 7.12: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the ACTIVE operating mode when in phases 5 and 6 - both lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Lt FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOII0 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 
DORMANT RLL L L L L L L 
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -------1,4,13,16,37,40,49,52,157,160,169,172,193,196, 205, 208, 469, 472, 481, 484, 505, 508, 517, 
Sc:enarlos 
520,625,628,637,640,661,664,673,676,1609,1612, 1621, 1624, 1645, 1648, 1657, 1660, 1765, 1768, 
1777,1780,1801,1804,1813,1816,2077,2080,2089,2092, 2113, 2116, 2125, 2128, 2233, 2236, 2245, 
2248, 2269, 2272, 2281, 2284 
Table 7.13: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the DORMANT operating mode - both lines 
A deviation within a tank section may be the result of a failure on one or potentially both 
of the stream lines. In the case where there is a failure in the main stream line and the 
redundant line is being used the failed line can be investigated as the occurrence of a failure 
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at this point in the system would be known. Tables 7.14 to 7.17 show the expected patterns 
for one line (11) in the main tank. 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Ll FLOW L1 FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTOllO FTOl00 
I, 4, 13, 16, 
.LL L t= L L ACTIVEPHASEl/2/3 33,36,37,40, 153, 156, 165, 168, 
169,172,173,176 
Table 7.14: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the ACTIVE operating mode when in phases 1, 2 and 3 - one line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOII0 FTOlOO 
1,4,5,8 
b. L b. L ACTIVEPHASE4 33,36,37,40 b 153, 156, 157, 16 
189, 192, 193, 19 
Table 7.15: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the ACTIVE operating mode when in phase 4 - one line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTOllO FTOlOO 
1,4, 13, 16 p,L L L ACTIVEPHASE5/6 33, 36, 45, 48 L L 53, 156, 165, 16 
189, 192, 201, 20 
Table 7.16: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the ACTIVE operating mode when in phases 5 and 6 - one line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOII0 FTOIOO 
1, 4, 13, 16 
"'L L L L L DORMANT 33, 36, 45, 48 53, 156, 165, 16e 
89, 192, 201, 204 
Table 7.17: Expected sensor patterns for the main tank section 
in the DORMANT operating mode - one line 
In a similar manner as carried out for the sets of patterns obtained from the key variables 
for each set of patterns a list of possible scenarios are obtained. 
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7.4.1.7 Fault Tree Construction 
7.4.1.7.1 Fault 'free Development 
Non-coherent fault trees are drawn to determine the causality of deviations from expected 
sensor readings within the system. A tree is developed for each transmitter in a subsystem 
by taking into consideration the system operating mode and the potential causes of failure 
within this part, thus restricting the boundary of causes to that particular section of the 
system. 
Non-coherent fault trees are constructed for deviations from the expected observations for 
the flow transmitters on the drainage line and each of the streams L1 and L2. Due to 
the symmetry of the structure the potential causes of failure for each of these streams are 
the same, the only difference being the numbering on each line. When the transmitters 
are known to be functioning correctly this information is incorporated into the analysis 
by drawing a success tree. Fault trees are also drawn for the level transmitter in each 
subsystem, indicating a loss of containment within the tank itself or another part of the 
subsystem. 
Fault trees have been constructed for the failure modes of each flow and level transmitter in 
a tank unit, details of which can be found in Appendix D. The structure of the main, wing 
and collector tanks are the same, therefore only fault trees for the main tank are illustrated. 
Fault trees are drawn for high, partial and low flow from each flow transmitter and constant, 
linearly decreasing and non-linearly decreasing levels from the level transmitters. Success 
trees have also been developed for when the system is functioning correctly. 
7.4.1.7.2 Possible Component Failures 
To apply fault tree analysis to any system all possible failures that could occur for each of 
the system components must be defined. Table 7.18 contains a list of possible component 
failures and their code for the main, wing and collector tanks in the system. The notation 'i' 
represents the particular subsystem and 'j' the component number within the subsystem. 
As all sensors are assumed to be reliable the possible failures for flow and levels sensors 
have been omitted. 
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Code 
IVPOijOFC (1 :s i :s 3) (1 :s; j :5 3) 
IVPOijOFO (1 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s; j :s; 3) 
IVPOijOFS (1 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s; j :s; 3) 
IVPOijOB (1 $. i $. 3) (1 :5 j S. 3) 
IVPOijOPB (1 :s i:S; 3) (1 :s; j :s; 3) 
IVPOijOL (1 :s i :s 3) (1 :s; j :s; 3) 
PSVOijOISC (I :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s j :s; 2) 
PSVOijOISO (1 :s; i :s 3) (1 :$ j :s 2) 
PSVOijOFS (1 :$ i :$ 3) (1 :s; j :s; 2) 
PSVOijOB (1 :$ i:S; 3) (1 :s; j :s; 2) 
PSVOijOPB (1 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s; j :s 2) 
PSVOijOL (1 :s i :s; 3) (1 :s j :s; 2) 
BPOijOB (1 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s j :5 2) 
BPOijOPB (1 :s i :s; 3) (1 :s j :s; 2) 
BPOijOL (1 :s; i:S; 3) (1 :s; j :s; 2) 
PPOijOFSO (1 :s i :s 3) (1 :s; j :s 2) 
PPOijOFM (1 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s; j :s 2) 
PPOijOL (1 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s j :s; 2) 
PPOijOFO (01 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s j :s; 2) 
POijB (1 :s i :s; 3) (01 :s; j :s; 25) 
POijF (1 :s; i :s 3) (01 :s; j :s; 25) 
POijPB (1 :s; i :s; 3) (01 :s j :5 25) 
POijL (1 $. i:S 3) (01 :s; j :s; 25) 
TKOilOR (1 :s i :s; 3) 
TKOil0L (1 :s; i :s 3) 
CTOijOT (1 :s; i :s; 3) (1 :s; j :s; 3) 
CTOijOF (1 :s; i < 3) (1 < j < 3) 
Component Failure 
Powered Isolation Valve IVPOijO Fails Closed 
Powered Isolation Valve IVPOijO Fails Open 
Powered Isolation Valve IVPOijO Fails Stuck 
Powered holation Valve IVPOijO is Blocked 
Powered Isolation Valve IVPOijO is Partially Blocked 
Powered Isolation Valve IVPOijO is Leaking 
System Stages 
Pressure Sprung Relief Valve PSVOijO Fails Incorrectly Set Closed 
Pressure Sprung Relief Valve PSVOijO Fails Incorrectly Set Open 
Pressure Sprung Relief Valve PSVOijO Fails Stuck 
Pressure Sprung Relief Valve PSVOijO is Blocked 
Pressure Sprung Relief Valve PSVOijO is Partially Blocked 
Pressure Sprung Relief Valve PSVOijO is Leaking 
Back Pressure Valve BPOijO is Blocked 
Back Pressure Valve BPOijO is Partially Blocked 
Back Pressure Valve BPOijO is Leaking 
Peristaltic Pump PPOijO Fails Shut Off 
Peristaltic Pump PPOijO Fails Mechanically 
Peristaltic Pump PPOijO is Leaking 
Peristaltic Pump PPOijO Fails On 
Pipe POij is Blocked 
Pipe POij is Fractured 
Pipe POij ia Partially Blocked 
Pipe POij is Leaking 
Tank TKOilO is Ruptured 
Tank TKOilO is Leaking 
Controller CTOijO fails reading True 
Controller CTOijO fails reading False 
Table 7.18: Potential component failures for the fuel rig system 
7.4.2 Fault Identification - The Application Stage 
7.4.2.1 Identification of Actual Patterns 
The patterns in Table 7.2 are used to indicate a problem in the overall system operation 
in the ACTIVE mode. Assume for example there is no flow out of the main tank when it 
is required in phase ACTIVE4. The system has been working as required up to this point. 
The expected and actual readings obtained for the system key variables are as shown in 
Table 7.19 along with the potential scenarios for the patterns from the key variables. 
Scenarios MAIN MAIN WING WING COLLECTO. COLLECTOR 
LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL 
FT0130 LTOllO FT0230 LT0210 FT0330 LT0310 
ACTIVE4 (Le = T,) I, 2, 13, 14 Q. RL~ L psL 1= RLb n Expected Patterns 17,18,29,3C " PS 
ACTIVE4 (Le < T,) 9, 52, 61, 64 L RLt= L p~ 1= ¥tb Actual Patterns TO P. 
Table 7.19: Actual sensor patterns for the overall system in ACTIVE phase 4 
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7.4.2.2 Identification of Deviated Key Variables 
Table 7.19 shows that the level in the collector tank is decreasing below threshold T2 when 
it should be constant. The pattern from the main tank level (LTOllO) at this point should 
be linearly decreasing and no flow out of the main tank is also indicating a problem. Key 
variable patterns not consistent with those expected for ACTIVE4 are FT0130, LTOllO 
and LT031O. An unchangeable level in the main tank indicates there is water present, 
unless a sensor has failed. Therefore there is at least one pattern not consistent with those 
expected in Table 7.19 for the given phase. A list of potential scenarios for the system is 
given. By forming a fault tree structure for the scenarios the problem can be identified as 
being present in the subsystem containing the main tank. 
7.4.2.3 TOP Event Structure Construction 
A comparison of subsystem sensors is made and patterns identified in the same way as for 
the overall system. Each stream is investigated to ascertain the potential failure cause. 
Table 7.20 shows an example of expected and actual sensor patterns for the working (L1) 
and redundant (L2) lines. 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOl00 
ACTIVE4 RL~ Q. L Q. Q. L L Expected Patterns p, 
-------- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- ------1,4, 13, 16, 11, 20, 21, 24, 53, 56, 65, 68, 69, 12, 13, 16, 469, 412, 481, 484, 485, 488, 489, 492, 521, 
Scenarios 524,533,536,537,540,541,544,671,680,689,692,693, 696, 691, 700, 729, 732, 741, 144, 745, 748, 
749,752,905,908,917,920,921,924,925,928,951,960, 969, 972, 973, 976, 977, 980 
Actual RLL L 1= L 1= L L Patterns 
- - Sc;n;rl-;'s- - - ----- ----- ----- ----- - - - -- - - - -- ------1869, 1872, 1881, 1884, 1885, 1888, 1889, 1892 
Operating Using ~:~LL -= _~_LL1J::1.Lh_ Redundant Line 
--------Scenarios 1869, 1872, 1873, 1876, 1905, 1908, 1909, 1912 
Actual ~LbJ_Ll_bl_Ll_bl_Ll_h_ Patterns 
--------Scenarios 1889, 1892 
Table 7.20: Expected and actual sensor patterns for the main tank subsystem 
when flow is expected on the outflow line 
In this example actual patterns from the system are indicating that both lines L1 and L2 
have flow on the recycle lines but not out on each of the stream lines. The flow sensor on 
the drain line is the only one giving the expected pattern for the tank section. 
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Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show the structure for scenarios 1889 and 1892 respectively together 
with the corresponding level pattern. 
Figure 7.5: Structure for Scenario 1889 in the ACTIVE operating mode phase 4 
Figure 7.6: Structure for Scenario 1892 in the ACTIVE operating mode phase 4 
Both deviated and working readings are included in the diagrams. The scenarios for each 
set of patterns are then combined using an 'OR' gate to form the overall TOP event for 
the sensor and level patterns, as shown in Figure 7.7. 
Observed 
Symptoms 
Scenario 1889 Scenario 1892 
ACTIVE ACTIVE 
Figure 7.7: TOP event structure for example 
7.4.2.4 Prime Implicants 
A qualitative analysis of the fault tree in Figure 7.7 will produce a set of prime implicants 
that highlight the potential causes of failure for these given subsystem symptoms, along 
with the working components. An example prime implicant obtained in this case is: 
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POl13B.POl13F.POl13PB.POl13L.POlT2l".POIT2L.POfiTI'.P0111L.P0110F.P5ITOL.POI09l' 
.P0109L.BP0120L.IVP0120L.IVP0120S.IVP0120FO.CT0120T.POlO7B.P0107F.P0107PB 
.P0107L.Pil:i:08B.P0108F.P0108PB.P0108L.PP0120FSO.PP0120FM.PP0120L.POl18B 
.POfi8l'.P01I8PB.P01I8L.P01I9B.P01I9F.P01I9PB.P01I9L.P0120B.P0120PB."'PS"'V"O"'12""O"'IS""C 
.PSV0120B.PSV0120PB.PSV0120S.PSV0120L.P0106F.POlO6L.PiIT05F.P0105L.POl04F 
.POTIi4L.P0103L.P0103F.BPOlIOL.IVPOlIOL.IVPOlIOS.IVPOlIOFO.CTOlIOT.P010lB.P0101F 
.P0101PB.P0101L.P0102B.P0102F.P0102PB.P0102L.PPOlIOFSO.PPOllOFM.PPOlIOL.P01I5B 
.POl15F .P01I5P B.P0115L.P01I6B.POl16F.P01I6PB.P0116L.POl17B.POl17PB.PSV0110lSC 
.PSV0110B.PSV0110PB.PSV0110S.PSV011OL.IVP0180S.IVP0180FO.CT0130T.TK0110L.'"TvK"'0l"1"ORn 
This prime implicant is of order 85. In total 66 prime implicants are obtained, two of order 
85 and 64 of order 86. 
7.4.2.5 Potential Causes of System Failure 
Any working component states are removed at this stage from the prime implicants by 
performing a coherent approximation, to give a list of potential causes of failure. The 
potential causes for the example are shown in Table 7.21. Post connection failures are 
failures that occur after the two streams join. The method has correctly identified all the 
potential causes of failure in this particular case. 
Post Connection Failures Failure on Failure on 
Stream Ll Stream L2 
1) P01I3B 1) P0103B 1) P0109B 
2) P01I4B 2) P0104B 2) POlIOB 
3) P0105B AND 3) P01I1B 
OR 4) POlO6B 4) P01I2B 
5) BPOlIOB 5) BP0120B 
6) IVPOlIOFC 6) IVP0120FC 
7) IVPOlIOB 7) IVP0120B 
8)CTOlIOF 8) CT0120F 
Potential Failure Causes (Order 1): 2 Potential Failure Causes (Order 2): 64 
Table 7.21: Potential causes of failure 
Table 7.21 shows there are 66 potential causes of system failure, 2 of order 1, as shown in 
the first column of the table and 64 of second order that are obtained by ANDing together 
the failures on stream L1 with those on L2. For instance, P0113B is a single failure and 
P0103B.IVP0120FC is a multiple failure containing two faults. 
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7.4.2.6 Ranking of Failure Modes 
Measures of importance [29] are used to identify the most likely cause of failure. The 
unavailability of each component is calculated using Equation 3.35. The Fussell-Vesely 
measure of minimal cut set importance, shown in Equation 3.49 is then used to rank the 
cut sets that were obtained using the method. Table 7.22 shows the unavailability of each 
component, assuming that the deviation occurred at t = 3600s. 
Component Conditional Unavailability 
Failure Failure Rate 
P0103B·POI06B, POl09B·P0114B 1.0x 10-8 3.5999351x 10 5 
BPOllOB, BP0120B 1.9xlO-7 6.83766123x 10-4 
IVPOllOFC, IVP0120FC 1.5x1O-7 5.39854225x 10-4 
IVPOllOB, IVP0120B 2.5xl0-7 8.9959512x 10-4 
CTOllOF, CT0120F 7.4x 10-6 2.6288285x 10-2 
Table 7.22: Component failure rate and unavailability 
QSYS is determined using the Rare Event Approximation (see Section 3.6.2.2.2), and 
for this example was found to be QSYS = 8.874151607xlO-4• Using the Fussell-Vesely 
measure of of minimal cut set importance has shown that the most likely cause of failure is 
CT0110F.CT0120F - controller CT0110 and CT0120 both failing reading FALSE - in this 
case. 
7.5 Results 
The example used in Section 7.4.2 has illustrated how the method obtains the potential 
causes of failure for the actual set of patterns identified from the system when a deviation in 
sub-mode ACTIVE4 occurs. This indicates that flow from the main tank section is required 
but is not occurring. There are 8 other sets of patterns for both lines in the main tank 
section that could have shown the deviation in the key variables of failure to output fluid, 
as illustrated in Table 7.23. The first two lines of the table are the required patterns out of 
the main tank section using the main and redundant lines respectively. 
For a given set of symptoms the most ideal outcome would be to obtain one potential cause 
of failure, of single order. In reality however this will not always be the case. The more 
components there are in a potential cause the less likely it will be the reason for failure. 
Therefore the potential causes of failure obtained are up to and including those of order 3 
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to reduce the complexity of the analysis. The effectiveness index lE that was used in the 
water tank system is used to indicate how well the method has been scaled up for use on 
the fuel rig. 
Possible LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
Pattern FLOW Lt FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FTOl30 FTOIll FTOIlO FT0121 FTOl20 FTOI00 n, nCi nai 
RL~ L L Q. Q. L L . . - -PS 
- - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - --
--'---------1,4,13,16,17,20,21,24,53,56,65,68,69,72,73,76. 469, 472, 481, 484, 485, 488, 489, 492, 521, 
Scenarios 524,533,536,537,540,541,544,677,680,689,692,693, 696, 697, 700, 729, 732, 741, 744, 745, 748, 
749,752,905,908,917,920,921,924,925,928,957,960, 969, 972, 973,976,977,980 
"L~ L L Q. L - --- --- - - -PS 
- - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - --
- -
- -
------
Scenarloa 1869, 1872, 1873, 1876, 1905, 1908, 1909, 1912 
t 
"t=lLl L L L L L 9 9 9 
- - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - --
-----------Scenarios 1777,1780,1813,1816,2245,2248,2281,2284 
2 : b L L 1_ L1_ L 1_ ~ 1_ L 1_ Ll ~4_l ~4-'- __ 3~ __ 
- - - - -Scenarloa 1785, 1788, 2253, 2256 
3 "Lt= L L L b L L 192 192 240 
- - - -- ----- ----- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -
------
Scenarios 1797, 1800, 2265, 2268 
4 
"Lt=l L1 1= L L L L 24 24 30 
- - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - --
-----------Scenarios 1881, 1884, 1917, 1920 
5 : b 1_ L 1_ b 1_ L1_ b 1_ L 1_ L 1 :6_l ~6 -'- __ 6~ __ 
- - - --Scenarios 1889, 1892 
6 "Lt= L 1= L b L L 528 528 528 
- - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - - ------Scenarios 1901, 1904 
7 "Lt=l Ll b L L L L 192 192 240 
- - - --
----- ----- -----
- - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - --
-----------Scenarios 2037, 2040 
8 "Lt=l L _ b 1_ L 1_ b 1_ L 1_ L 1 ~8_l5~8-'- _ ~2~ __ 
- - - --Scenarios 2045, 2048, 2073, 2076 
9 "Lt= L b L b L L 128 128 128 
- - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - -
------Scenarios 2057, 2060 
Effectiveness Index lE 0.911 
Table 7.23: Possible flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a constant level 
and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - both lines 
Results have been obtained considering the possible patterns that could occur for the given 
key variables in this case. There are four sets of patterns for which the actual number of 
potential failure causes are not obtained. These are numbers 2, 3, 4, and 7. Pattern 4 is a 
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'mirror image' of 2 and similarly with 7 and 3. The results obtained in patterns 1, 5, 6, 8 
and 9 are correct for the given readings. The results give an effectiveness index lE = 0.911, 
indicating that although not all possible component failures were identified the method has 
still achieved a very good result. 
In pattern 2 there are 24 potential causes of failure obtained, but 30 actual possibilities. 
On line L1 no flow at both FTOll1 on the recycle line and at FTOll0 are caused by 
peristaltic pump PPOll0 failing shut off (PPOll0FSO), or pipes POlO1 or POlO2 being 
blocked (POlOlB, POlO2B). On line L2 there is flow at FT0121 and no flow at FT0120. This 
situation is caused by either a blockage in pipes POlO9, POlIO, P0111 or P0112 (P0109B, 
POll0B, POlllB, P0112B) or powered isolation valve IVP0120 failing closed, blocked or 
controller CT0120 causing the valve to be closed (IVP0120FC, IVP0120B, CT0120F). This 
gives the 24 possibilities that were obtained by the method. In addition to these failures 
on line L2 there could also be a blockage in pipes P0113 or P0114 (P0113B, P0114B), 
but these failures are hidden because they are a potential cause for both lines and get 
cancelled out by the expected behaviour at FTOll1. This problem was also the reason for 
the non-identification of all failures in patterns 3, 4 and 7. 
A deviation could occur in the system, but it could continue with normal operation using 
system redundancy. Assume the key variables indicate as before and the conclusion drawn 
is that there is a problem in the main tank section. In the event of a failure on the main 
stream line, the system will use the redundant line. There will however be a pattern from 
the main stream line sensors indicating that a problem has occurred, resulting in the use 
of the secondary line. In this case switching to the redundant line in the tank may enable 
it to carry on as required. Regardless of whether the system carries on working or not the 
failed line can be investigated to ascertain the problem. There are 3 sets of patterns that 
could be indicated from the given key variables, these are shown in Table 7.24. 
The first line shows the required patterns out of the main tank section using the main 
stream line. There are 3 possible sets of patterns that can result in no flow out of the tank 
and no change in the level. In all cases the correct number of potential causes of failure 
have been obtained. The effectiveness index of 1.000 indicates that the method has worked 
well in this case when investigating one line. 
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Possible Scenarios LEVEL Ll MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
Pattern FLOW Ll Ll FLOW Lt FLOW Actual 
!Possibilities 
LTOUO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOII0 FTOlOO no ne, na. 
1,4,5,8,33,36, 37, RL~ L L Q. L . 0, 153, 156, 157, 160, . . . 189, 192, 193, 196 PS 
1 165, 168, 201, 204 
"'L L L L L 3 3 3 
2 173,176 
"'L L 1= L L 10 10 10 
3 185, 188 RLL L b L L 80 80 80 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table 7.24: Possible flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a constant level 
and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - one line 
Results are shown in Appendix E for various key variable patterns that lead to a failure 
within the main tank section to demonstrate the method in the ACTIVE mode. Additional 
results in the DORMANT mode are shown in Appendix F for the situation where it has 
been concluded that a problem has occurred in the main tank causing unwanted flow. 
The results include patterns exhibiting unexpected flow, low flow and no flow when in the 
ACTIVE operating mode and unexpected flow or low flow when in the DORMANT mode. 
7.6 Discussion of Results 
7.6.1 Overview 
The results have given an average effectiveness index of lE = 0.973 for investigating both 
lines together and lE = 0.886 when looking at a single line in the ACTIVE operating mode. 
These show that in both cases the method has been very effective at obtaining the potential 
causes of failure for the given subsystem. DORMANT results, shown in Appendix F have 
yielded an average effectiveness index of lE = LOOO for both lines and lE = LOOO looking 
at a single line respectively, therefore strengthening the performance of the method in both 
cases. Application to an aircraft is required to determine how effective the method can be 
on a real system. 
Advantages and disadvantages were obtained for looking at lines singularly and together. 
Investigating both lines was more likely to give higher order possibilities, therefore breaking 
the analysis up into separate lines in this case would enable the analysis to focus in on the 
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actual cause. Investigating one line at a time reduces the complexity of the problem. The 
results show that there are in general less potential causes of failure when looking at a 
single line. Also the combining of less sensor readings compared to investigating both lines 
reduces the time taken to obtained a diagnosis. A single line was not always enough to find 
the cause, as the line under investigation indicated that this was not causing the overall 
failure on the outflow of the subsystem. Therefore the second line in this instance would 
also need investigation. 
When there is unexpected no flow out of the tank it is advantageous to look at each of the 
lines separately because it is known that the line on which flow is expected has failed. If 
unexpected flow occurs then either of the two lines could have caused the failure. Therefore 
when one line is investigated in this situation it may not necessarily be the one that contains 
the failure. If it is deduced that the line being investigated does not contain the cause then 
the second line can be examined in further detail. 
7.6.2 Limited Order 
The likelihood of a potential cause being the actual failure decreases the larger the cut set 
order. Therefore, only potential causes of up to order 3 were obtained during the analysis. 
This has indicated that some of the sensor patterns, although valid, are not very likely to 
occur. Limiting the order has therefore enabled the method to focus in on the most probable 
faults and highlight scenarios that are not very likely to appear in the analysis. Possible 
causes of higher order were more likely to occur when looking at both lines together. In 
these cases it would be better to investigate lines separately to reduce this and focus in on 
the failed area. As used in the analysis of the water tank system, in the event that there is 
more than one possible fault, measures of importance are used to obtain the overall cause 
of failure. 
7.6.3 Subsystems 
The breaking down of the system into smaller sections has meant that the method can be 
utilised on larger scale systems. Monitoring the key process variables enabled any deviation 
in the patterns to be highlighted in the event of a problem within each subsystem. Once 
a subsystem has been pinpointed as having a failure it can then be investigated further to 
focus in on the most likely cause. 
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7.6.4 Complexity of the Fault Trees 
The fault trees shown in Appendix D for the fuel rig system in the majority of cases are 
quite large, especially compared to those used in the water tank system. Another approach 
that could be used to potentially reduce the complexity of the analysis would be to just 
indicate the components that could have potentially failed for the system rather than how. 
This would reduce the size of the fault trees. However, different failure states will result in 
different types of sensor readings, for instance a blockage in a pipe may affect the system 
differently to a fracture. NOT logic is used to remove any deviations both within the fault 
trees and by indicating what component states should not be failed when a sensor is not 
deviated. Therefore alternatively the same type of failures could be grouped together such 
as all blockages in pipes that could be the result of the same sensor deviation. This would 
reduce the size of the fault trees, by identifying the location and type of failure rather than 
the actual cause. A list of potential causes of failure could be drawn up for each type of 
failure. Once the area in which the failure location is obtained and the type of failure found, 
the most likely cause could be ascertained from the list using measure of importance. 
7.6.5 Sensor Failures 
The sensors in the system were assumed to be reliable. A failure in a sensor could however be 
indicated in the system by any patterns that are deemed invalid, for instance the occurrence 
of overall flow out of the tank, but no flow on either of the two lines before this. A set of 
patterns that cannot occur would be identified. 
If a set of patterns were to occur that were not valid then this would signify the occurrence 
of a problem with one or more of the sensors within the system or subsystem under 
investigation and that these rather than any of the other components should be investigated. 
7.7 Summary 
• The dynamic method is extended and described by applying it to a model based on 
a fuel rig from BAE Systems. This features redundancy and is a larger system than 
previously considered. 
• In the majority of cases the method has effectively identified the potential causes of 
failure for both the ACTIVE and the DORMANT operating modes. 
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• Application to a real aircraft fuel system is required to validate the method's 
effectiveness and scalability to an even larger example. 
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A pplication to Aircraft Fuel Systems 
8.1 Introduction 
The fault tree method so far has only been demonstrated on small, simple systems. This 
chapter describes the characteristics of aircraft fuel systems, indicating any similarities and 
difficulties that may be faced when applying the fault diagnostic method. 
8.2 Aircraft Systems 
The overview of a general aircraft system has highlighted a number of issues that may be 
encountered. This section looks at these issues and how this will impact on the application of 
the fault diagnostic method. The Modelling and Preparation Stage (MPS) steps described 
in Section 7.2.1 were: 
1. System division 
2. Identification of system sensors 
3. Identification of key process variables 
4. System scenario identification 
5. System operating modes and assumptions 
6. System scenarios 
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7. Expected pattern behaviour for key variables 
8. Expected pattern behaviour for other variables 
9. Fault t ree construction 
The method is now applied to an example aircraft fuel system. 
8.2.1 Nimrod MRA4 
The Nimrod i the world 's only jet powered mari time patrol and anti-submarine aircraft 
developed in the 1960s through extensive modification of the de Havilland Comet, which 
was the world ' first jetliner. It was created in order to replace the Royal Air Force's pi ton-
engined Avro Shackleton as their primary marit ime patrol aircraft and ha been so ince 
the early 1970s. The most recent design of the Nimrod is the MRA4 , the main roles for 
which are maritime reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, ant i-surface uni t warfare, and 
search and re cue. The fuel y tern i comprised of thirteen tanks supplying four engines, a 
typical structure for t he Nimrod MRA4 is as illustrated in Figure .1 [81]. The aim, as for 
any aircraft fuel sy tern , is to provide an adequate supply of fuel to each of the four engines 
for the duration of flight. 
5 
Figure 8.1: The Nimrod MRA4 Fuel System 
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The fuel system consists of three collecting or feed tanks used to supply four engine via a 
fuel feed gallery. In addi t ion each wing conta ins three tanks that feed into a collect ing tank , 
and similarly in there are four feeding t anks within the fuselage. A surge tank is locatecl in 
each of t he wings, which is pa rt of the vent ing system. These are usecl to prevent fuel from 
being lost in the event of any entering the venting system. 
8.2 .1.1 System Comp o nen t D escript ion 
8.2.1.1 .1 Fuel Tanks 
Tanks 1, 5 and 6 are located within the ma in fu elage and two of each of the remaining 
tanks labelled 2, 3, 4 , 4A and 7 are locatecl within each of the wings, as shown in Figure 8.l. 
Those labelled4A are pod tanks and are direct ly linked to their adj acent tank 4, from which 
4A i gravity fed fuel. As a result , the total fuel within ta nks 4 and 4A is gauged together. 
The three collector tanks are ta nk 1 and 4/ 4A wi thin each of the wings. "Vhen the system 
is in normal operation ta nk 1 will feed engines 2 and 3, with tan k 4/ 4A on the left- hand 
side feeding engine 1 and tank 4/ 4A on the right-hand side feecl ing engine 4. Tanks 2, 3, 5, 
6 and 7 are t ransfer tanks as fuel is transferred from these to the tanks feecl ing the engines. 
8.2.1.1.2 Fuel Measurement 
The contents of fuel within each tank is measurecl u ing capacitance gauge probes. An 
accurate mass of fuel is obtained from t hese measurements a well as data from the 
Enhanced Global-positioning-system lnert ia l-navigation-unit (EG I), densitometers, wh ich 
are locatecl in tank~ 1, 2 (right-hand side) and 4 (left-hand-side), level sensors and 
compensators. The mass of each individual tank is displayed and t he tota l amount avai lable 
is indicated to the pilot . From this, the level of fuel within each tank can a lso be determinecl . 
The information obta inecl i al 0 usecl to determine the cent re of gravity for the aircraft . 
The distribution of fuel within the aircraft is controlled by the Fuel Management System 
(FUlV!). The main part of thi i ' t he Utilities Systems Management System (USMS). For the 
majori ty of time fuel within th system is automatically controll ecl and managed through 
USMS computer 1 an I 2 using the in forma tion obta ined from the measurements taken 
in the Fuel Gauging and Levell ing Sensing System (F UG ). The aircrew provide manual 
input in the event of certain malfunctions taking place, and also during refuel, defuel, fuel 
dumping, fuel transfer and air- to-air refuelling. Tempera ture sensor a re locatecl wit hin 
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each collecting tank to ind icate if it is wit hi n an acceptable limit. A high temperature 
could cause the fuel to boil and if it is too low it could result in it waxing, if water is 
present in the fuel then t his could freeze. 
8.2.1.1.3 FUel Galler ies 
The system conta ins two main fuel galleries that enable fuel to be pumped between the tanks 
and on to the engines and auxi liary power uni t. An ill ustration of the fuel system indicating 
the locations of the two main fuel gallerie', labelled ' fuel feed gallery' and ' refuel/ t ran fer 
ga llery' , are shown in Figure 8.2 [82]. The fuel feed gallery is fed from collecting tanks 1 and 
4AR/ L. The refuel/ t ransfer gallery is used to tran port fuel to the appropriate collecting 
tank when the aircraft is in operation. 
USMS 1 
• Monrtor & 
Manual 
control 
F 
USMS2 
• Monrtor& 
Manual 
control 
D 
USMS I & 2 
• control & 
""",Ior 
USMS I 
• oontrol & 
moortor 
Fuel feed 
gallery 
\ 
L3 
x D AFD 
AFR 
USMS2 
• control & 
IOOI1Itor 
L4 
Figure 8.2: Nimrod MRA4 fuel system components 
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8. 2.1 .1.4 Fuel Pumps and Valves 
Each t ransfer tan k - except fo r number 7 tanks - contains two transfer pumps (P ) and 
tra n fer pump va lves (TX) so ena bles the fuel to be t ra nsported to the g iven collecting 
tan k (number 7 ta nks contain on ly one t ra nsfer pump and valve). The three collecting 
tanks (1 and 4) each have two feed pumps (P ) and two feed isolate valves (F ). In addit ion , 
t he number 4 tanks a lso contain a transfer pump to enable fuel to be fed from tank 4 to 
4A in the event t ha t gravity feeding is not po ible, for instance when t hese tanks are low 
on fuel. Non-return valves a re located on t he li nes from each collect ing tank to ena ble fuel 
to be t ransferred to the back-up feed line. A component key for the fuel system is shown 
in Figure .3 [ 2]. 
® Fuel pump @ GM Ground Master sIlut-<Jff valve 
@ A AAR Master sIlut-<Jff valve @L Engine LP fuel cocks 
@ AFO APU Feed valve @ S Tank sIlut-<Jff valves 
@ AFR APU Fire valve @ TI Transfer isolate valves 
8 c COmmon-feed valves 8 lX Pump transfer valves 80 DefuellSOlate valves @ x Cross feed valve 
@ OP Dump isolate valves <> on-return valves 8 F Feed isolate valves _ APS AAR pressure sensor 
Figure 8.3: Nimrod IRA4 fuel system component key 
Each pump wi t hin t he system is located such t hat a ll fuel can be drawn from the tan k, even 
when t he aircra ft is at a n angle. Each pump is a ble to opera te independently as needed. 
During normal operation both pumps in tank 1 are expected to provide fuel to the engines. 
There a re number of additional types of va lve within t he system. Each tank is fi tted with 
a shut-off valve (S) to control t he flow of fuel into it . F\lel fl ow from t he ai rcraft system to 
t he engine sy tem can a lso be prevented by closing t he manually cont rolled low pressure 
fuel cocks (L). Common-feed (C) and cross-feed (X) valves enable fuel to be directed to 
different location along the fu el feed gallery, a nd similarly t ransfer isolate valves (T I) are 
used to direct fuel along t he refuel/ transfer ga.llery to the collecting tanks. 
The defuel isolate va lves (D) are used during t he defuelling and fuel dumping of t he ai rcra ft . 
In addition to t his t hey are a lso utilised in fuel t ransfer . The dump isolate va lves (DP) 
are opened when the system is in fuel dumping mode in order to release fue l. Other va.lves 
include t he ground master shut-oA' (GM) t hat a re used during ground refuel a nd defuel, t he 
air-ta-air refuelling valve (A) u ed when the a ircraft is being refuelled in the a ir and the 
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APU feed valve (AFD), APU fire valve (AFR) and APU fuel pump (P) control fuel flow 
into the APU. The non-return valves force fuel to flow in one direction and prevent it from 
going back the other way. 
8.2.1.1.5 Fuel System Indicators and Displays 
Fuel system data is displayed to the pilots via the fuel system page, the engine warning 
display and the final fuel selector display. 
Fuel System Page This is the main display that gives information regarding the modes 
of system operation, fuel quantities in each tank, fuel temperature, the presence of 
any leakages, the low pressure cock status (open or closed), the status of the XFEED, 
LCOM and RCOM valves (open or closed), pipeline status (presence or absence of 
fluid), and finally whether the system is in the fuel dump and refuel modes. 
Engine Warning Display This displays any warnings that are encountered in the 
system, such as low levels in fuel tanks and when fuel dumping is taking place. 
Final Fuel Display This displays the final fuel that is manually selected by the FINAL 
FUEL selector. 
Multi-Function Control and Display Unit This displays mission information including 
reports on flight progress, nearest airport locations and possible diversions. 
Critical Data Area There is a critical data area on the fuel system page that displays 
the total amount of fuel flow per hour, the amount of fuel available, reserve fuel, and 
predicted fuel left once arriving at the chosen destination. 
8.2.1.2 Level Transmitter Thresholds 
Capacitance probes are located within each of the tanks in order to indicate high and low 
levels by transmitting the information to the USMS. This information is then used to control 
the transfer of fuel within the tanks in the system. An illustration of typical principles of the 
capacitance probe functions for level indication is shown in Figure 8.4 [81]. There are five 
main thresholds within each tank: 'High-High' (Hi-Hi), 'High' (Hi), 'High-Low' (Hi-Lo), 
'Low-High' (La-Hi) and 'Low-Low' (Lo-Lo). 
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Hi-Hi An OVERFILL alert is given when the Hi-Hi level is reached within any tank. This 
will cause any shut off valves from refuelling appliances (for instance, during air-to-air 
or ground refuel) to close. 
Hi A Hi level reading from any tank will cause its shut off valve to close in order to stop 
the fuel transfer into the tank. 
Hi-Lo A tank's shut off valve will open to enable the transfer of fuel into the tank when 
the level reaches 'Hi-Lo' or below. 
Lo-Hi The Lo-Hi level is that which any tank must be at in order to allow fuel to be 
transferred from it to another tank within the system. Any level below this and fuel 
transfer from the given tank cannot be carried out. 
Lo-Lo Reaching the level Lo-Lo in any of the tanks will result in the termination of fuel 
transfer from that particular tank. Fuel transfer will only recommence if the level in 
the tank rises to the Lo-Hi level. 
Causes AAR and Ground MSOVs 10 cbse I 
Hi-Hi • Hi has failed .ne! in~" OVERFILL.1ert 
HI • Closes Wlk SOY to stop Ir.msfer inlc link 
Hi-Lo • Opens lank SOY ttJ infIiR transfer inlo liWlk 
(Approx. 15C11to. below Hi sensor) 
Lo-Hi· RMlitiltes lransfedrom tank if fuel level riset 
Lo-Lo· Termfnlles lransfer from link 
Figure 8.4: Nimrod MRA4 capacitance probe functions for level indication 
8.2.2 Modelling and Preparation Stage 
8.2.2.1 System Division 
For the fault detection process to take place the system described needs to be divided into 
sections. This will enable the analysis to be broken down and allow failed areas to be 
focused in on. During normal operation engine 1 is fed by collector tank 4/4A within the 
left wing of the aircraft, which in turn are fed by transfer tanks 2 and 3. Similarly engine 4 
is fed by collector tank 4/4A on the right-hand side of the aircraft, which is fed by transfer 
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Figure 8.7: Sub-division of the Nimrod MRA4 fuel system for the fuselage 
8.2.2.2 Identification of System Sensors 
Measurements taken from the system include flow out of the tanks into the engines, and 
the level within each tank. Each of the tanks contains a series of probes that are used to 
continuously monitor the level of fuel and pass data to the USMS, as described in more 
detail in Section 8.2.1.2. This information is combined with other data to determine the 
overall mass of fuel within each tank and therefore within the whole system. There is a 
flow transmitter on the line to each engine to indicate that the correct amount of fuel is 
getting transferred. In addition flow transmitters could be located on each line out of a 
feed tank and into each of the collecting tanks. These will indicate whether fuel has been 
successfully transferred from a feed tank into a collector tank. Similarly flow meters could 
be located to monitor fuel flow to and from other tanks within the system. 
8.2.2.3 Key Variables 
The key process variables within the system would be the level in each of the collecting tanks 
and the flows into each of the four engines from the collecting tanks. The level in earn of 
the feeding tanks are also important factors to consider in the system functionality as these 
could indicate a problem with an individual tank that may otherwise be left undetected. 
The key process variables will indicate to the operator the occurrence of a failure and can 
be used to determine in which part or parts the failure or failures are located. 
Each wing section in the system contains one engine that is fed by one collecting tank. A 
wing section therefore contains one key flow transmitter on the respective engine to the 
collector tank, which contains the key level sensor for this section. The fuselage section 
contains two engines, which are both fed via separate pumps and lines out of tank 1. In 
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this case there are two key flow transmitter readings and one key level. 
8.2.2.4 Operating Modes and Assumptions 
8.2.2.4.1 Operating Modes 
The major transfer modes in a military aircraft: engine feed and transfer, APU fuel feed, 
air-to-air refuel, ground refuel or defuel, fuel dumping and shut down. 
• Engine Fuel Feed and Transfer (XFER) - Fuel is transferred from the tanks to the 
engines. 
• APU Fuel Feed (APUFEED) - Fuel is fed from Tank 4R via the number 3 engine 
gallery to the APU during normal operation. 
• Air-ta-Air Refuel (AAR) - The aircraft is refuelled from another plane whilst in flight 
via the A valve. 
• Ground Refuel (REFUEL) - The aircraft is refuelled whilst on the ground. 
• Ground Defuel (DEFUEL) - The aircraft is defuelled whilst on the ground. 
• Fuel Dump (DUMP) - Fuel is dumped from the nimrod via the DP valves. 
• Shut Down (DORMANT) - The system is dormant, therefore no fuel transfer takes 
place. 
For the purposes of illustrating the method the XFER operating mode is examined in more 
detail. 
8.2.2.4.2 Assumptions 
The following assumptions have been made for the Nimrod MRA4 fuel system: 
• Systems sensors are assumed to be reliable. 
• The system will start off with a full level of fuel in each tank if the system is in the 
XFER, APUFEED, DUMP or DORMANT modes. 
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8.2.2.5 System Scenarios and Patterns for the Key Process Variables 
8.2.2.5.1 System Scenarios 
The flow into each engine can be indicated as functioning normally (WK), failed in a mode 
that causes high flow (HF) (eg: engine Iow pressure fuel cock valve open), failed resulting 
in partial flow (PF) (eg: valve partially open) or failed in such a way that results in low 
flow (LF) (eg: valve closed). If a section of the system is working this indicates that fluid 
is being provided from that part to the engine or engines as and when required in response 
to the system state and operating mode. Flow transmitters are located on the feed lines 
for each engine and are labelled FTOlOO, FT0200, FT0300 and FT0400 for engines 1 to 4 
respectively (see Figures 8.8 and 8.10). Each of the 4 sensors could be functioning in one of 
the 4 possible ways described above, leading to 256 different potential scenarios that could 
possibly occur (as 44 = 256). A few examples of the scenarios for these sensor readings are 
shown in Table 8.l. 
Scenario FTOlOO FT0200 FT0300 FT0400 
1 WK WK WK WK 
2 WK WK WK HF 
3 WK WK WK PF 
4 WK WK WK LF 
Table 8.1: Nimrod fuel system key variable scenarios 
The flow transmitters indicate whether the correct amount of fluid is exiting the given 
collecting tank from which it is being fed and getting to the engine. Each potential scenario 
is examined and patterns are recorded from the transmitter readings for the flows on the 
engine lines for the wing and fuselage sections and the level in each of the collecting tanks 
that feed the given engine or engines. The system scenarios for the key variables from 
each section are used in the analysis to identify the section or sections where a failure has 
occurred. 
If all sensors in a system were analysed simultaneously then the amount of data could 
be too complex to consider, especially on large systems. The method demonstrated on 
the fuel rig system in Chapter 7 brought about the idea of using a hierarchical approach 
to analysing a system by focusing on the area of failure using key variable sensors. This 
involved examining the readings from key sensors and then investigating deviated areas 
further, thus building up a hierarchy. This is now used on the Nimrod MRA4. The first set 
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of flow sensors within the system to consider (key variable sensors) would be those on the 
lines from the collecting tanks, along with their level sensors. This information can be used 
to identify a deviation within a system section from the point of view of it not delivering 
the correct amount of fuel. 
8.2.2.5.2 Potential Patterns for Key Variables 
A flow rate history is built up for each of the readings from the flow transmitters in order 
to identify system pattern behaviour. In addition readings from the level sensors are used 
to build up level patterns to determine the fluid flow or rate of change of height. These 
indicate how the level within each collecting tank has changed over time. Both flow and 
level patterns can therefore be used to determine a change in flow or level at given locations 
in the system over time. The shape of the trend for each pattern is investigated in each 
case. The XFER mode has three phases of operation, the expected sensor patterns for each 
of these are shown in Table 8.2. 
Scenarios FT0100 LT0104L FT0200 FT0300 LT0201 FT0400 LT0404L 
FLOW LEVEL FLOW FLOW LEVEL FLOW LEVEL 
1, 2,5,6, 17,18, 1= "'1= 1= 1= "'1= 1= HI 1= XFERPhascl 21,22,65,66,69, 70, 81, 82, 85, 86 
1,2,5,6, 17, 18, tL HI~ tL tL '''~ tL "'~ XFERPhaMC 21, 22, 65, 66, 69, 70, 81, 82, 85, 86 LOL LOL LO!. 
1, 4, 13, 16, 49, 52, L LOLL L L I.OLL L LOLL XFERPhat:lc 61, 64, 193, 196, 205, 08, 241, 244, 253, 25 
Table 8.2: Expected key sensor patterns for engine feed lines and level in each 
collecting tank in the XFER operating mode 
A number of scenarios for each set of expected readings can be obtained, however, scenario 
1 is the only one in which the system can be working as required. The other scenarios 
contain potential failures, but these are hidden and the system carries on to seemingly 
work as required. Any deviation from the expected patterns for each phase indicates that a 
failure has occurred in some part of the system. At this point the engine that is not being 
fed properly or a deviation in level in the respective collector tank indicates the section in 
which the failure has occurred and therefore needs further investigation. If there is more 
than one deviated section then each needs to be individually analysed in more detail. A 
set of patterns are valid if they they can occur for any of the possible operating modes. For 
each of these there will be at least one system scenario exhibited from the 256 outcomes 
for the 4 sensors and their 4 possible values (see Table 8.1). 
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8.2.2.6 System Scenarios and Patterns for Each Section 
Information from the key variables within the system is used to identified the section or 
sections of the system in which a failure has taken place. Once the section or sections 
have been determined analysis can focus on obtaining the cause of failure. A potential 
deviation within a section is analysed individually using additional sensor readings in the 
given section. 
8.2.2.6.1 Wing Section 
Scenarios 
A set of scenarios has been developed for each of the wing section within the system using 
sensors FTOlOO, FT0104 and FT0102, as shown in Figure 8.8. (Flow transmitter FTOlOO is 
similar to FT0330 in the collector tank section on the fuel rig system, and similarly FT0102 
and FT0104 are like FT0130 and FT0230 in the main and wing tank sections). 
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FQ~ FQ2 
Figure 8.8: Sensors in the wing section 
These sensors will indicate to the user the sub-section or sub-sections in which the failure 
has occurred. There are 43 = 64 different potential scenarios that this part of the system 
can be in at any given point for the chosen sensor readings. These are obtained from having 
3 sensors each with 4 possible values. Examples of the scenarios are shown in Table 8.3. 
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Scenario FTOIOO FTOI04 FT0102 
1 WK WK WK 
2 WK WK HF 
3 WK WK PF 
4 WK WK LF 
Table 8.3: Nimrod fuel system wing section scenarios 
The 64 scenarios can be used to indicate the area in the wing section in which the deviation 
or deviations are located. Additional sensors within the system, for instance on the 
individual lines out of each tank (as in the fuel rig example), can be used to carry out 
a more in depth investigation into each tank within the wing section. This will lead to the 
identification of more scenarios for that given system area. For example, there is a flow 
sensor located on the feed line from wing feeder tank 2, but there could also be flow sensors 
located on each of the lines out of this tank. Once it has been established that a failure is 
located in this tank section, investigations can be carried to focus in once again on finding 
the cause. Figure 8.9 illustrates tank 2 in the left wing section, showing the locations of 
the sensors in this sub-section. 
Wing 
Feeder 
Tank 2 
To Collector._--1 ___ .L __ .....J 
Tank4 ~ 
Figure 8.9: Sub-section containing tank 2 in the left wing section 
The sub-section shows that in addition to the flow sensor FTOI02 on the feed line there are 
also sensors on the pump lines, labelled FT0112 and FTOI22. There are 59 different valid 
potential scenarios for this sub-section, as shown in Table 8.4. 
Sccnario F'I0102 J:I0112 :(:T0122 Scenario J: 10102 rl0112 H0122 Scenario J: !0102 J:T0112 J: 10122 
1 WK WK WK 21 HF HF WK 41 PF LF WK 
2 WK WK HF 22 HF HF HF 42 PF LF HF 
3 WK WK PF 23 HF HF PF 43 PF LF PF 
4 WK WK LF 24 HF HF LF 44 LF WK WK 
5 WK HF WK 25 HF PF WK 45 LF WK HF 
6 WK HF HF 2. HF PF HF 4. LF WK PF 
7 WK HF PF 27 HF LF WK 47 LF WK LF 
8 WK HF LF 28 HF LF HF 48 LF HF WK 
• WK PF WK 2. PF WK WK 4. LF HF HF 10 WK PF HF 30 PF WK HF 50 LF HF PF 
11 WK PF PF 31 PF WK PF 51 LF HF LF 
12 WK PF LF 32 PF WK LF 52 LF PF WK 
13 WK LF WK 33 PF HF WK 53 LF PF HF 
14 WK LF HF 34 PF HF HF 64 LF PF PF 
15 WK LF PF 35 PF HF PF 65 LF PF LF 
16 WK LF LF 36 PF HF LF 55 LF LF WK 
17 HF WK WK 37 PF PF WK 57 LF LF HF 
18 HF WK HF 38 PF PF HF 58 LF LF PF I. HF WK PF 3. PF PF PF 5. LF LF LF 
20 HF WK LF 40 PF PF LF 
Table 8.4: Nimrod fuel system tank 2 sub-section scenarios 
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(Flow transmitters FT01l2 and FT0122 are in similar locations to FTOllO and FT0120 
in the main tank section on the fuel rig system). There should be 64 potential scenarios 
obtained from 3 sensors having 4 possible outcomes. However, 5 of the possibilities are 
invalid for the location of the sensor readings, therefore are not included in the table of 
possibilities. The invalid scenarios are shown in Table 8.5. 
Scenario FTO 102 
1 HF 
2 HF 
3 HF 
4 HF 
5 PF 
FT01l2 
PF 
PF 
LF 
LF 
LF 
FT0122 
PF 
LF 
PF 
LF 
LF 
Table 8.5: Nimrod fuel system tank 2 invalid sub-section scenarios 
Scenarios 1 to 4 in Table 8.5 are invalid because high flow cannot occur at FT0102 if there 
is only partial or no flow at FT0112 or FTOI22, and in scenario 5 partial flow cannot occur 
when there is only low flow at FT0112 or FTOI22. 
Patterns 
In the same way as for the key variables a set of patterns can be developed from the flow 
rate and level measurement history for the sensors in the left wing section, as shown in 
Table 8.6. 
Scenarios FTOlOO LTOI04 FTOI04 LTOI03 FTOI02 
FLOW LEVEL FLOW LEVEL FLOW 
1, 2, 5, 6 t= "l= t= "'C t= XFERWingPhasel 17,18,21,22 
1,4,5,8 t= "'C t= "'~ L XFERWingPha.se2 17,20, 21, 24 we 
XFERWingPhase3 1,2,5,6 t= "'C D. weL rr. 17, 18, 21, 22 
1,4, 13, 16, D. "~ L wI.L L XFERWingPha.se4 17,20,29,32 1.0 
XFERWingPhnse5 
1, 4, 13, 16, L weL L l.oeL L 49, 52, 61, 64 
Table 8.6: Expected sensor patterns for the left wing section 
in the XFER operating mode 
LTOI02 
LEVEL 
.7119 lilt:: 
'"'1== 
':b w 
r.oeL 
wwL 
The patterns from the wing section will indicate the scenarios that the system could 
potentially be in. This will highlight the tank or tanks in the section in which there is 
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a problem, therefore showing which require further investigation. A deviation at FT0102 
or LT0102 will indicate a problem in tank 2L in the system. This can then be investigated 
in order to focus in on the possible problem area and determine the possible cause. The 
patterns and their potential scenarios are shown in Table 8.7. 
Scenarios FTOI02 LTOI02 FT01l2 FT0122 
FLOW LEVEL FLOW FLOW 
1,4, 5, 8, t= HIt:: D. L XFERTank2Phasel .7t19 17, 20, 21, 24 
XFERTank2Phasc2 
I, 4, 13, 16, L m,c L L 44,47,56,59 
XFERTank2Phase3 1, 4, 5, 8, t= '''i:=::: t= L 17, 20, 21, 24 LOlll 
XFERTank2Phase4 
1,2,5,6, b. b. D. 17,18,21,22 LO~ co 
XFERTank2Phasc5 
1, 4, 13, 16, L coLL L L 44,47,56,59 
Table 8.7: Expected sensor patterns for tank 2 in the left wing section 
in the XFER operating mode 
A fault tree can be constructed for any patterns that deviate from those expected in a given 
phase in order to ascertain the most likely causes of failure in the system. 
8.2.2.6.2 FUselage Section 
Scenarios 
A set of scenarios has been developed for the fuselage section in this particular fuel system 
for the sensors FT0201, FT0200 and FT0300, as shown in Figure 8.10. 
FT0300 
FT0205 ENGINE 3 
r---------------, 
1 
1 
1 5 
1 1 
1 
r--- FT0206/7R 1-------1 
1 1 ~~l::::::::+11 6 1 
1 1 L ______ I 1 _______ 1 ~>:,-,.,-=-,,-,.,-=--::-,.,-=-===~ 
FT0201 
FT0207L 
FT0200 
ENGINE 2 
Figure 8.10: Sensors in the fuselage section 
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The lines that FT0200 and FT0300 are located on lead to engines 2 and 3 respectively, and 
FT0201 is on the line leading into tank 1 in the same way as provided for each wing section. 
(Flow transmitter FTOlOO is similar to FT0330 in the collector tank section on the fuel rig 
system, and similarly FT0104 and FT0102 are FT0230 and FT0130 in the main and wing 
tank sections). A set of 64 scenarios are obtained from the 3 sensors each having 4 possible 
values, as introduced in Table 8.8. 
Scenario FT0200 FT0300 FT020l 
1 
2 
3 
4 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
HF 
PF 
LF 
Table 8.8: Nimrod fuel system fuselage section scenarios 
If there is no flow into the collecting tank 1 (FT0201) when required then there must be 
a failure preventing the transfer of fluid from the feeding tanks. Similarly there could be 
too much fluid going into the collecting tank. More sensors can be incorporated into the 
analysis - for instance flow meters FT0205 and FT0211 (see Figure 8.10) - which indicate 
the fuel flow from the fuselage transfer tanks into the collecting tank. There are 64 different 
potential scenarios that can be obtained for FT0201, FT0211 and FT0205 (3 sensors each 
having 4 values). Table 8.9 illustrates some of the scenarios for the given sensor readings. 
This part of the analysis identifies the area within the section in which the failure has taken 
place resulting the deviation. 
Scenario FT020l FT0211 FT0205 
1 
2 
3 
4 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
WK 
HF 
PF 
LF 
Table 8.9: Nimrod fuel system scenarios for inlet into collecting tank 1 
The potential scenarios from this part of the analysis will indicate whether a failure has 
occurred in the tank 5 section or if there is a problem in tanks 7 right/left (7R/L) or tank 
6. If it is indicated that the failure is in either tanks 7 or 6 then scenarios can be developed 
for FT0201, FT0211, FT0206/7R and FT0207L in the same way as illustrated in order to 
focus in on the location of the deviation. In this case there will be 256 scenarios obtained 
from analysing 4 sensors each with 4 possible values (44 = 256). Some example scenarios 
for these sensor readings are shown in Table 8.10. 
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Scenario FT0201 FT0211 FT0206j7R FT0207L 
1 WK WK WK WK 
2 WK WK WK HF 
3 WK WK WK PF 
4 WK WK WK LF 
Table 8.10: Example Nimrod fuel system scenarios for sub-section 
containing tanks 6, 7R and 7L - 1 
Aircraft Systems 
More sensors can be located in the system on the individual lines out of each tank in order 
to provide a more in depth investigation. For instance, as wen as the flow sensor located 
on the line from wing feeder Tank 5 there could also be flow sensors located on each of the 
lines out of this tank. If a failure is indicated as being within this tank section, analysis 
can focus in once again on finding the cause. Figure 8.11 illustrates Tank 5, showing the 
locations of the sensors in this sub-section. 
Fuselage 
Feeder 
Tank 5 
To Collector 
TMkl +-~------~----~ 
Figure 8.11: Tank 5 in the fuselage section 
The sub-section shows that in addition to the flow sensor FT0205 on the feed line there are 
also sensors on the pump lines, labelled FT0215 and FT0225. There are 236 different valid 
potential scenarios out of 256 (44) for this sub-section, as shown in Tables 8.11 to 8.13. 
Flow transmitter FT0201 is also included in the analysis as a failure at this point may not 
be indicated by the other sensors within the section. 
Scenano FT0201 Ft 0205 FT0215 Ft 0225 Scenario FI0201 FT0205 FT0215 FT0225 
1 WK WK WK WK ,. WK WK LF LF 
2 WK WK WK HF 17 WK HF WK WK , WK WK WK PF 18 WK HF WK HF 
• WK WK WK LF ,. WK HF WK PF 5 WK WK HF WK 20 WK HF WK LF 
• WK WK HF HF 21 WK HF HF WK 7 WK WK HF PF 22 WK HF HF HF 
8 WK WK HF LF 23 WK HF HF PF 
• WK WK PF WK 2. WK HF HF LF 10 WK WK PF HF 2' WK HF PF WK 
11 WK WK PF PF 2. WK HF PF HF 
12 WK WK PF LF 27 WK HF LF WK 
13 WK WK LF WK 28 WK HF LF HF ,. WK WK LF HF 2. WK PF WK WK 
15 WK WK LF PF 30 WK PF WK HF 
Table 8.11: Nimrod fuel system tank 5 sub-section scenarios - 1 
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Scenario J:'T0201 ~ 10205 Iil0215 t: T0225 Scenario FT0201 F'I0205 t: 10215 ~'I 0225 
31 WK PF WK PF 123 PF WK HF WK 
32 WK PF WK LF 124 PF WK HF HF 
33 WK PF HF WK 125 PF WK HF PF 
34 WK PF HF HF 126 PF WK HF LF 
35 WK PF HF PF 127 PF WK PF WK 
3. WK PF HF LF 128 PF WK PF HF 
37 WK PF PF WK 129 PF WK PF PF 
38 WK PF PF HF 130 PF WK PF LF 
39 WK PF PF PF 131 PF WK LF WK 
40 WK PF PF LF 132 PF WK LF HF 
41 WK PF LF WK 133 PF WK LF PF 
42 WK PF LF HF 134 PF WK LF LF 
43 WK PF LF PF 135 PF HF WK WK 
44 WK LF WK WK 136 PF HF WK HF 
45 WK LF WK HF 137 PF HF WK PF 
4' WK LF WK PF 138 PF HF WK LF 
47 WK LF WK LF 139 PF HF HF WK 
48 WK LF HF WK 140 PF HF HF HF 
49 WK LF HF HF 141 PF HF HF PF 
50 WK LF HF PF 142 PF HF HF LF 
51 WK LF HF LF 143 PF HF pF WK 
52 WK LF PF WK 144 PF HF PF HF 
53 WK LF PF HF 145 PF HF LF WK 
54 WK LF PF PF 14' PF HF LF HF 
55 WK LF PF LF 147 PF PF WK WK 
56 WK LF LF WK 148 PF PF WK HF 
57 WK LF LF HF 14' PF PF WK PF 
58 WK LF LF PF 150 PF PF WK LF 
59 WK LF LF LF 151 PF PF HF WK 
60 HF WK WK WK 152 PF PF HF HF 
61 HF WK WK HF 153 PF PF HF PF 
62 HF WK WK PF 154 PF PF HF LF 
'3 HF WK WK LF 155 PF PF PF WK 
.4 HF WK HF WK 156 PF PF PF HF 
66 HF WK HF HF 157 PF PF PF PF 
66 HF WK HF PF 168 PF PF PF LF 
67 HF WK HF LF 159 PF PF LF WK 
68 HF WK PF WK 160 PF PF LF HF 
69 HF WK PF HF 161 PF PF LF PF 
70 HF WK PF PF 162 PF LF WK WK 
71 HF WK PF LF 163 PF LF WK HF 
72 HF WK LF WK 164 PF LF WK PF 
73 HF WK LF HF 165 PF LF WK LF 
74 HF WK LF PF 166 PF LF HF WK 
75 HP WK LF LF 167 PF LF HF HF 
76 HF HF WK WK 168 PF LF HF PF 
77 HF HF WK HF 169 PF LF HF LF 
78 HP HF WK PF 170 PF LF pF WK 
79 HF HF WK LF 171 PF LF pF HF 
80 HF HF HF WK 172 PF LF PF PF 
81 HF HF HF HF 173 PF LF PF LF 
82 HF HF HF PF 174 PF LF LF WK 
83 HF HF HF LF 175 PF LF LF HF 
84 HF HF PF WK 176 PF LF LF PF 
85 HP HF PF HP 177 PP LF LF LF 
8' HF HF LF WK 178 LF WK WK WK 
87 HF HF LF HF 179 LF WK WK HF 
88 HP PP WK WK 180 LF WK WK PF 
89 HF PP WK HP 181 LP WK WK LF 
90 HF PF WK PP 182 LF WK HF WK 
91 HF PF WK LP 183 LF WK HF HF 
92 HF PP HF WK 184 LF WK HF PP 
93 HF PF HF HF 185 LF WK HF LP 
94 HF PP HF PF 186 LF WK PF WK 
95 HF PF HF LF 187 LF WK PF HF 
96 HF PP PF WK 188 LF WK PF PF 
97 HF PP PF HF 189 LF WK PF LF 
98 HP PP PF PF 190 LF WK LP WK 
99 HP PF PF LP 191 LF WK LF HF 
100 HP PF LF WK 192 LF WK LF PP 
101 HP PF LF HP 193 LF WK LF LF 
102 HP PF LF PF 194 LF HF WK WK 
103 HP LF WK WK 195 LF HF WK HF 
104 HP LF WK HP 196 LF HF WK PF 
105 HP LF WK PF 197 LF HF WK LF 
106 HP LF WK LP 198 LF HF HF WK 
107 HP LF HF WK 199 LF HF HF HF 
108 HP LP HF HP 200 LF HF HF PF 
109 HP LF HF PP 201 LF HF HF LF 
110 HP LP HF LP 202 LF HF PF WK 
111 HP LF PF WK 203 LF HF PF HF 
112 HP LF PF HF 204 LF HF LF WK 
113 HP LF PF PP 205 LF HF LF HF 
114 HP LF PF LF 206 LF PF WK WK 
115 HP LF LF WK 207 LF PF WK HF 
116 HP LF LF HP 208 LF PF WK PF 
117 HP LF LF PP 209 LF PF WK LF 
118 HP LF LF LP 210 LF PF HF WK 
119 PP WK WK WK 211 LF PF HF HF 
120 PF WK WK HF 212 LF PF HF PP 
121 PP WK WK PP 213 LF PF HF LF 
122 PP WK WK LP 214 LF PF PF WK 
Table 8.12: Nimrod fuel system tank 5 sub-section scenarios - 2 
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Scenario FT0201 FT0205 FT0215 FT0225 Scenario FT0201 FT0205 FT0215 FT0225 
215 LF PF PF HF 226 LF LF HF HF 
21' LF PF PF PF 227 LF LF HF PF 
217 LF PF PF LF 228 LF LF HF LF 
21S LF PF LF WK 229 LF LF PF WK 
219 LF PF LF HF 23. LF LF PF HF 
22. LF PF LF PF 231 LF LF PF PF 
221 LF LF WK WK 232 LF LF PF LF 
222 LF LF WK HF 233 LF LF LF WK 
223 LF LF WK PF 234 LF LF LF HF 
224 LF LF WK LF 235 LF LF LF PF 
225 LF LF HF WK 236 LF LF LF LF 
Table 8.13: Nimrod fuel system tank 5 sub-section scenarios - 3 
There are 20 invalid scenarios, shown in Table 8.14. 
Scenario FT0201 FT0205 FT0215 FT0225 Scena.rio FT0201 FT0205 FT0215 FT0225 
1 WK HF PF PF 11 PF HF PF PF 
2 WK HF PF LF 12 PF HF PF LF 
3 WK HF LF PF 13 PF HF LF LF 
4 WK HF LF LF 14 PF HF LF WK 
5 WK PF LF LF 15 PF PF LF LF 
6 HF HF PF PF I. LF HF PF PF 
7 HF HF PF LF 17 LF HF PF LF 
S HF HF LF LF IS LF HF LF LF 
9 HF HF LF WK 19 LF HF LF WK 
I. HF PF LF LF 2. LF PF LF LF 
Table 8.14: Nimrod fuel system tank 5 invalid sub-section scenarios 
Scenarios 1 to 4, 6 to 9, 11 to 14 and 16 to 19 cannot occur because high flow cannot occur 
at FT0205 if there is only partial or no flow at FT0215 or FT0225. Scenarios 5, 10, 15 and 
20 cannot occur because low flow at FT0215 and FT0225 will not result in partial flow at 
FT0205. 
Patterns 
In the same way as for the key variables a set of patterns can be developed from the flow 
rate and level measurement history for the sensors in the fuselage section, as shown in 
Table 8.15 using the scenarios in Table 8.8. 
Scenarios FT0200 FT0300 FT0201 LT0201 
FLOW FLOW FLOW LEVEL 
XFERFusclagcPhasel 
1,2,5,6, 1= 1= 1= "'t= 17,18,21,22 
XFERFut;clagcPhasc2 1, 2, 5, 6, 1= 1= rr "'t= 17, 18, 21, 22 
1, 4, 5, 8, il rr L "'~ XFERFusclagcPhase3 17,20,21,24 wc 
XFERFusclagcPhase4 
1,4,13,16, L L L wcL 49, 52, 61, 64 
Table 8.15: Expected sensor patterns for the fuselage section 
in the XFER operating mode - 1 
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The patterns from the fuselage section will indicate the scenarios which the system could 
potentially be in and highlight the area or areas in which a problem has occurred. The 
reading at FT0201 into collecting tank 1 can indicate if there is a problem with fuel flow into 
this tank from the feeding tanks. Patterns can be developed for the sensor readings FT0201, 
FT0211 and FT0205 used to develop the scenarios introduced in Table 8.9. Expected 
pattern behaviour is shown in Table 8.16. 
Scenarios FT0201 LT0201 FT0211 FT0206 LT0205 
FLOW LEVEL FLOW FLOW LEVEL 
XFERFuselageColloctorPbasel 1, 4, 5, 8, t= mt= t= L fIlt= 17,20,21,24 
1,2,5,6, a. "'t= a. a. H[~ XFERFuselageCollcctorPhase2 17, 18, 21, 22 J.OL 
XFERFuselageColloctorPhasc3 
1, 4, 13, 16, LL:~ L L [OIL 49, 52, 61, 64 
XFERFuselagcColloctorPhase4 1, 4, 13, 16, L LocL L L WLL 49, 52, 61, 64 
Table 8.16: Expected sensor patterns for the fuselage section 
in the XFER operating mode - 2 
Deviation from these expected patterns will indicate whether a failure has occurred in tank 
5 or from tanks 6, 7R or 7L, which are linked to the collecting tank by the same line. A set 
of expected patterns for the sub-sections containing tanks 6, 7R and 7L along with their 
potential scenarios introduced in Table 8.10 are shown in Table 8.17. 
XFER67LRPhasel 
XFER67LRPhasc 
XFER67LRPhasc 
XFER67LRPhasc4 
Scenarios FT0201 FT0211 FT0206 LT0206 LT0207R FT0207L 
FLOW FLOW FLOW LEVEL FLOW FLOW 
1,2,5,6,17, 18, t= 1= t= mt= H[~ a. 21, 22, 65, 66, 69, 70, 81, 82, 85, 86 WL 
1,4,5,8,17,20, t= t= a. "[~ WLL L 21,24,65,68,69, 72, 81, 84, 85, 88 WL 
1,4,13,16,17,20, a. a. L[,oL [aLL L 29, 32, 65, 68, 77, 80, 81, 84, 93, 96 
1, 4, 13, 16,49, 52, L L L wL wL L 61, 64, 193, 196, 205, 08, 241, 244, 253, 25 
Table 8,17: Expected sensor patterns for the fuselage section 
in the XFER operating mode - 3 
LT0207L 
LEVEL 
"'~ WL 
W[,L 
LOLL 
!.O[L 
The tank or tanks in the section in which there is a problem in the fuselage can be indicated 
from the patterns for FT0201, FT0205, FT0215 and FT0225 (see Table 8.16), A deviation 
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at FT0205 will indicate a problem in tank 5 in the system. This can then be investigated 
in order to focus in on the possible problem area and determine the possible cause. The 
patterns and their potential scenarios are shown in Table 8.18. 
Scenarios FT0201 FT0201S LT020lSL FT0211S FT0221S 
FLOW FLOW LEVEL FLOW FLOW 
1,4,5,8, 17, 20, t= t= H't= b. L XFERFuselageTank5Phascl 21, 24, 65, 68, 69, .'"' 72, 81, 84, 85, 88 
1, 4, 13, 16, 49, 52, L L '''C L L XFERFuselngcTank5Phnsc2 61,64,193, 196, 205, 208, 241, 244, 253, 256 
1,4,5,8, 17, 20, t= t= t= L XFERFuselageTank5Phnsc3 21, 24, 65, 68, 69, '''L Lour 72, 81, 84, 85, 88 
1, 2,5,6,17, 18, t= b. b. b. XFERFusclageTank5Phnse4 21,22,65,66,69, [,orb. 70,81,82,85,86 w 
1, 4, 13, 16, 49, 52, b. L w,.L L L XFERFuselagcTank5Pha.sc5 61, 64, 65, 68, 77, 80, 113, 116, 125, 128 
1, 4, 13, 16, 49, 52, L L w~ L L XFERFuselagcTank5Phnsc6 61, 64, 193, 196, 205, 208, 241, 244, 253, 256 
Table 8.18: Expected sensor patterns for tank 5 in a fuselage section 
in the XFER operating mode 
A fault tree can be constructed from for any patterns that deviate from those expected in 
a given phase in order to ascertain the most likely causes of failure in the system. 
8.2.2.7 Fault Tree Construction 
Non-coherent fault trees would be drawn to determine the causality of any deviations 
from expected behaviour identified from the sensor readings within the system. A tree is 
developed for each reading that exhibits unexpected behaviour and takes into consideration 
the operating mode that the system is in along with the potential causes of failure for that 
given section of the system, thus restricting the boundary of possible causes to the identified 
area. Success trees are also to remove potential causes that conflict with working parts of 
the system. 
8.3 Discussion 
The application of the modelling and preparation stage steps to a real aircraft system 
has shown that the method could potentially be utilised on larger systems. In order 
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to fully conclude this the application stage steps would also need to be applied. In 
applying the method to a larger system it has been noted that fuel systems could have 
an increased number of and more complex operating modes, which will have to be taken 
into consideration in developing the fault trees and within the application stage of the 
analysis. It is also important that any assumptions made about the system should be 
listed. 
The Nimrod is a characteristic example of a fuel system and has shown that an increased 
number of fuel tanks will be more complex to analyse compared to the water tank and fuel 
rig systems. Investigations into the Nimrod and other fuel systems (Typhoon and Hawk) 
has indicated that typically fuel is fed from a series of tanks to a collecting tank or engine 
feed line in order to then be transported to the given engine. A fuel system would require 
sectioning that enables the possibility of groups of tanks to be analysed rather than the 
system as a whole. This can be identified depending how the fluid leads into a collecting 
tank, several collecting tanks or an engine feed line. Analysis can then focus on an individual 
section and sub-sections within that section rather than the system as a whole, which will 
aid fault localisation. 
In most cases it would be too complex to consider all sensors in a section at the same time 
because of the number of potential scenarios created and the possible patterns for each. A 
sensor increases the number of possible scenarios by a multiple of its number of possible 
failure modes. Each section would contain key variables, these being namely the level 
within a collecting tank and any sensor monitoring flow into an engine. The key variables 
enable all sections in the system to be initially analysed as this is enough to indicate a 
problem somewhere within the system. Conclusions can then be drawn as to which area 
of the system a failure has occurred depending on the findings. The sections identified as 
potentially having a problem can then be investigated further. For larger examples sections 
can be divided into sub-sections. As before the sub-section or sub-sections in which a failure 
has occurred can then be identified and these be investigated further. This allows the fault 
to become more and more localised until the area is known and the potential causes of 
failure obtained. 
8.4 Summary 
• The modelling and preparation stage steps listed in Section 7.2.1 have been applied 
to the Nimrod fuel system. This application has indicated that the method does have 
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potential for use on real aircraft fuel systems. 
• Within fuel systems fuel is typically fed from a series of tanks to a collecting tank or 
engine feed line in order to then be transported to the given engine. 
• Sectioning is required that enables the possibility of groups of tanks to be analysed 
rather than the system as a whole. This can be identified depending on how the fluid 
leads into a collecting tank, several collecting tanks or an engine feed line. 
• The identification of key variables enables all sections in the system to be initially 
analysed as this is enough to indicate a problem somewhere within the system. The 
area or areas in which a failure has occurred can then be located and investigated 
further. 
• Fuel systems could have an increased number of and more complex operating modes, 
which will have to be taken into consideration in developing the fault trees and within 
the application stage of the analysis. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Future Work 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of the research was to develop a method that could be potentially used for 
diagnosing faults in aircraft fuel systems. The main aspects in the formation of the fault 
diagnostic method are described in this chapter. 
9.2 Summary and Conclusions 
9.2.1 Review of Existing Literature 
A number of existing fault diagnostic techniques were reviewed in which the failings of 
currently available methods were identified. The development of a model-based approach 
was decided upon as it enabled the use of a physical system to determine actual behaviour 
and to identify all possible states that it could be in at any point in time. System failures 
are not always the result of one single fault, therefore the ability to diagnose multiple faults 
is vitally important. The technique employs knowledge of the overall system to find any 
deviations and can be easily and efficiently developed from this information. 
It was concluded that PTA would be utilised to describe all possible causes of a specified 
system state in terms of the components within the system. The causes of the system's 
failure modes could then be described in terms of the component states. It was thought 
that multiple failures could be considered using the fault trees and successful component 
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behaviour through the use of NOT logic to remove any conflicting causes. 
9.2.2 FTA for Fault Detection 
A method was developed using FTA to diagnose faults in systems. This initially considered 
aspects of system performance observed at steady-state or specified points in time. The 
initial work in developing a fault diagnostic method using FTA indicated this technique can 
be used to identify multiple faults in a systems fault diagnostic capability, as illustrated 
through the water tank level control system example. The use of non-coherent fault trees 
to represent the causes of sensor outputs provided more reliable results than those obtained 
using coherent fault trees. 
The introduction of consistency checks with information provided by all sensors is required 
to produce a more accurate list of potential causes of the current system state. Scheme 4 
(11) was found to be the most accurate of the four schemes investigated. The work carried 
out on the water tank system indicated a number of issues to be considered when developing 
the method. These were the need for a consistency check within the analysis alongside the 
issue of scalability and complexity, the possible presence of imperfect or unreliable sensors, 
the ability of the method to obtain the exact failure cause, dynamic effects and finally the 
possibility of having more than two system phases. 
9.2.3 FTA for Fault Detection When Considering Dynamics 
The method was extended to consider system dynamics. This was developed to identify 
component failures on the water tank system and takes into account the system dynamics 
using a simple pattern recognition technique. In the majority of cases the method was 
able to correctly identify the possible potential causes of failure for both the ACTIVE and 
DORMANT operating modes and this is reflected in the results. The use of fault trees 
that are restricted to the control systems on each stream has reduced the complexity of the 
approach and should enable the method to be scaled up on larger systems. The analysis 
needed to take into consideration the level of water in the tank as this is the key variable 
within the system and provides important dynamic information. 
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9.2.4 Expansion to a Larger System 
The established method was applied to the BAE Systems fuel rig to investigate the 
scalability for use on a larger system. The method has been successfully utilised on the 
fuel rig system, for which system redundancy has also been taken into consideration. In 
most cases the method has identified the correct potential causes of failure for the given 
set of sensor patterns. To determine whether the method would be feasible for use on a 
real aircraft system it was concluded that further application of the approach would be 
required. 
9.2.5 Prospective Expansion to an Aircraft Fuel System 
The implications of expanding the method to a full aircraft fuel system were determined. 
Typical characteristics of a fuel system were identified and how the method could be 
potentially utilised on a larger system was investigated by considering the application to 
the Nimrod fuel system. The implications of applying the fault diagnostic method to this 
system on the current modelling and preparation stage steps in Section 7.2.1 have been 
identified. It was concluded that the method does have potential for use on real aircraft 
systems. In order to fully conclude whether the method would be feasible the application 
stage steps also need to be applied. 
9.3 Future Work 
The research within this thesis has highlighted a number of areas in which further 
investigation could potentially be carried out. These areas are now discussed in the following 
sections. 
9.3.1 Binary Decision Diagrams 
Fault trees are an effective way of visually representing the failure logic of a system. 
However, the larger fault trees within the analysis become the greater the complexity of 
obtaining a solution. This is reduced using approximations in the analysis, but in doing so 
this leads to a loss of accuracy in the results obtained. An alternative approach would be 
to convert the fault trees in the diagnostic method to Binary Decision Diagrams (BBDs), 
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developed by Rauzy [83-85), to provide a more efficient way of performing FTA. The method 
has the potential to exploit the efficiency of BDDs to manipulate the resulting fault trees 
and produce a set of possible symptom causes that are consistent with all the evidence. 
This should be investigated as may provide an improvement to the analysis and reduce the 
complexity encountered when using fault trees. 
9.3.2 Laboratory Demonstration 
It is possible to link the approach developed to the fuel rig and give a laboratory based 
demonstration of the method. Whilst this work is in preparation for the practical 
demonstration it is beyond the scope of the material'in this thesis. 
9.3.3 Real-Scale System 
At present the method has been fully applied to two systems, both of which are relatively 
small in comparison to a real aircraft fuel system. Application of the method to an aircraft 
system is therefore required to indicate if it is feasible to use it on larger systems. In order 
to test the method the example or examples that it is applied to should contain one or 
more of the following features: 
• An increase in the complexity of system sectioning, 
• An increase in the number of system sensors, 
• Different modes of operation considered (other than engine feed (ACTIVE) or engine 
shut down (DORMANT)). 
The modelling and preparation stage steps for the Nimrod fuel system have already been 
conducted and shows that this contains all these additional features. 
9.3.4 Sensor Reliability 
So far it has been assumed that the sensors that give the system variables in the method 
are reliable. Failures in these sensors have been noted to be identifiable when conflicting 
readings occur as these are highlighted through the patterns obtained. Further investigation 
is required to identify failures in sensors that show the system performing a certain task 
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with no conflicting readings, but the system is actually functioning in a different way. For 
instance, flow is indicated on an outflow line in a tank when there is no flow at this point, 
or if a tank level is constant, but flow is occurring out of it. 
9.3.5 Hidden Symptoms 
The method is not able to identify any hidden failures of components that have the same 
symptoms as when they are working as required. This is a restriction in the analysis that 
at present cannot be resolved unless either a change of operating mode is made that alters 
the expected system behaviour such that a failure is indicated, or the area of the system 
in which a hidden failure is located is used. The method could be extended to produce a 
list of hidden failures that could have potentially occurred for the given system status. For 
instance, for the water tank system if valve V2 is open as expected then a potential hidden 
failure could be V2FO. These could be potentially identified through the system scenarios 
in the method. The scenario indicating the most deviated sensor readings could be used to 
identify an outcome that includes the possible hidden failures present within the system. 
Alternatively a set of scenarios could be developed from the sensor patterns identified. 
9.3.6 Dynamics 
The most likely scenario to have caused a deviation is that which contains the least number 
of deviated sensor readings. However, without scenarios in the method there would be no 
proper structure in the identification of patterns exhibited by the sensor readings. Further 
work could involve identifying all possible patterns for each sensor or groups of sensors 
within the system and how these would impact on the behaviour. Rather than using all 
the possible scenarios in the analysis the one causing the least sensor deviations could 
be indicated and used to identify the system status. This could potentially reduce the 
complexity of the fault tree produced in the analysis. The method may benefit from having 
the ability to distinguish in more detail the patterns with the scenarios, but this may lead 
to a more complex set of scenarios as a result of more possible outcomes for each sensor. 
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Appendix A 
Fault Trees for the Water Tank Level 
Control System 
A.I Coherent Fault Trees 
A.1.I Flow Through Valve VI 
Figure A.I: Coherent fault tree for flow through valve VI 
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Figure A.2: Coherent fault tree for flow through valve VI - transfer I 
Number Potential Cause Number Potential Cause 
1) VIFO 7) P3F 
2) CIFL 8) V3FO 
3) SIFL 9) C2FH 
4) TL 10) S2FH 
5) TR 11) P5F 
6) V2FO 
Table A.I: Potential causes of flow through valve VI 
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A.1.2 Flow Through Valve V2 
Figure A.3: Coherent fault tree for flow through valve V2 
The only possible potential cause of system failure for this sensor reading is V2FO, which 
is of first order. 
A.1.3 Flow Through Valve V3 
Figure A.4: Coherent fault tree for flow through valve V3 
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Figure A.5: Coherent fault tree for flow through valve V3 - transfer 1 
Number Potential Cause Number Potential Cause 
1) V3FO 9) CIFL.P3F 
2) C2FH 10) CIFL.P4B 
3) S2FH 11) CIFL.V2FC 
4) VIFO.P3B 12) SIFL.P3B 
5) VIFO.P3F 13) SIFL.P3F 
6) VIFO.P4B 14) SIFL.P4B 
7) VIFO.V2FC 15) SIFL.V2FC 
8) CIFL.P3B 
Table A.2: Potential causes of flow through valve V3 
when the system is ACTIVE 
Number Potential Cause Number Potential Cause 
1) V3FO 4) VIFO 
2) C2FH 5) CIFL 
3) S2FH 6) SIFL 
Table A.3: Potential causes of flow through valve V3 
when the system is DORMANT 
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A.1.4 No Flow Through Valve VI 
Figure A.6: Coherent fault tree for no flow through valve VI 
Figure A.7: Coherent fault tree for no flow through valve VI - transfer I 
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A.1.5 
Number Potential Cause Number Potential Cause 
I) VIFC 6) P2B 
2) CIFH 7) NWMS 
3) SIFH 8) V2FC 
4) PIB 9) P3B 
5) PIF 10) P4B 
Table A.4: Potential causes of no flow through valve VI 
Water in the Overspill Tray 
Figure A.8: Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray 
Flowln al 
Valve V1 
Figure A.9: Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray - transfer 1 
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Figure A.lO: Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray - transfer 2 
Figure A.ll: Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray - transfer 3 
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Number Potential Cause Number Potential Cause 
1) TR 38) CIFL.P3B.P6B 
2) TL 39) CIFL.P3F.V3FC 
3) VIFO.V2FC.V3FC 40) CIFL.P3F.C2FL 
4) VIFO.V2FC.C2FL 41) CIFL.P3F.S2FL 
5) VIFQ.V2FC.S2FL 42) CIFL.P3F.P5B 
6) VIFO.V2FC.P5B 43) CIFL.P3F .P5F 
7) VIFO.V2FC.P5F 44) CIFL.P3F.P6B 
8) VIFO.V2FC.P6B 45) CIFL.P4B.V3FC 
9) VIFO.P3B.V3FC 46) CIFL.P4B.C2FL 
10) VIFQ.P3B.C2FL 47) CIFL.P4B.S2FL 
11) VIFQ.P3B.S2FL 48) CIFL.P4B.P5B 
12) VIFO.P3B.P5B 49) CIFL.P4B.PSF 
13) VIFO.P3B.P5F 50) CIFL.P4B.P6B 
14) VIFO.P3B.P6B 51) SlFL.V2FC.V3FC 
15) VIFO.P4B.V3FC 52) SlFL.V2FC.C2FL 
16) VIFO.P3F.C2FL 53) SlFL.V2FC.S2FL 
17) VIFO.P3F.S2FL 54) SlFL.V2FC.PSB 
18) VIFO.P3F.P5B 55) SIFL.V2FC.PSF 
19) VIFO.P3F.PSF 56) SlFL.V2FC.P6B 
20) VIFO.P3F.P6B 57) SlFL.P3B.V3FC 
21) VIFO.P4B.V3FC 58) SlFL.P3B.C2FL 
22) VIFO.P4B.C2FL 59) SlFL.P38.S2FL 
23) VIFQ.P4B.S2FL 60) SlFL.P3B.P58 
24) VIFQ.P4B.P5B 61) SlFL.P38.P5F 
25) VIFO.P4B.P5F 62) SlFL.P38.P68 
26) VIFO.P48.P68 63) SlFL.P3F.V3FC 
27) CIFL.V2FC.V3FC 64) SIFL.P3F.C2FL 
28) CIFL.V2FC.C2FL 65) SlFL.P3F.S2FL 
29) CIFL.V2FC.S2FL 66) SlFL.P3F.P5B 
30) CIFL.V2FC.P5B 67) SlFL.P3F.P5F 
31) CIFL.V2FC.P5F 68) SlFL.P3F.P6B 
32) CIFL. V2FC.P6B 69) SlFL.P4B.V3FC 
33) CIFL.P3B.V3FC 70) SlFL.P4B.C2FL 
34) CIFL.P3B.C2FL 71) SlFL.P48.S2FL 
35) CIFL.P3B.S2FL 72) SlFL.P4B.PSB 
36) CIFL.P3B.PSB 73) SlFL.P4B.P5F 
37) CIFL.P3B.P5F 74) SlFL.P4B.P6B 
Table A.5: Potential causes of water in the overspill tray when 
the system is ACTIVE 
Number Potential Cause Number Potential Cause 
1) TR 11) ClFL.S2FL 12) CIFL.P5B 
2) TL 
3) VIFO.V3FC 13) CIFL.P5F 
4) VIFO.C2FL 14) CIFL.P6B 
5) VIFO.S2FL 15) SlFL.V3FC 
6) VIFO.PSB 16) SlFL.C2FL 
7) VIFO.P5F 17) SlFL.S2FL 
8) VIFO.P6B 18) SlFL.P5B 19) SIFL.PSF 9) CIFL.V3FC 
20) SlFL.P6B 10) CIFL.C2FL 
Table A.6: Potential causes of water in the overspill tray when 
the system is DORMANT 
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Figure A.13: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve VI - transfer 1 
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FlolO! out at 
V,h/e V2 
V,lIIe V2 is 
Open 
Non-Coherent Fault Trees 
Figure A.14: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve VI - transfer 2 
Number Prime Impllcants 
I) VIFO.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.VIFC 
2) CIFL.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH 
3) SlFL.NWMS."PTB.PIF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH.sIFH 
4) TR.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.TL 
5) TL.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.rn 
6) P3F.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.YIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3B.TR 
7) P5F.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.YIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P58.TR 
8) V2FO .NWMS .PlB.PIF .P2B .VIFC .CIFH .slFH .V2FC .P3B.P3F .P4B. TR 
9) V3FO.NWMS.PlB.PIF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.V3FC.P5B.PsF.P6B.TR 
10) C2FH.NWMS.PIB.PIF:P2B.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.Y3FC.C2FH.P5B.P5F.P6B.TR 
11) S2FH.NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B.VIFC.CIFH.sIFH. Y3FC.C2FH.S2FH.P5B. P5F.P6B. TR 
Table A.7: Prime implicants for flow through valve VI 
when the system is DORMANT 
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Figure A.15: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve VI - transfer 3 
Table A.8: Prime implicants for flow through valve VI 
when the system is ACTIVE 
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A.2.2 Flow Through Valve V2 
Figure A.16: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve V2 
Figure A.17: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve V2 - transfer 2 
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If the system is ACTIVE then flow through valve V2 is expected and so does not result in 
failure. The prime implicant obtained for this operating mode is: 
V2FC.P38.P3F.P4B.TRVIFC.CIFH.SIFH.PI8.PIF.P28.NWMS, 
This is of order 12 and contains only the components and states that are known NOT to 
have failed. The prime implicant failure obtained for this sensor reading when the system 
is DORMANT is: 
V2FO.V2FC.P38.P3F.P4B.TRVIFC.CIFH.SIFH.PIB.PIF.P28.NWMS, 
and is of order 13. After performing the coherent approximation the result obtained for 
'flow through valve V2' is 'V2FO', which is the same as that obtained by the coherent fault 
tree for this reading in Section A.1.2. 
A.2.3 Flow Through Valve V3 
Figure A.18: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve V3 
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Figure A.19: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve V3 - transfer 1 
Figure A.20: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve V3 - transfer 2 
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Figure A.21: Non-coherent fault tree for flow through valve V3 - transfer 3 
Number Prime Implicants 
I) V3FO.PSB.PSF.P6B.TRV3FC 
2) C2FH.PSB.PSF.P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL 
3) S2FH.PSB.P5F.P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL.S2FL 
4) VIFO.P3B.PSB.PSF.P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL.S2FL.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.P3F 
S) VIFO.P3F.P5ll".P5F.P6B.TRV3FC_C2FL.S2FL_PIB_PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC_P3B 
6) VIFO_P4B_PSB.P5F_P6B.TR V3FC.C2FL_S2FL.PIB_PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC_P4F 
7) VIFO.V2FC_PSB.PSF_P6B.TR.V3FC_C2FL.82FL_Pm_PIF_P2B.NWMS_VIFC_V2FO 
8) CIFL.P3B.PSB_PSF_P6B.TR.V3FC_C2FL.S2FL.PIB.PIF_P2B.NWMS_VIFC.CIFH.P3F 
9) CIFL.P3F.P5ll"_PSF_P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL_S2FL.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH_P3B 
10) ClFL.P4B_PSB_PSF.P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL_S2FL_PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS_VIFC.CIFH_P4F 
11) CIFL.V2FC.PSB_PSF_P6B_TR_V3FC_C2FL_S2FL_Pm_PIF.P2B.NWMS_VIFC_CIFH_V2FO 
12) SIFL_P3B.PSB_PSF_P6B.Tlf.V3FC_C2FL.S2FL.PIB.PIF_P2B.NWMS_VIFC.CIFH.8IFH.P3F 
13) SIFL.P3F_P5B.P5F_P6B.TRV3FC_C2FL.S2FL_PIB.PIF_P2B.NWMS_VIFC.CIFH_SIFH.P3B 
14) SIFL.P4B.PSB.PSF.P6B.TRV3FC_C2FL_S2FL_PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH_P4F 
IS) SIFL .V2FC_PSB.PSF .P6B. TR V3FC_C2FL.S2FL_PIB_PIF_P2B.NWMS_ VIFC.C IFH.8IFH_ V2FO 
Table A.9: Prime implicants for flow through valve V3 
when the system is ACTIVE 
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A.2.4 
Number Prime Implicants 
1) V3FO.P5B.P5F.P6B.TR.V3FC 
2) C2FH.P5B.P5F.P6B.TR.V3FC.C2FL 
3) S2FH.P5B.P5F.P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL.S2FL 
4) V1FO.P5B.P5F.P6B.TR.V3FC.C2FL.S2FL.i'IB.P1F.P2B.NWMS.V1FC 
5) C1FL.P5B.P5F.P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL.S2FL.i'IB.P1F.P2B.NWMS.V1FC.C1FH 
6) S1FL.P5B.P5F.P6B.TRV3FC.C2FL.S2FL.P1B.P1F.P2B.NWMS.V1FC.C1FH.S1FH 
Table A.lO: Prime implicants for flow through valve V3 
when the system is DORMANT 
No Flow Through Valve VI 
Figure A.22: Non-Coherent fault tree for no flow through valve VI 
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Figure A.23: Non-Coherent fault tree for no flow through valve VI - transfer 1 
Figure A.24: Non-Coherent fault tree for no flow through valve VI - transfer 2 
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Number Prime ImpJicants 
1) NWMS 
2) V1FC.V1FO 
3) PlB.P1F 
4) P1F.PlB 
5) P2B.P2F 
6) C1FH.V1FO.C1FL 
7) SlFH.V1FO.C1FL.s1FL 
8) V2FC.V2FO 
9) P3B.P3F 
10) P4B.P4F 
Table A.ll: Prime implicants for no flow through valve VI 
A.2.5 Water in the Overspill Tray 
Tank Ruptured 
and NOT 
leaking 
Tank Ruptured 
OR leaks 
Tank is leaking 
and NOT 
Ruptured 
WaterinttJe 
Overspill Tray 
Tank is NOT 
Ruptured 
Tank Ruptured Tankis NOT Tank Leaks Tank is NOT 
Ruptured Leaking 
TR 
Tank level 'IS 
High 
Flow in at 
Valve V1 
No Flow 
ootatValve 
V2 
No Flow 
wat Valve 
V3 
Figure A.25: Non-Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray 
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Figure A.27: Non-Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray - transfer 2 
Figure A.28: Non-Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray - transfer 4 
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Figure A.29: Non-Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray - transfer 3 
Figure A.30: Non-Coherent fault tree for water in the overspill tray - transfer 5 
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Number Prime Implicants 
1) TR.TL 
2) TL.TR 
3) VlFO.V2FC.P5B.TRVlFC.V2FO.P5F 
4) VlFO.V2FC.P5F.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.V2FO.P5B 
5) VlFO.V2FC.P6B.TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.V2FO.P6F 
6) VlFO. V2FC. V3FC. TRPlB.PlF .P2B.NWMS. VlFC. V2FO. V3FO 
7) VlFO.V2FC.C2FL.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.V2FO.V3FO.C2FH 
8) VlFO .V2FC .s2FL. TR.PlB.PlF .P2B.NWMS. VlFC. V2FO. V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
9) VlFO.P3B.P5B.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3F.P5F 
10) VIFO.P3B.P5F.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3F.P5B 
11) VlFO.P3B.P6B.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3F.P6F 
12) VlFO.P3B. V3FC. TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS. VlFC.P3F. V3FO 
13) VlFO.P3B.C2FL.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3F.V3FO.C2FH 
14) VlFO.P3B.S2FL.TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
15) VlFO.P3F.P5B.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.P5l' 
16) VlFO.P3F.P5F.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.P5B 
17) VlFO.P3F.P6B.TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.P6F 
18) VlFO.P3F.V3FC.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.V3FO 
19) VlFO.P3F.C2FL.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.V3FO.C2FH 
20) VlFO.P3F.s2FL.TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
21) VlFO.P4B.P5B.TRPlB.Pil'.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P4F.P5F 
22) VIFO.P4B.P5F.TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P4F.P5B 
23) VIFO.P4B.P6B.TR.PlB.PiF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P4F.P6F 
24) VlFO.P4B.V3FC.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P4F.V3FO 
25) VlFO.P4B.C2FL.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P4F.V3FO.C2FH 
26) VIFO.P4B.s2FL.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
27) CIFL.V2FC.P5B.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.V2FO.P5F 
28) CIFL. V2FC.P5F. TRPIB.P IF.P2B.NWMS. VlFC. V2FO.P5B 
29) ClFL.V2FC.P6B.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.ClFH.V2FO.P6F 
30) ClFL.V2FC.V3FC.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.V2FO.V3FO 
31) CIFL. V2FC.C2FL. TRPlB.P IF.P2B.NWMS. VIFC.CIFH. V2FO. V3FO.C2FH 
32) CIFL.V2FC.s2FL.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.ClFH.V2FO.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
33) ClFL.P3B.P5B.TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.ClFH.P3F.P5F 
34) CIFL.P3B.P5F.TitPIB.Pil'.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.P3F.P5B 
35) CIFL.P3B.P6B.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.P3F.P6F 
36) CIFL.P3B.V3FC.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.ClFH.P3F.V3FO 
41) ClFL.P3F.V3FC.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.V3FO 
37) ClFL.P3B.C2FL.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.ClFH.P3F.V3FO.C2FH 
38) CIFL.P3B.S2FL. TRPlB.P IF.P2B.NWMS. VlFC.ClFH.P3F. V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
39) CIFL.P3F.P5B.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.P5F 
40) ClFL.P3F.P5F.Tli.PlB.Pil'.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.P3B.P5B 
41) CIFL.P3F.P6B.TR.PIB.Pil'.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.P3B.P6F 
42) CIFL.P3F.V3FC.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.P3B.V3FO 
43) CIFL.P3F.C2FL.TR.PlB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.ClFH.P3B.V3FO.C2FH 
44) ClFL.P3F.S2FL. TRP lB.PlF.P2B.NWMS. V lFC.ClFH.P3B. V3FO. C2FH.S2FH 
45) CIFL.P4B.P5B.TRPlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.ClFH.P4F.P5F 
46) CIFL.P4B.P5F.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.ClFH.P4F.P5B 
47) ClFL.P4B.P6B.TR.PlB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.ClFH.P4F.P6F 
48) CIFL.P4B.V3FC.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VWC.CIFH.P4F.V3FO 
49) CIFL.P4B.C2FL.TR.PIB.PlF.P2B.NWMS.VlFC.ClFH.P4F.V3FO.C2FH 
50) CIFL.P4B.S2FL.TRPlB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
Table A.12: Prime implicants for water in the overspill tray when 
the system is ACTIVE - Table 1 
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Number Prime Implicants 
51) SIFL.V2FC.P5B.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.V2FO.P5F 
52) SIFL.V2FC.P5F.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.8IFH.V2FO.P5B 
53) SIFL.V2FC.P6B.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.8IFH.V2FO.P6F 
54) SIFL.V2FC.V3FC.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIl'C.CIFH.SIFH.V2FO.V3FO 
55) SIFL.V2FC.C2FL.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.V2FO.V3FO.C2FH 
56) SIFL.V2FC.S2FL.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.V2FO.V3I'IT.C2FH.S2FH 
57) SIFL.P3B.P5B.TR'i"IB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.P3F.P5F 
58) SIFL.P3B.P5F.TR'i"IB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3F.P5B 
59) SIFL.P3B.P6B.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3F.P6F 
60) SIFL.P3B.V3FC.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3F.V3FO 
61) SIFL.P3B.C2FL.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3F.V3FO.C2FH 
62) SIFL.P3B.S2FL.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
63) SIFL.P3F.P5B.TR'i"IB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3B.P6F 
64) SIFL.P3F.P5F.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3B.P5B 
65) SIFL.P3B.P6B.TRPffi.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFH.P3F.P6F 
66) SIFL.P3F.V3FC.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3B.V3FO 
67) SIFL.P3F.C2FL.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3B.V3FO.C2FH 
68) SIFL.P3F.S2FL.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P3B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
69) SIFL.P4B.P5B.TR.'i"IB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P4F.P5F 
70) SIFL.P4B.P5F.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.C!FH.SIFH.P4F.P58 
71) SIFL.P4B.P68.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.sIFH.P4F.P6F 
72) SIFL.P4B.V3FC.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P4F.V3FO 
73) SIFL.P4B.C2FL.TRPIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P4F.V3FO.C2FH 
74) SIFL.P4B.S2FL.TRPffi.PIF.P2B.NWMS.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
Table A.13: Prime implicants for water in the overspill tray when 
the system is ACTIVE - Table 2 
Number Prime Impllcanh 
I) TR.TL 
2) TL.TR 
3) VIFO.PSB.TE.TR.PIB.'PTi'.'P'2i3.NWMS.'P"3F.PSF.~ 
4) VIFO.PSF.TL.TR.PIB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.P3F.PSB.VIFC 
S) VIFO.P6B.'f[.TR.PIB.PIJ:I.P2B.NWm.P3F.V1FC.P6F 
6) VIFO. V3FC. TL.TR.PI B.PTF.'j5"21J.NWMS.P3F. VIFC. V3FQ 
7) VIFO.C2FL.TL.TR.PIB.PTF.'P"2tJ.NW'MS.P3F.'V'i'FC.V3FQ.C2FH 
8) V1FO.S2FL.TL.TR.PIB.P1F .P2Jj.NWMS.P3F.VIFC.V3FO'.C2FH.S2FlJ 
9) CIFL.P5B. TL. TR.P'i'B.P1F.P2B.NWMS.P3F.P5F. VIFC.C1FH 
10) CIFL.PSF.TL.TR.P1B.P1F.P2B.NWMS.P3F.PSB.VIFC.CIFH 
11) CIFL.P6B,TL.TR.PTB.PIF.P2B.NWMS.P3F.VIFC.CIFH.P6F 
12) CIFL,V3FC.TL.TR.P1B.PIF.P2'S',NWMS.P'3F,V1FC.CIFH.V3FO 
13) CIFL.C2FL.TL.TR.P3F.VIFC.PIB.PTF.P2B.NWMS.C1FH.V3FO.C2FH 
14) CIFL.S2FL.Tr. T'FLp 1B.PIF .P'2"S. NWMS.P3F. V1FC.C1FH.V3FO.'C2FH.S2FFC 
15) SlFL.P5B.TL.TR.PIB.P'IF.P2B.NWMS.P3F.P5F.V1FC.CIFH.S1FH 
16) SlFL.P5F.TL.TR.PIB.PIF.P28.NWMS.P3F.P5B.~,ClFH.S1FH 
17) SlFL.P6B.TL,TR.PTB.P1F.P21i.NWMS.P3F.V1FC.CI'FH:SIF'H,'P6P' 
18) SlFL.V3FC.TL.TR.PIB.PIF.fi2B.NWMS.P3F.'V'i'FC,CIFH.S1FH.V3FO' 
19) SI FL. C2FL. n. 'I'R. P 1 B.PI'F .P"2"S. NWMS. 'P3F. 'V'i'FC. Cl FH. S IF H. V3F0. am 
20) SlFL.S2FL.TL.'f1'[P1B.P1F.P2B.NWMS.P3F.VIFC.C1FH.SIFH.V3FO.C2FH.S2FH 
Table A.14: Prime implicants for water in the overspill tray when 
the system is DORMANT 
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Simulation Description 
B.l Introduction 
The program is started from a command prompt requiring five parameters, each of which 
specify the name of a file. There are two input files containing changes to the default system 
configuration of the program and the fault trees to be used in the analysis. The remaining 
three are output files describing how the system is configured, data from the simulation run 
and fault information for each of the four schemes. 
B.2 Input Files 
To control how the simulation operates a system description file can be created. This defines 
values of the simulation's system variables and any component state changes. If no changes 
are made to the system setup by the user the default values within the program will be 
used. 
B.2.1 System Description File 
The system description file is a text file containing comma-separated values. It allows the 
simulation to be configured to function in a specific way as required by the user. Each 
line in the file will perform one of three possible actions; set a system variable, change a 
component state or generate a random failure. 
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B.2.1.1 System Variables 
The simulation variables allow the duration of the simulation and the frequency of the 
check and print steps to be altered. Each change to the value of a variable in the system 
description file is defined with the text 'VARIABLE' followed by the name of the variable 
to set and its new value: 
'VARIABLE' I,' < variable's name> ",' < number >. 
The five simulation variables are listed in Table B.l. The variables 'TIMEINC', 
'TIMESTART' and 'TIMEEND' allow the time increment, start time and end time of 
the simulation to be specified respectively. The time increment, 'dt', is the duration of a 
single time step between subsequent calculation intervals. Note the simulation does not 
work in real-time, the time variables only affect the calculation and do not control the 
simulation's elapsed time. 
Variable Name Description 
TIMEINC Time increment 
TIMEEND End time 
TIMESTART Start time 
CHECKSTEP Time steps between fault checks 
PRINTSTEP Time steps between system prints 
Table B.l: Simulation Variables 
The PRINTSTEP variable controls how often the states of the components and the values 
from the sensors are printed to the data file. A PRINTSTEP of '1' would force the 
components states and sensor measurements to be output to the data file at every time 
step. The CHECKSTEP variable controls how often a comparison is made between the 
sensor readings for actual and expected system behaviour. It specifies the number of time 
increments between checks for failures. 
B.2.1.2 Induced Component State Change 
A component state change is used to set the state of a component at a specific point in 
time. Each state change is defined in the system description file with a line of the form: 
< component name > ',' 'STATE' ',' < new component state> [ time I. 
The component to change is identified along with the action and the new state. The time 
of the change can be optionally defined, but will default to t = 0.00 if not specified. A list 
of valid component names and states are shown in Table B.2. 
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Component Code Component Component Code Component 
State State 
VALVEi OPEN SENSORi LOW 
(l:5 i :53) CLOSED (l:5i:52) FAILEDLOW 
FAILEDOPEN HIGH 
FAILEDCLOSED FAILEDHIGH 
CONTROLLERi LOW PIPEi NORMAL 
(l:5 i :5 2) FAILEDLOW (l:5i:56) BLOCKED 
HIGH FRACTURED 
FAILEDHIGH MAINSUPPLY WATER 
TANK NORMAL MAINSUPPLY NOWATER 
TANK LEAKING PHASE ACTIVE 
TANK RUPTURED PHASE DORMANT 
Table B.2: State induced changes 
B.2.1.3 Random Component Failure 
The 'random component failure' feature is used to produce a fixed number of randomly 
generated component failures at a specified time. Such failures are specified in the system 
description file with a line of the form: 
'RANDOM' ',' < number> ',' [ time I. 
The line contains the keyword 'RANDOM', followed by the number of failures to create 
and an optional time at which they should occur (this defaults to 0.00 if not specified). 
All components have the same likelihood of failure. Each component selected to be failed is 
chosen by generating a random number. For all components except the main supply (which 
only has one possible cause of failure) a second random number is generated to determine 
the component's failed state. 
The random numbers used in the water tank program are generated by the 'rand' function. 
This is a pseudo random number generator. The sequence of numbers returned is 
determined by a seed. To try to ensure that each run is different the seed is initialised 
using the time in seconds from the 'time' function. This gives the number of seconds that 
have elapsed in a universal time coordinate (since January 1st 1970). Running the program 
with the same seed and same set of 'RANDOM' commands in the description file would 
produce the same result as previous runs. 
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B.2.1.4 Unavailability Failure 
The 'unavailability failure' feature enables a failure to occur based on the unavailability of 
the components in the system. Each component has both a failure and repair rate that is 
used to calculate its unavailability, qc. Over time as a component is used the likelihood of 
being unavailable will gradually increase, therefore this is re-calculated at each time step. 
The format of the input line for the unavailability failure is: 
'RANDPROB' ',' < number >, 
where the keyword is 'RANDPROB' and <number> is the number of time steps between 
the generation of failures. 
Failures in the system are simulated by generating a random number for each component 
between 0 and 1. If the number produced for a component indicates unavailability then it 
has failed. 
B.2.2 Fault Tree Branch File 
The fault tree branch file contains the definitions of the branches of the fault trees. Storing 
the branches in a file allows them to be changed without re-building the water tank system, 
provided there are no extra component or state names that have not been defined in the 
program. Each line of the file is formatted to define a named branch of a fault tree: 
< FAULT TREE NAME> = < FAULT TREE EXPRESSION >, 
where a fault tree expression is a formatted string that defines a fault tree using the three 
logical operators: 'AND', 'OR' and 'NOT', together with the terminal component name and 
state strings, for instance 'VIFO'. A fault tree expression can be written in the following 
ways: 
< FAULT TREE EXPRESSION> = « WATER TANK COMPONENT STATE», 
AND« number >, < FAULT TREE EXPRESSION' », 
OR« number >, < FAULT TREE EXPRESSION' », 
NOT« FAULT TREE EXPRESSION' », 
where '*' indicates that there can be more than one fault tree expression. An example of a 
simple fault tree described in this way is: FTV2 = OR(2, NFPV2, V2FO), which is shown 
in Appendix A, Figure A.3. 
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B.3 Output Files 
The output files are used to redirect the standard output into files that can be analysed 
after the simulation run has completed. 
B.3.1 Configuration File 
The configuration file is divided into three sections. The first section contains details of the 
initial state or value of all the components and variables in the water tank system before 
any re-configuration takes place, as shown in the example in Figure B.1. 
liatar Tank Simulation - Syatam Configuration 
System Fhasa 
Controllar(t) 
Controllar(2) 
Main Supply 
Over Spill Tray 
Pipe(t) 
Pipe(2) 
Pipe(S) 
Plpa(4) 
Pipe(5) 
Pipe(6) 
Sensor(l) 
Saneor(2) 
''''''' Valve(t) 
Valve(2) 
Valve(S) 
: State • Dormant 
: State. High 
: Stata • High 
: State • liater 
: State • Empty 
: State • Normal 
: State • Normal 
: Stata • Normal 
: State • Normal 
: State • Normal 
: State • Normal 
: State • High 
: State • High 
: State • Normal 
: State • Closed 
: State • Closed 
: State • Closed 
System Variables : TimaInc • 0.250000, 
TimeStart • 0.000000, 
TimeEnd • 1000.000000, 
CheckStep • 1800, 
PrintStep • 40, 
RandPStap • 0 
Failura Rata ad aapair Rata Va1l1as 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
IComponent 1 State 1 Failure Rate 1 Repair Rate 1 
1---------------------------------------------------------------1 
IControllerl 1 FailedLov 1 0.0000074000 1 0.0000000000 1 
IControllerl 1 FailedHigh 1 0.0000074000 I 0.0000000000 I 
I . .. I ... 1 ..• I ." I 
State Chang811 Induced at end of stated tilDe point 
State Change: Phase, time· 0.000000, sta.te • Active, ... COMMAND INDUCED ••• 
State Change: Pipe3, ttlae ·400.000000, state· Blocked, ••• COMKAND INDUCED ••• 
Figure B.1: Example system configuration file 
The second part consists of a table of initial failure and repair rates for each of the 
component's failure states. The final section of the file contains a record of each component 
state change that occurs during the simulation. It records the time the change occurred at 
and whether the change was induced explicitly by the user or randomly created using one 
of the three operations, as listed in Table B.3. 
State Change Tag 
*** COMMAND INDUCED *** 
*** COMMAND RANDOM *** 
*** UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE *** 
Reason for State Change 
Caused by the user issuing a state command in the system description 
file 
Caused by the user issuing the 'RANDOM' Command 
Random failure dependent upon the component failure rates. System 
variable 'RANDPROB' is set to greater than zero in the system 
description file. 
Table B.3: State change tags 
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Note that the simulation applies state changes for a given time at the end of the time 
interval after the calculation, checking and reporting steps have taken place. Therefore 
any changes will be apparent at the time increment following the time at which they were 
applied. 
B.3.2 Data File 
The data file records the values of flow rates and component states at specified time 
steps. Each line contains output for a particular time step. The number of time intervals 
between output lines is controlled using the 'PRINTSTEP' variable. At each iteration of 
a PRINTSTEP time interval a snapshot of the states of the components in the system 
together with specific measured values are output to the data file. It is formatted as a 
comma separated value file that can be tabulated using a spreadsheet. The first row of the 
file contains the names of components and variables. The file has 28 columns in total, a 
description of their contents is given in Table B.4. 
Column Heading 
Time 
Water Level 
Volume 
VFi (1 :;; i :;; 3) 
SPl 
TVF2 
TVF3 
DHDT 
DHDTIND 
WIND 
PHASE 
Ci (1 :;; i :;; 2) 
MS 
Pi (1 :;; i :;; 6) 
Si (1 :;; i ~ 2) 
TK 
Vi (1 ~ i ~ 3) 
Description 
Simulation time point 
The height of water in the tank 
The volume of water in the tank 
The volume ft.ow rate at sensor VFi 
Detects the amount of water coming out of the tank and landing in the tray 
Volume flow rate in pipe P4 
Volume flow rate in pipe P5 
Rate of change of height 
Rate of change of height indication 
Water level indication 
The current phase the system is in - 'ACTIVE' or 'DORMANT' 
The status of controller Ci - 'high', 'low', 'failed high' or 'failed low' 
The status of water coming from the main supply - 'water' or 'no water' 
The status of pipe Pi - 'normal" 'blocked' or 'fractured' 
The status of sensor Si - 'high" 'low', 'failed high' or 'failed low' 
The status of the tank - 'normal', 'ruptured' or 'leaking'. 
The status of valve Vi - 'open', 'closed', 'failed open' or 'failed closed' 
Table B.4: Column headings and description 
B.3.3 Fault File 
The fault file is a text file containing the results from the fault diagnostic method for each of 
the four schemes. The simulation is checked for deviations at intervals defined by the system 
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variable 'CHECKSTEP'. At each check interval the fault tree, sensor readings, minimal cut 
sets (scheme 1) or prime implicants (schemes 2, 3 and 4), importance measures and the 
most likely cause of failure are recorded in the file for each of the four fault tree schemes. 
An example fault file for scheme 1 is shown in Figure B.2. 
Fault Tree Compa:rsion at Time • 100.000000 
Fault Tree for Scheme 1: 
...................... 
• Minimieed cut uta • 
••••••••••••••••• u ••• 
1-0R 
Contenta of cut set MCI 
I-Sensor2 (Faile<iH1gh) Sensor2(FailedHigh) 
I 
2-Controller2(FailedHigh) Contenta of cut set MC2 : 
2-Val ve3(FIIHedOpen) 
Sensor Readings: 
VFl • 0.001661 
VF2 • 0.000000 
VF3 • 0.001191 
SP1 • ElDpty 
Val ve3 (FailedOpen) 
Contents of cut set MC3 : 
Controller2 (FailRdHigh) 
....................... 
• Importance Measures • 
....................... 
... Most likoly cause(s) of failure occur at cut sot(s) 
He3 
Figure B.2: Example 'fault file' output for scheme 1 
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Fault Tree and Success Tree 
Construction 
C.l Fault Tree Construction 
C.1.I High Flow in Section 1 (VI) 
HFV1 = NWMS.PlB.P1F.P2B.(V1FO.V1FC + C1FL.C1FH.V1FC 
+SlFE.S1FL.S1FH.SIFVH.S1FF.C1FH.V1FC 
+SlFL.S1FE.S1FH.SIFVH.S1FF.C1FH.V1FC) 
Number Prime Implicants 
1) VIFO.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.VIFC 
2) ClFL.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH 
3) SIFE.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH.SIFL.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF 
4) SIFL.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.VIFC.CIFH.SIFE.SIFH.sIFVH.SIFF 
Table C.1: Prime implicants for high flow in section 1 (VI) 
Number Potential Causes of Failure 
1) VIFO 
2) CIFL 
3) SIFE 
4) SIFL 
Table C.2: Potential causes of failure for high flow in section 1 (VI) 
after performing the coherent approximation 
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C.1.2 High Flow in Section 2 (V2) 
HFV2 = V2FC.P3B.P3F.P4B.(ACTIVE.DORMANT + V2FO.DORMANT.ACTIVE) 
The prime implicant obtained for 'high flow in section 2 (V2)' when the system is ACTIVE 
is: 
V2FC.P3B.P3F.P4B, 
which is of order 4 and contains only components and states that are known to NOT have 
failed. 
The prime implicant obtained for 'unexpected flow at valve V2' when the system is 
DORMANT is: 
V2FO.V2FC.P3B.P3F.P4B, 
which is of order 5. After performing the coherent approximation the result obtained is 
'V2FO'. 
C.1.3 High Flow in Section 3 (V3) 
HFV3 - P5B.P5F.P5B.(V3FO.V3FC + C2FH.C2FL.V3FC 
+S2FH.S2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FF.C2FL.V3FC 
- +S2FVH.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FF.C2FL.V3FC 
- +S2FF.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FVH.C2FL.V3FC) 
Number Prime Implicants 
1) V3FO.P5B.P5F.P6B.V3FC 
2) C2FH.P5B.P5F.P6B.V3FC.C2FL 
3) S2FVH.P5B.P5F.P6B. V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FF 
4) S2FH.P5B.P5F.P6B.V3FC.C2FL.s2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FF 
5) S2FF.P5B.P5F.P6B.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FVH 
Table C.3: Prime implicants for high flow in section 3 (V3) 
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Number Potential Causes of Failure 
1) V3FO 
2) C2FH 
3) S2FH 
4) S2FVH 
5) S2FF 
Table C.4: Potential causes of failure for high flow in section 3 (V3) 
after performing the coherent approximation 
C.1.4 Low Flow in Section 1 (VI) 
LFVl = NWMS + VIFC.VIFC + PIB.m + PIF.PIB + P2B.P2F 
+CIFH.VIFO.CIFL + SlFH.VIFO.ClFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFVH.81FF 
+Sl VFH. VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFH.SIFF 
+SlFF.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFH.SIFVH 
Number Prime Implicants Number Prime Implicants 
1) NWMS 6) CIFH.VIFO.CIFL 
2) VIFC.VIFO 7) SlFH.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFVH.SIFF 
3) PIB.PIF 8) SlFVH.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.81FH.81FF 
4) PIF.PIB 9) SlFF.VIFO.CIFL.81FE.SIFL.SIFH.SIFVH 
5) P2B.P2F 
Table C.5: Prime implicants for low flow in section 1 (VI) 
Number Potential Causes of Failure Number Potential Causes of Failure 
1) NWMS 6) CIFH 
2) VIFC 7) SlFH 
3) PIB 8) SlFVH 
4) PIF 9) SlFF 
5) P2B 
Table C.6: Potential causes of failure for low flow in section 1 (VI) 
after performing the coherent approximation 
C.1.5 Low Flow in Section 3 (V3) 
LFV3 - P5B.P5F + P5F.P5B + P6B.P6F + V3FC.V3FO 
+C2FL.V3FO.C2FH + S2FE.V3FO.C2FH.S2FL.S2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
+S2FL.V3FO.C2FH.S2FE.S2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
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Number Prime Implicants 
1) P5B.P5F 
2) P5F.P5B 
3) P6B.P6F 
4) V3FC.V3FO 
Number Prime Implicants 
5) C2FL.V3FO.C2FH 
6) S2FE.V3FO.C2FH.S2FL.82FH.82FVH.S2FF 
7) S2FL. V3FO.C2FH.S2FE.S2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
Table Co7: Prime implicants for low flow in section 3 (V3) 
Number Potential Causes of Failure 
C.1.6 
Number Potential Causes of Failure 
1) P5B 
5) C2FL 
2) P5F 
6) S2FE 
3) P6B 
4) V3FC 7) S2FL 
Table CoS: Potential causes of failure for low flow in section 3 (V3) 
after performing the coherent approximation 
'fray Level in Section 4 
TRAYL - TR.TL+TL.TR 
Number Prime Implicants 
1) TR.TL 
2) TL.TR 
Table Cog: Prime implicants for tray level in section 4 
Number Potential Causes of Failure 
1) TR 
2) TL 
Table Co1O: Potential causes of failure for tray level in section 4 
after performing the coherent approximation 
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C.l. 7 Tank Level Pattern Decreasing 
TANKDECL ACTIVE.DORMANT(TL.TR + TR.TL 
Number 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
+P5F.P5B + P5B.P5F.P6B.(V3FO.V3FC + C2FH.V3FC.C2FL 
+S2FH.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FF 
+S2FVH.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FF 
+S2FF.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FVH) 
NWMS + VIFC.VIFC + PIB.m + PIF.PIB + P2B.P2F 
+CIFH.VIFO.CIFL + SlFH.VIFO.C1FL.SIFE.SIFL.81FVH.SIFF 
+SlFVH.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFH.SiFF 
+SlFF.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFH.SIFVH) 
+DORMANT.ACTIVE.(TR.TL + P5F.P5B 
+P5B.P5F.P6B.(V3FO.V3FC + C2FH.V3FC.C2FL 
+S2FH.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FF 
+S2FVH.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FF 
+S2FF.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FVH) 
+TL.TR.(V2FO.V2FC + P3F.P3B) 
+(TL.TR + V2FO.V2FC + P3F.P3B).(NWMS + VIFC.VIFC 
+PIB.m + PIF.PIB + P2B.P2F + CIFH.VIFO.CIFL 
+SlFH.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFVH.SIFF 
+SlVFH.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.81FH.SiFF 
+SlFF.VIFO.CIFL.SIFE.SIFL.SIFH.SIFVH)) 
Prime Implicants Number Potential Causes of Fail ure 
NWMS 10) SIFH.SIFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO 
TL.TR 11) SIFVH.SIFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO 
TRTL 12) SIFF.SIFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO 
P5F.P5B 13) V3FO.P5B.P5F.P6B.V3FC 
VIFC.VIFO 14) C2FH.P5B.P5F.P6B.C2FL.V3FC 
PIB.PIF 15) S2FH.P5B.P5F.P6B.S2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FF.C2FL.V3FC 
PIF.PIB 16) S2FVH.P5B.P5F.P6B.S2FE.S2FL.s2FH.S2FF.C2FL.V3FC 
P2B.P2F 17) S2FF.P5B.P5F.P6B.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FVH.C2FL.V3FC 
CIFH.CIFL.VIFO 
Table C.ll: Prime implicants for tank level pattern decreasing 
in the ACTIVE operating mode 
242 
Fault Tree and Success Tree Construction Fault Tree Construction 
Number Potential Causes of Fail ure Number Potential Causes of Failure 
I) NWMS 10) SIFH 
2) TL 11) SIFVH 
3) TR 12) SIFF 
4) P5F 13) V3FO 
5) VIFC 14) C2FH 
6) PIB IS) S2FH 
7) PIF 16) S2FVH 
8) P2B 17) S2FF 
9) CIFH 
Table C.12: Potential causes of failure for tank level pattern decreasing 
in the ACTIVE operating mode after performing the coherent approximation 
Number 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
18) 
Prime ImpUcants Number Potential Causes of Failure 
TR.TL 19) P2B.TL.P2F.TR 
P5F.P5B 20) V3FO.P5B.P5F .'P'6'B. V3FC 
NWMS.TL.TR 21) CIFH.V2FO.CIFL.VIFO.V2FC 
NWMS.V2FO.V2FC 22) CIFH .P3F .CIFL.VIFO .P3B 
NWMS.P3F.P3B 23) Cl FH. TL.Cl FL. VIFO. TR 
TL.V2FO.TR.V2FC 24) C2FH.P5B.P5F.P6lJ.C2FL.V3FC 
TL.P3F.TR.P3B 25) SlFH.V2FO.S1FE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO.V2FC 
VIFC.V2FO.VIFO.V2FC 26) SlFVH.V2FO.STFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO.V2FC 
PIB.V2FO.P'i'F. V2FC 27) SlFF.V2FO.SIFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO.V2FC 
PIF.V2FO.PIB.V2FC 28) SlFH.P3F.SIFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO.P3B 
P2B.V2FO.P2F.V2FC 29) SlFVH.P3F.SIFE.SIFL.CtFL.VIFO.P3B 
VIFC.P3F.V1Fo.P3B 30) SIFF.P3F.SIFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO.P3B 
PIB.P3F .P"i'F.'P'3i3 31) SlFH.TL.SIFE.SIFL.CIFL.VIFO.TR 
PIF.P3F.PIB.P3B 32) SI FVH. TL.Sl FE.SIFL.Cl FL. Vl Fo. TR 
P2B.P3F.P2F.P3B 33) SI FF. TL.SIFE.S'IIT.CIFL. VIFO. TR 
VIFC.TL.VIFO.TR 34) S2FH.P5B.P5F.P6EJ.S2FE.S2FL.S2FVH.S2FF.C2FL.V3FC 
PIB.TL.PIF.TR 35) S2FVH.P5B.P5F.P6B.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FF.C2FL.V3FC 
PIF.TL.PIB.TR 36) S2FF. P 5 B. P5F. 'P'69'. S2FE.S2F L. S2FH. C2FL. V3FC 
Table C.13: Prime implicants for tank level pattern decreasing 
in the DORMANT operating mode 
Number Potential Causes of Failure Number Potential Causes of Failure 
1) TR 19) SlFH.P3F 
2) P5F 20) SlFVH.P3F 
3) V3FO 21) SlFF.P3F 
4) C2FH 22) PIB.P3F 
5) S2H 23) PIF.P3F 
6) S2FVH 24) P2B.P3F 
7) S2FF 25) NWMS.P3F 
8) VIFC.V2FO 26) V1FC.TL 
9) CIFH.V2FO 27) CIFH.TL 
10) SlFH.V2FO 28) SIFH.TL 
11) SlFVH.V2FO 29) StFVH.TL 
12) SIFF.V2FO 30) SlFF.TL 
13) PlB.V2FO 31) PtB.TL 
14) PIF.V2FO 32) PIF.TL 
15) P2B.V2FO 33) P2B.TL 
16) NWMS.V2FO 34) NWMS.TL 
17) VIFC.P3F 35) V2FO.TL 
18) C1FH.P3F 36) paF.TL 
Table C.14: Potential causes of failure for tank level pattern decreasing 
in the DORMANT operating mode after performing the coherent approximation 
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C.1.S Tank Level Pattern Oscillating 
TANKOS - TR.P3F.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.S2FH.S2FVH.S2FF.V3FO 
.C2FH.(NWMS.PlB.P1F.P2B.(V1FO.V1FC + C1FL.C1FH.V1FC 
+SlFE.S1FL.S1FH.S1FVH.S1FF.C1FH.V1FC 
+SlFL.S1FE.S1FH.S1FVH.S1FF.C1FH.V1FC).(ACTIVE.V2FO 
+ACTIVE.(V2FC.V2FO + P3B.P3F + P4B.P4F))) 
Number Prime Impllcanta 
1) VIFO. V2FC. TR.psILP5F. V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2"F"L. VIFC.N"WK1S. PIB.PIF ,P2B. V2FQ 
2) VIFO.P3B.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P3F 
3) VIFO .P4B.TR.P5B .P5F .V3FC .C2FL .S2FE.S2FL. VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P4F 
4) CIFL.V2FC.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.s2FL.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V2FO 
5) CIFL.P3B.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.s2FE.S2FL.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P3F 
6) CIFL.P4B.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.s2FE.S2FL.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS."Pi"B.PIF.P2B.P4F 
7) SIFE.V2FC.TR."j5""gH.P5F,V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.sIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF:P2i3.V2FO 
8) SlFL. V2FC. TR.i"5B".P5F .V3FC .C2FL.S2FE.S"2FI:.VIFC .CIFH .SIFH.SIFVH.S IF F .NWMS.PI B.PIF .P2B. V2FO 
9) SlFE.P3B.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL,VIFC.C1FH.SIFH.SIFVH.sIFF.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.P3F 
10) SIFL.P3B.TR.P5B.P5F."V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.VIFC.CIFH.SlFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.P3F 
11) SIFE.P4B.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P4F 
12) SIFL.P4B.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P4F 
Table C.15: Prime implicants for tank level pattern oscillating 
in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Number Prhne Impllcanta 
Number 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
1) VIFO.TR.P5B.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P28. 
2) Cl FL. TR.P5B".P5F .V3FC .C2FL.S2FE.S"2F'L.V I FC .C IFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B. 
3) SIFE.TR.~.P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.s2FL.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B. 
4) SIFL.TR."P5"S".P5F.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL.VIFC.ClFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B. 
Table C.16: Prime implicants for tank level pattern oscillating 
in the DORMANT operating mode 
Potential Causes of Failure Number Potential Causes of Failure 
V1FO.V2FC 7) S1FE.V2FC 
V1FO.P3B 8) S1FE.P3B 
V1FO.P4B 9) S1FE.P4B 
C1FL.V2FC 10) S1FL.V2FC 
C1FL.P3B 11) S1FL.P3B 
C1FL.P4B 12) S1FL.P4B 
Table C.17: Potential causes of failure for tank level pattern oscillating 
in the ACTIVE operating mode after performing the coherent approximation 
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Number Potential Causes of Failure 
I) VIFO 
2) CIFL 
3) SIFE 
4) SIFL 
Table C.IS: Potential causes of failure for tank level pattern oscillating 
in the DORMANT operating mode after performing the coherent approximation 
C.1.9 Tank Level Pattern Increasing to Full 
TANKINCF - TR.P3F.P5F.(NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.(VIFO.VIFC + CIFL.VIFC.C1FH 
+SIFE.VIFC.CIFH.SIFL.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF 
+SIFL.VIFC.CIFH.STFE.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF).(ACTIVE.V2FO 
+ACTIVE.(V2FC.V2FO + P3B.P3F + P4B.P4F).(P5B.P5F 
+P6B.P6F + V3FC.V3FO + C2FL.V3FC.C2FH 
+S2FE.V3FC.C2FH.S2FL.S2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
+S2FL.V3FC.C2FH.S2FE.S2FH.S2FVH.S2FF)) 
Number Prime Irnplicanta 
I) VlFO.P3B.PSB.TR.P3F.PSF.VlFC.NWMS.PlB.PlF.P2B 
2) VlFO.V2FC.PSB.TR.P3F.PSF.VlFC.NWMS.PTEf.PlF.P2B.V2F0 
3) VIFO.P38.V3FC.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.NWMS.~.PIF.P2B.V3FO 
4) CIFL.P38.PSB.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PiF.'P"2'Ef 
S) VIFO.P38.P6B.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.PI8.PIF.'P'2B.P6F 
6) VIFO.P48.P58.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.PI8.PIF.P2B.P4F 
7) VI FO. V2FC. V3FC. TR.P3F .PSF. VlFC.NWMS.PIB.PlF .P2B. V2FO. V3FO 
8) CIFL.V2FC.P58 .Ti't.P3F .P5F .VIFC .ClFH .NWMS ."PiB.PIF .P2B.V2'F'O 
9) V1FO.V2FC.P6B.TR.P3F.PSF.V1FC.NWMS.PIB.PlF.P2B.V2FO.P6F 
10) Cl FL.P3B. V3FC.Tit.P3F .PSF. VIFC.C IFH.NWKrn.PIB.PlF .P2B. V3FO 
11) VlFO.P3B.C2FL.TR.P3F.P5F.VlFC.NWMS.P'i'S.P1F.P2B.V3FO.C2FH 
12) ClFL.P3B.P6B.TR.P3F.PSF.V'iFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.P1F.P'2'S.P6F 
13) V1FO.P4B. V3FC .TR.P3F .P5F .VIFC .NWMS.PTlj .P1F:P2i3 .P4F.V3FO 
14) CIFL.P4B.P5B.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.C1FH.NWMS.P1B.PIF.P2B.P4F 
15) VIFO.P4B.P6B.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.P4F.PtW 
16) CIFL.V2FC.V3FC. TR.P3F .PSF. V1FC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B. V2FO. V3FO 
17) VlFO.V2FC.C2FL.TR.P3F.PSF.VlFC.NWMS.PlB.PlF.P2B.V2FO.V3FO.C2FH 
18) ClFL. V2FC.P6B.TIt.P3F .PSF. VIFC.CIFH .NWNrS'.PlB .PlF .P2B .V2FO .P6F 
19) ClFL.P3B.C2FL.'I'lt.P3F.P5F.VlFC.ClFH.NWKrn.PlB.PTF.P2B.V3FO.C2FR 
20) CIFL.P4B.V3FC.Tl't.'P3"F.P5F.VIFC.ClFH.N'W'MS.P1B.PlF.P2B.P4F.V3FO 
21) VIFO.P4B.C2FL.TR.'P3"F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.PTl3.PIF.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH 
22) CIFL.P4B.P68.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2H.P4F.P6F 
23) ClFL. V2FC.C2FL. TR.P3F .PSF. V1FC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B. V2FO .V3FO .C2FH 
24) VIFO.P3B.S2FE."Ttt.P3F.PSF.VIFC.NWMS.'Pi'];.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVR.S2FF 
2S) VIFO.P3B.S2FL.Tl't.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.'PiB.PlF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
26) VIFO.P3B.S2FH.TR.P"3'F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.P1l3.PTF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
27) SI FE.P3B.PS8.TR.P3F .PSF. VlFC.ClFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF .NWMS.PlB.PIF .P28 
28) SlFL.P3B.PSB.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SlFVH.slFF.NWMS.PlB.PlF.P2B 
Table G19: Prime implicants for tank level pattern increasing to full 
in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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Number Prhne Impllcants 
29) CIFL.P4B.C2FL. TR.P3F.P5F .VIFC.CIFH .NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B.P4F. V3FO.C2FH 
30) VI FO. V2FC.S2FE.TR:'. P3F .P5F. VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PiF.P2B. V2FO. V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
31) VIFO. V2FC.S2FL.TIt.P3F .P5F. VIFC. NWMS.PIB.Pi'F.P2B. V2FO. V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
32) VI FO. V2FC. S2FH .1'R'. P 3F . P5F . '\i'i"FC. N WMS.P'Tli. P 1 F . P2B. V2FO. V3FO. C2FH. S2 FV H.S2FJ:" 
33) SlFE.V2FC.PSB.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.sIFF.NWMS.PIB.P1'F.P2B.V2FO 
34) SlFL.V2FC.PSB.TRP3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.V2FO 
35) SIFE.P3B.V3FC.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FO 
36) SIFL.P3B.V3FC.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PlF.P2B.V3FO 
37) CIFL.P3B.S2FE.TRP3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2'S.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
38) CIFL.P3B.S2FL.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PTF.i"'2B".V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
39) CIFL.P3B.S2FH.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.'PiB'.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
40) SlFE.P3B.P6B,TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SlFVH.SIFF.NWMS.P'i'B.PIF.P2B.P6F 
41) SlFL.P3B. P6B. TR.P3F .P5F. VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.Sl FVH.SIFF .NWMS.PIB.PlF .P2B.P6F 
42) VIFO.P4B.S2FE.TR.P3F.P5F.VlFC.NWMS.PlB.PTF.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
43) VIFO.P4B.S2FL.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.'PiB'.PIF.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
44) VIFO.P4B.S2FH.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
4S) SlFE.P48. P5B.TRP3F .P5F. VIFC.ClFH.SlFH.Sl FVH.SIFF .NWMS.P'i'B.PIF .P2B.P4F 
46) SlFL.P4B.PSB. TRP3F .P5F. VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.Sl FVH.SIFF. NWMS.PIB.Pl F .P2B.P4F 
47) SIFE.V2FC.V3FC.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SlFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P"2B.V2FO.V3FO 
48) SlFL.V2FC.V3FC.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SlFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.'PlF.P2B.V2FO.V3FO 
49) SlFE.V2FC.C2FL.TR.P3F.PSF.vn:'C.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.V2FO.V3FO.C2FH 
50) SlFL.V2FC.C2FL.TR.P3F.P5'F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.'PiB'.PIF.P28.'V'2FO.V3FO.C2FH 
51) CIFL.V2FC.S2FE.TR.P3F.P5F.VTFC'.CIFH.NW1Vm.PIB.PTF.P2B.V2FO.'V3F<:J.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
52) CIFL.V2FC.S2FL. TR. P3F .PSF. VIFC.CIFH.NWM8.PIB.PIF.P2B. V2FO. V3FU.C2FH .S2FVR.S2FF 
53) CIFL.V2FC.S2FH.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.N'W'MS.'PiB'.PIF.P2B.V2FO.V3FU.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
54) SIFE.V2FC.P6B.TRP3F.P5F.VIFC.ClFH.SlFH.SlFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2i3.V2FO.P6F 
55) SlFL.V2FC.P6B.TRP3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V2FO.P6F 
56) SlFE.P3B.C2FL.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SlFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PlB.PlF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH 
57) SIFL.P3B.C2FL.TR.P3F.PSF.VlFC.ClFH.SlFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PlF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH 
58) SlFE.P4B.V3FC.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P4F.V3FO 
59) SlFL.P4B.V3FC.TRP3F."P'5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PTB.PTF.P2B.P4F.V3FO 
60) CIFL.P4B.S2FE.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PlB.PIF.'P2'S'.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
61) CIFL.P4B.S2FL.TRP3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.P1F.P2B".P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
62) CIFL.P4B.S2FH.TRP3F."P'5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWM$.PIB.PTF.P21j,P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
63) SlFE.P4B.P6B.TR.P3F.P'5'F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.P'IB.PIF.P2B.P4F.P6F 
64) S lFL.P4B. P6B. TR.P3F.PSF. VIFC.CIFH .SlFH.S IFVH.SIFF .NWMS.PIB.PIF .'P"2B.P4F. P6F 
65) SIFE.P3B.S2FE.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
66) SlFL.P3B.S2FE.TRP3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
67) SlFE.P4B.C2FL.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PTI'.P2B.V3FO.C2FH 
68) SIFL.P4B.C2FL.TRP3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PlB.PlF'.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH 
69) SIFE.P3B .S2FL.TR.P3F .PSF .VIFC.C IFH.S IFH.SIFVH.SIFF .NWMS.PTB'.PTF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
70) SlFL.P3B.S2FL.TRP3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PTB.PTF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
71) SlFE.P3B.S2FH.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PTi3.PTF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
72) SIFL.P3B.S2FH.TR.'P3'F'.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PTI".P2B.V3FO.C2FH.82FVH.S2FF 
73) SIFE.V2FC.S2FH.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SlFVH.sIFF.NWMS.PlB.PlF.P2B.V2FO.V3FO.S2FVH.S2FF 
74) SIFL. V2FC.S2FH .TR.P3F .PSF .VIFC.Cl FH .SlFH .slFVH .slFF .NWMS.P IB.PIF .P2B. V2FO. V3FO.S2FVH.S2FF 
7S) SIFE.P4B.S2FE.TR.P3F.PSF.VlFC.ClFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PlB.PlF'.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
76) SIFL.P4B.S2FE.TRP3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SlFH.SlFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PTi3.PIF.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
77) SlFE.P4B.S2FL.TRP3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.P1B.PiF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
78) SlFL.P4B.S2FL.TRP3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PTB.PTF.P2B.P4F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVlI.S2FF 
79) SIFE.P4B.S2FH. TR P3F .PSF. VIFC.CIFH .SlFH .SIFVH .SlFF .NWMS.PIB .PIF .P2B.P4F .V3FO .C2FH .s2FV H.S2FF 
BO) SlFL.P4B.S2FH.TRP3F.PSF.VIFC.CtFH.SIFH.SlFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.P4F.V3FQ.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
81) SIFE. V2FC.S2FE. TRP3F.P5F. VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.81FVH.SI FF .NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B. V2FO. V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
82) SlFL.Y2FC.S2FE.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V2FO.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.s2FF 
83) SI FE. V2FC.S2FL.TR.P3F .P5F. VIFG.CIFH.SIFH.sIFVH.sIFF .NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B. V2FO. V3FO.C2FH .S2FVH.s2FF 
84) SlFL.V2FC.S2FL.TR.P3F.PSF.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SlFVH.sIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V2FO.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.s2FF 
Table C.20: Prime implicants for tank level pattern increasing to full 
in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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Number Potential Causes of Failure Number Potential Causes of Failure 
I) VIFO. V2FC. V3FC 43) SIFE. V2FC.V3FC 
2) VIFO.V2FC.C2FL 44) SIFE. V2FC.C2FL 
3) VIFO.V2FC.s2FE 45) SIFE. V2FC.S2FE 
4) VIFO.V2FC.s2FL 46) SIFE.V2FC.s2FL 
5) VIFO.V2FC.S2FH 47) SIFE.V2FC.S2FH 
6) VIFO.V2FC.P5B 48) SIFE. V2FC.P5B 
7) VIFO.V2FC.P6B 49) SIFE.V2FC.P6B 
8) VIFO.P3B.V3FC 50) SIFE.P3B.V3FC 
9) VIFO.P3B.C2FL 51) SIFE.P3B.C2FL 
10) VIFO.P3B.S2FE 52) SIFE.P3B.S2FE 
11) VIFO.P3B.S2FL 53) SIFE.P3B.S2FL 
12) VIFO.P3B.82FH 54) SIFE.P3B.S2FH 
13) VlFO.P3B.P5B 55) SIFE.P3B.P5B 
14) VIFO.P3B.P6B 56) SIFE.P3B.P6B 
15) VIFO.P4B.V3FC 57) SIFE.P4B.V3FC 
16) VIFO.P4B.C2FL 58) SIFE.P4B.C2FL 
17) VIFO.P4B.S2FE 59) SIFE.P4B.S2FE 
18) VIFO.P4B.S2FL 60) SIFE.P4B.S2FL 
19) VIFO.P4B.S2FH 61) SIFE.P4B.S2FH 
20) VIFO.P4B.P5B 62) SIFE.P4B.P5B 
21) VIFO.P4B.P6B 63) SIFE.P4B.P6B 
22) CIFL.V2FC.V3FC 64) SIFL.V2FC.V3FC 
23) CIFL.V2FC.C2FL 65) SIFL.V2FC.C2FL 
24) CIFL.V2FC.S2FE 66) SIFL. V2FC.S2FE 
25) CIFL. V2FC.S2FL 67) SIFL.V2FC.S2FL 
26) C1FL. V2FC.S2FH 68) SIFL.V2FC.S2FH 
27) CIFL.V2FC.P5B 69 SIFL. V2FC.P5B 
28) CIFL.V2FC.P6B 70) SIFL.V2FC.P6B 
29) C1FL.P3B.V3FC 71) SIFL.P3B.V3FC 
30) CIFL.P3B.C2FL 72) SIFL.P3B.C2FL 
31) CIFL.P3B.S2FE 73) SIFL.P3B.S2FE 
32) ClFL.P3B.S2FL 74) SIFL.P3B.S2FL 
33) CIFL.P3B.S2FH 75) SIFL.P3B.S2FH 
34) CIFL.P3B.P5B 76) SIFL.P3B.P5B 
35) CIFL.P3B.P6B 77) SIFL.P3B.P6B 
36) CIFL.P4B. V3FC 78) SIFL.P4B.V3FC 
37) CIFL.P4B.C2FL 79) SIFL.P4B.C2FL 
38) CIFL.P4B.S2FE 80) SIFL.P4B.82FE 
39) C1FL.P4B.S2FL 81) SIFL.P4B.S2FL 
40) C1FL.P4B.S2FH 82) SIFL.P4B.S2FH 
41) CIFL.P4B.P5B 83) SIFL.P4B.P5B 
42) CIFL.P4B.P6B 84) SIFL.P4B.P6B 
Table C.21: Potential causes of failure for tank level pattern increasing to full 
in the ACTIVE operating mode after performing the coherent approximation 
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Number Prime Impllcants 
1) VIFO.V3FC.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PIF.PZB.V3FO 
Z) VIFO.P5B.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PIF.PZB 
3) V1FO.P6B.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.NWMS.PIB.PIF.PZB.PGF 
4) CIFL.P5B.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2i3 
5) CIFL.V3FC.TJ't.P3F.P5F. VIFC.CIFH.N'WM'S'.PT'B.PIF .P2B. V3FO 
6) V1FO.C2FL.TR.P3F.P5F.V1FC.NWMS.PTIJ.PIF.P2B.V3FO.CZFH 
7) CIFL.P6B.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.P1F.~.P6F 
8) C1FL.C2FL.Tlt.P3F .P5F .VYFC'.CIFH.N'WJVrS.PIB.PIF .P2B. V3FO.CZFH 
9) VIFO.S2FE.TJ[.P3F.P5F.'VfFC".NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
10) VIFO.82FL.TJ't.P3F .P5F .VYFC'.NWMS.'PTB.PTF.P2B. V3FO.C2FH.S2FVff.S2FF 
11) V1FO.S2FH.TRP3F.P5F.V1FC.NWMS.P1B.PIF.P2B.V3FO.CZFH.S2FVR.S2FF 
12) SlFE.P5B.TRP3F.P5F.V1FC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.PT'B.PTF.P2B 
13) 81FL.P58.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.S1FH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B 
14) SIFE. V3FC.T1t.P3F .P5F .VYFC'.Cl FH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF .NWMS.PIB.Pl F .P2B. V3FD 
15) SlFL.V3FC.T1't.P3F.P5F.VYFC'.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.P1B.P]F.PZB.V3FO 
16) CIFL.S2FE.'Tl''LP3F.P5F.VYFC'.C1FH.'NWM'S.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
17) CIFL.82FL.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3Fo.C2FH.S2FVH.~ 
18) C1FL.S2FH.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.NWMS.PIB.PlF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF' 
19) 81FE.P6B.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.sIFF.NWMS.PIB.PTF.P2B.P6F 
20) 8 IFL.P6B. TR. P3F .P5F. VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF .NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B.P6F 
21) S IFE.C2FL.Tlt.P3F.P5F.VYFC'.CI FH.SI FH.Sl FVH.SIFF .NWMS.PIB.PIF .P2B. V3FD. C2FH 
22) S IFL.C2FL.TR.P3F .Pt)F .VIFC.C IFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF .NWMS.PIB.P IF .P2B. V3FO. C2FH 
23) S IFE.S2FE. TRP3F .P5F. VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.S1FVH.SIFF .NWMS.Pl B.PI F .P2B. V3FD.C2FH .S2FVH.s2FF 
24) SlFL.S2FE.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FQ.C2FH.S2FVH.s2FF 
25) SlFE.S2FL.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CtFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FQ.CZFH.S2FVH.sZFF 
26) SlFL.s2FL.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SIFF.NWMS.P'i'B.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
27) SlFE.S2FH.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.SlFF.NWMS.'PTB.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
28) SIFL.S2FH.TR.P3F.P5F.VIFC.CIFH.SIFH.SIFVH.sIFF.NWMS.PIB.PIF.P2B.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
Table C.22: Prime implicants for tank level pattern increasing to full 
in the DORMANT operating mode 
Number Potential Causes or Failure Number Potential Causes or Failure 
1) VIFO.V3FC 15) SlFE.V3FC 
2) VIFO.C2FL 16) SlFE.C2FL 
3) VIFO.S2FE 17) SIFE.S2FE 
4) VIFO.S2FL 18) SIFE.S2FL 
5) VIFO.S2FH 19) VIFO.S2FH 
6) VIFO.P5B 20) SIFE.P5B 
7) VIFO.P6B 21) SlFE.P6B 
8) CIFL.V3FC 22) SlFL.V3FC 
9) CIFL.C2FL 23) SIFL.C2FL 
10) CIFL.S2FE 24) SlFL.S2FE 
11) CIFL.S2FL 25) SlFL.S2FL 
12) VIFO.S2FH 26) VIFO.S2FH 
13) CIFL.P5B 27) SlFL.P5B 
14) ClFL.P6B 28) SIFL.PGB 
Table C.23: Potential causes of failure for tank level pattern increasing to full 
in the DORMANT operating mode after performing the coherent approximation 
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C.2 Success Tree Construction 
C.2.I Working High Flow in Section I (VI) 
SUCCESSHFVl - NWMS.PlB.PIF.P2B.VIFC.ClFH.SIFE.SIFL.SIFH.SlFVH.SIFF 
C.2.2 Working High Flow in Section 2 (V2) 
SUCCESSHFV2 - DORMANT.V2FC.P3B.P3F.P4B 
C.2.3 Working High Flow in Section 3 (V3) 
SUCCESSHFV3 - P5B.P5F.P6B.V3FC.C2FL.S2FE.S2FL 
C.2.4 Working Low Flow in Section I (VI) 
SUCCESSLFVl - VIFO.ClFL.SIFE.SIFL 
C.2.5 Working Low Flow in Section 3 (V3) 
SUCCESSLFV3 V3FO.C2FH.S2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
C.2.6 Working Tray Level in Section 4 
SUCCESSTRAYL TR.TL 
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C.2.7 Normal Level Pattern 
SUCCESSTANKNORMAL - TR.P5F.V3FO.C2FH.S2FVH.S2FF 
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Fault and Success Trees for the Fuel 
Rig when ACTIVE or DORMANT 
D.l Fault Trees 
D.1.1 High Flow at IVP0130 
HFIVPOI30 IVP0130B.IVP0130FC.!VP0130S.]VP0130L.IVP0130PB.P0121B.POI21F.P0121PB.P0121L 
.P0122B.P0122F.P0122PB.P0122L.P0123B.P0123PB (IVP0130FO + CT013OT.CT0130F) 
Number Prime hnpllcants 
1) IVP0130FO,IVP0130B,IVP0130FC,IVP0130S.IVP0130L.IVP0130PB.P0121B.P0121F 
.P0121PB.POf2iL.~.PCi'i22F.POI22PB.P'OT'2"2i:.P0'I23i3.POI23PB 
2) eTD t30T .IVP0130B .IVPO 130FC ,IVPO 130S .IV PO 130L .IV PO 130PB .PO 1218 ,PO 121 F 
.PQ121PB.PQ121L.P0122B.P0l22F.PQ122PB.P0122L.P0123B.P0123PB.CTQ130F 
Table D.1: Prime implicants for high flow at IVP0130 
in the ACTIVE or DORMANT operating modes 
251 
Fault and Success Trees for the Fuel Rig when ACTIVE or DORMANT Fault Trees 
D.1.2 Partial Flow at IVP0130 
PFIVPOl30 = POI21B.POI21F.POI22B.POI22F.POf23B 
.{lVPOI30S.lVPOI30FC.IVPOI30FO.IVPOI30B.IVPOI30PB.IVPOl30L 
+{IVPOI30FO. (IVPOI30FC.IVPOI30B.IVPOI30S .IVPOI30PB.IVPOI30L) 
+COI30T.(CTOI30F.IVPOI30FC.IVPOI30B.IVPOI30S.IVPOI30PB.IVPOI30L)} 
.(POI21PB.POI21L + POI2IL.POI2IPB + POI22PB.POI22L + POI22L.POI22PB 
+POI23PB.POI23B.POI23F.POI23L)} 
Number PrlDle IDlplicanta 
D.1.3 
1 ) IV P 01308. IVPO 130B. IVPO 130FC .IVP0130FQ. IVP0130L .IV PO 130PB .'P5I2IB . PO 121F . PO 122B. PO 122 F . P0123B 
2) P0121 PB. IVPO 130FO. P0121 B . PO 121 F .PO 121 L. POI22B. PO 122F . PO 123B. IVPO 130B. IVP0130FC .IVPO 130S 
.IVPOI30L.IVPOI30PB 
3) PO 121 L.IVP0130FO. PO 121 B .POI21F . PO 121 P B. PO 1228. P0122F . PO 123B .IVPOI30B .IVPO 130FC. IVP0130$ 
.IVP0130L.IVPOI30P8 
4) P0122P 8 .IVP0130FO .POI22B . PO 122F . PO 122L. P0121 B.PO'i"2fI:' . PO 123B .IVPO 130B .IVP0130FC .IV PO 130S 
.IVPOI30L.IVPOI30PB 
5) P0122L.IVPOI30FO. P0122B.POI22F. P0122PB .P0121B.POI21f .P0123B .IVP0l30B.IVPOI30FC.IVPOI30S 
.IVP0130L.IVPOI30PB 
6) PO 123PB.IVPOI30FO.'PO"f2'3'B .POI23F .P0123L.P0121 B.POI21F .P0122B.POI22F .lVP0130B.IVPOI30FC 
.IVPOI30S .!VPOI30L .IV PO 130PB 
7) POI21PB.CT0l30T .POI21B .POI21F. P0121 L.POI22B.P0l22F .P01238 .IVPOI30B .IVPOI30FC.CTOI30F 
8) PO 121 L. CT0130T . PO 121 B . P0121 F. P0121 P B. PO 1228 . P0l22F . PO 123B . IVP01308 . IVPO 130FC. CTO 130F 
9) POI22PB.CTOI30T.P0122B .P0122F. P0122L.POI21B .P0121F .P0123B .IVP01308 .IVP013ol' C.CTOI30F 
10) PO 122L. CT0130T . PO 122B .PO 12 2F . P0122P B. PO 121 8 . POlU F .PO 123B. IVPOI30B. IVPO 130FC. eTO 130F 
11) POI23PB.CTOI30T.POI23B .POI23F .P0123L.P0121B .POI2a .POI22B .P0122f .IVP0130B .IVP0l30FC .CT0130F 
Table D.2: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVP0130 
when in the ACTIVE or DORMANT operating modes 
High Flow at IVPOllO 
HFlVPOllO POIOIB.PlITOfF.POlOIPB.POIOIL.POI02B.POI02F.POI02PB.POI02L.l"OI03B 
.POI03F.POI03PB.POI03L.POI04B.POI04F.P0104PB.POI04L.l'OI05:B.POI05PB 
.POI06B.P0106PB.P0113B.P01l3PB.P01l4B.P01l4PB.PPOllOFSO.PPOllOFM 
.PPOIIOL.BPOIIOB.BPOIIOPB.(IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOS 
.IVPOllOPB.IVP01lOL + CTOllOT.CTOIIOF.lVPOllOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVP01lOS 
.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOL).(ACTIVE.DORMANT + DORMANT.PPOllOFO.'A"'c"T;rIV"'E") 
NUDlber Prime Impllcanta 
1) IVPO 1WFO .IV PO llOFC . IV POlIOB .IVPO llOP 8.1 V PO 11 OS .IV POll OL. PO 1018. POw 1 F . POIOI P B 
.POIOIL.POl02B.POl02F'.POI02PB.POI02L.POl03B.POI03F.POI03PB.POI03L.P0104B.POI04F 
.POTIi4P'iJ.POTIi4I:'.POW'59'.POI05PB.POI06B.~.POlI3B.P0113PB.POI14B.POl14PB 
.PPOII0FSO.PPOlIOFM.PPOllOL.BPOllOB.BPOIIOPB 
2) CTOll OT .IVPOllOFC . IV POII0B. IVPO lIOPB. IVPO llOS."lyJip>io"n"O"'L. POW 1 B. PO 1 0 1 F . Pol 0 I P B 
. POW 1 L. POI02B. PO 102 F . POI 02P B . POI 02L.PO 103 B . POI03F . POW3P B. PO 103L .P01 04 B. POI 04F 
. PO 104P B. PO 104L. POl 05B.PO 105PB .PO 106B. PO 106P B. PO 113 B. PO 113PB. PO 1148 .PO 114P B 
.PPOl10FSO.PPOlIOFM .PPOI10L.CTOlIOF .BPOllOB .BP0110PB 
Table D.3: Prime implicants for high flow at IVPOllO 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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D.1.4 
Number Prime ImpUcants 
I) IVPOII0FO. PP01lOFO.IVPOllOFC .IVPOllOB.IVPOI10PB.IVPOlI0S.IVPOI10L.POI01B.POlOlF .POIOIPB 
· PO 10 1 L. PO 1 02B .PO 1 02F .PO 102PB. POI02L. P0103 B. POl 03F .PO 1 03P B .PO 1 03L.P01048 .PO 1 04F 
.PiIT04'PB.PO'i"04i:.POlo5B.POI05PB.POI06B.~.POI138.POl13PB.POI148.P0114P8 
· PPO llOF50. P POllOFM. PPO 110L. B'POITIi'B'. B POll OP B 
2) CTO 11 OT .PPOllOFO .IVPO 11 OF C .IVPOll OB. IVPO 11 OPB .IV POll 05 .IVPOll OL.POI 0 1 B. POlO 1 F . PO 101 PH 
· PO 10 1 L. POl 02B. PO 102F . PO lO2PB. P0102 L. POlO3 B . POl oaF . PO 103P8. PO lO3L. PO 1 048. PO 1 04F 
.'P0T04'Pi3.Pii"i04i:.PO"i:1i58.POI05PB.POl06B.POl06PS.P0iT3i3.POI13PB.POl14B.POlI4PB 
.PPOllOF50.PPOllOFM.PP0110L.CTOllOF .BPOllOB.BPOllOPB 
Table D.4: Prime implicants for high flow at IVPOllO 
when in the DORMANT operating mode 
High Flow at IVP0120 
HFNPOl20 POI07B.POI07F.POI07PB.POI07L.POI08B.POI08F.POI08PB.POI08L.POI08B 
.POI09F.P0109PB.POI09L.POlIOB.POllOF.POlIOPB.POllOL.POlllB.POIIIPB 
.P5IT2B.P0112PB.POI13B.POI13PB.POI14B.POI14PB.PPOI20FSO.PPOI20FM 
.PPOI20L.BPOI20B.BPOI20PB.(NPOI20F0.1VPOI20FC.IVPOl20B.IVPOI20S 
.1VPOI20PB.IVPOI20L + CTOI20T.CTOI20F.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.IVPOI20S 
.IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20L).(ACTIVE.DORMANT + DORMANT.PP0120FO.·A"C"T"IV""E') 
Number Prime Impllcants 
1) IVPO l20FO. IVP0l2WG .IV PO 120B.I V PO 120P B .IVPO 1205.1 V P0120L. PO 1 07 B. PO 107F . PO 1 07P B 
· POI 07L. POl OSB. POl oSF . POiOBPi'f. PO 1 OSLo PO 109 8. PO 1 09 F . P0109PB. Pol 09L. PO 1 lOB . PO 11 OF 
.~.PO'i'I'Oi:;.POITIB.POIIIP8.POl128.P0IT2I>i3.POI138.POI13P8.POI14B.POI14PB 
· P PO 120FSO. P POl20FM .PPO 120L. BPOI20B. B PO 120PB 
2) CTOl20T .IVPO 120FC . IVPO 1208. IVPO 120P B .IV POI20S."IV"'P"'O"'I;;;2"OL'. PO 1078. POI 07F . POI 07 PS 
· PO 107L. PO lOS8. POIOSF . PO 108P8 .PO 1 OSLo POl 09 8 . POlO9F . PO 109 P B. PO 109 L. POll OB .POll OF 
.POllOPB.POllOL.POl11B.POllIP8.POl128.POI12PB.POl13B.POI13P8.P0114B.POI14PB 
.PPO 120f sO. P PO 120F M. PPOI20L. CTOl20 F . 8 POI268 . BPO 120P 8 
Table D.5: Prime implicants for high flow at IVP0120 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Number Prime Impllcants 
1) IVPO l20FO. P POI20FQ. IV PO 120FC .I V PO 120B.IV PO 120P 8 .IVPO 1205.IV PO 120L. PO 1078 . PO 107 F . PO 1 07 P 8 
· P0107L. POIOSB .PO lOBF . PO lOBP B.PO lOBL. PO 109 B. PO 109 F . PO 109 PB. PO 1 09L. PO 1108. P OllOF 
· POTI'O"Pi3. PQi"i"ij'L. POTITB. PO 111 P 8 .PO 112B . POIT2'Pi3. PO 113B. PO lI3P B. P01l4 8. PO 114 P 8 
· PPO 120FS O. P PO 120FM . P PO 120L. BPiIT2Otf. BPOl20P B 
2) eTO 120T . PPO 120FQ. IVPO 120FG .IVPOI20B. IVPO 120P 8. IVP0120S. IVPO 120L. PO 1078. PO 1 07F . P0107P B 
.POI 07L. PO lOBB. PO lOSF . PO lOBP B. POI OBL. PO 109 8. POlO9F . PO 1 09 P 8. PO 109L. PO 1108 . P 0 llOF 
.POlI0PB.POllOL.P0111B.POl1IP8.P01l28.POI12PB.POl138.POI13PB.POI148.POI14PB 
· P PO 120FSO. P P0120FM.P POl20L .CTOI20F . BP0120B.B PO 120P B 
Table D.6: Prime implicants for high flow at IVP0120 
when in the DORMANT operating mode 
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D.1.5 
D.1.6 
Low Flow at IVPOllO 
LFIVPOlJO = POlOIB.POlOlF.POlOlPB.POlOlL + POlOlF.POlOlB.POlOlPB.POlOlL 
+POl02B.P0102F.P0102PB.P0102L + POl02F.POl02B.P0102PB.P0102L 
+P0103B.P0103F.P0103PB.P0103L + POl03F.P0103B.P0103PB.POl03L 
+POl04B.P0104F.P0104PB.P0104L + P0104F.P0104B.P0104PB.P0104L 
+P0105B.P0105F.P0105PB.P0105L + POl06B.P0106F.P0106PB.P0106L 
+P01J3B.P01J3F.P01J3PB.P01J3L + P01l4B.POIT4F.P01J4PB.P01J4L 
+IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOFO.lVPOllOB.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOPB.IVPOlJOL 
+IVPOllOB.lVPOllOFO.IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOPB.lVPOllOL 
+CTOlJOF.CTOlJOT.IVPOlJOFO.IVPOlJOS + BPOlJOB.BPOlJOPB."'B"'P"'Ol"l"O'L 
+PPOllOFSO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
Number Prime Impllcants 
I) POlOIB.POlOIF.POlOIPB.POlOIL 
2) POIOlF.POlOIB.POI01PB.POlOIL 
3) P01028.POI02F.P0102PB.P0102L 
4) POI02F.P0102B.POI02PB.POI02L 
5) POI03B.P0103F.P0103PB.P0103L 
6) POI03F.P0103B.P0103PB.P0103L 
7) POI048.P0104F .POI04PB.P0104L 
8) POI04F.P0104B.P0104PB.P0104L 
9) POI058.P0105F .P0105PB.P0105L 
10) POI06B.P0106F.P0106PB.POI06L 
11) P0113B.P01l3F .POI13PB.POI13L 
12) POI14B.POlI4F.POi'I4Pl3'.~ 
13) IVPO llOFC. IV PO llOFO .1VPOIIOB .nIy,"p,,"Ol;Tl O""S.IV POll Ope. IVPO 11 QL 
14) IVP0110B.IVPOII0FO .IVPOllOFC .IVPOII0S.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOL 
15) CTOllOF .IVPOllOFO .IVPOllOS .CTOI10 r 
16) BPOllOB.BPOllOPB.BPOllOL 
17) PPOIIOFSO.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM .PPOIIOL 
Table D.7: Prime implicants for low flow at IVPOllO 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Low Flow at IVP0120 
PFIVP0120NF P0107B.POl07F.P0107PB.P0107L + POl07F.P0107B.P0107PB.POl07L 
+P0108B.P0108F.POl08PB.P0108L + P0108F.POl08B.P0108PB.POl08L 
+P0109B.P0109F.P0109PB.P0109L + POl09F.P0109B.P0109PB.P0109L 
+POllOB.POlJOF.POlJOPB.POlJOL + POlJOF.POlJOB.POlJOPB.POlJOL 
+POllJB.POlJlF.POlJlPB.POllJL + P01J2B.P01J2F.P01l2PB.P01J2L 
+P01l3B.P01J3F.P01J3PB.P01J3L + P01J4B.POIT4F.P01J4PB.P0114L 
+IVP0120FC.IVP0l20FO.IVP0120B.IVP0120S.IVP0120PB.IVP012OL 
+IVP0120B.IVP0120FO.IVP0120FC.IVP0120S.IVP0120PB.IVPOl20L 
+CT0120F.CT0120T.IVP0l20FO.IVP0l20S + BP0120B.BP0120PB."B"'P"'O"12"'O"L 
+PP0120FSO.PP0l20FM.PP0120L 
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Number Prime Impllcants 
1) POI01B.P0107F .P0107PB.P0107L 
2) POI01F.P0107B.P0107PB.P0107L 
3) POI08B.P0108F .P0108PB.POI08L 
4) POI08F.POI08B.P0108PB.POI08L 
5) P0109B.P0109F.P0109PB.P0109L 
6) P0109F.P0109B.P0109PB.POI09L 
7) POII0B.POllOF.POllOPB.POIIOL 
8) POlIOF.POllOB.POllOPS.POllOL 
9) POllIB.POl11F.POlllPB.POlIlL 
10) POI12B.POI12F .POlI2PB.POlI2L 
11) P01l3B.P0113F .P0113PB.P0113L 
12) P01I4B.P0114F .iiOTf.iP!f,POTI4E' 
13) IVP0120FC.IVP0120FO . IV P0120B .IV P0l20S.IVPO 120PB .IVPO 120L 
14) IV POI20B. IVPO 120FO. IVPO 120FC .IVPO 1208. IV P0120P B. IV POl20L 
15) CTOl20F .IVP0120FO .IVPOI20S.CTOI20T 
16) BPOI20B.BP0l20PB .BP0l20L 
17) PP0120FSO.PP0l20FO.PPOI20FM .PPOI20L 
Table D.8: Prime implicants for low flow at IVP0120 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode 
D.l. 7 Partial Flow at IVPOllO when Flow is Required 
Fault Trees 
PFIVPOIIOF PliIOIi'l.POIlill".P5I02B.POf52F.POI03B.P5TIi3F.POI04B.POI04F.P0105B.POI06B.PoiT3l3.POl14B 
.IVPOllOB.lVPOllOFC.BPOllOB.PPOllOFSO.CTOllOF.(POlOlPB.POTIiIT + POlOIL.POlOIPB 
+P0102PB.POW2L + POI02L.P0102PB + POl03PB.P0103L + POI03L.POI03PB + POI04PB.POI04L 
+P0104L.POI04PB + POl05PB.POl05F.J5OI05L + POI06PB.P0106F.POTIi6L + P01l3PB.P01l3F.P01l3L 
+P01l4PB.POIT4F.POII4L + IVPOllOS.lVPOlOFO.IVPOllOPB.lVPOllOL 
+IVPOlIOPB.lVPOlIOFO.lVPOllOS.IVPOllOL + IVPOllOL.IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOPB 
+BPOllOPB.BPOllOL + PPOllOFM.PPOllOFO.PPOllOL + PPOllOL.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM) 
Number Prime Impllcants 
1) POIQ1PB.POlOIB.POlOIF .POlOIL.P0102B.PO 102F. P0103B.POI03F .POl04B.POI04F .P0105B .POl06B .POlI3B 
.P01l4B.BPOIIOB.IVPOllOFe.IVP01108.PPOllQFSO.CTOI10F 
2) POlO 1 L. PO 10 I 8 . POTIiTF. PQTIiTi5B. P"OI02'B.PiIT02F. PO 103B. PO 103F . PO 104B. POl 04F . P0105B. PO 1 068. PO 113 8 
· POl14 8 .BPO 11 OB .IV POllOFC.IVPOl10 B. P POllOFSO. CTO 110F 
3) POI02PB.P0102B.POI02F.~.POTIITB.PiITOTF.POIQ3B.POl03F.P0104B.PO104F.P0105B.POI06B.POlI38 
.POl14B.BPOllOB.IVPOllOFC.lVPOl108.PPOI10FSO.CTOIIOF 
4) POIQ2L.P0102B.POI02F.~.POTIITB.PiITOTF.POI038.P0103F.P0104B.P0104F.P01058.POI06B.POlI3B 
· PO 114 8 .BPO 11 OB .IV POll OFe. IVPO 110 8. P POlIQFSO. CTO 110F 
5) Pot 03P8. PO 1038 . POi03F. P<iT03E'. POTIITB.P01OTF. PO 1028. POI 02 F . P01048. POl 04F . PO 1058. PO 1068. PO 1138 
· POl14 8. 8PO 11 OB .IV POlIOFC .IVPOllO 8. P POll OFSO .CTOlIOF 
6) P0103L.POl 03B. J5"01"53F. PiITQ315'B'. POTIITB.POIO"fF. POl 028. POl 02 F . POI 04B. P0104 F . POI05B. PO 1068. PO 113 8 
· PO 114B . B P01IOB . IVPO 110FC .IVPO 1108. P PO 1IOFSO. CTO 110F 
7) PO 104PB.PO I 04 B .'PiIT'B4'F.~. POTIITB .POIOIF. POl 02 8. PO 102F . POI 03 B. PO I 03F . POl 05B . POI 06B. PO 113B 
· POll4 B .BPO 11 OB .IV POll OFe.IVPO 11 08. P PO lIOFSO. CTO 11 OF 
8) POI 04L. PO 104 B .POI04'F .POTIi4PB. POTIITB.POIOIF. PO 102B. POI02F'. P0103B. POl 03F . PO 105B. PO 1 068. PO 1138 
· PO 114 8. BPO 1 lOB. IV PO 110FC .IVPOll OB. P POll OFSO. CTOllOF 
9) P0105PB.~.POI05F.PQ'IOSI;.POTIITB.POiOTF'.PiiI02B.POl02F.P0103B.P0103F.POlO48.P0104F.POI06B 
.POI13B.POI14B.8POII0B.IVPOllOFC.IVPOI108. PPOIIOF Su.CTOllOF 
10) POI06PB.P0106B .POI06F .P0106L.POIOIB .POIOIF .P01028.POI02F .POI03B.POI03F .POI04B.POl04F .POI05B 
· POl138 .PO 114B. SPO 1108 .IV POll OFC .IV PO 11 OB. P PO 11OFSO. CTOllOF 
Table D.9: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVPOllO when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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11) POI13PB.POI13B.P01l3F.POI13L.POIOIB.POIOIF.POI02B.POlO2F.POI03B.POI03F.POI04B.POI04F.POI05B 
· POI06B. POI14B. BPOll OB. IVPO 11 Of C . IVPOll OB. P POll OFSO. CTOll OF 
12) P0114P B.PO 114B . POl14F . POI"i4I:". POTIiIB. POI01"F.P0T02i3 .PO I 02F . pal 03B. PO I 03F .PO 1048 .PO I 04F .PO 105B 
· PO 106 B. POI13B. B PO IIOB .IVPOll OF C. IVPOll OB. P POll OFSO. CTOTI"O"F 
13) IVPOlIOS.JVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOFO .IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOL.POIQTJ;.POlOIF .POI02B.POI02F .POI03B 
· PO 103F . POIOiB. P"OiO"4F. POI05i3. POi06B.P5IT3"B."P6TI4lJ."i3PoITIiB. PPO 11 OFSO . CTOIIOF 
14) IVPOlIOPB.IVPOIIOFC .IVPQllOB.IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOS.IVPOlIOL.PQTIIT13.POlOIF .P0102B.POI02F .P0103S 
· POI03F ."PiJI048.~.P0I05i3.P0i06i3.P5IT3"B.~."i3PoITIiB. PPOlIOFSO.CTOllOF 
15) IVP011 OL.IVPO 11 OFC .IV POllOB .IVPOl1 OFO. IV PO 11 OS. IVPO 11 OP B. POIQTJ; .P5TIiTF. POI02B.PO 102F . PO 103B 
· PO 103F . POI04B. POlO4 F . PO 105B.POiOi3B. POI13B. PO 114B . 8 POIIOB . PPO 11 OFSO. eTO llOF 
16) BPOIIOP8.BPOI lOB .BPOlIOL .PPOIIOFSO .POIOIB .POIO IF .POI02B.POI02F .POI03B.POI03F .POI04B .POI04F 
· PO 105B . POI06B. P6II3i3. POIT4B". IVPO IIOFC .IVPO llOB. CTO 11 OF 
17) P POll OFM. P POllOFO . P POlIOFSO. P PO 11OL. POlO 1 B .PO 1 01 F . POlO2B . POl 02F . POI03B. POI03F . POI04B. PO 1 04F 
· POlO5B . POI06B. P6II3i3.P0II4i3. S PO 110B .IV POll OFC. IVPO 11 OB. CTOllOF 
18) PPOIlOL. P POIIOFO. PPO 11 OFM. PPO 110FSO. PO 101 B. PO 101 F . PO 102B. POIQ2l:'" .PO 103B .PO 1031' . PO 104B .PO 104F 
· PO 1058. POI 068. PO 113B. PO 114B. BPO 11 OB .IV POll OFO .IVPOllOB. eTO 1101' 
Table D.1O: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVPOllO when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
D.1.8 Partial Flow at IVP0120 when Flow is Required 
PFIVP0120F POWiB.POI07l".POI08B.POIii8F.'i'OfO§B.POTIi9F.POITOB.POIIOF. POIIIB.POI12B.POIT3B.POI14B 
.IVPOI20B.lVPOI20FC.BPOI20B.PPOI20FSO.CTOI20F.(POI07PB.POTO'iL + POI07L.POI07PB 
+POI08PB.POI08L + POI08L.POI08PB + POI09PB.POI09L + POI09L.POI09PB + POllOPB.POllOL 
+POllOL.POllOPB + POIllPB.POlllF.PiiiTfL + P01l2PB.POIT2F.POIT2L + P01l3PB.P01l3F.P01l3L 
+P01l4PB.POIT4F.l'OII4L + IVPOI20S.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20L 
+ IVPOI20PB.IVP0120FO .IVP0120S.lVP0120L + IVPOI20L."IV"'P"'O"I"20'"F"'O"."IV"'P"'O"I"20'"§!.I·"'V"P"'O"I"20'"P""'B 
+BP0120PB.BPOI20L + PP0120FM.PP0120FO.PP0120L + PPOI20L.PPOI20FO.PP0120FM) 
Number Prime ImpHcants 
I) P0107PB.POI07B .POI07F .P0107L.P0108B .PO 108F .P0109B.P0109F .POlIOS .POllOF .POllIS .POlI2B .POI13S 
· PO 114 B. B PO 1208 .IVPOI20FC .IV POI20B. P PO 120FSO . CTOl20F 
2) POI07L.P0107B .POi07F ."PiITO'fPB.PiiT08i3.PO:i:"68"F .P0109B.P0109F .POlIOB .P0110F .POIIIB.POII2B.PO 113B 
· P01148. BP0l20B .IV P0120FC. IVPO 120B. P POI20FSO. eTO 120F 
3) P01 08PB. pm 08 B . PO"iij8"F. POf08L.PCiI07B. POI"07"F. PO 1 09 B. PO 109 F . PO 11 OB. PO 1l0F . PO 111 8. PO 1128. PO 1138 
· POl14 B. BPO 120B. IV PO 120FC .IVPO 1208 .PP0120FSO. CTO 120F 
4) P0108L. POI08B . POI08lr P51""08P"B. PCiI07B. POTIi7F. PO 1 09 B. pm 09 F . PO 1 lOB . P01IOF . PO III 8. POU2S. PO 113B 
· PO 114 B .BPO 120B .IVPO 120FO .IV POI20B. P PO 120FSO. CTO 120F 
5) PO 109 PS. PO 109B .POW9F. POTI59L.PCiI07B. POTIi7F .PO 108B. P0108F . POllOB. POll OF .PO 111 B . PO 112B . PO 1138 
.PiITi4B. B POl20B .IVP0120FO. IVPO 120B. P P0120FSO . CT0120F 
6) POI09L.P0109B .POi"09"F.POlO9PB.PiiTIi7i3.POTO'fF.POI08B.P0108F ,POllOB.POl10F .P011IB.POI12B.PO 113B 
· PO lI4B. BPO 120B .IV POI20FC. IV PO 120B.P PO 120FSO. eTO 120F 
7) POll OPB. PO llOB .PQI"ilj"F. POITIiL". PiiTIi7i3. P5i""07F. PO I 08B. POlO8F . POl 09B. POlO9 F .POITTB". POll2 B. POl13B 
.POlI4 B. BPO 120B. IVPO 120FC. IVP0120B.P PO 120FSO. CTO 120F 
8) POllOL.POllOB .POIT6F.P0IT0Pi3.PiiTIi7i3.POi"i57F.POI08B. POI08F .POI09B .POI09F .POlIlB. POI12B.POlI3B 
· PO 114B. B POl20B .IVP0120FC .IVPOI20B. P POl20FSO . CTOl20F 
9) POII1PB.POll tB.PDITIF .POITII:.""POfO"7B .JiCi"i"07F.POT58B.POI08F .POI09B.POI09F .POlIOB .POllOF .POlI2B 
· PO 1138. PO 114 B. BP0120B.l V PO 120FC .IVPO 120B. P PO 120FS6 .CTO 120F 
10) POlI2PB.POI12B .POlI2F .POfi2I:".PiiTIi7i3.JiCi"i"07F.Pcii158B".POI08F .POI09B.POI09F .POllOB.P01IOF .POlIIB 
· POlI3B. POlI4B. B PO 120B .lVP0120F C .IVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO. eTO 120F 
11) P0113PB.POI13B.POl13F .POI13L.POI07B.POI07F ,POI08B.POI08F .POI09B.POI09F .POIIOB.POllOF .P01IIB 
.POI12B.P0114B.8P0120B.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.PP0120FSO.CT0120F 
Table D.ll: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVP0120 when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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D.1.9 
12) POl14PB.POl148 .P0114F .~.P01078.POI07F .P01088.POI08F .P01098 .P0109F .POII0B.POIlOF .POIIIB 
· PO 112B. POI13B. B PO 120B. IVPO 120FC .IVPO 120B . PPOI20FSO. CTO 120F 
13) IVPOI20S.IVPO 120FC .IVPO 120B. IVPO 120FO. IV P0120P B .IVP0120L. POIQ71j. POl 07F . POl 08B .PO 108F . PO 109B 
· P01 09F . POTIOi3. PDITIiF. POITIB. P0112B. PO 113B. PO 114 B. BPOI20B. PPO 120FSO. CT0120P 
14) IVPO 120PB. IVP0120FC . IVPO 1208 . IV PO 120FO. IVP0120S .IVPO 120L. 'POTIi"7'B. PO 107F . PO 108B. PO 1 08F . PO 109B 
· PO 1 09 F .1"5TIiiB.PDITIiF .POITlB' .Pii1T2i3.P<i'i1"3B. POl14B. B PO 120B . P PO 120FSO. CTa 120F' 
15) IVP0l2aL.IVPO 1201' C .IV PO 120B .IV PO 120FO. IVPO 1205.1 V PO 120P B.POIQ71j. P0107F . POI 08B. PO 108F . PO 1098 
· PO 1 09 F . POiTOi3. POTli5F. PDTIIB. POl12B. PO 1138 . PO 1148. 8P01208. PPO 120FSO. CT0120F 
15) IVPO 120L. IVPO 120F C .IVP0l20B .IVPOI20FO . IV P0120S. IVP0120P 8. PCi"iO'7FJ. PO 1 07F . PO 1088. PO 1 08F . PO 1 09 B 
· PO 109 F . POll 08. POll OF . PO III B. POTi'2'B. PO 1138. P01148. 8PO 120B . P PO 120FSO. CTO 120F 
16) BPO 120P8.BPi)'i'2O"B' .B PO 120L .PP0120FSO . PO 107 B .Pi5IO'fF. P0108B. PO 108F . PO 109 B. PO 109 F . POl108. POll OF 
· PO III B. POli'2B. POTI'3B. POl14B .IVPO 120FC. IVPO 120B. CT0120F 
11) P POI20FM. P PO 120FO . P POI20FSO. PPOl20L .PO 101B.POT57F. POTIi8B. PO 1 08F . PO 109 B. PO 1 09F ,POll OB .PO 110F 
,POl11 B . POli'2B, POTI'3B. POi'I41'J. BPOl20B .IV PO 120FC .IVPOI20B, CTO 120F 
18) P PO 120L. P P0120FO. PPO 120FM.P POI20FSO. PO 1018, POTIi7F. POTIi8B, PO lOaF. P0109B. PO 1 09 F . PO 1108. PO 11 OF 
.PO III B . P0112B .POlI3B .POT'I4B'. BPO 120B . IV P0120FC. IVPO 120B. CTOl20F 
Table D.12: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVP0120 when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Partial Flow at IVPOllO when Low Flow is Required 
PFNPOllOLF POIOfi3.PiiIOIF.POI02B.POI02F.POI03B.POT03F.POI04B.PoI04F.POI05B.POI06B.POI13B .POI14B 
.IVPOIIOB.IVPOI10FC.BPOI10B.PPOI10FSO.(ACTIVE.DORMANT 
+DORMANT.PPOlIOFO.ACTIVE.PPOlIOFM.PPOllOL).{(POI01PB.POIOIL + POI01L.P0101PB 
+POI02PB.POI02L + P0102L.P0102PB + POI03PB.POI03L + POI03L.P0103PB + P0104PB.P0104L 
+P0104L.POI04PB + POI05PB.P0105F.PiiT05L + POI06PB.POI06F.POI06L + P01l3PB.P01l3F.POIl3L 
+P01l4PB.POIT4F.PO!ill + BPOllOPB.BPOllOL + PPOllOFM.PPOllOFO.PPOllOL 
+PPOllOL.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM).(IVP01IOFO.IVP01IOS.IVPOI10L.IVPOI10PB 
+CTOllOT. CT01lOF.lVPOllOS.IVP01lOL.IVPOllOPB) + IVPOlIOS.IVPOIOFO."IV"'P"'O"I'l"'OP"'B"."N""P<>O"'I;;I"'OL 
+IVPOllOPB.IVPOIIOFO.NPOllOS.IVPOllOL + IVPOllOL.lVPOllOFO.lVPOllOS.lVPOllOPB} 
Number Prime Impllcants 
I) POI01PB.IVPOllOFO.POI0lB .P0101F .POIOI L.P0102B.P0102F .P0103B.P0103F .P01048.POI04F .P0105B .P0106B.POI13B 
.P0114B.BPOII08 .IVPOIIOFC .IVPOIlOB. PPOI10FSO.IVPOII0S.IVPOllOPB.IVPOI10L 
2) POIOIL.IVPOllOFO.POTIITB'.~.POI0IPB.POiCi2B.POI02F.PCi'i<i313.POi03F.POI04B.POI04F.P0105B.P0106B.POI13B 
· PO 114 B. SPO 110B . IVPOII OFC .IVPO 11 OB. PPO 11OFSO. IVPOll OS. IV POllOP B. IVP0110L 
3) POI02PB.IVPOIIOFO.PO'I02B.~.POT02I:'.POiOIB.POIOiF.PCi'i<i313.POT03F'.POI04B.P0104F'.P0105B.POI06B.POI13B 
· PO 114B. BPO IIOB .IVPO 1IOFC. IVPO 11OB. P PO IIOFSO .IV PO 110S .IVPO 1 lOP B. IVPOIIOL 
4) PO 1 02L.IVPO 11OFO .POf02"B .POi'02F ,P01 02P B ,PQiOIB ,POIOiF.POI03B.POT03F' ,'PQ'i7j4B. PO 1 04F ,PO 1 05B. PO 106B . P0113B 
· P0114 8. BPO IIOB .IVPOll OFC .IV POll OB. P POll OFS 0, IVPOII OS, IV POllOPB .IVPO llOL 
5) POI03PB.IVPOlIOFO.POI03B .POTIi3F.PO'i03'C.POiOIB.POIOiF.POTIi"2B.~.'PQ'i7j4B.POI04F .P0105B.POI06B.POI13B 
· POl14B .BPO 110 B . IVPOll OFC .IVPO 11OB. PPO llOFS 0 ,IV PO IIOS, IVPO IIOP B, IVPOlI OL 
6) POl 03L.IVPOll OFO. POi'03B'.1"'OI'03F, P0103 PB . POiOIB. POTIiIF. PO'i'02B.~. 'PQ'i7j4B. POl 04 F .PO 1 05B ,PO 1068. P01138 
· PO 1148, 8POll 08 .IVPO 1IOFC, IV PO 110B .P POll OFSO .IVPO 1105 .IVPO 11 OP 8 .IV PO 110L 
7) P0104PB.IVPOI10FO.P0I'04i3 .~.~.POiOIB,POIOiF,PO'i'02B.PO'i"02'F.Pillii3B.POI03F ,P0105B.P0106B .POI13B 
· P0114 B. BPO 110B ,IV POllOFC .IVPOllOB. PPO llOFS 0, IV POllOS, IV POll OP B .IVPO 110 L 
8) POI04L.IVP0110FO.POT04'B.POiOiF,POI04PB,POiOIB.J5OiQIF.P0102'B.~.P5'i03i3,P0103F.POI05B.POI06B.POI13B 
.PO 1146 .BPO 110B .IVPO 11 OFC .IV PO 11 OB. P POllOFS 0 .IV POll OS.IVPO 11 OP B, IVPOlI OL 
9) pal 05P B. IV POll OFO, P0105B ,POIOSF. 'P"5T'55L. POiOiB ,J5OiQIF.'P0I02i3 ,~.Pillii3B .'POI'53F ,PO 1 04B .P 0 I 04F ,POI06B 
· POI13B. PO 114B. BPOII 08. IV P011OFC. IVPO 11 OB. P PO 110F SO. IV P01IOS.IV POll OP B. IVPOl1 OL 
10) POI06P8.IVP0110FO.POI06B .P0106F .POI06L.POI01B.POIOIF .P0102B.P0102F .P01038 .P0103F .P0104B.P0104F .POI05B 
· POl138 .P0114B ,BPOllOB ,IVPOl101' G. tvpo 1108. PPO 11OFSO . IVPOIl OS. IV POll OP B.l VPOII OL 
Table D.13: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVPOllO when low flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
257 
Fault and Success 7rees for the FUel Rig when ACTIVE or DORMANT Fault Trees 
Number Prime Implicants 
I I) POll3P 8. IVPO 11 OFO. PO 1138 . PC.IT13F'. PO 113L .poTIffEL PO 101 F . PO 102 8 . PO 1 02F . PO 1038. POI03F". PO 1048. POl 04F . POl 058 
.PO 1068. POl14 8 . 8POllOB .IVPOll OFC. IVPOII 08. P POllOFSO. IVPOllOS.lVPO llOPB.IV POll0L 
12) PO Il4P 8. IVPOllOFO .POlI4B . POII4F. POTI'iL. POTOTi3. POTIiIF. POf52i3. PCiTIi""2F. POI03B. POI03F. PO 1 04B . PO 104 F . PO 1 05B 
· PO 1 06B. PO 1138 .SPO 11 OB .JVPO lIOFC.IV POlIO 8. P PO 11OFSO .IVPO 110S. IVPO 11 OP 8. IVPO 11 OL 
13) BPOIlOPB.IVPOI10FO.BPOI10B .BPOlIOL. PPOlIOFSO.POI01 B.POlOIF .POI02B.P"OI5"2F.POl03B.POI03F .POI 04B.P0104F 
· PO 1058 . pal 06 B . po Il3B. POll4B .IV POlIOFC. IVPO 11 OB .IV po llOS.IVPO llOP B .IV POlI0L 
14) PPOllOF M. IVPOllOFO. PPO lIOFO . P POll OFSO. P POll OL.PO 101 B . P6T6TF."i5O"i02"Ef. PCiTIi""2F.Pi)f53i3. POI 03F . PO 104 8 . PO 104F 
.POI05B.P0106B.POI13B.POl14B.BPOIlOB.IVPOI10FC.IVPOlI0B.IVP0110S.IVPOllOPB.IVP0110L 
15) PPO lIOL.IVPO llOFO. PPO 11 OFO . P POllOFM.P POll OFSO. POlO 1 B. POiCffF. POI02B. PCiTIi""2F. PoI03B. PO 103F .POl04B. pal 04 F 
· PO 105B. POI06B. POIT3"B". POl14B. BPOllO 8 . IVPOllDFC .IVPO 1108. IVPO 11OS. IV PO 110P 8 .IVPO 11 OL 
16) POI0IPB.CTOl10T."POIOfB.POIiITF.POTIiTI:.POTIi2Ii.P0102F.~.P0103F.P0104B.P0104F.POI05B.POI06B.POI13B 
· PO 114B . SPOil 08 .IVPO 110FC .!VPO 1108. P POll OFSO. CTOl1 OF 
17) POlOlL.CT0110T .POfCi"IB.PiITOTF.PORilPB".~.POI02F .POI03B.P0103F .P01048.POI04F .P0105B.P0106B.POI13B 
· POlI4B. B POll 08 . IVPOll OFC .IVPOI lOB. PPO 11 OFSQ. CTO llOF 
18) POI02P B. CTOII OT. POI02B. POIi52F .PoTIi2I:".POIOiB". PO 10 1 F . PO 1 03B. PO 103F . P0104S. po 104F . P0105B. P0106B. PO 1138 
.POI14B .BPOllOB .IVPOllOFC .IVPOllOB .PPOIlOFSO .CTOllOF 
19) P0102L.CTOllOT.~.Pi5I02F.PQI02i5B.Pi5IOfB".POlOIF.POl03B.P0103F.P0104B.P0104F.P0105B.P0106B.POlI3B 
.PO 114B. BPO 11OB. IVPOll OFC .IVPOll OB .PPOll OFS O. CTO 110F 
20) POl03P B. CTO I1 OT. POi03B". POI03F. powaEj51ffiiIB·. POlO IF. PO I 02B. PO 102 F . POl 04B. PO 104 F . P0105B . POI06B . POl13B 
· POI14B. B POll 08. IVPOl1OFC. IVPOI lOB. PPO 11 OFS O. CTO 110F 
21) POI03L .CTOllOT .P"CiI03B".POTIi3F .P""OIi53P13.POTOi'S"".POI01F .POi02"B.P0102F .POI048.POI04F .POI05B.POI06B.POI13B 
· PO 1148. BPO 110B .IVPO llOFC .IVPOi lOB. P POll OFS O. CTO 11 OF 
22) P01 04P B. CTOllOT. PO"I"04B. PO'I04F, pijTIMEj'l'OliITB" . POl 0 1 F . PO 1 02 B. PO 102F . POl 03B . PO 103F . P0105B. P0106B . POl13B 
.POlI4B.BPOllOB .IVPOlIOFC.IVPOI108.PPOIIOFSO.CTOllOF 
23) P0104L.CTOIlOT ."i"Of04l3 .PO'i04F.POI04Pi3.P6T5IB" .POIOlF .P0102B.P0102F .POI03B.POI03F .POI05B.P0106B .POI13B 
· PO 114 B. BPOllOB .IVPO 11 OFC .IVPOllOB .P POll OFSO .CTO 11 OF 
24) PO 1 asp B. CT0110T . P0105B ."PO'fB5'F."POTIi"SL. POiOTB . POIiITF. PO 1 02 B. PO 102F . PO 1 03B. PO 103F . POl 04B. POl 04 F . POl06B 
· PO 113B. PO 114 B. BPO 110 B .IVPOllOFC .IV pal lOB . P POI1OFSO. CTO 110F 
25) PO 106PB. CTOII OT. pal 068 . P0106F. i5"O'f061:.POiOTB. P5TIiTF. PQIij!B". PO 102 F . P01 038. PO 103F . P01048 . POI 04 F . POI 058 
· POl138. POl14B . BPOllOB. IVPO 11 OFC. IVPOllOB.P POllOFSO. CTO II OF 
26) POl 13PB.CTOl lOT .P01138 .POi'i3F."i"OII3E":i>0I0Il'J.POIOIF.P0102B .POl02F .POI038 .POI03F .POI04B .POlO4F .P0105B 
· PO 1068. PCi'iT4B.B PO 110B .IVPOllO FC .IV PO 11 0 8 . P POllOFSO. CTO llOF 
27) PO 114 PB.CT011OT. POl14 B .PCii'i""4"F. PiITIiL.POfiiTB" . P5TIiTF .PO 1 028. PO 102F . PO 103B. PO 103F . POl04B . P0104 F • POI 058 
· pal 06B . PO 113B. BPOll OB. IVPO 11 OFC .IVPOllOB. P POllOFSO . CTO 11 OF 
28) BPOlIOPB.CTOllOT.BPOllOB. BPOllOL.PPOllOFSQ.POIOlB.POlOIF .P0102B.POI02F .P0103B.P0103F .POl04B.POIQ4F 
.POl05B.P01068 .POI13B.POI148 .IVPOll0FC.IVPOllOB .CTOI10F 
29) PPOllOFM. CTOIl OT. P POllOFO . P PO llOFSO. PPOTiOL.P5T0fi3. PO 1 01 F . PO 1 028 .PO 102 F . PO 103B .PO 1 03F . PO I 04B. P0104 F 
.P01058.P01068.~.POI148.BPOll08.1VPOltOFC.IVPOllOB.CTOllOF 
30) PPOIIOL.CTOIlOT.PPOllOFO .PPOllOF M. PPOllOFSU.POlOI8.P0101F .P01028 .POI02F .P0103B.POI03F .POI048.POI04F 
· PO 1058. PO 106B. i5'0TI"3B". POl14 B. BPO 11 OB .IV POI to!' C .1VPOII OB. CTOllOF 
31) IVPO 11 os. PiITOiB. POlO 1 F ."PO'i7J2B. POI"02F."P0i"038. POI03F. j5(j""fij4B". POi'OiF. POlO5B. PO 1068. POl13B. PO 1148 
· 8PO 11 OB .IVPOllOFC. IVPOll 08 .IVPOllOFO .IVPO 11 oL. IVPO 11 OPB. P POll OFSO. CTOllOF 
32) IVPO 11 OP8. CTOllOT. POiOiB . POIOIF. POTIi2B. POI02F. P'OTiJ3B. POI03F. P5T"548. PO 104F . PO 1 05 B. PO 106B. PO 113 8 . PO 1148 
.BPOllOB.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOllOB .IVPOIIOFO.IVPOllOL.IVPOllOS.PPOllOFSO.CTOlIOF 
33) IVPOllOL.CTOllOT.POlOI8 .POlOIF .POI028.POI02F .POI038.POl03F .P0104B.POl04F .P0105B.POI06B .POI138.POI14B 
.BPOIIOB.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOI1OB.IVPOllOFO.IVPOI10PB.IVPOI10S.PPOII0FSO.CT0110F 
Table D.14: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVPOllO when low flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Number Prime Impllcant& 
1) POlOI P 8 .IVPOI10FO. P POIIOFO. PO 101 B . PO 10 1 F . POlO 1 L. PO 1028. PO 102 F ."POT03B". PO 103 F .PO 104 8. PO 104F .POl 05 8 .PO 106B 
.POlI3B .PO 1148 .BPQ1IOB .IV POllOFC .IVPO 11 OB .P POllOFSO .I VPOlIOS. IVPO 11 OP 8 .IVP011OL. PP011 OL. P PO IIOFM 
2) POlOl L. IVPOlIOFO. P PO 11 OFO."POTIiTB". POTIiIF. PoIOIPB."i"0TIi2i3."PO'I"02"F. P0103i3. POTIi3F. POI04i3. PO 1 04F . ~. PO 1 06B 
.POI13B.POll48.BPOIIOB.IVPOI10FC.IVPOlIOB.PPOlIOFSO.IVPOIIOS.IVPOll0PB.IVPOI10L.PP0110L.PPOI10FM 
3) POl 02P B.IVPOll0FO. PP01IOFO. POi028 . POI"02"F. POI"02L. POIOIB. POTOIF. POI03Er. POTIi""3F. POI04B". PO 1 04F . POi05B. PO I 06B 
· PO 113B. POl14 B .BPOIIOB. IVPO llOFC .IVPO 11 OB. P P OllOFSO .IVPO lIOS. IVPO 11OP8. IVPO llOL. P PO 11 OL. PPO llOF M 
4) P0102L.IVPOIIOFO.PPOIIOFO."POT02B".~.Pci'i02PB.POIOIB."POTIiTF.~.POTIi""3F.jiij""f04"8 .POl04F .POi05B.POI06B 
· POl138. PO 1148 . BPO 11 OB .IVPO IIOFG .IV PO 11 08. P POll OFSO. IVPO lIOS.IV PO I lOP B .IVPOlIOL. PP011 OL. P POll OFM 
5) POI03PB.IVPOII0FO.PPOII0FO.P0i03i3."POi'53F.POI03L.POIOIB.POIiITF."P0TIi2i3.POW21rPOI04B".P0104F.~.POl06B 
· PO 113B .POl14 B. BPO 11 OB. IVPO 11 OFC .IV POll OB. P POlIO FSO. IVPO 11OS. IVPOI1OPB .IV PO 11OL. PPO 11OL.P POll OFM 
6) POI 03L .IVPOll OFO. P POIIOFO. PO 103B . P0103F . PO 1 oap 8 . POlO 1 8. PO 10 IF. PO 1028. PO 102F . PO 1048. PO 104F . PO 1 05B . PO 106B 
· PO 113B. POI14B. BPOllOB. IVP011 OFC .IV POll OB. P P{)1l0FSO .IV POll OS .IVPO I lOP 8 .IV PO II OL.P PO 11 OL .P PO IIOF M 
Table D.15: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVPOllO when low flow 
is required in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 1 
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7) P0104PB.IVPOI lOFO.PPOIlOFO.P0104B .P0104F .POl 04L.P0101B.POlOIF .POI02B .P0102F .Pi5lO3"'S.P0103F .P0105B.P0106B 
· PO 113B. P0114 B . SPOIl OB. IVPO 11 OFC .IVPO 1 lOB. P POll OFSO. IVPO 11 OS. IVPOllOPB. IVPOllOL. P POll OL. PPO 110 FM 
8) POI04L.IVPOI10FO.PPOI10FO.POI04B .PO'i"04'F.~.POTOTB.POIiiTF.POi'O"2B.POI02F.P0TIi3i3.POI03F .~.POI06B 
· POU38. PO 114B . SPO 110B . IVPOll 0 FC. IVPOI10S. PPO 110 FSO .IVPOU OS .IVPO 11 OP B . IV PO 11OL. P PO 11OL. P PO 11 OF M 
9) POI 05P S.IVPOIIOFO. PPO 11 OFO. POI05B. POi"CiS'F.~. POf5TI3. POIOiF. J5'0'I'52i3. POI02F. Pi5lO3"'S.J5'5'Iii"3F. PO 1 04B .PO'f04"F 
· PO 106B. POIl3B. PO 114B. B POll OB. IVPO llOFC.IV PO 1108. PPOIIOFSO. IVPO 11 OS.IVPO llOP B .IV POll OL. PPO 11OL. P POll OFM 
10) POlO6PB. IVP011 OFO. P POll OFO. 'Pimiirn' . J5"5'I'06'F. 'Poi06L. POTOTB. POIiiTF. J5'0'I'52i3. POI02F. ~ .J5'5'Iii"3F. P0104 B. PO'f04"F 
· PO 105B. PO 113B . PO 114B. BPO 110B .IV PO 110FC .IVPOllOB. P PO 11OFSO .IV PO IIOS. IV POll OP 8 .lVPOIIOL. P PO 11OL. PPO 11 OF M 
11) POl13P B. IVPOll OFO. P POll OFO. POiT3"B' . ~. PiIT'I'3'I::. POTOTB. ~. i"iCiI52i3. POI'i52F. POI03B. J5'5'Iii"3F. P0104B .PO'f04"F 
· PO I 058. PO 106B . PO 114B. B PO 11 08 .IVPO 110FC.IV PO 1 lOB . PPOllOFSO. IVPOll OS.IVPO IIOP B .IV POll OL. PPOII'OL'. PPOll OFM 
12) P0114PB .IVPOIl OFO . P PO 11OFO. POII4i3 . PO'II'4'F. 'PoI14'L. PiITOIi3. POTIii"F. J5'0'I'52i3. POI'i52F.~. J5'5'Iii"3F. POI04B. PO'f04"F 
.PO I 05B. POl 06B. POlI3B. BPOll OB .IV POll OFC .IVPOl lOB. P PO IIOFSO .IV POIIOS. IV POll OPB .IV PO 11OL. P PO I1OL. PPO 11 OFM 
13) B POIIOP B .IVPOll OFO. P POll OFO. BPO 11 OB . 'i3POTIOL. P PO 11 OFSO. POlO I B .POTij"fI:". POTIi'2i3 .~ .POl 03B. P'Oi"03'F. PO 1048 
.PO'ITi4'F.P0105B.POI06B.POI13B.~.IVPOII0FC_IVPOIIOB.IVP0110S.IVP01lOPB.IVPOII0L.PPOllOL.PP01lOFM 
14) PPOllOFM.IVPOIIOFO.PPOI10FO.PPOIIOFO .PPOlloF SO.PPOllOL.P0f5TI3.PO'I'OIF.POlO2B.POI02F .~.P0103F .PDIii4B 
· PO 104F . P0105B. POlO6B. PO 113B . PO 114 B . B PO 11 OB .IVPonOFC .IVPOllOB .IVPO 11Os. IVPOllOP B. IVPOllOL. P PO II OL.P POliO F M 
15) PPOllOL.IVPOIIOFO.PPOI10FO.PPOllOFQ.PPOllOFM.PPOllOFSO.POIO18.POi'iITF.POi'O"2B.POI02F.~.POI03F.POIii4B 
· POI04F . PO 1058. PO 106B. Pon38. PO 114B. BPOllOB . IV PO IIOFC. IV PO 11 OB. IV POI 1 OS .IVPO I lOP B .IVPO lIOL. P PO llOL. P POll OFM 
16) POI01PB.CTOllOT.PPOl10FO.POI'OT'B.P01O'IF.~.POlO2B.POI02F.POI03B.POi'i53F.~.P0104F.POI05B.P0106B 
.POlI3B.POI14B.8POII0B.IVPOllOFC.IVPOIIOB.PPOllOFSO.CTOII0F.PPOlIOL.PPOIIOFM 
17) POlOIL.CTOllOT.PPOllOFO.P0f5TI3.Pi5IOIF.~.POI02B.POlO2F.POI03B.POi'i53F.~.P0104F.P0105B.PCiTIi6B' 
· PO 113B. PO 114 B. BPonoB .IVPO IIOFC. IV PO 1 lOB . PPOllOFSO. CTO lIOF . P POll OL. P POllOF M 
18) POl 02P B. CTOll OT. PPOIl OFO.POi"02B . P<iT02F.PQ1"5"2I;. POTI5IB. POIOI F . PO 103B. POfB3'F.~. PO 104F . PO 1058. POlO68 
· POI13H. PO 1148 .BPO II OB .IVPO 11 OFC. IVPO IIOB. P pen 1 OFSO. CTO 110F . P POll OL.PPO lIOFM 
19) POI02L.CTOlIOT.PPOllOFO.PO'i"O'213.POI02F.~.POTI5IB.POI0IF.P01038.POi'i53F.~.P0104F.POI05B.P01068 
.P0113B.P0114B .BPOII0B.IVPOllOFC.IVPOIIOB.PPO 1l0FSO.CTOllOF .PPOII0L.PPOllOFM 
20) POI03P8.CTOII0T.PPOII0FO.POI03B.POI03F.~.P0I0I8.POI01F.P0102B.Pi5'iO"2F.POI04B.P0104F.POI0gB.P0106B 
.POI13B.POI14B.BPOII0B.IVPOIIOFC .IVPOII08.PPOllOFSO.CTOIIOF .PPOllOL.PPOIIOFM 
21) POI03L.CTOllOT.PPOllOFO.P0TIi3i3.PO"i"03'F.~.P0f5TI3.POIOIF.POl02B.~.P0T04i3.POI04F.POI05B.P0106B 
,P0113B .P01l4B ,BPOllOB .lVPOII0FC .IVPOllOB.PPO IIOFSO .CTOlIOF .PPOllOL.PPOllOFM 
22) POI04PB.CTOIIOT.PPOllOFO.POTIi4B'.~.POi'i)4I;.POTI5IB.POIOIF.POICi2B.~.POi"03'B.POl03F.POI05B.POI06B 
· PO 113B. POll4 B. BPOIIOB. IVPO IIOFC. IVPO 11 OB. PPO llOFSO. CTO 110F . P PO llOL. P POllOF M 
23) PO 1 04L. CTOII OT. PPO 11 OFO. POi'04i3 . P<iTIi4F. PO'I04i"B'. POIOi'B. POlO IF. PO 102B . ~. POi"03'B. POI03F . PO 1058. PO 106 B 
· PO 113B. PO 114B. BPO I !OB .IVPO 11 OFC . IVPO IIOB. PPO IIOFSO . CTO 110F . P POll OL.P PO 11 OFM 
24) POI 05PB .CTO 11 OT .P POll OFO .PO 105B .POlO5'F .POi'05'L.P0T0fi3 .Pii'IiITF. PO 102B .PO 1 02F .J5"0'i"03i3. 'P'Oi03F .PO 104B. P0104F 
· POl 068. POl13B . POI14B. BPO 11OB. IVPO IIOFC.IV POll OB .PPO 11OFSO. CTOlI OF . P POllOL. P POll OFM 
25) POI 06PB. CTOll OT . P POll OFO. POl 06B . PiJ'i'06F.POi"iJ6"L. POIOiB. POIOiF. PO 1028. PoTIi"2F. POlO3B. P<i"f03'F. PO I04B. P0104 F 
· PO I 05B . PO 113 B .PO 114B. B POlIOB .IV POll OFC .lVPO 1 lOB. P POIIOFSO. CTO IIOF . P PO 11OL. P PO lIOFM 
26) POI13PB.CTOIIOT.PPOIIOFO.POI13B .POi1"3'F.PO'I13L.POIOiB.POIOiF.POI02B.POI02F .~.POI03F.POI04B. P0104F 
· POI 05B. PO 106B. PO 114B. B POll OB . IVPO 110 FC .IVPOl lOB .PPO 11OFSO .CTOII OF .PPO 11OL. PPO 11 OFM 
27) POI14PB. CTO 11 OT. PPOIIOFO. PO 114 B . POI'i4F.POiT4L'. POIOi'B. Pii'IiITF. PO 1028. PO 1 02F . 'j5'jj'f{j3'j3. POi'03'F. PO 104 8. PO 104F 
· PO 1 05B. P0106B .P0113B . BPOll OB .IV POllOFC. IV POlIOB. P PO IIOFSO. CTO IIOF . P POll OL. P POll OFM 
28) BPOIIOPB.CTOllOT .PPOIIOFO.BPOIIOB .BPOlIOL.PPonOFSO.POI01B.POI01 F .POI02B.~.P0103B.P0103F .POI04B 
· PO I 04F . PO 1058. POI06B. POI13B. P0114B. IV P01IOFe. IVPO IIOB . CTOUOF . P PO 11 OL. PPOll OFM 
29) PPOIIOFM.CTOUOT.PPOII0FO.PPOlIOF Q .PPOlIOFSQ.PPOI10L.POlOI B .POI01F .P0102B .POT02F.'j5'jj'f{j3'j3 .POI03F .POI04B 
· PO 1 04F . POI05B .POl 06B . PO 113B. POff4B'. BPOII OB . IVPO 11 OFe. IV POll OB. CTOll OF . PPOIIOL. P POll OF M 
30) PPOllOL.CTOlIOT .PPOII0FO.PPOIlQFO .PPOIIOFM.PPOlIOFSo.POlOIB.POIOtF .POI02B .~.i:;Oi03B.POI03F .POI04B 
.POI04F,POI05B.POI06B.POlI3B.POU4B.BPOllOB.IVPOIIOFC.lVPOIIOB.CT0110F .PPOlIOL.PPOI10FM 
31) IVPO 11 OS. P POIlOFO. PoT'5Ti3. POiOi'F. POI02B. PO'TIi2F. POTIi3B. POI03F.POi'04B. POI04F .PO I 058. POI 068. PO 1138 
· PO 1148. BPO 11 OB. IVPOlIOFC. IVPOlI OB. IV POll OFO .IVPOl1 OL. IVPO llOP8 . P PO 110FSO. CTO 11 OF .P POll OL ."PO'P'"0"1"1 O"F"M' 
32) IV POlIOP8. CTOU OT . P POIIOFO. POTIITB . POTOi'F. POIO'2B. POI02F. P'Oi'03B. PiIT03F. POi'04B. PO 1 04F . P01058 . POIO'6i3. POl13B 
.POI14B. BPOII0B.IVPOI10FC .IVPOllOBJVPOIIOFO.IVPOllOL.IVPOIIOS.PPOI10F SO.CTOlI0F .PPOIIOL.PPOllOFM 
33) IVPOlIOL.CTOllOT .PPOIIOFO.POIOIB .POIOIF .POI02B.POI02F .Pof03'B.POI03F.P0T04i3.POI04F .POI05B.POf06B'.POlI3B 
· PO 114B . B POll OB .IVPOIlOFC .IVP011 OB .IV PO 11 OFO .I V PO IIOPB .IVPO IIOS. P POll OFSO. CTO 11 OF . P POllOL. P POll OFM 
Table D.16: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVPOllO when low flow 
is required in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 2 
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D.1.lD Partial Flow at IVP0120 when Low Flow is Required 
PFIVPOl20LF POiNB.POI07l'.POI58B.POI08l'.POTIi9B.POI09F'.POIIOB.POTI1iF.POIIIB.POI12B.POI13B.POI14B 
.IVPOI20B.IVP0120FC.BP0120B.PP0120FSO.(ACTIVE.DORMANT 
+DORMANT.PP0120FO.ACTlVE.PPOI20FM.PPOI20L).{(P0107PB.i'Of07L + P0107L.P0107PB 
+P0102PB.i"OI08L + POI08L.P0108PB + POI09PB.P0109L + POI09L.POI09PB + POllOPB.POllOL 
+POllOL.POllOPB + P0115PB.POlllF.POIIII: + P0116PB.P0112F.POIT2L + P0113PB.P0113F.P01l3L 
+P01l4PB.J.5OII4F.POlill + BPOI20PB.BPOI20L + PPOI20FM.PPOI20FO.PPOI20L 
+PPOI20L.PPOI20FO.PPOI20FM).(IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20L.IVPOI20PB 
+CTOI20T.CTOI20F.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20L.IVPOI20PB) + IVPOI20S.nIV"'P"'O"I"20"'F"O"."IV"'P"'O"'1"2'"OpmB,.iiIV"'P"'O"'I'"2"'OL 
+IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20L + IVPOI20L.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB} 
Number Prime Impllcants 
1) P0107PB. IVPO 120FO. PO 107B .PO 107 F . PO 107L. PO 108B. P0108F .PO 109B. PO 109 F . PO 11 OB .P011OF . POIll B .PO 112B. P0113B 
.POI14B.BPOI20B.IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.PPOI20FSO.IVP0120PB.IVP0120S.IVPOI20L 
2) POI07L.IVP0120FO.~.POW7F.P0107PB.POW8B.P0108F.PO'i09B.POT09F.POlTIiB.~.POllIB.P0112B.P0113B 
· PO 114B. BP0120B .IV PO 120FC .IVPO 120B. P P0120FSO. CTO 120F . IV PO 120 PB.IV PO 120S.IVPO 120L 
3) POI 08PB.IVP0120FO. POi08B .PO'I'58F. PO"iOS't'. P<iT07B. POi'Ci7F. PO'i09B. POT09F. POlTIiB .POllOF . POll1 B .PO 112B. P0113B 
.POI14B.BP0120B.IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.PP0120FSO.IVPOl2OPB.IVP0120S.IVP0120L 
4) POI 08L.IVP0120FO. 'POi08i3. POIii"8F'. PO I OSPB. POfO'7B. POi'Ci7F. f.i'5T'B9i3.POT09F. POTIOi3. PO llOF . POTITB'. POl12B . PO 113B 
· PO 114B. B P0120B .JVPO 120FC. IV P0120B. P P0120FSO. IV PO 120P B. IV P0120S. IVP0120L 
5) PO 109P B .IVPO 120FO. 'POI09i3 . PiIT'O§'F. P01'09'L. POI07i3. POi'Ci7F .POTIiSB.~. POi'iOB. PO 110F . PO 111 B. PO 112B. PO 113B 
· PO 114B. B PO l20B . IV PO 120FC .IVPO 120B. P P0120FSO .IV PO 120P B.l V PO 1205.IVPO l20L 
6) pal 09 L.IVPOI20FO. POi'09B. PO'i"09F. PO 109P B. POI07i3. POi'Ci7F. POTIiSB.~. POTii)B'. PO 110F . POll 1 B. PO 112B. P0113B 
· POl14B .BP0120B .IV PO l20FC .IVP0120B. P PO 120F50. IVPO 120PB. IVPO 1205. IV P0120L 
7) POII0PB.IVP0120FO.POITIiB.~.Pi5TiOL.POI'O'7B'.POi'Ci7F.POTIiSB.~.POI"09B.POI09F .POll1 8 .POfI2'B.POl13B 
· POiT4B'. B POl20B .IVPO 120FC . IV POI20B. P P0120FSO. IVPO 120P B. IVPOl20S .JVPO 120L 
8) PO 11 OL.IV P0120FO. Po'i"iOB. 'POII'O'F. POil'OPtr.P0T07i3. POI07F.~. POTIiBF. POI"09B .PO 1 09F . PO III B. POfI2'B. POll3B 
· POiT4B'. B PO 120B .IVP0120FC .IVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO .IVPOI20PB . IVPO 120S .IV P0120L 
9) POll 1 P B.IVPOI20FO. POll1 8 . POTITF. P'l5i:TI'L. P<iT07B. ~ .POI08B,PO'f08"F. PiITQ9B, PO"i"O§'F. POll OB, PO 11 OF . POl12 8 
· POl13B. PO 1148. BP01208. IVPO 120FC. IVP0l208 . PP0120FSO .IVP0120P B .IV POl20S .IVPO 120L 
10) POl12PB.IVPOt20FO .POlI2B .POI'i'2F.'i5O"fi'2L.P0T07i3.POI07F .POWsB.'P01'08F .POlO'9'B.PO'i'09'F .POII0B.POllOF .POIIIB 
· PO 113 B. PO 114B . BPO 120B . IVPO 120FC. IV PO 120B. P POl20FSO .IV PO 120P B. IVPOI20S.JVPO 120L 
ll) POl13PB. IVP0120FO. POl13B. PO'I'i3F. POfi3i'::. POTi57i3. 'P6'f07F. PiITOBB. POTIiBF. POi09i3. POTIi9F .PO 11 OB. POllOF . PO III B 
· PO 112B. POl14B . BPO 120B .IV P0120FC .JVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO. IVPO 120 P B. IVPO 120S. IVPO l20L 
12) PO 114P B.JVPO 120FO. PO 114B .P'5If.iF. PQII4i';. POTi57i3. 'P6'f07F. 'Pi5i08i3 .POlO8F. POi09i3. PO'i'09'F. POll OB. PO 11 OF . P01118 
· i>OITI"S'. P0113B. B PO 120B .IV PO 120FC .IVPOI208 . P PO 120FSO .IV PO 120P B .IV PO 120S. IVPO 120L 
13) BPOI20P8.JVPOI20FO.8POI208.8POI20L.PP0120FSO.~J50T01F.~.POi08F.P01098.P0109F.POl108.POllOF 
.POlll B. PO 1128. POl138.POTI4B . IVPO l20FC.IVPOI20B . IV P0120P B. IVPOI20S. IVPO 120L 
14) PPO 120FM .IVPOI20FO. PP0l20FO . PPO 120F SO. P POI20L. POI07B. PO 107F . PO lOSB. POTIi8F.~. POl 09F . PO 11 OB. PO'iI'O"F' 
· PO III B. PO 1128. PO 113 B. PO 1148. BP0120B .IVPOI20F C .IVPO 120B. IV PO 120PB .IVPO 120S. IVP0l20L 
15) P PO 120L.IVP0120FO . P P0120FO . P P0120F M . PP0120FSO . PCi'I01H. j5"Q'fij'fF. PCiTOBB. POTIi8F. POI09i3. PO 109F . POll OB . POIIOF 
· PO 111 B. P0112 8 . PO 113B.POI148. BP0l20B . IVPO 120FC. IVPO 1208 .IVPO l20P B. IVP0120S. IVPO 120L 
16) POI07PB.CTOI20T.~ .POW7F.POI01L.POi08B'.P0108F .P0109B.P0109F .POllOB.POllOF .POIllB.POI12B.P01138 
· PO 114B. B P0120B .IVP0120FC. IVP0120B. P P0120F50 . CTO 120F 
17) POlO7L.CT0120T.POi01B.'P6'f07F.'PO'I07PB.~.P0108F.P0109B.POI09F.POllOB.POI10F.POII1B.POI128.P01l3B 
.PO 1148. B PO 120B .IVPO 120 FC . IVPO 120B. PPO 120FSO . CT0120F 
18) POIOSP8.CTOI2OT.PiIT081LpiIT08F.~.POI01B.POl07F.P0109B.P0109F.POIlOB.POllOF.POlIIB.POl128.POI13B 
· PO 114B. B P01208 .IV P0120FC .IV PO 120B . P POl20 FSO . CT0120F 
19) POlOSL.CTOI20T.POTIi8B' .POTIi8F.~.PO'i07B.P0107F .POI09B.POI09F .POTi'tiB'.POI10F .POl11B.P0112B.POl13B 
· POTI4B'. B P0120 B. IV P0120FC .IV POI20B. P P0120FSO . CTO 120f 
20) POI 09PB. CT0l20T . PO'i09"S' . ~ .POlO'9I:', POT57i3. PO 107F . PO 108B .PO lOSF . POlIO B. POll OF .PO 1118. PO 1128. PO 113 B 
.POI14B. BPO 120B .IVPOI20FC .IVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO . CT0120F 
21) POI09L.CT0120T.POi09B.POi'09'F.~.P0Ti57i3.P0107F.P0108B.POlOSF.POI1OB.POllOF.POIIIB.POI12B.P01138 
· PO 114B. B PO 120B .IVPOI20FC .IVPO 1208. P POl20FSO . CT0120F 
22) POll0PB.CTOI20T.POIiOiJ .'j5'ij'IT(j"F.POITOL.P0T57i3.P0107F .POlOSB.POI08F .POI09B.P0109F .POIIIB .POI12B.P01l3B 
.POmB'.BP0120B.JVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.PP0120FSO.CTOI20F 
23) POII0L.CT0120T .POIIOB .POlIOF .POlI0PB.P0107B.P0107F. POlOSB.POI0SF .POI09B.P0109F .POI11B.POU28.POI13B 
.PO 114B. B PO 120B .IV PO 120FC. IV P01208. P PO 120FSO . CT0120F 
Table D.17: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVP0120 when low flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
260 
Fault and Success Trees for the Fuel Rig when ACTIVE or DORMANT Fault Trees 
Number Prime Impllcants 
24) P0111PB.CTOI20T.P0111B.POIIIF.POI11L.P0107B.P0107F.POI088.P0108F.P0109B.P0109F.POllOB.POllOF.FOl128 
· F01138. PO 1148. 8P01208 . IVPO 120FC. IVPO 1208. PP0120F80 . eTO 120F 
25) P0112P8. CTO 120T. PO 1128 . PQ'i"i2F. P<iTI2L. POTO'flj. POI67F. PO 1 088. POl 08F . PO 109 8. PO 109F . FOI108. POll of . POITi'B 
· POl13 B. PO 1148. BPO 120B .IV PO 120FC .IV PO 120B. PP0120F80. CTO 120F 
26} POl13P8. CTOl20T .P01l3B . POII'3F .POfi'3[. POI07B .POI67F. POI 08B. pal 08F . PO 1 09B. P0109 F . PO 110B . POll OF . PO 111 8 
· PO 112B.PO 114 B. B PO 1208 .IVPO 120FC .IVPOI20B.P P0120F80 . CTO 120F 
27) POl14P B. CT0l20T. PO 114B . POIT4'F. POTI4I:'.POT07Ii. POI'67F. PO 1 088 . POI 08F . PO 109 B. PO 1 09F . POllOB . POll of . PO III B 
· POl12 B. PO 113 B. BP0120B. IVPO 1201< C . IVPO 120B. PP0120F8 O. CTO 120F 
28) BPOI20PB.CTOI20T .BPOI20B .BPOI20L.PPOI20FSO.POI07B .POI07F .P0108B.POI08F .P0109B.P0109F .POII0B. POllOF 
.POI11B.POI128 .POl 13B.P0114B .IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.CTOI20F 
29) PP0120FM. CT0120T. P PO 120FO . P P0120F80. P P0120L. PO 107B. PO 107F . POl 08B . P0108F .PO 109B. PO I 09 F . PO 1108. PO 110F 
· PO 111 B. PO 112 B. PiITI3B' .PO 114B .BPO 120B.IVPO 120FC .IV PO 120B. CTO 120F 
30) PPO 120L. CT0120T ,P P0120FQ . P PO 120FM. PPO 120FSQ • POI07B. PO 107F . P0108B. PO 108F . pm 09 B. pal 09F . PO 1108. POllOF 
· P0111 B. PO 1128 . POlI3B. P01148 . B P0120B. IV P0120FC .IVP0120B. CT0120F 
31) IVP0120S. PO 1078. POfij'7F'. PO 1071. POlO8'B. POI08F. PO'iO"9B. ~.j5{jTI'()j3. POllOF . P0111 8. P0112B. P01l3B 
· PO 1148. B P0l20 B .IVP0120FC. IV POl20B .IVPO 120F 0 .IVP0120L. PPO 120FSO. CT0120F 
32} IVP0120PB. CTO 12OT. ~ .POTIi7F .PiITD7L. 'P'Oi08i3.POi"08'F. POI'09B. 'PiIT09'F. POTIi5B. POll OF . PO IIIB. POll1 8. POU3B 
· POl14B. BPO 120B .IVP0120FC .IVP01208. IVP0120F 0 . IVPO 120L. IV PO 1208. PPO 120F8Q. CT0120F 
33) IVP0120L. CTO 120T . POI07B . POTIi7F. PCiI'5'7L. PO 108 B . PO 108F . POl 09B. PO 109 F . POll 08. PO 110F . POl11 8 . POIT2'B'. PO 113B 
· POI14B. BPO 1208 . IVP0120FC. IV P0120B .IVPO 120Fo .IVPO 120P B .IV P0120S. P P0120FSO. CTO 120F 
Table D.18: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVP0120 when Iow flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Number PrIme Impllcants 
I) POI07P8.IVPOI20FO.PPOI20FO.POIOI8 .POI07F .P0107L.POI088 .POI08F .P01098 .P0109F .~.POIlOF .POIIIB. P0112B 
· PO 113B. POl14 8 . 8 P0120B .IV P0120FC .IV PO 120B. PP0120FSO. IVPO 1208. IVPO 120PB .IVPO 120L. P PO 120L. P PO 120FM 
2) POI07L.IVPOI20FO.PPOI20FO.P0TIi78.~.POlO"fl5B.POlO8'B.POI"58F.~.~.POTiOIf.POI10F.j5(jTI'fB.P01128 
· POI13B. PO 1148. 8 PO 120B. IVPO 120FC .IVP01208. P PO 120FSO .IV P0120S .IVPO 120p B .IV PO 120L. PPO 120L. P PO 120FM 
3) POI08PB.IVP0120FO.PPOI20FO.i>iIT08l3 .POI08F.POlO8L.POi'O'fB.POI07F.PCiT09"B.~.POiTOB'.POII0F .POi1TB.POI128 
.PO 113 8. POl14 B. 8 P0120B .IV PO 120FC . IVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO. IVPO 120S .IV PO 120P B .IVPO 120L. P POI20L. P PO 120F M 
4) POI08L.IVP0120FO.PPOI20FO.'i'5'l5I08i3 .POI158F.P01'08'PH.POi'O'fB.POiO'7F.~.~.PiiTI'O'iJ.POIlOF .POi1TB.POI12B 
· PO 1138. P01148 . 8 PO 120B. IVPO 120 FC .IVP01208 . P PO 120FSO. IV P01208 .IVP0120P B .IV PO 120L. PPO 120L. PPO 120FM 
5) POI09PB.IVPOI20FO.PPOI20FO.~ .POi"59'F.POi09L.P0TIi7i3.POi'O'fF.POTIiSB'.PO'I'58'F.~.POI10F .j5(jTI'fB.POI12B 
· POlI3B. PO 114B. B PO 1208 .IVPO 120FC. IVP0120B. P PO 120F80 .IVPO 1208 .IVPOI20P B. IVPOI20L. P PO 120L. PPO 120F M 
6) POI 09L.IVP0120FO. PPOI20FO. POI09B. POTIi9'F. POI09J5'B' .POTIi7i3. POi'O'fF. POTIiSB'. PiiTOSF. POiTOB'. PO 11 OF .j5(jTI'fB. POl12B 
· PO 113B .POl14 B. B P0120B. IV PO 120FC. IVPO 120B. P POI20FSO. IVPO 120S .IVPO 120PB. IVPO 120L.P PO 120L. P PO 120F M 
7) POI10PB.IVPOI20FO.PP0120FO.POT'iOB .POITIiF.'PO'iT01:.POI07B.POTIi7F.POTIi8B'.~.POT09B'.POI09F .POTIIB.POI12B 
· PO 113B. P0114 B. BPO 120B. IVPO 120 FC .IVPO 1208 . P PO 120FSO .IV PO 120S .IVP0120P B .IVP0120L. P PO 120 L. PPO 120FM 
8) POll OL.IVPO 120FO. PPO 120FO. P'OiTOB. 'POIT'5F. PCiTI'OPB' .POTIi"'fB. POI07F.~. 'POi08F'. 'P0109i3. PO 109 F . POi1TB. PO 112B 
· POl138. PO 114B. B PO 120B.IVPO 120FC . IVPO 120B. P PO 120F80. IVPO 1208. IV P0120P B. IVPOI20L. P P0120L. PP0120F M 
9) POl11 P B. IVP0120FO. PP0120FO .POiTfB .POTI'TF. 'PoTITL.POTIi'fB. POI07F.POTIiSB'. 'POi08F'. 'P0109i3. POI09F. POll OB. POiTO'F 
· PO 112 8 .P0113 B . PO 114B. BP01208.1 V PO 120FC. IVPO i 2 OB. PP0120FSO .IVP0120S. IV PO 120P B. IVPO 120L. PPO 120L. P P0120F M 
10) PO 112PB.IVPO 120FO. P P0120FO. POII2B' . POIT'2F. POi'I2L. POI07B. POi07F. POTIi8B. POf68'F. POT09B'. POI09F. P01I08 . POiTO'F 
· PO 111 B. POl13B. P01148. BPO 120B. iVP0120FC.IV P0120B.P PO 120FSO. IVP0120S .IV PO 120PB. IVPO 120L. P P0120L. P P0120F M 
11) POl13PB .IVP0120FO. PPOI20FO. POTI3B' . POiT3"F. POi"i3I:'.POI07B. POi'O'fF. PCilO8B. PiiTOSF.P'6109i3. POI09F. P0110B. Pi5i'i'OF 
.POI11B.POI12B.POI14B.BPOI20B.IVPOI20FC.IVP012OB.PPOI20FSO.IVPOI208.IVPOI20PB.IVP0120L.PPOI20L.PP0120FM 
12) P0114PB. IVP0120FO. PP0120FO .POi"i4B .'POTI4F .Po'iT4E.POTIi1B.'P5I07F .PO'i'08'B .POlO8F."POI'09"B .PO'i'O§'F. PO 11 OB .PO'i"iOF 
.PO 111 B. P0112 B . P01138. BPO 120B.I V PO 120FC. IVPO 12{)B. P PO 120FSQ .IVP01208.IVPO 120P 8. IVPO 120L. PPO 120L. P P0120 F M 
13) BP0120PB. IVPO 120FO. P PO 120FO. BPO 120B . BP0120L. P PO 120F80 . POl 078. POI07F'. PO 1088 . Pil'rn8F". P01 098.PiIT09F. POIIOB 
· POll OF . POlll B. PO 112B. PO 113B. J5OTI'41J. IVP0120FC . IV PO 120B. IV PO 120S.IVPO 120P B. IVPO 120L. P PO 120L. P P0120FM 
14) P P0120FM .JVPOI20FO. P POI20FO. P P0120FO .P P0120F SO. PPOI20L. 'POTIi7i3.'P'iITO'fF. POTIi8B'.~. 'P'OI09B. PO 109F . POiTIiB' 
.POI04F .POI11B .P01128 .P01138.PCiTI'iB'.BP0120B .IVPOI20FC.IVPOI208.IVPOI20S.IVP0120PB.IVPOI20L.PP0l20L.PP0l20FM 
15) PP0120L.IVPOI20FO. PP0120FO. P PO 120FO . P PO 120FM .PPO 120FSO. PO 107B. 'POTIi"'7'F. POi"58B'.~. P'6109i3. P0109 F . POITIiB' 
· PO 110 F .POlll B .PO 112 B. P0113B .POI14B. BPO 120B .IVP0120FC. IVPO 1208 .IVPO 1208 .IV PO 120P 8 .IV P0120L. P PO 120L. P PO 120FM 
16) POl 07PB. CTOI20T. PPO 120FO.P0TIffi3 . POT07F'.'POTQ7i':'. Pi5TIi8B. POl 08F . PO 109 B. POiO§'F. POTI013. PO 110F . POI1IB. PO 112B 
· PO 113B. PO 114B .BPO 120B .IVP0120FC . IVPO 120B. PP0120F80. CT0120 F . PPO 120L. P PO 120FM 
17) POI07L.CTOI20T .PPOI20FO.'P0TIi'7i3.i5"OT07F.~ .'P0I'B8i3 .POI08F .POI09B.~ .PO'ITIiB.P0110F .P0111B.POI12B 
· P01138. PO 114 B. B P0120B .IV PO 120FC .IVP0120B. P PO 120FSO. CT0120F . P P0120L. PPO 120F M 
18) PO 1 08P B. CT0120T . P P0120FO. Pi5i08B . POI158F. POi:Q8[;. 'POI07B .POI 07F . P0109B .POiO§'F. P'OiTOB. POIIOF . PO 111 8 .PO 1128 
.POI13B.POl14B.8POI20B.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.PPOl20F80.~.PPOI20L.PP0120FM 
19) POI08L. CTOI20T. PP0120FO. PO 108B . POI 08F . PO lOBP B. POl 078. POl 07F • PO 1 09 8. PO 109 F . POll OB . PO llOF . POI'i"TIf. PO 112B 
.POlI3B .POl14B .BPOI20B .IVP0120FC .IVPOI20B .PP0120F80 .CT0120F .PPOI20L.PPOI20FM 
Table D.19: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVP0120 when Iow flow 
is required in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 1 
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Number Prime Impllcants 
20) POl 09 P B.CTOI20T. P POI20FO. POl 09B . PO 109 F . PO 109 L. PO 1078. PO 107F . P01088. P0108F . PO 11 OB. PO 110F . PO 111 B . PO 1128 
· P0113B.POl14B.~.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.PP0120FSO.CTOI2OF .PP0120L.PPOI20FM 
21) PO 1 09L. CT0120T. P P0120FO . PCiICi9B . POTIi9F. POT59'J51j.~. P0107F . PO 1 088. POTIiSF. Pi5'IT'OB'. PO 11 OF . PO III 8. P0112 B 
.P0113B.POI14B.BPOI20B.IVPOI20FG.IVP01208.PPOl20FSO.CT0120F.PPOI20L.PP0120FM 
22) POll0PB.CT0120T.PP0120FO.POTiOB.POT'f5F.POi'TIiL.~.POI07F.P0108B.POTIiSF.PCiT09Ef.P0109F.POI11B.P01128 
.P 01138. P0114 8. 8P0120B .IV PO 120FC.IVPO 1208. P PO 120FSO. CT0120F . PP0120L. P PO 120FM 
23) POllOL. CT0120T . PPO 120FO. POiTIiB . POTIii'F. POi'Iti'J'>B'. ~. P0107F . PO 1088. POIii"8'F .POT09B' .PO 109F . PO III 8. P0112 B 
· PO 1138 . PiITI4B. B PO 120B. IV P0120FG. IV PO 1208 . P P0l20FSO . CTO 120F . P PO 120L. P POl20F M 
24) POlllPB.CT0120T.PP0120FO.POlIIB.POi"i'TF.PO'iTfi:'.~.~.P01088.POl08F.PCiT09Ef.POi'09F.POI108.POllOF 
· P01068. POl138. PO 114 B. 8 PO 120B . IVPO 120FC .IVP01208. P PO 120FSQ. CT0l20F . PPO 120L. P PO 120F M 
25) P0112P 8 .CTOI20T .P P0120FO .P 01l2B .J5'iITI'2F .Po'i"i2i:.~ .PO'iO'fF. PO 1 088. P0108F .POi'Q9T!."POI'5"9F' . POII0B. POIlOF 
.P01058.P0113B.POI14B.BPOI20B .IVP0120FC.IVPOI20B.PPOI20F SO.CT0120F .PP0120L.PP0l20FM 
26) POl13PB.CT0120T.PP0120FO.P0113B.POIT3'F'.P'OiT31::pOi07B.~.P0108B.P0108F.~.POI09F.POllOB.POllOF 
· PO 1058. PO 112B . P0114 B .BPOI20B. IVPO 120FC .IVP0120B . P PO 120FSQ. eTO 120F .PPO 120L. P PO 120F M 
27) P0114P B. CT0120T. P PO 120FO. PO 114B . POi"i"4'F. Pii'iT4'L. ~. ~. PO 108B. PO 108F . PCiT09Ef. PQ'i{j"g'F. PO I10B . PO 11 OF 
.POI 05B .POlI2B .PiITi!B' .8PO 120B .IV PO 120FC .IVP0l20B. PPO 1201< SO. CT0120F . PP0120L. P P0120F M 
28) BP0120PB.CTOI20T.PPOI20FO.BPOI20B.BP0120L.PP0120FSO.P01078.P0107F.~.POi'08F'.P0109B.P0109F.POllOB 
· PO llOF . PO 11lB. P'Oi"i21J. PO 113B . P0114B .IVPO 120FC .IVPO 120B . CT0120F . P P0120t. P P0120F M 
29) PPOI20FM. CTO 120T. P POI20FO. P PO 120FO . PPO 120FSQ. P PO 120L. PO 1 078. PO 1 07F . PO 1 08B. 'POI'08F. POTIi9B. PO 1 09 F .POIl OB 
· POI 04 F . POl11 B . PO 1128. PO 1138. POTIiB. B'POI'2OB. IVPO 120FC. IVPO 120B. CT0l20F . P PO 120L. P P0120FM 
30) PP0120L.CTOI20T .PPOI20FO .PP0120FO .PPOI20FM .PP0120FSO .POIOTB .POIOTF .P0108B .'POI'08F.'P0I09i3.POI09F .POI108 
· PO 110F . PO 111 B. POlI2B.PO 113B. POl14B .B P0120B .IVPO 120FC .lVP0120B . CTOnOF'. P P0120L.PPO 120 FM 
31) IVPO 1208. P P0120FO. P6TIi7i3 . POIiYiF. J5O'I"08i3. POi'08F. POI09B. 'PciTIi9F. POITOB. j5'(j'ffij'F. PO 111 B. POl128. ~ 
.POI14B.8P0120B.IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.lVP0120FO.IVP0120L.IVPOI20P8.PP0120FSO.CTOI20F.PPOI20L."P"'P"O"C12"O"F"M' 
32) IVP0120P 8. CT0120T . PP0120FO. P'6'iO'fB .'PQ'iij"fF. P0108B . POTIi8F. 'POf59B' .J5'5'IQ9F'. POi"'iOB. PO 11 OF . POll I 8 . PiJIT2i3. PO 113 B 
· P01148. B PO 120B. IVPO 120 FC .IVPOI20B. IVP0120FO .IV PO 120L .JVP0120S .PPO 120FSO .CT01201< .P PO 120L.P P 0120FM 
33) IVPO 120L. CTO 120T. P P0120FQ. PO 107B .POl 07 F . PO 1 088. PO 108F . P0109 8. 'Piffii9F' .POTI"OB. POll OF . PO III 8. POIi2i3. POIT3'B 
· PO 1148. BP0120B .IVPO 120FC .IVPO 120B .IVP0120FO .IVP0120P B. IVP0120S. P P0120F SO. CTO 120F . PPO 120L. P P0120F M 
D.1.11 
Table D.20: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVP0120 when low flow 
is required in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 2 
High Flow on Main Outflow Line 
HFOUTFLOWF {POlOIB.POIliIF.POlOIPB.POIOIL.POI02B.POI02F.POI02PB.POI02L.POTIi3B 
.P0103F.POI03PB.POI03L.POI04B.POI04F.POI04PB.POI04L.POIO5B.POI05PB 
.POl06B.POI06PB.P01l3B.P01l3PB.P01l4B.P01l4PB.PPOllOFSO.PPOllOFM 
.PPOllOL.BPOllOB.BPOllOPB.(IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOFC.IVP0110B.IVPO110S 
.IVPOlIOPB.lVPOllOL + CT0110T.CTOlIOF.lVPOllOFC.IVPOlIOB.lVPOllOS 
.IVPOlIOPB.IVPOlIOL).(ACTlVE.DORMANT + DORMANT.PPOlIOFO.'ArC"T"'IV"E")} 
+{POI07B.POI07F.POI07PB.POI07L.POI08B.P0108F.POI08PB.POI08L.POlO8B 
.POI09F.POI09PB.POI09L.POlIOB.POllOF.P0110PB.POllOL.P0111B.POIllPB 
.P01l2B.P0112PB.P0113B.P0113PB.P0114B.P0114PB.PP0120FSO.PP0120FM 
.PP0120L.BP0120B.BP0120PB.(IVP0120FO.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.IVP0120S 
.IVP0120PB.IVP0120L + CT0120T.CT0120F.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.IVP0120S 
.IVP0120PB.IVP0120L).(ACTIVE.DORMANT + DORMANT.PP0120FO.'ArC"T"'IV"E")} 
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1) IVPOII0FQ.IVPOII0FC.IVPOllOB.IVPOIIOPB.IVP01105.IVP011OL.P0101B.P0101F.POlOIPB 
· PO 1 01 L. PO 102B. PO I 02F . P0102PB. PO I 02L. POI 03 B. POI 03F . P01 03PB. PO I 03L. POI 048 . POI 04F 
· PO 1 04P B. P0104L.PO 105B . PO I 05 F . PO 1 05P B . POIOSL. POTIi6B. POT15C"F'". P0106P 8 .POI 06L. POll3B 
· PO'i"I""3F. PO 113P B. POIT3l:". PO 114B. PO 114PB. PPO 11OFSO. P PO 110FM . PPOII OL. BPO 110B 
.BP011OPB.BPOllOL 
2) CTOIIOT. IVPO 110FC .IVPO 11 OB. IVPO] lOP B .IV POll 0$ .IVPO llOL. PO 10 lB. POlO 1 F . PO 1 OIP8 
· PO I 01 L. PO 102B. PO I 02F . PO 1 02PB. PO 102L. POl 03 B. POI 03F . PO 1 03PB. PO 1 03L. POI04B . PO I 04 F 
.PO 1 04P B. POI04L.P0105B . POI 05F . PO 105 PB. POiOSL. POIii6B. POW6F". P0106P B. POI 06 L. P0113B 
· PO"IT"3F. PO 113P B. PQiT3I;. POII"4B. PO 114PB. PPO llOF SO. P PO 11 OFM . P POIIOL. BPO 11 OB 
.BPO 110P B. B PO 11 0 L. CTO 1l0F 
3) lVPO 120FO .IVPO 120 FC ."IVi7PDO"';;2;;O~B', 'I"V"POO"1;;2;;Oi'iP"'B. IV PO 1205. IVP0120L. POI07B. PO 1 07 F . PO 107P B 
· PO I 07L. PO lOSB. PO 1 08F . POlOSP B. PO 1 OSLo P0109 B .POI09F . PO 1 09PB. POI 09L. PO 11 08 . PO 110F 
.PO 11 OP B. POll OL.POITllr. POl11 F . PO III P B. POiTIE". PiITI2B. POIT2F'". P0112P 8 .POlI2L. POl13B 
.PO"I'i"3F. PO 113P 8 .PO U3L. PO 1148. P0114P 8. PPO 120F SO. P PO 120 F M . PPO 120L. BP01208 
.BP0120PB.BPOI20L 
4) CT0120T .IVPO 120FC .!VPO 120B.IV P0120PB .IV PO 120$ .IVPO 120L. POI 07B. PO 107F . PO 107P B 
· PO I 07L. PO 1088 .PO 108F . POW8P B. PO 1 OSL. PO 109B .PO 109F . PO 109PB. POl 09 L. PO 11 OB. PO 110F 
.POI10PB.POlIOL.POI11B .POIIIF .POII1PB.POiTIE".POiT2B.POiI"2F.POU2PB.POI12L.POI13B 
.POI13F.P0113PB.POU3L.P0114B.POI14P8.PPOI20FSO.PP0l20FM.PPOI20L.BP01208 
.BPOI20PB.8P0l20L.CTOI20F 
Table D.21: Prime implicants for high flow on the main outflow line 
when low flow is required in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Number Prime Implicants 
Fault Trees 
1) IVPOII0FQ.PPOI10FQ.IVP011OFC.IVPOllOB.iVPOllOPB.lVPOIIOS.IVPOII0L.P01018.POlOIF.P0101P8 
.POI01L.POI02B.POI02F .POI02PB. POI02L.P0103B.POI03F .POI03PB.P0103L.P0104B.POI04F 
.P0104PB.P0104L.POI05B.P0105F .POI05PB.POi05E"."POi06If.PCiTIi6F.P0106PB.POl06L.P6TI3B 
· PCiTT3"F. PO 113PB. POTi3I:". POTf.ii3. PO 114P B. PPO 110FSQ. P POllOFM. P POlIOL. BPO 11 OB . P POll OFSQ 
.PP011OFM .PPOlIOL.8P0110PB.BP011OL 
2) CTOll OT . PPO 110FQ .IV POll oFC .IVPO 11OB. IVPO 110P 8 .IV PO 1108. IV PO 11OL. POlOI 8. PO 10 IF. POlOI PB 
· Pol OIL. PO I 02B .POl 02F . PO 102 P 8 . P01 02 L. POI 038. POl 03F . P0103P 8. PO 103L. PO I 04B. P0104F 
· PO 104P B . POI 04L. P0105 B. POI 05F . PO 105 P B. P5I05i:. POIOirn". PCiTIi6F. PO 106P B. P01 06L. PO 113B 
· POITSF. fiOII3l5"B. PO 113L. PO 1148 . POI14PJj. PPO 1IOFSO. P POllOFM. P PO 11OL. B PO II OB 
.8POllOPB.BP0110L.C1"OfIOF".PPOllOFSO.PPOlIOFM.PP0110L 
3) IVPO 120FO. P PO 120FO. IVPO 120FC . IVPO 120B .IVPOI20P B ."'V~P;';;O~12~O~S', 'I"V"p5CO~1"2"O"L. PO 107B . PO 1 07F . PO 1 07P 8 
· P0107L. PO 1088. POIOSF . PO 108P 8. POlOSL. P 0 109 8. P0109 F . POlO9 P 8 . PO 1 09 L. POlI08. POllOF 
· POll OP 8. POlIOL. POll I B. PO III F . PO 111 P 8. "POITIL. POII2"B."POII"2F. PO 112P 8 . POll2 L. PO 113B 
."POiT3F. POlI3PB. POTI3L. POli48. POII4i5"B". P PO 120FSO . P P0120FM . P PO 120L. 8 PO 120B 
.BPOI20PB.BP0120L.PPOI20FSO.PPOI20FM.PP0l20L 
4) CTOl20T . PPOI20FO. IVP0120FC .IVPO 120B. IV P0120PB .IVPO 1208 .IV POI20L. PO 1078 . P0107F . PO 1 07P B 
· PO 107L. POlOSB. PO 108F . PO lOSP B. PO 1 08L. PO 109B. PO 109 F . PO 109P B. P0109 L. POl108 . PO 11 OF 
.POllOPB.POlIOL.POI11B.P0111F.P0111PB.Pi5ITiL.P0TI2i3."POII"2F.P0112PB.POI12L.P0113B 
.P0113F.POI13PB.POlI3L.POI14B.POl14PB.PP0120FSO.PP0120FM.PPOI20L.BPOI20B 
.BP0120PB.BP0120L.CTOI20F.PP0120FSQ.PPOI20FM.PPOI2OL 
Table D.22: Prime implicants for high flow on the main outflow line 
when in the DORMANT operating mode 
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D.1.12 Low Flow on Main Outflow Line 
LFOUTFLOW P0113B.P01l3F.P0113PB.P0113L + P0113F.P0113B.P0113PB.P0113L 
+P0114B.P01l4F.P0114PB.P01l4L + P0114F.P0114B.P01l4PB.P01l4L 
+(POIOIB.POIOIF.POIOIPB.POIOIL + POIOIF.POIOIB.POIOIPB.POIOIL 
+POI02B.POI02F.POI02PB.POI02L + POI02F.POI02B.POI02PB.POI02L 
+POI03B.POI03F.POI03PB.POI03L + POI03F.POI03B.POI03PB.POI03L 
+POI04B.POI04F.POI04PB.POI04L + POI04F.POI04B.POI04PB.POl04L 
+POI05B.POI05F.POI05PB.POI05L + POI05F.POI05B.POI05PB.POI05L 
+POI06B.POI06F.POI06PB.POI06L + POI06F.POI06B.POI06PB.POI06L 
+IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOL 
+IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOFO.lVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOL 
+CTOlIOF.CTOIIOT.IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOS + BPOIIOB.BPOIIOPB.BPOIIOL 
+PPOlIOFSO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL).(POI07B.POI07F.P0107PB.POIO7L 
+POI07F.POI07B.POI07PB.P0107L + POI08B.POI08F.POI08PB.POI08L 
+POI08F.POI08B.POI08PB.POI08L + POI09B.POI09F.POI09PB.POl09L 
+POI09F.POI09B.POI09PB.POI09L + POllOB.POllOF.POlIOPB.POllOL 
+ POllOF .POlIOB.POlIOPB.POIIOL + POIIIB.POI05F.POIIIPB.POllIL 
+P0111F.POI05B.POIllPB.POll1L + P0112B.P01l2F.P0112PB.P01l2L 
+P0112F.P01l2B.P01l2PB.P0112L + PPOI20FSO.PPOI20FM.PPOI20L 
+IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20B.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20L 
+IVPOI20B.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20FC.lVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB.IVPOl20L 
+CTOI20F.CTOI2OT.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20S + BPOI20B.BPOI20PB.BPOI20L) 
Number Prime Impllcants 
1) P01l3B.POl13F .POl13PB.POl13L 
2) P01l3F.POl13B.POl13PB.POl13L 
3) POl14B.POl14F.P01l4PB.P01I4L 
OR 
1) POlO1B.POlOlF.POlOIPB.POlOlL 1) P0107B.P0107F .P01Q7PB.POI07E' 
2) POlO1F .POlO1B .P01OTP'B.POI'OfL' 2) P0107F . PO 1078. PO 107 P B . PO 107L 
3) PPOllOFSO.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM 3) PP0120FSO.PP0120FO.PPOI20FM 
.PP0l20L 
AND 
4) POI08B.P010BF .POlO8PB.POIOBL 
5) POI 08F. PO 1 08B . PO 108PB. PO 108L 
6) P0109B. P0109F .P0109PB.P0109L 
7) P0109F . PO 109B. PO 1 09PB . PO 109 L 
Fault Trees 
8) IVP0120B.IVP0120FC.IVPOI20FO.IVP0120PB 
.IVPOllOS.IVPOI10L .IVP0120S.IVP0120L 
9) IVP011OFC.IVPOllOB .IVPOllOF 0 .IVP0110PB 9) IVP0120FC.IVP0120B .IVPOI20FO . IV P0120P B 
.IVPOI lOS.IVP01 IOL .IVPOI20S.IVP0120L 
10) CTOI lOF .IVPOI10FO.IVP0110S.CTOIIOT 10) CT0l20F .IV POl20FO . IV P0120S. CTO 120T 
11) P0104B.P0104F.POI04PB.POlO4L 11) POllOB.P01lOF .POllOPB .POllOL 
12) POI04F.POlO4B.POl04PB.P0104L 12) POlIOF .POII0B.POllOPB .POllOL 
13) POI0SB.POlOSF.POlOSPB.POlOSL 13) P0111B.POlllF.~.POlllL 
14) P010SF.P0"f05i3.POlOSPB.POlOSL 14) P0111F.POlIIB.~.POII1L 
IS) BPOII0B.BPOIIOPB.BP0110L 15) BPOI20B.BPOI20PB .BPOI20L 
16) P0106B.P0106F .POlO6PB.POlO6L 16) POI12B. PO'i"i2F. PO 112 P B . PO 1I2L 
17) P0106F.POl068.P01Q6PB.POlO6L 17) P01l2F .P0112B .POI12PB. POl12L 
Table D.23: Prime implicants for low flow on the outflow line 
when flow is required in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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D.1.13 Partial Flow on Outflow Line when Flow is Required 
PFOUTFLOWF = «POIOIBPOIOIF .POI02B.POI02F .PiIT03B. POfil3F.PDTIi4B.POI04F.POf05B.POI05F.POI06l3 
.POTIi6F.POIT3B.POl13F.POl14B.BPOIIOB.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOB.CTOIIOF.PPOIIOFSO 
+POI07BPOI07F.POI08B.POI08F.POI09B.POlliW.POITOJj.l'OITilF.POITIB.POfiTI'.P5IT2l3 
+.POl12F.POl13B.POl13F.POl14B.BP0120B.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.CT0120F.PP0120FSO) 
.(P01l3PB.P01l3L + P01l3L.P0113PB + P01l4PB.PliIT4L)) 
+(P0101B.POIOIF.P0101PB.POIOIL + P0101F.P0101B.P0101PB.P0101L 
+P0102B.P0102F.POI02PB.P0102L + POI02F.P0102B.POI02PB.POI02L 
+POI03B.P0103F.POI03PB.P0103L + P0103F.POI03B.POI03PB.POI03L 
+P0104B.P0104F.P0104PB.P0104L + P0104F.POI04B.P0104PB.POI04L 
+P0105B.POI05F.POI05PB.P0105L + P0105F.POl05B.P0105PB.P0105L 
+P0106B.P0106F.P0106PB.P0106L + P0106F.POI06B.POI06PB.POI06L 
+IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOllOL 
+IVPOllOB.IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOL 
+CTOllOF.CTOllOT.IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOS + BPOllOB.BPOllOPB.BPOllOL 
+PPOIIOFSO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL) 
(POI07BP0107F.POI08B.POI08F. POI09ll.POlliW.POITOJj.l'OITilF.POITIB.POfiTI'.P5IT2l3 
+.P01l2F.P01l3B.P01l3F.P01l4B.BP0120B.IVP0120FC.IVPOI20B.CT0120F.PP0l20FSO) 
.(P0107PB.P0107L + P0107L.POI07PB + POI08PB.P0108L + P0108L.P0108PB 
+POI09PB.P0109L + P0109L.POI09PB + POllOPB.POllOL + POllOL.POllOPB 
+POIllPB.l'OIITL + POlllL.P0111PBP01l2PB.P01l2L + P01l2L.P01l2PB 
+ IVP0120PB .IVP0120FO.IVP0120S.IVP0120L + IVP0120S.IVP0120FO ."IV"'P"'O'"1020"'P"'B"."IV"P"'O'"lo27ii"OL 
+IVP0120L.IVP0120FO.IVP0120PB.IVP0120S + BP0120PB.BPOI20L + BP0l20L.BP0120PB 
+PP0120L.PP0120FM + PP0120FM.PP0120L.PP0120FO) 
.(P0107B.P0107F.P0107PB.P0107L + POI07F.P0107B."P"Ol"o"'7np nB.P0107L 
+P0108B.POI08F.P0108PB.POI08L + P0108F.P0108B.POI08PB.POI08L 
+P0109B.P0109F.P0109PB.P0109L + P0109F.P0109B.POI09PB.P0109L 
+POllOB.POllOF.POllOPB.POllOL + POllOF.POllOB.POllOPB.POl04L 
+ POlllB.POlllF .POIllPB.P0105L + P0105F .POIllB .POIIIPB .POI05L 
+P0106B.P01l2F.P01l2PB.POI06L + POI06F.P5IT2l3.P01l2PB.POI06L 
+IVP0120FC.IVP0120FO.IVP0120B.IVP0120S.IVP0120PB.IVP0120L 
+IVP0120B.IVP0120FO.IVP0120FC.IVP0120S.IVP0120PB.IVP0120L 
+CT0l20F.CT0120T.IVP0120FO.IVP0120S + BP0120B.BPOllOPB.BPOllOL 
+PP0120FSO.PP0120FM.PP0120L) 
.(POIOIB.POIOIF.POI02B.POI02F.PiIT03B.POfil3F.PDTIi4B.POI04F.POf05B.POI05F.POI06l3 
.P0106F.P01l3B.P01l3F.P01l4B.BPOllOB.IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOB.CTOllOF.PPOllOFSO) 
.(POIOIPB.P0101L + P0101L.POIOIPB + P0102PB.P0102L + P0102L.P0102PB 
+P0103PB.P0103L + POI03L.POI03PB + P0104PB.P0104L + POI04L.P0104PB 
+P0105PB.POf65L + POl05L.POI05PBPOI06PB.POI06L + POI06L.POI06PB 
+ IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOFO.IVPOIIOS.IVPOllOL + IVPOllOS.IVPOllOFO ."IV-"P"'O"l'lO"'P"'BD ."IV"P"'O"'l"lni'"OL 
+IVPOllOL.IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOS + BPOllOPB.BPOllOL + BPOllOL.BPOllOPB 
+PPOllOL.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM + PPOllOFM.PPOllOL.PPOllOFO)) 
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Numbe.- P.-Ime Impllcants 
1) P01l3PB.P01l3B.POI13F.POl13L 
2) POI13L.POl13B.P01l3F.P0113PB 
3) POlI4PB.P0114B.PQi'i41:'".POI14L 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
AND 
PO 10 lB. POlO1 F . PO 102 B. PO 102F . POl 03B. PO 103F . POlO4B . PO 104F POl OSB. P01 OSF PO I 06B. POl 06 F . PO 1138 . PO 113 F PO 1148 
.8POII0B.IVPOllOFC.IVP0110B.CT011OF .PPOlIOF SO.P0107B.P0107F .POI"OBB.P01O"8F". POI09B.P0109F .POllOB.FOlIOF 
.PO III B. POll I FPOlI2B. POl12F . BP0120B .IVPOI20F C. IVPOI20B. CTO 120F . P POl20F80 
OR 
POI018.POlOIF .P0101PB.POlOIL 1) POI07PB.POI07B. POlO7F .PO 107L 
POI 01 F. POIOI B .POI 0 1 PB. PO 10 lL 2) P0107L.P0107B.P0107F .P0107PB 
PPOIIOFSO.PPOIIOFU.PPOIIOFM 3) PP0120FM.PP0120FO.PPOI20F80 
.PPonoL .PPOI20L 
P01028.POI02F .P0102PB.P0102L AND 4) PO 1 08PB.POl 08B . POI08F . PO 108L 
P0102F.P0102B.POI02PB.P0102L 5) P0108L.P0108B.P0108F .P0108PB 
POl03B.P0103F .POlO3PB.P0103L 6) P0109P B. PO I 09 B. PO 109 F . POI 09L 
PO 1 03F . PO 103B . PO 103P B. P0103L 7) P0109L. PO 109 B . PO 109 F . PO 109P B 
lVPO 11 oB. IVPO 110FC . IVPOIIOFO .IVPO 110 P B 8) IVPO 120P8. IV PO 120FC .IV PO 120FO 
.IVP0110S.IVPOlIOL .IVPOI20B.IVP01205.IVP0120L 
IVPOllOFC.IVPO 1108 .IVPO llOFO. IVPOllOPB 9) IVPOl205 .IVPOI20B .IVP0120F 0 
.IVPOllOS.IVPOIIOL .IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20L 
CTOllOF.1 VPO llOFO . IV PO 1105. CTO 11 OT 10) IVPOI20L.IVP0120FQ 
.IV PO 1205. IVPO 120FC. IV PO 120B. IVPO 120P B 
POI048.P0104F .P0104PB.POI04L 11) POI10PB.POllOB .P0110F .POllOL 
POl 04F . PO 104B . PO 104 PB. PO 104L 12) POlIOL.POIIOB.POllOF .POll OPB 
POlOSB.POI05F .POlOSPB.POlOSL 13) POIIIPB.POlIlB .POIIIF .POlllL 
POlOSF .PO I 05B. POI OSPB. PO 105L 14) POIllL.POTiTB".POlIIF .POlllPB 
BP0110B .BPOllOPB. BPOIIOL 15) 8 P0120PB. BPOl20B . B PO 120L 
POl 06 B. PO l06F . PO 106P B .POl 06L 16) POI12PB.POlI2B.POI12F .P0112L 
POl 06F . P0106 8 . PO 106PB. PO 106L 17) POI12L.POI12B.P0112F .POI12PB 
18) PP0120L.PPOI20FO.PPOI20F80 
.PPOI20FM 
19) BPOI20L.BP0120B.BP0l20L 
AND 
.P01138 .P01l3F .F0114B.P0107B. POI07F .P01088. POlO8F .POI09B.P0109F .POIIOS .POll0F .POlI18.P0111F .POI128.POl12F 
.BPOI20B .IVP0120FC.IVP0l20B.CT0120F .PPoI20F SO 
OR 
POI07B.P0107F .P0107PB.POI07L 1) POI0IPB.POIOI B .FOlOIF .POlOIL 
POl 07F . Pol 078 . POl 07PB. PO I 07L 2) POlOIL.POIOIB.POIOIF.POIOIPB 
PPOI20FSO.PPOI20FO.PP0120FM 3) PP0110FM.PPOllOFO.PP011OFSO 
.PPOI20L .PPOllOL 
P0108B.P0108F .P0108PB.P0108L AND 4) P01 02PB. PO 1 028 . PO I 02F . PO I 02L 
POI08F .P0108B .POI08PB. P0108L 5) PO 102L. PO 1028 . PO 102F . PO 1 02P B 
P0109B.POI09F .POI09PB.P0109L 6) PO 103 Pa. P01 03B .PO 1 03F . POI 03L 
PO 1 09F .PO I 09B. P0109PB. PO 109L 7) POI03L.P0103B.P0103F .POI03PB 
IVPOl20B .IVPOI20FC .IVPOI20FO. IV PO 120P B 8) lVPOII0PB.IVPOltOFC .IVPOIIOFO 
.IVP0120S.IVP0120L .IVPOl108.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOL 
IVPO 120FC.IV P0l20B .IVP0120FO .IVPOI20PB 9) IVPOllOS.IVPOllOB .IVPOlI0F 0 
.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20L . IV POll OP B. IVPOII OFC.IV POllOL 
CTO 120F .IVP0120FO .tvpo 1208 . eTO 120T 10) IVPOIIOL.IVPOllOFO 
.IVPO 110S .IV POll OFC .IV pall OB. IV pall OPB 
POIIOB.POllOF .POTIQ1'">iJ.POIIOL 11) PO I 04PB. POl 04B. POI 04F . PO 104L 
POllOF. POlIO 8 . PCi1TOPB". PO 110L 12) PO 104 L.PO 104B .P0104F . PO I 04P B 
POllla.POIIIF .POIITP"S". POIllL 13) POI05PB. PQl05B .POI05F .POIOSL 
POIIIF.POIIIB.~.POllIL 14) POI05L.POI05B .POIOGF .POI05PB 
BP0120B. BP0120PB .8P0120L 15) BPOIIOPB. BPOl108 .BPOIIOL 
POI12B.P01l2F .POI12PB .POI12L 16) PO 106PB. POl 068. PO 106F . PO 106L 
P01l2F .POI 128 ,POl12PB.POl12L 17) P0106L.PO 106 B .PO 106F .Pot 06P B 
18) PPOIIOL.PPOlIOFO.PPOIIOFSO 
.PPOllOFM 
19) BPOlIOL.BPOlIOB. BPOllOL 
AND 
. P01l3B. POll3F . POTi4"B". POlO 1 B .POl 0 IF . P0102B. PO 102F . POlO3 B . PO I 03F . POI04B. PO 104F . POlOn 8. POlO5F . PO 106B . P0106F 
.BPOlIOB .IVPOlIOFC.IVPOllOB .CTOIIOF .PP01IOFSO 
Table D.24: Prime implicants for partial flow on the outflow line 
when flow is required in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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D.1.14 
PFOUTLF 
Partial Flow on Outflow Line when Low Flow is required 
POIOIB.POIOIF .POI02B.PiiTIi2F.POI03B.POI03F.POI04l3.l'OI04F.J5OI05B.Plff05l"'.PiiI06ll.POI06F 
.P01l3B.P01l3F.P01l4B.BPOllOB.IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOB.PPOllOFSO.CTOllOF.PPOllOFSO 
.((IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOL + IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOL 
.(P01l3PB.P01l3L + P0I13L.P01l3PB + P01l4PB.P01l4L + P0101PB.POf6iL + POI01L.P0101PB 
+P0102PB.POW2L + P0102L.P0102PB + POI03PB.POW2L + POl03L.P0103PB + POI04PB.P0104L 
+POI04L.P0104PB + P0105PB.l'OW5L + POI05L.P0105PB + POI06PB.POI06L 
+POI06L.P0106PB + BPOllOPB.BPOllOL + BPOllOL.BPOllOPB)).(ACTIVE.rD"'O"'RM""A""N"'T 
+DORMANT.PPOIIOFO.ACTIVE.PPOIIOFM.PPOIIOL)) 
+ P0107B.POI07F .POIOBB.POlO8l".POI09B.P5Ili9F.PlfiTIiB.POITOF.PDITiB.PliITfF.POIT2B.POlI2F 
.POl13B.POI13F.POlI4B.BPOI20B.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.PP0120FSO.CT0120F.PPOI20FSO 
.((IVPOI20S.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20L + IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20S.IVP0120PB.IVP0120L 
.(P0I13PB.P01l3L + P0I14PB.P01l4L + P0107PB.P0107L + POlOBPB.POTIi8L + POI09PB.P0109L 
+POllOPB.POllOL + POllIPB.PliITIL + POIl2PB.i'OTI2L + BPOI20PB.BP0120L)).(ACTIVE.rD"'O"'R"'M'A'N"""T 
+DORMANT.PPOI20FO.ACTIVE.PP0120FM.PPOI20L)) 
Number Prhne Implicants 
I) POI13P8.IVPOII0FO.POI13B .POI13F .POll3L.POIOIB .POlOIF .P01028 .P0102F .POI03B.P0103F .POI'04IJ.POI04F .POI058 
· PO 105F . POI06B. PO 106 F . PD1.14B. B POlIO B .IVPO 110FC .IVPO 110 B. P POll OFSO. eTO 110F "IVPO 11 OS. IVPO 110P B. IVPO 11 oL 
2) PO 113L. IV PO llOFO. PO 1138. P0113F . PO 113P B. PO'I'iTI'B. POIBIF.P0'I02i3. 'i"'6T5"2F. PO 1038 . 'PiIT'03F. ~.l"5'I'04'F. P'5Ti55B 
.POI05F.POI068.P0106F .POI14B.8POII08.IVPOllOFC.IVPOI tOB.PPOIIOFSO.eTOIlOF .IVPOllOS.IVPOllOPB.IVPOIIOL 
3) POll4P8.IVPOIl OFO. POl148 . PO 114 F . PCiII4L. PO 101 B . POIBIF. PO'I02i3. POfi)2"F. POI'53B. PO 1 03 F . Po'f04i3 .l"5'I'04'F. ~ 
.P0105F .PO 106 B. P0106F . POI13B. P0113F . B PO 11OB. IVPO 110FC .IV POll OB. P PO 11 OF SO. CTOIl OF . IV PO 11 OS.IVPO 11 OP B. IVPOIIOL 
4) POl 01 PB. IVPOll OFO. PO 101 B . POTIiTF. POlO 1 L. POi"02'B. POi02F. 'P6Tii'3B. PCi'I03F. PO 1 04B .l"5'I'04'F.P0I05i3. P'Oi'Osi'i' .POTO'6B 
· PO 106F . PO 113B. P0113F . PO 114B. B POIIOB.I V POll OFC .IVPO 11 OB. PPOllOFSO. CTO 11 OF .IVPO 110S .IVPO I lOP B.IVPO 11 OL 
5) PO lOlL. IV POll OFO. PO 1 01 B . PiITDfF. POlO 1 P B .PO'i"O'2B. POI"02'F. 'P6Tii'3B .~. PO 104B. P'O'i04F. POI05i3. P'Oi'Osi'i'. POi"06B 
· PO 1 06F . P0113B. PO 113 F . PO 114 B. B PO I lOB .IVPO 11OFC. IVPO 11OB. PPO 1IOFSO. CTO 110F .IVPOlIOS .IVPOIIOP 8.IV PO 110L 
6) POl 02PB.IVPOIl 0 FO. POi02B .Pcmi2F. PO 102 L.PO'iOfB. POIBIF. 'P6Tii'3B. PCi'I03F. P0104B. POTIi4F. POi'05B'. POI05F. i5"Cii'66B 
.POI06F'.POI13B.POlI3F .POlI4B.BPOII0B .IVPOllOFC .lVPOII0B .PPOIIOFSO .CTOllOF .lVP0110S .IVPOII0PB .IVPOIIOL 
7) POl 02L.IVPOll OFO. PO 1 02B . P0102F . Pol 02P B. P'OIOiB . POIBIF. ~. POI03F. PO 1 04B. POTIi4F.P1IT05B'. POI05F. j5'(j"f(j6B' 
· POl 06F . PO 1138 . POl13F . PO 1148. B POllOB .IVPO 11 OFC .IVPOll OB. PPOll OFSO. CTOll OF . IVPO 11OS. IVPO 11 OP B .IVPO 110L 
8) P0103PB. IVPOl1 OFO. PO 103B . Pol 03F . POl 03L. POTIiTB . POi"OTF.l"6T'02i3. Piffii2F. PO 104 8. POTIi4F. POIiiS'B. POI05F. POTO'6B 
.P0106F .POlI3B.POI13F .POI14B.BPOIlOB.IVPOII0FC.IVPOIIOB .PPOlI0FSO.CTOllOF .IVPOlIOS .IVPOllOP8.IVPOII0L 
9) PO 103L.IV POll OFO. PO t038. PO 1 03 F . PO 103P B.POTIITB. POi"OTF.l"6T'02i3. Piffii2F .PO I 04 B. POTIi4F. POIOSB. POI05F. POT'06i3 
· POI 06F . P01138. POl13F . POlI4B. B POll OB .IVPOll OFC .IVPOll OB. P PO 11 OF SO. CTOllOF .IV POll OS .IVPO 11 OPB .IVPO 110L 
10) POI04PB.IVPOlIOFO .P0104B .POI04F .PO 104L.POIOIB.~ .POI02B.~.POI03B.~ ."P01"05B'.'PO'f(i"gF .P0T'06i3 
· PO 1 06F . PO 113B . PO 113F . POI14B. 8 P01I08. IVPO 11 OFC .IV POll OB. P POllOFSO. eTOll OF . IV PO 1108. IVPO 110P B.IVPO lIOL 
11) pal 04L. IVPOll OFO .PO 1 048 . POI04F .P0104 P 8. POTIiTB _ P6IiiTF. POT02B' . 'i"'6T5"2F. PO 1 038. POI03F. PiIT05B'. P'5'I05F. PO'i'O'6B 
· PO 106F . PO 1138. POl13F . PO 1148. 8 POlIO 8. IV PO 110FC .IVPO I tUB. PPOlIOFSO. eTa 110F .IVPO 110S .IV PO 110P 8. IV PO 11 OL 
12) POI 05P 8. IVPOl1 OFO. POI05B . POlO5 F . P0105L.POTIITB. POTIITF'. P5I62i3. POfB2F'. POl 038. POTI53F'. 'POT54B'. POI04F'. P5T56B' 
.POlO6f .POlI3B.POI13F .POI14B.8POIIOB.IVPOIlOFC.IVPOIIOB.PPOIIOFSO.CT0110F .IVPOllOS.IVPOI10PB.IVPOI10L 
13) P0105L. IV POll OFO. PO 105B . PO 1 05F . PO 105P B. POTIiIB. POiOiF.l"6T'02i3. POi'02F. POl 03B. POTI53F'. P'5T'64B. POI04F'. P5T56B' 
· PO 1 06F .POI138. POl13F .PO 114B. BPO 110B .IVPOllOFC .IV POll OB. P PO 11 OFSO .CTO 11 OF .IV pall OS .IVPO llOP B.IVPOlI oL 
14) POI 06PB .IYPOll OFO. PO 1068 . PO I 06F . Pot 06L.POTIiIB . P6TIiTF. POI02B. POi'02F. PO I 038. POTI53F'. P'5T'64B. PoTIi4'F. POI05B 
· PO 1 05F . PO 113 B . PO 113F . POIT4i3. B pal lOB . IVPOl1 OFC .IVPO 11 OB. P POll OFSO. eTOll OF .IV PO 1108. IVPO 11OPB.IVPO 11 OL 
15) POI06L.IVPOll OFO. PO I 06B . PO 1 06 F . PO 1 06P B.POTIiIB. POiOiF. POI02i3. POi'02F. PO 103 B . POTI53F'. POTIi4B'j5(j'104F. POI05B 
.~.POIT3B'.POTI'3F'.POI14B.BP0IT0i3.IVPOllOFC.lVP01l0B.PPOllOFSO.CTOllOF .IYPOllOS.lVPOllOP8.IVPOllOL 
16) IVPOlIOS.IVPOllOFe.IVPOl108.IVPOllOFU.lVPOllOPB.IVPOIIOL.P010IB.POI01F.P0102B.~.P0103B 
.P0103F.P0104B.P0104F.POI05B.POI05F.~.POI06F.P01l3B.POI13F.POI14B.BPOIIOB.PPOIlOFSQ.CTOllOF 
17) BPOllOPB. IVP011 OFO. B PO 11 OB . 8PO 11 OL. P PO 11OFSO .POlO 1 B .PO 101 F . PO 102B. PO 102F . POI03B .PO I 03F . 'i"OTIi4'B. POIOiF" 
· POI 058. PO 105F . PO 1068 . POI06F . P01l38 . PO 113F . PO 114B .IVPOll OFC. IV PO 11 OB . eTa 11 OF .IVP011OS .IVPOll OPB. IVPOll OL 
18) BP011 OL.IVPOll OFO. 8POIIOB . BPOllOP B. P PO llOFSO. POl'O'rn',Pi)"f(i1"F. POI02B. P0102 F . POI03B. PO 1 03F . 'i"OTIi4'B .'POI04'F" 
.POI05B.POI05F .P0106B .POI06F.POl13B.POlI3F .POlI4B.IVPOllOFC.IVPOI10B .CTOllOF .IVPOII0S.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOllOL 
19) PPOllOFM.IVPOllOFO.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFSO.PPOllOL.P0101B.'Pi.ITOTF.PO'i'02B.~.P0103B.POT53'F.i50f04B·.PO'I04F 
· pal 058. POTIiSF'. POl 06B .POI06F. PO 113B. PO lI3F .P0114 B. 8PO 1108 .IVPO 11 OFC . IVPOllOB. CT011 OF .IVPOl1 OS. IVPOl1 OP B ."IV""P"O"I"I"OL" 
20) PPO 11 OL.IVPOI1 OFO. PPOll OFO. PPO llOFM . P POll OFSO .Pot 0 I 8. PO I 01 F . P0102 8. POI 02F . PO 1038 . POl 03F . PO 1048 .POI04F 
· PO 1 05B. PO 105F . PO 1 06B. PO 106F . PO 1138. PO 113F . PO 114 8.8 PO 110 B .lVPO 11 OFe .1 VPO 11 OB. eT011 OF .lVPOl1 OS.IV POllOPB ."IV"P"O"'I"I"O'L 
Table D.25: Prime implicants for partial flow on the outflow line when 
low flow is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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Number Prime Impllcants 
21) PO 113P B .IVPO 120FO. PO 1138 . PO 113F . POI13L. P0107B. P0107F . PO I 08B .PO 108F . PO 109B. PO 109F . PO 11 OB. POIT5"F. PO III B 
· PO III F . PO 112B. POl12F . PO 114B. BPOl20B .IVPO 120FC .IVPO 120B. PPO 120F80. CTO 120F .IV POl20S .IV POl20P 6 .IV PO 120L 
22) POI13L.IVPOI20FO.POI13B.P01l3F.POI13PB.~.'POIi57F.~.~.P0109B.POTIi9F.P'i5'IT013.POTI'OF.P0TITi3 
· PO 111 F . POU2B . PO 112F . POI14B. B PO 120B .IVPO 120 FC . IV P0l20B . PP0120F80. CTOl20F .IVPO 1208 .IVPO 120P B .IV PO 120L 
23) P0114PB .IV POI20FO. PO 114B . P0114 F . PO I14L. PO 1076. PiITD7F. 'P'0108B'.~. 'P01'59i3. POTIi9F. P'i5'IT013. POiIOF. POTITi3 
.POlll F . P0112B. POl12F . PO 113B. PO 113F . BPOl20B .IVPOI20FC .IVPO 120B. PPOl20FSO .IV PO 120S. IVPO 120P B .IVPO 120L 
24) PO 1 07P BJVPOl20FO .PO 1 07B . P0107F. PO I 07L. Pii"f0813. PO"i'58'F. 'PoTIi9B. POTIi9F. PO 11OB. POITIiF. POiT'iB. POITfF. POI"i2B 
· PO 112 F . PO 113B. PO 113F . P0114B .BPOI20B . IVP0120FC .IVP0120B. P PO 120FSO. eT0120F . IVPO 1205. IVPO 120P B. IV P0l20L 
25) POI 07L. IVPO 120FO. POl 07B . PO 1 07F . P0107 PB. POIOSB'. PO"i'58'F. POi:09'B'. POTIi9F. PO 110B . POITIiF.P0TITi3. POTITF". POI"i2B 
.PO 112F . POl13B .PO 113F . PO 114B. BPOl20B .IVPO 120FC. IVPO 120B .PPO 120F80. CTO 120F . IV POl20S .IVPO 120P 6 .IVPO 120L 
26) PO 108PB .IVPOI20FO. POI08B . POI 08F. PO 1 08L.'PiITO'fB.POI07F .POI08B .Pi5'i'Ci8F' . PO 109B .~ .PCiIITB. POTITF .POI"i2B 
.POlI2F.POI13B.POI13F.POlI4B.~.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.PP0120FSO.CT0120F.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB.IVP0120L 
27) POIOSL.IVP0120FO.POI08B.POI08F .POI08PB.POIOfS'.P<iT07F.POiQ8'a'.POTIi8F.POI09B.POI09F.Pi5ITiB.~.Po'fI'2'B 
.POI12F .POl13B.POI13F .POlI4B.BP01206 .IVPOI20FC .IVPOI20B.PPOI20FSO.CTOI20F .IVP0120S.IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20L 
28) POl 09PB. IVPOI20FO. POI09B . P0109 F. PO 1 09L. POI'07i3. 'PiITO'fF.i"1iT08i3. POi."OsF. PO 11 OB. POITIiF. POiT'iB. POiTi'F. POI"i2B 
.PO 112F . POII3B. P0113F . 'PiITI"4'B.BPOI20B. IVP0120FC. IVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO. CTO 120F . IV PO 120S .IV PO 120P 6 .IVPO 120L 
29) PO 1 09 L.IVP0120FO. PO I 09B . POI 09F . PO 1 09PB . POI'07i3.'PiITO'fF. ~ .'P'01'08F. POllOB. j5(j'ff{jF. PCiiTI'B. POfITF .PO'i'I2B 
.POI12F.POl13B.POI13F.POl14B.~.IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.PPOI20FSO.CT0120F.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20L 
30) POIlOP B .IVP0120FO. PO 110B .POllOF . PO 11OL. PO"i07B'. POI07F. 'j5(ij'Q8'B' .POi."OsF. PO 109 8. POIO§F. PCiiTI'B. POiTIF. POI"i2B 
.PO 112F . PO 113B. POl13F . P0114B. BPO 1206. IVP0120FC .IVPO 120B. PPO 120FSO. eTO 120F . IV PO 1208 .IVPO 120P 6 .IV PO 120L 
31) POll OL .IV PO 120FO .PO 11 OB. POllOF . PO 11 OP B.'j'5'ij"fij'fB.POTIi7F .J5Oi08I3 .POT08F . POl 09B .'POi'09F.POITT'B.'J5'OTIT1i' .P0Tf2i3 
· POl12F . PO 113B. PO I13F . POI14B. B P0120B .IVPO 120FC. IVP0120B. P P0120FSO. eTO 120F .IVPO 120S. IVPOl20P 6. IV P0120L 
32) PO 111 P B .IVPOI20FO. PO 111 B . POll1 F . PO 111 L. PiiI07B.PO'iO'7F.~. POi."OsF. PO 109B . POTIi9F. P'i5'IT013. POiTIW.PO'i"f2B' 
.PO 112 F . POl13B .PO 113F . PO 1148. BP0120B .IVPOI20FC .IVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO. eTO 120F . IV P0120S .IVPO 120P B.IV PO 120L 
33) POl11 L. IVPO 120FO. PO III 8 . POll 1 F . PO III PB . POI07I'f. 'PiITO'fF. PQ'iti8S'. POi."OsF. P0109 B. POI09F. PiITTIiB. POiIOF .PO'i"f2B' 
.P0112F .POI13B .POl13F .POI14B.8P0120B .IVP0120FC .IVPOI20B.PPOI20FSO.eTOI20F .IVP01208.IVP0120PB.IVP0l20L 
34) P0112PB.IVP0l20FO. PO 112B . 'PiIT'i'2'F. PO 112 L. POIO"fS'. P5TIi7F. P'i:iIOBB'. POIOSF. PO 109 B. POIO'§F. PiITTIiB. POiIOF. 'P5TIIB 
· PO 111 F . P01138. P0113F . PO 1148. B PO 120B. IVPOl20 FC .IVPO 120B. PPO 120FSO. eTO 120F . IV P0120S .IVPO 120P B.IV PO 120L 
35) PO 112L. IVP0120FO. POI12B. PO 112F .PO 112P B.P'OfO'fl'J'. POI07F. 'PoT08B'. POT08F. P0109B. 'POi'09F. P'i5'IT013. POiIOF. POTII'B 
.PO III F . POi'I'3'B'. J50TI'3'F. 'j5j'j'i"i4B. BP01208 .IVPO 120FC .IVPO 120B. P P0120FSO. CT0120F .IV PO 1208. IV PO 120P B .IVPO 120L 
36) IVPOI20S.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.IVPOI20FO .IVPOI20PB .IVP0120L.P0107B .P0107F .POI08B.PiiT'08'F .P0109B 
.POI09F .POIIOB.POI10F .POllIB.POI11F .'P0IT2i3.POI'I2F.P01l3B.P0113F. P0114B.BPOI20B .PP0120FSO.CTOI20F 
37) BPO 120P B. IVPOI20FO. BP0120B . 8 P0120L. PP0120FSO. POI 07B. PO 107F .POI 08B . PO 1 08F . PO 1 09 B . POIO'§F. POIIO'B. PoITIi'F 
· PO III B. POlll F . PO 112B . P0112F .Pi5IT3B', PO 113F . PO 114B. IVP0120FC .IVPO 120B. eTO 120F .IV P0120S. IVPO I20PB. IVP0120L 
38) 8P0120L. IV P0120FO. B PO 120B. BP0120P6. P P0120FSO . PO 1 07B. PO 107 F . P0108B .PO 108F . PO 109B. P0109 F . PO 11OB. P01lO F 
.POIIIB.POI11F.P0112B.~.'PiTIT3B'.POIT3F.P0114B.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B.CT0120F 
39) PP0120FM.IVP0120FO.PPOI20FO.PPOI20FSO.PP0120L.POI07B.~.POiOsB.POI08F.POI09B.~.PO'iTOB.POiTi)F' 
· POlll B. PO 111 F . PO 112 B . 'PiIT'i'2'F. PO 113B. PO 113F . P0114 B. B P0120B . IV PO 120FC .IV PO 120B. eTO 120F . IVPO 120S .IVP0l20PB. IVPOl20L 
40) PPOI20L.IVP0120FO.PP0120FO .PPOI20FM .PP0120FSQ .POI07B.P0107F .P0108B.POI08F .P01098 .P0109F .POII0B.POIIOF 
· PO 111 B. PO 111 F . POI12B. PO 112F . P0113B. PO 113F .PO 114 B. BPO 120B. IVPO 120FC. IVP0120B. CT0120F .IV P0120S.IV PO 120PB .lVPO 120L 
Table D.26: Prime implicants for partial flow on the outflow line when 
low flow is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Number Prime ImpIlcants 
I) P POll OFO. POI13PB. IVPOllOFO. POl13B . PO 113F . P0113L .PO 101 8. PO 101 F . PO 102B. P0102F . PO 103B. PO 103F .PO 104B. PO 104F 
· POI05B. 'P'OTi55F j 50Iii'6'B'. PO 106F . PCiIi"4S'. BPO 110B . IVPO llOFC. IVPO 11OB. P POll OF80. CTO 110F . IVPO llOS.IVPO 11 OP B 
.IVPOIlOL .PPOI10FM.PPOIlOL 
2) PPOI10FO.POlI3L.IVPOllOFO.P01136.POI13F.'POT'i3J5B.P5TIiI'B.POIOIF.PO'i'02B.~.POI03B.PO'I'03F.P0'f(i48.~ 
· 'POi'058 .'P'OTi55F. i'>OI'06B. PO 1 06F . POI14B. 8 POlIO B. IVPO llOFC. IV POllOB. P PO 11 0 F sO. CTO 110F . IVPO 1108. IVPO 11 OP B 
.IVPOllOL.PPOlI0FM.PPOllOL 
3) P POll OFO. P0114PB. IVPOl1 OFO. P0114B .PO 114F . P0114L .P5TIiI'B. POIOIF. PO'i'02B. 'PO'iCi2'F. P'6TO'3"S'. PO 1 03F .POI04B .~ 
.'P0i'058.POIOsF .POTIi6B .POl 06F .POI13B.P 0 113F . B PO 1108 . IVPOll OFC. IVPO 11 08. P PO llOFSO. CTO 110F . IVPOll OS. IV PO 110P 8 
.IVPOIlOL.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
4) PPOII0FO.POlOIPB.IVPOIlOFO.POI0IB.POIOIF.P'OiOfL.POI02B.'PO'iCi2'F.POI03B.~.P0104B.~.P'0i05i3.'P61"05'F 
· POTIi6B. POTIi6F. P'O'IT3B. PO 113F . PO 114B. B PO IIOB . IVPOll OFC . IV PO 11OB. P PO 11 OF sO. CTO 110F .IVPO 1108. IVPO 110P B 
.IVPOlIOL.PPOlI0FM.PPOllOL 
5) PPOI10FO .PO 10 I L .lVPO 11 OFO .POl 0 1 B .PO 101 F .POTIITPB' .P0I02i3 .PO'i7J2F .Pii'I'03'B .'P(ii'6"3'F. P0104B.'POTIiiF .POI05B .'i5Oi"55F 
.POI06B.POTIi6F.POI'I'3lJ.POl13F .PCiIi"4S'.BPOllOB.IVPOIlOFC.IVPOI10B.PPOl10F SO.CTOllOF .IVPOI10S.IVPOllOPB 
.IVPOIIOL.PPOll0FM.PPOllOL 
6) PPOII0FO.P0102PB.IVPOI10FO.POI02B.POI02F.'PoI'52E'.P5TIiI'B.~.PO'i"03B.'POI03F'.POI04B.~.POI05B.POTIi5F 
.POTIi6B.POTIi6F.POTI'3'B.POI13F .P0114B.8POUOB .IVPOllOFC .IVPOI10B.PPOUOF SO.CTOIlOF .IVPOII08.IVPOl10PB 
.IVPOlI0L.PPOII0FM .PPOllOL 
Table D.27: Prime implicants for partial flow on the outflow line 
in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 1 
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Number Prime Impllcants 
7) P POllOFO .PO 102L. IVPOIIOFO. POl 02B . PO 102F . P0102P B . POlO I B. PO 10 1 F .POi."53B. PO 103F . PO 1 04 B. PO 104F . PO 105B. POl 05F 
.P5TIi6B.~.POII3B'.POI13F.POlI4B.BPOllOB.IVPOI10FC.IVPOIIOB.PPOllOFSO.CTOllOF.IVPOllOS.IVPOIlOPB 
.IVPOllOL.PPOllOFM.PPOIIOL 
8) PPO 11 OFO. PO 1 03P B .IVP01I OFO.POTIi3B" . PO 1 03F . PO'i031'.:'. POIOIB. J5'OIOI'F. 'P5'f02'Er .POI'6'2'F. POI 048. POI"04F.PO'i'05'B. ~ 
.P5TIi6B.~.POII'3B.POl13F.POl14B.BPOI10B.IVP0l10Fe.IVPOlIOB.PPOI10FSO.CTOIIOf .IVPOlIOS.IVPOI10PB 
JVPOllOL.PPOllOFM.P POllOL 
· POI06B. P01"06'F J'oITal1. PO I13F .POfi"4"S'. B P01IOB J VPO 11 OFC . IVPOllOB.P PO 11 OFSO. CT0110F . IVPO 11OS.IVPO 11 OPB 
.IVPOllOL.PPOI10FM.PPOlIOL 
10) PPO llOFO. P0104PB.IVPOllOFO. POI 046 . PO 1 04 F .'i'>6TIi4L. POIOi'B. J5'OIOI'F. PQi"i52lj .POI'6'2'F. POI 03B. 'POT'03F'. ~.~ 
.POI06B.~.PiiTI3i3.POl13F.POI14B.BPOI10B.IVPOllOFC.IVPOlI0B.PPOII0FSO.CTOllOf .IVPOlIOS.IVP0l10PB 
.IVPOIlOL.PPOIIOFM .PPOl10L 
11) PPOIl ON. PO 1 04 L. IVPOllOFO. PO I 04 B .PO 1 04F . Po'i"04P'B. POIOi'B .POTIiiF. POI02B. PO'IO"2F. PO 1 03 B. 'POiii3F. PiITOSB. POTIi5F 
· 'PO'i06B. POI"06"F.~. POl13F .Pi5'iI4'S'. B PO 110B .IVPO 110FC . IVPO 11 OB. P POll OFSO. CTO 110F . IVPO 11OS. IVPOII OP B 
· IV POllOL. P POll OF M. PPO 11 OL 
12) PPOIIOFO. P0105PB.IVPOlIOFO .POI 05B . PO 1 05F . Pi5T55"L. POIOi'B. POTIiiF. PQi"i52lj. POI'6'2'F. P0103B.'POT'03F'. 'Pi5I04B. PiIT04F 
.POI06B .POTIi6F .POIT31T .POl13F .POI14B .BPOllOB .IVPOllOFC .IVPOII08 .PPOlI0FSO .CTOllOF .IVPOIlOS.IVPOIlOPB 
.IVPOIIOL.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
13) PP0110FO.POl05L.IVPOllOFO.P0105B.POI05F.~.POTIiIB.POTIiiF.'P6IQ"2'B'.POTIi"2'F.P01038.~.'Pi5I04B.~ 
.P0i'06i3. POTIi6F. POi1"3I3 .POl13F . PO 114 B. SPOIl OB. IV POll OFC .IV POlIOS. PPOllOFSO. CTO 110F .IVPO 11 OS. IV POll OPB 
· IV POllOt. P POll OFM. PPO 11 OL 
14) PPO 11 OFO. POI OOP 8. IVPOll OFO. PO 106B . PO I06F .'PoI06L.POlOTB .J5OIiiTF .Pi5I'02l!.POTIi"2'F .PO 103B .POii53F.P0T04i3 .POI"04F 
· POIOSB. PO'i'05F. POII3B'. PO 113F . POl14B . 8PO 11 08 .IVPO 11 OFC. IVPO 11 OB.P POllOFSO. CTO llOF . IVPO 1108. IVPOll OP B 
.IVPOl tbL.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
15) PPOlI0FO.P0106L.IVPOI10FO.P0106B.POI06F.~.POlOTB.J5OIiiTF.~.POTIi"2'F.POl03B.~.POI04§'.~ 
· POIOSB. PO'i'05F.POi1'3B', PO 113F . poIT41L B POll 08. IVPO 11 OFC. IVPOllO B. P POllOFSO . CTO 1101 . IVPOll OS.IVPO 11 OP 8 
.IVPOIIOL.PP011OFM.PPOIlOL 
16) P POllOFO .IVPOl1 OS. IV POll OFe . IVPO 110B .IVPOllOf 0 .IVPO 11OPB. IV PO 11 OL. PO 10 1 B . PO 101F . P5T02i3. POi02F. PO 103B 
· P<iT03'F. PO 1048. PO 104F .PO I 05B. PO 105F . P01068. POl 06F . P01138. PO 113F . POI14B. 8PO IIOB. P POll OFSO .CTOllOF 
.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
17) PPOllOFO.BPOI10PB.IVPOllOFO.BPOI108.BPOlIOL.PPOllOFSO.P01018.POIOIF.POlO'2B.POI02F.POTIi3B.POI"03'F.~ 
· POT04'F. POTIiS'B. PiIT05F'. PO 1 068. POI 06F . PO 1138. PO 113F . PO 114B.IV POIIOFC. IVPO 11 08. CTO 110F .IVPO IIOS .IVPOll OPB 
.IVP01 tOL.PPOI10FM .PPOllOL 
18) PPOllOFO.8POlIOL.IVPOlIOFO.BPOlIOB.8P011OPB.PPOllOFSO.P010IB.POTIITF'.~.POI02F.P0I'03i3.PO'i"O'3F.~ 
· POT04'F. POI'B5i3. P'Oi155F .POl 06B. POT06F. POlI3B. POl13F . PO 114B .IVPOll OFe. IVPOllOB. CTOilOF. IV POll OS .IV PO 11 OP 8 
.IVP0110L.PP0110FM.PPOllOL 
19) P P0120FO. POl13PB .IVPOI20FO. PO 113 6 .PO 113F . POiT3i:. POTI57B. POIii"7'F. POTIi8B'. Pii'I'08'F. PO 109 B. POI09F. Pi5ffOi3. POfiOF 
.POlI1B.POIIIF.POl12B.POI12F.POI14B.BPOI20B.IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.PP0120FSO.CTOI20F.IVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB 
· IV PO 120L.P PO 120FM. P P0120L 
20) PP0120FO. PO 113L. IVPO 120FO. P01l3B .PO 113F . PoiT3PB. POTI57B. POI07F. PoTIi8'B. Pii'I'08'F. PO 109B.POI09F. Pi5ffOi3. POfiOF 
· POITIB. POiTiF. POTI2iJ. PO 112F . POl14 B. B PO 120B. IVP0120FC .IV PO 120B. PPO 120FSQ. CTO l20F .IVPO 1208. IVP0120P B 
.IVPOI20L. PPOl20FM . PPO 120L 
21) P POI20FO. POll4P B .IVP0120FO. ~. POl14F . PO 114L. POTIi7i3. POIii"7'F. PoTIi8'B. P01"08F. POTIi9B.150W§'F. POfi'OB'. PO 11 OF 
.POITIB. POiTiF. P"5Ii2B' .PO 112F . POi13B'. PO l13F .BPOI20B .IV POl20F C. IVPO 120B. PPO 120FSO .IV P0120S. IVPO 120P8 
.IVPOI20L.PPOI20FM.PP0120L 
22) P P0120FO. PO 1 07P B .IV POI20FO. POfO"71J . PO 107F .POT57I:'. PCiIO'SB .Pii'I'08'F .~. POI09F. POll OB.J5OTIOF. POi'iTB.POITfF 
.~.POIT2F.PlITT3B'.POI13F .POI146.BPOI20B.IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B .PPOI20FSO.CT0120F .IVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB 
.IV P0120L. PPOl20FM . PPO 120L 
23) PP0120FO .POlO7L.IVP0120FO. PO 107B . PO I 07F . 'POi'Q7i5B. PCiIO'SB. POi"08"F. P'OT59i3. POTIi9F. POll OB.J5OTIOF. POIITB .POTiTF 
· 'P6TI2i3.POIT2'F. POIT3B' .PO ll3F . PCiTI4H.B P0120B .IVPO 120FC . IVP0120B. P P0120FSO. CTOI20F . IV P0120S. IV PO 120P 8 
.IVPOI20L.PP0120FM.PP0120L 
24) PPOI20FO. PO 1 08PB. IV POI20FO. ~ .PO 108F . POT08L. P6TIi7i3. POTIi1F. PCiTIi81J. 'P5I'08'F. PO 1 09B. P5'TIi9F. POi'iTB.POITfF 
· 'P6TI2i3.POIT2'F .PO'iT3'S, PO 113F . POI14B. BPO 120B .IVP0120FC. IVPO 120B. PPO 120FSO. eTO 120F .IVPO 120S. IVPO 120P B 
· IVPOI20L. PP0120FM . PPO 120L 
25) PP0120FO .POl 08L. IVP0120FO. PO 108 B . PO 1 08F . ~. P6TIi7i3. POTIi1F. POT08B'. 'P5I'08'F. POI 09 B. POI09F. POTiTB. POITi'F 
· 'P6TI2i3.PiIT'i2F. P01l3 B. PO 113F . PO 114 B. B POI20B. IVPO 120FC .IV P0l20B. PP0120FSO. CT0120F . IVPOI20S. IV PO l20PB 
.IVP0120L.PP0120FM.PP0120L 
26) P POI20FO. PO 1 09PB. IV P0120FO. PO 1 09B . PO 109 F .POi"59"L.POI'57'B.Pi5I07'F ."POI'OB'B.POi'OB'F . POll 08 .P'6'IIOF . POi'iTB.POITi'F 
· P'Oi:T2B. PiIT'i2F. POTI3B'. POl13F . P01148. BPO 120B .IVPO l20FC . IVPO 120 B . P PO 120FSO. CTO 1201 .IVPO 120S. IVPO 120P B 
· IVPO 120L. PP0120FM . PPO 120L 
27) PPO 120FO. P0109L.IVPOI20FO. PO 109B . PO 1 09 F .P0'iQ9i5i3. POiO'fB .POTIi1F. 'i'i'O'I08B'. 'P5I'08'F. P01IOB .J5OTIOF. POTITB. POITIF 
· P0112 B. PO 112F . POlI3B. PO 113F . PO 114B. BP0120B .IVPO 120FC .IV P0120B. P P0120FSO. CT0l20F . IV POl20S .IVPO 120P B 
.IVPOI20L.PP0120FM.PP0120L 
28) PP0120FO. PO 11 OPB. IVP0120FO. PO 110B . POll OF . PO"i1:OL. POiO'fB. POIO'fF. PiiTIiBS'. Pii'I'08'F. POI 09B. POI09F. POTiTB. POITIF 
.PCi'iT2"B .PiIT'i2F. 'j5(j"ff3B' .POlI3F . P01148. BPO 120B .IV P0120FC .IVPO 120B. P PO 120FSO. CTO 120F .IVPO 120S. IVPO 120PB 
.IVPOI20L.PP0120FM .PPOI20L 
29) PPO 120FO. POll OL. IVPO 120FO. PO 1108. POllOF . POTf5P'B. P"OTO'fB. POIO'fF. P'OI08B'. 'P5I'08'F. POI 09B. POi"09F . POTITB.~ 
.P0112B .POI12F .POlI3B .POll3F .~.BP0120B .IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.PP0120FSO.CT0l20F .IVP0120S.IVP0120PB 
.IV POI20L. P POl20F M. PPO 120L 
Table D.28: Prime implicants for partial flow on the outflow line 
in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 2 
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30) PPOI20FO.POIIIPB.IVPOI20FO.POIIIB .POIIIF .POIIIL.POI07B.P0107F .POI08B.P0108F .P0109B.P0109F .POII0B.POIlOF 
.~.POIT2F.j5"jjff3jj.POI13F.POI14B.BPOI20B.IVP0120FC.IVPOI20B.PPOI2OFSO.CTOI20F.IVP0120S.IVPOI20PB 
· IVPO 120L. PPOl20FM . P P0120L 
31) PPOl20F O. PO III L.IVPO 120FO. PO 1118 . PO III F .PofiT'PB. PiiTIffi3. J5""OI07F j'OTOStf. POT68F. PO I 09 B. J50Iii9"F. PO'iTOB. POi1OF 
· PCiT'f28. POIT2"F. P"OiT3B". PO 113 F . POI14B. SPO 120B. IVPO 120FC. IVPO 120B. PPOI20FSO. CTO 120F . IVPOI20S.IV PO 120PB 
.IVPOI20L .PP0120FM .PPOI20L 
32) P PO 120FO. POI12PB. IVPOI20FO. POl12 B . POl12F . POIT2t. POf07i3. POTi57F. PQTIi8i'j. POT68F .PO 1 09B.J5OIii9"F. PO'iTOB. POi1OF 
· POiITB. PiifiTF. PiIT"i3B. POl13F .PO 1148. B P0120B .IV P0120FC . IV PO 120B.P PO 120FSO. CT0120F .IVPOI20S. IVP0120PB 
.IVP0120L.PPOI20FM.PPOI20L 
33) PPOIZOF O. PO 112L. IVP0120FO. PiITi2B. POl12F . P6'iT2"PB. PiiTIffi3. POTi57F. PCiTIi8i3. POT68F. PO I 09B. POi"O§"F. PO'iTOB. POi1OF 
.P0TII8 .PiifiTF.~ .POI13F .POI14B .BP0120B .IVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.P P0120FSO.CT0120F .IVPOI20S.IVPOI20PB 
.IVPOI20L.PP0120FM.PP0120L 
34) PP0120FO. IVPOI20S. IV P0120 FC . IVPOI20B. IV PO 120FO. IV PO 120PB. IVPO 120L. PO 107B. POI 07F . PO 1088. PO"i08F 
.POI09B.""PiITii"9F".PCi'iTOB".POIIOF .POIIIB.POI11F .POI128.P0112F .POl13B.P01l3F .POlI4B.BPOI20B.PPOI20F sO 
.CT0120F.PP0120FM.PPOI20L 
35) P PO 120FO .BPOI20P 8 .IVP0120FO .BP0120B .BPOI20L .PPO 120F SO . PO 1078. POTI5'7F.POi"0813. PO I 08F .P0I"09i3.P'Oi"09F .P0TI0i3 
.P"5TIOF. PiITIIB .POfITF. P01l2 8 .FO 112F . PO 1138 . P0113F . PO 1148 .IV POI20FC. IVPOI20B. CTOl20F .IVPO 1208. IV PO 120P 8 
.IVPOI20L.PPOI20FM.PPOI20L 
36) PPO 120FO. 8 POI20L.IV PO 120FO. B PO 120B . B POl20P B. P PO 120FSO. PO 1078. PDTIi7F. POlO88. POI 08F .POI 09B . PO 1 09 F .PO 1108 
.POII0F .POTITB.PiITITF.POl12B.POI12F .POI13B.POlI3F .POI148.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20B 
.CTOI20F .PP0120FM.PPOI20L 
Table D.29: Prime implicants for partial flow on the outflow line 
in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 3 
D.1.l5 High Flow at PSVOllO 
HFPSVOllO (POI03B.POIOIB.POIOIF.POIOIPB.POIOIL.P0102B.P0102F.POI02PB.POI02LPOI15B.POI15F 
.POI15PB.POI15L.POI16B.POI16F.POI16PB.POI16L.POff7il.POff'iF.PPOIIOFSO.PPOIIOFM 
.PPOlIOL.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOS.PSVOllOL.P0103F.P0103L.POI03PB 
+(.POfOIB.POIOIF.POlOIPB.POIOIL.P0102B.POI02F.POI02PB.POIO2L.P01l5B.P01l5F 
.POI15PB.POI15L.POI16B.P01l6F .POI16PB.P01l6L.POI17B.P01l7F .PPOllOFSO .PPOllOFM 
.PPOlIOL.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOS.PSVOIIOL.POI03F.P0103L.IVPOlIOL 
.IVPOllOS).(POI04B.POI04F.P0104PB.POI04L + POI05B.POI05F.POI05PB.P0105L.P0104L 
+POI06B.P0106F.POI06PB.POI06L.POI04L.POI05L + IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOB.IVPOlIOPB 
+POI13B.POI13F.POI13PB.P01l3L.BPOIIOL.POI04L.POI05L.POl06L 
+POI14B.PciIT4F.POI14PB.POI14L.BPOIIOL.POW4L.l'5TIi5L.POI06L.POI13L 
+CTOllOF.CTOIIOT.IVPOIIOFO + BPOIIOB.BPOIIOPB.BPOIIOL.POI04L.POI05L).(ACTIVE.DORMANT)) 
+DORMANT.PPOllOFO.ACTIVE.POIOIB.POIOIF.POIOIPB.POIOIL.POI02B.POI02F.POI02PB.POI02L 
.POiI5B.POll5F.POlI5PB.POI15L.POI16B.POl 16F .POlI6PB .POI16L.POlI7B .POI17F .PPOlIOFSO ."'P"'PO"'I'"I"'OF"'M' 
.PPOllOL.PSVOllOlSC.PSVOllOB.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOS.PSVOllOL.POI03F.POI03L 
j 50ITSF. POiT5"PB. POTI5i:.PO"iT6B"j'OIT6F .POTI"6P13. PO 116L. POll 78. POll 7P B . PSVO llOISC. PS VOllOB . P SV O1lOP B 
.PSVOl10S.PSVOl10L.PPOl10FSO.PPOl10FM.FPOI10L 
2) POl 04 B. P0104F . PO 104P B. P0104L. POI 01 8. PO 10 1 F . POlO 1 P B. PO lOlL. PO 103F . PO 103L. POI02 B .1"5TIi2F. PO 102P B 
· P0102'L .POIT5B. POl'i'5"F. PiITI"5Pi3. P6'iT5[ .POIT6Ei. 'PoTI6F. POi"i6"PB. POfi""6"L. POTI7i3 .POI11P B. IVPO 11 OL."IV"P"O'"I"l"OS" 
· P SVO llOISC .PSVOllO 8. PSVO 11 opS. PSVOll os. PSVO 11 OL. P POllOFSO. P POll OFM. P POll oC 
3) POI 05 B. PO 105F .POl OSP B. PO 1 osL. PO 1 01 B. PO 101 F . PO 10 1 P8. POIOfL. PO 1 03 F . P01 03L. PO 1 028 .1"5TIi2F. POTQ2i5B 
· P0102L. Pi5'iT5B. POIISF. POiI5PJj. POTI5i:. POIT6Ei. POiT"6F.POI16PB .P5TI6L. POTI7i3. POll 7P B .IV PO 110L."IVO"P'"O"'1"'''OS'' 
· PSVO 11 OISC. PSVO 11 OB . PS V 011 OP 8. PS VOll OS.PS VOIl OL. P PO 1IOFSO. PPO 11 OFM . PPO 11 OL. PO 104L 
Table D.30: Prime implicants for high flow at PSVOllO 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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4) POl 06B. PO 106F . P0106PB. PO 106L. POlO 1 B . PO 10 1 F . POlO 1 PB. PO 10 1 L. P0103F . PO 103L. PO 1028 . PO 102F . PO 102P B 
· 'POI02'L. POIT5B. PiITT'5'F. 'POIT'5'P'B.POITSL. PiITT6i3. POIT6"F. Pii'IT6PH.POTI'6'L. POIT'fB. PO 11 7P B . IVPO 11 OL."IVO'P"O"'I"I"OSO 
· PSVO llOlSC . PSVOll OB. PSVOll OPB. PS VOll OS. PS VO 11 OL. P PO 11 OFSO. P PO llOF M . P POll OL. Pol 04L. PO 105L 
5) POl13B.POI13F .POI13PB.POI13L.POI0IB .POI01F .POlOIPB .P0101L.P0103F .POI03L.P0102B.~.P0102PB 
· 'POI02'L. POIT5i3. POiT5F. 'POIT'5'P'B. POITSL. PiITT6i3. PiIT'i6F. Pii'IT6PH. POTI'6'L. POII7B. POl17P B. IV P0120L .~IV"P"O'"I;;I"OSO 
.PS VO 1 iOlse .P S V01I OB .P S VO 11 OP B. PSVO 11 OS. PSV OllOL. PPOllOFSO. PPO 11 OFM . PPOllOL. PO 104L. POI 05L. PO I 06L 
.8POllOL 
6) POl14B.POlI4F .POl14PB.POlI4L.POlOIB .P0107F .P0101PB .P0101L.P0103F .P0103L.P0102B.~.P0102P8 
· 'POI02'L. POTI5i3. ~. 'POIT'5'P'B. POITSL. PiITT6i3 .POI1'6F. POiT6J5'B. P0116L. PO 117B. POl17P B. IVPOl1 OL.~IV:'P"O"'I"I"OS" 
· PS VO I WIse. PS VOII OB .PSVO 1 lOP B. PSVO 11 OS. PSVOll OL. PPOll OFSO. PPO 11 OFM . PPOlI OL. P0104L. POI 05L. P0106L 
.POI13L.BP011OL 
7) IVPO 11 OFC."IV"P"O"'I"I"O"FO". IVPOllOB .IVPO 11 OS. IVPOllOPB. PO 1 0 lB. Pol 0 1 F . POIOIJS"[J. POlOI L. P0103F .PO 103L. PO 102 8 
· ~. PCi'I02'l5B .P0102L. POTI'5'B. POi'ISF. PQIT5i5'li. POiTSL. P7IT'I6B'. POIT6F. POTI'6'PB'. PO 116L. P0117B. POll 7P B .fIV"P""O!"I"O"L 
.P8VOl10ISe.P8VOI10B.PSV0110PB. P8V0110S.PSV0110L.PPOllOFSO.PPOI10FM. PPOl17L 
8) IVPOIIOB.IVP01IQFC .IVPOlI0Fo.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOPB.POlOIB .POlOIF .POlOI PB.POlOIL.P0103F .P0103L.P0102B 
· P'Oi'O"2F .PCi'I02'l5B.~ .POiT513.POi'ISF .PCiTf5'i5'B.P'6TI5I:'.POIl6'B".POTI'6'F .POII6PB. PO 116L. PO 117B. PO ll7P B .fIV""P"O I"I"O"L 
· PSVO 1101SC. PSV011 OB. PS V011 OP 8. PSVO 11OS. P S V011 OL. PP011OFSO. PPOllOF M . P PO 11 OL 
9) CTOllOF .IVP011OFO .IVPOllOS.CT0110T. POI07B.POlOIF .POI0IPB .POlOIL.P0103F .P0103L.'PO'I02B.PiIT02F.P0102PB 
· P'iIT02"L. PCi'iT5i3. ~. PoIi'5'Pi3. POi"i'5I:'. Pi5lTIiB. P5TI'6'F. POiT6'P13.POli6L. POll 7B. PO 117P B. IVPO 11 OL 
.P8VOliOlSe.PSVOI10B.PSVOI10PB.PSV0110S.PSV0110L.PPOII0F80.PPOIIOF M .PPOllOL 
10) BPOIIOB.BP011OL .BPOlIOPB.POlOtB .POIOI F .POI01PB .POIOIL.P0103F .POI03L.POI02B.POI02F .'P0TIi"2'Pi3 
· PO 1 02L. PO 1158 . POllSF . PO IISP B. POI15L. PO 116B. PO 116F . PO 116P B. POI16L. POl17B. POl17P B. IV POll OL ."IV"P"'O"'I"I"OS" 
· PS VO 11 OlSC. PS VOII 08 .PSVO 11 OP B. PSVO 1108. PSVO 11OL. P POll OFSO. P PO II OF M . PPO llOL. PO 104L. POI osL 
Table D.31: Prime implicants for high flow at PSVOllO 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Number Prime Impllcants 
1) PPOII0FO. POI01B.POlOIF .POlOIPB.POlOIL.POIQ2B. POI02F .P0102PB.P0102L.POI15B. POI15F. POl15PB .POI15L.POI168.POlt6F 
.P0116PB.P0116L.POiT'7B'.P0117F .PPOIIOFSQ.PPOll OFM .PPOllOL.PSVOllOISC.PSVOl108.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOS.PSVOIIOL 
.P0103F.POl03L 
Table D.32: Prime implicants for high flow at PSVOllO 
when in the DORMANT operating mode 
D.1.16 High Flow at PSV0120 
HFPSVOl20 (POI09B.POI07B.POI07F.POI07PB.POI07L.POI08B.POI08F.POI07PB.PlIT08L.POI18B.POfi8F 
.POI18PB.POI18L.P0TI9i3.POff§F.POI19PB.POI19L.POI20B.POI20F.PPO120FSO.PPOI20FM 
.PPOI20L.PSVOI201SC.PSVOI20B.PSVOI20PB.PSVOI20S.psvo120L.POI09F.POI09L.POI09PB 
+(.POI07B.POI07F.POI07PB.POI07L.POTIi8B.POI08F.POI08PB.POI08L.POI18B.POfi8F 
.P01l8PB.P01l8L.P0TI9i3.POff§F.P01l9PB.P01l9L.POI20B.POI20F.PPOI20FSO.PPOI20FM 
.PPOI20L.PSVOI201SC.PSV0l20B.PSVOI20PB.PSVOI20S.psvo120L.POI09F.POI09L.lVPOI20L 
.IVPOI20S).(POlIOB.POllOF.POllOPB.POlIOL + POllIB.POIIIF.POIIIPB.POllIL.POff5l: 
+POI12B.POI12F.P01l2PB.P01l2L.POff5l:.POlIIL + IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20FO.IVP0l20B."IV"P"O"12"'O"'P"'B 
+POI13B.P01l3F.POI13PB.POI13L.BPOI20L.POllOL.POlllL.POl12L 
+P01l4B.POU4F.P01l4PB.POlI4L.BPOI20L.POllOL.POlllL.P01l2L.POll3L 
+CTOI20F.CTOI20T.IVPOI20FO + BPOI20B.BPOI20PB.BPOI20L.POIIOL.POIIIL).(ACTIVE.DORMANT» 
+DORMANT.PPOI20FO.ACTIVE.POI07B.POI07F.POI07PB.POIO7L.POI08B.POI08F.POI07PB.POI08L 
.POIT8B.POTI8F.POI18PB.POI18L.POiT9ll.POI19F.POI19PB.POI19L.POI20B.PO120F.PPOI20FSO."P"P""OI"2"'OF'"'M'"' 
.PPOI20L.PSVOI201SC.PSV0120B.PSVOI20PB.PSVOI20S.PSVOI20L.POI09F.POI09L 
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I) POI 09 B. P0109F . PO I 09 PB. PO 109 L. PO 107B. PO 1 07F . POI 07P B. POlOn. PO 108B. P0108F . PO 108PB. PO lOSL.PO 118B 
· POTi"8F . PiiI"i8PB .P0118L. POI"i"9B.POTI9F. P0119P B. PO 119 L. POI20B. P0120P B .PSVOI20ISC.PSV0120B. PSV0120PB 
.PSV0120S.P$V0l20L.PP0120FSO.PP0120FM.PP0120L 
2) P0110B.P0110F .POllOPB.POllOL.POI07B .P0107F .P0107PB. P0107L.POI09F .P0109L.P0108B.P011i8F.PiITQSl'>B" 
· POi08L. POIT8B. POIT8F .POTI8P13". POiTBL. PCiiI9B. POTI9F. P'OTf9l">B". POIT§"i:. POI2OB. P0120P B . IVPO 120L. IVPO 120$ 
.PSVOI2 OISC .P SVO 120B .P SV 0120P 8. PSVO 120S. PS VOI20L. P P0120FSO. P PO 120F M. PP0120L 
3) POll1B.F0111F. POIIIPB.P011IL.POI07B.P0107F .POI07PB.P0107L.P0109F .P0109L.P0108B."PiIT08F.POT08P"Ir 
.POi08L.P0Ti8i3.POTI8F.PoiT8i513.PiITiBL.POIi"9B.PCili9F.~.POIT§"i:.POI2OB.P0120PB.lVP0120L.lVP0120S 
· PSVO 1201Sc. PSVO 1208. PS VO 120PB. P S VO 120S. P S VO 120L. P PO 120FSO. PP0120F M . P PO 120L. POll OL 
4) POlI2B. POl12F . POII2"P"B". PO 112L. POI 07B. P0107F . PO I 07PB . POI on. POl 09F . P0109L. PO 108B. POW8F. PCii08P13 
.POi08L."P0IT8i3.PiITISF".PoiT8i513.PiITiBL.P"i5iT9"B."POTi9F.~.POfi9I:.~.POI20PB.IVP0120L.IVPOI20S 
· PS V0l2 OIsd. PS VOl20B .PS VOl20P B .PS VO 120S. PSVO 120L. PPO 120FSO. PPO 120F M .P PO 120L. POll OL. POlI1L 
5) POl13B. P0113F .POlI3PB.POl13L.POI07B .POI07F .POI07PB. POlO7L.P0109F .POI09L.POI08B.POi""08"F.~ 
.POi08L."P0IT8i3.POIT8F .POI18Pi3. i>ciIT8L. P"i5iT9"B. PCili9F. POiT§1">B" .POIT§"i:. ~. PO 120P B. IVPO 120L. IVPO 120$ 
· PSV012(J1SC. P SVO 120B. P SV0120P B. PSVOI20S. P$VOI20L. P P0120FSO .PPO 120F M . PPO 120L. P OllOL. PO II1 L. POTi2"L 
.BPOllOL 
6) POl14B.POI14F .POI14PB.P0114L.POI07B .P0107F .POI07PB. P0107L.P0109F .P0109L.P0108B.POW8F.PiITQ8i5"§" 
.POi08L."P0IT8i3.~.POTI8PB.POi"T8L.P"i5iT9"B.Pi5"iI"9F.~.POIT§"i:.~.POI20PB.IVP0120L.IVPOI20S 
· PSVO 1201SC. PSVO 120B. P SVOI20PB. PSVO 120S. PSVOI20L. P P0120FSO. P PO 120F M. PPO 120L. pall OL. PO II1 L. PO 112L 
· PO 113L. "BP"5I26L 
7) IVPO 120FC. IV POl20FO .IV P0120B .IVPO 120S .IV PO 120P B .POI 07B .POl 07F .PO 107P B .PO 10 7L.P 0] 09F . PO I 09L. POI08B 
· POTIi""8F. POTIiSPB.POlO8L. PCiITSB. POTI"8F. POiT8P"1J. POIT8L."P"5TI9B"."Pi5iT9"F. POIT9PB. P0119 L. PO 120B. PO 120PB."Iy;7p",omlC52'1ioT:L 
.P8V 0 1201Sd. PSVO 120B. PSVO 120PB. PSV0120S. P SVO 120L. P POI20FSO. P PO 120F M. PPOl20L 
8) IVPOI20B. IVPO 120FC . IV PO 120FO. IVP0120S.IV PO 120P B. P0107B. POl 07F . PO 1 07PB. PO 107L.PO 109 F . P01 09L. PO 108 B 
· P<iTOBF."P"Oi08PB. POlOS"L. POTI8i3. POTi""8F. POI18PlJ. POIT8L. POII"§"B"."Pi5iT9"F. POIT9PB. P0119 L. P0120B. PO 120P B ."ly""pDCO'"I'"2"oLr 
· PS V0l20ISd. PSV0120B. PSVO 120PB. P SVQ 120S. P S VO 120L. P P0120FSO .PPO 120F M .PPO 120L 
9) CTO 120F .IV PO 120FO .1VPO 120S. CT0120T . PO 1 07B. POI 07F . PO 107PB. PO 107L. P0109 F .PO 1 09L."POI"08B"."P"Oi08F. PO 108PB 
.POIOsL. POTI"8B. PiITISF". POTI8PB.POi"T8L. P"i5iT9"B. j5"ij"ffg"F. PO'II9"PB. POi"i9L". "POI2OB. PO 120P B .IV P0120L 
· PSV012olSC. P S VO 1208. PSVO 120P B. PS VO 1208. PSVO 120L. P PO 120FSQ . PPO 120FM . P PO 120L 
10) BP0120B.BP0120L.BP0l20PB.P0107B.P0107F.P0107PB.P0107L.P0109F.P0109L.POI08B.POI08F.~ 
· P"iIT08i:,"P0IT8i3 .POTI"8F'" .P01'i"8"PB. PiITiBL. P"i5iT9"B. POTI9'F. P01T9J5B. PO 119 L. P0120B .P0120P B. IVPO 120L ."IY""P"O"'I"'2"'O"S 
.PS Y 0 120ISC. PSVO 120B. PSVO 120PB. PSVOI20S. PSVO 120L. P PO 120FSO. P PO 120F M. P POI20L. POlIOL. PO 111 L 
Table D.33: Prime implicants for high flow at PSV0120 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Number Prime ImpUcants 
1) PPOl20FO .POl07B .P0107F. P0107PB.POI07L.POI08B.POI08F .POf08P"B. P0108L.POl18B. POI18F. P0118PB .POI18L.P0119B .POl19F 
. PO 119P B. POl19 L. PO 120B. PO 120F . PPO 120FSO.PP0120F M . P PO 120L. PSV0120ISC. P SV0120B. P SVO 120P B. PSYOI20S. PSVO 120L 
.F0109F.POI09L 
Table D.34: Prime implicants for high flow at PSV0120 
when in the DORMANT operating mode 
D.1.17 Low Flow at PSVOllO 
LFPSVOllO POlOIB.POlOIF.POlOIPB.POlOIL + POIOlF.POlOlB.POlOIPB.POlOIL + POI02B.POl02F.P0102PB.POl02L 
+P0102F.P0102B.P0102PB.P0102L + P0103F.POI03B.P0103PB.POl03L + POIl5B.P01l5F.P01l5PB.POIl5L 
+POl15F.POl15B.POl15PB.POl15L + POl16B.POl16F.POl16PB.POl16L + POl16F.POl16B.POIl6PB.POl16L 
+POIl7B.P01l7F.P01l7PB.P01l7L + PPOllOFSO.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
+PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOISO.PSVOllOS.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOB.PSVOllOL 
+PSVOllOB.PSVOllOISO.PSVOllOS.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOL 
+IVPOllOFO.lVPOllOFC.IVPOllOB.lVPOllOS.lVPOllOPB.IVPOllOL.P0103B.P0103PB.P0104B.P0104PB 
.P0105B.POI05PB.POI06B.P0106PB.P01l3B.P01l3PB.P01l4B.POll4PB.BPOllOB 
+CTOllOT.IVPOllOFC.IVPOl10B.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOL.P0103B.POl03PB.POl04B.POI04PB 
.POl05B.POI05PB.P0106B.P0106PB.POl13B.P01l3PB.POl14B.POl14PB.BPOII0B.CTOIlOF 
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1) PPOII0FSO.PPOllOFO .PPOl10FM.PPOllOL 
2) POI15B.POl15F.POI15PB.P0115L 
3) P01l5F.POtl5B.P01l5PB.P01l5L 
4) P0116B.P01l6F .POfi6i5B.P01l6L 
5) P0116F.P0116B.P0116PB.POI16L 
6) POI17B.P0117F .POI17PB.POll7L 
7) POlOIB.~.P0101PB.POI01L 
8) POI01F.POlOIB.P0101PB.P0101L 
9) P0102B.POI02F .P0102P8.P0102L 
10) POI02F.POI02B.P0102PB.P0102L 
11) POI03F .P0103B ."P0I53Pi3.POIO"3L 
12) PSV011 OISC. PSVO 11 OlSO . PS VO 1108. PSVO II OPB. PSV011OB. PSV011 OL 
13) PSVOl1 OB. PSV011OISO. PSVO 11 OS. PS VOll 0 P B. PSV011 OISC. PSV011 DC 
14) IVPOllOFO. IV POll OFC .IVPO 110B .IVPOllOS.IVPO 11 OP B .IVPOllOL. PO 103B. Pi5IOJi5!f. POl 04 B .POl 04 P B 
. POlOSB. Po105PB."POlB6B. PiIT06PB."PiITI3B". POII3i"B. POff4i3. POfi4l"B".B POll OP B. B PO 11 OB 
15) CTOllOT .IVPOllOFC .IVPOllOB .IVPOlIOS.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOL.POI03B.P0103PB.POI04B.P0104PB 
.POl05B.P0105PB.POl06B.P0106PB.POlI3B.POI13PB.POI14B.P0114PB.BPOllOPB.BPOllOB.CTOllOF 
Table D.35: Prime implicants for low flow at PSVOllO 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode 
D.1.l8 Low Flow at PSV0120 
Fault 'Trees 
LFPSV0120 P0107B.P0107F .P0107PB.P0107L + P0107F.POlO7B.POI07PB.P0107L + POl08B.P0108F .P0108PB.P0108L 
+POI08F.P0108B.P0108PB.POI08L + P0103F.P0103B.P0103PB.POI03L + P01l5B.P01l5F.P01l5PB.P01l5L 
+P01l5F.P01l5B.P01l5PB.P0115L + P01l6B.P01l6F.P01l6PB.P01l6L + P01l6F.P01l6B.P01l6PB.P01l6L 
+POl17B.POl17F.POl17PB.P01l7L + PPOIIOFSO.PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
+PSVOllOlSC.PSVOllOISO.PSVOllOS.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOB.PSVOllOL 
+PSVOllOB.PSVOllOlSO.PSVOllOS.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOL 
+IVPOllOFO.IVP0110FC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOllOS.lVPOllOPB.IVPOI10L.P0103B.POI03PB.POI04B 
.P0104PB.P0105B.P0105PB.P0106B.POI06PB.P01l3B.P01l3PB.P01l4B.P01l4PB.BPOllOB 
+CTOllOT.lVPOllOFC.IVPOllOB.lVPOllOS.lVPOllOPB.IVPOllOL.P0103B.P0103PB.P0104B 
.P0104PB.P0105B.P0105PB.P0106B.P0106PB.P01l3B.P01l3PB.P01l4B.PO114PB.BPOllOB."'C"'T"'O"u"'O""F 
Number Prime lmplicanta 
I) PP0120FSO.PPOI20FQ.PP0120FM.PP0120L 
2) POI18B.POI18F .P01l8PB.POI18L 
3) P01l8F.P01l8B.P01l8PB.P0I18L 
4) POlI9B.P0119F.POl19PB.P0119L 
5) POIl9F.P01l9B.POU9PB.POIi9L 
6) P0120B.POI20F .P0l20PB.POI20L 
7) P0107B.POi07F.P0107PB.POI07L 
8) POI07F.POI07B.P0107PB.POlO7L 
9) POI08B.POIOsF .POTIi8PB".P0108L 
10) POI08F.P0108B.P0108PB.POI08L 
11) POI09F.POI09B.POTB9P13.~ 
12) PSVOI20ISC. PSV01201S0, PSVO 1208. P8VO 120PB. P8V0120B . P SV0120L 
13) P SVOI20B. P S VG 120180 . PS V01208. PSV0120P B .P8VOI2oISd. P8V0120L 
14) IVPO 120FO .IVP0120FC. IVP0120B. IVPO 1208. IVPO 120P B .IVPO 120L. PO 109 B. POT09PB". PO 110 8 . PO 110P B 
.POIIIB.PoITIPB.P0iT28.POi12Pi3."POiI"3"B.PiITl3P8."'i5"0TI4i3.~.BP0120PB.BPOI20B 
15) CT0120T .IVPO 120FC .IV P0120B .IVP0120S. IV P0120PB. IVP0120L.POl 09B. POI 09PB. POliO B. PO 11 OPB 
.POIIIB.POIIIPB.PGl12B.POlI2PB.POI13B.POl13PB.P0114B.POI14PB.BP0120PB.BP0120B.CT0120F 
Table D.36: Prime implicants for low flow at PSV0120 
when in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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D.1.19 Partial Flow at PSVOllO when Low Flow is Required 
PFPSVOllOLFA = POiliIB.l'51OIF.PoTIi2B.Plmi2F.POIT5B.PoII5F.POI16B.POI16FB.POI17B.POl03F.IVPOllOFO 
.PPOllOFSO.PSVOllOlSC.PSVOllOB.CTOllOT.(P0103PB.P0103B.POl03L 
+P0104PB.P0104B.POl04F.P0104L + P0105PB.POl04F.P0105B.P0105F.P0105L 
+P0106PB.POl04F.P0105F.POl06B.P0106F.P0105L 
+POI13PB.POl04F.POl05F.POl06F.POI13B.POI13F.POI13L 
+ POI14PB.POTIi4F.P0105F.PiIT06F.POil3F.POII4B.POIT4F.POI14L 
+IVPOllOS.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOB.IVPOllOL 
+IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOllOL + BPOllOPB.BPOllOL.BPOllOB) 
+(P0103B.P0103F.P0103PB.P0103L + P0104B.POl04F.POl04PB.POl04L 
+P0105B.P0105F.P0105PB.POl05L + P0106B.P0106F.P0106PB.POl06L 
+P01l3B.POil3F.P01l3PB.POlI3L + P01l4B.P01l4F.P01l4PB.P01l4L 
+IVPOllOS.IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOB.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIl0L 
+ IVPOllOB .IVPOllOFO .IVPOllOFC .IVPOllOPB .IVPOllOS .IVPOllOL 
+IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOB.BPOllOB.BPOllOPB.BPOllOL) 
.(POlOlPB.POlOlB.POIOIF.POlOIL + POlOlL.POlOlB.POlOIF.POlOIL 
+P0102PB.POl02B.POl02F.POl02L + P0102L.P0102B.P0102F.P0102L 
+P01l5PB.P01l5B.P01l5F.P01l5L + P01l5L.P01l5B.P01l5F.P01l5L 
+ POI16PB.POI16B.POI16F.POlI6L + P01l6L.POI16B.POI16F .POI16L 
+ P01l7PB.POiT7B.POIill.POITiL + P0103L.Pil"i:03B.PolO3F.POTIi3L 
+PPOllOFM.PPOllOFSO.PPOllOL + PPOllOL.PPOllOFSO.PPOllOFM 
+(PSVOllOS.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOL + PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOS. PSVOll OL 
+PSVOllOL.PSVOllOPB.PSVOllOS).(PSVOllOB.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOlSO) 
+(POl03B.POl04B.POl04F.IVPOllOB.IVPOllOFC.CTOllOF).(POl04L.POl04PB 
+P0105L.P0105B.P0105F.POl05PB + POl06L.P0106B.P0106F.P0106PB.POl05B.P0105F 
+POI13L.i'OlTIB.POil3F.POI13PB.POl05B.POl05F.POl06B.PiIT06F.BPOllOB 
+BPOllOL.BPOllOB.BPOllOPB.POl05B.POl05F)).(ACTIVE.DORMANT) 
LFPSVOllOFD = PPOllOFO.PPOllOFSO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL.(POlOlB.l'51OIF.PoTIi2B.POlO2F.POI15B.POI15F.POI16B 
.POI16F.POI17B.P0103F.PSVOllOlSC.PSVOllOB.(IVPOllOFO.CTOllOT + P01l5PB.POI15L 
+P01l5L.P01l5PB + P01l6PB.PiilT6L + P01l6L.P01l6PB + P01l7PB.POIT7L 
+POlOlPB.POlOlL + POlOlL.POlOlPB + P0102PB.POI02L + P0102L.P0102PB 
+POl03PB.POTIi3L + P0103L.POl03PB + PSVOllOS.PSVOllOISO.PSVOllOL 
+PSVOllOL.PSVOllOISO.PSVOllOS + PSVOllOlSO.PSVOllOS.PSVOllOL 
+IVPOllOS.IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOB.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOL) 
+(POiliIB.POlOlF.POl02B .l'OI02F.POIT5B.PoII5F.l'OIT6B.PoII5F.PiiIT7B.POI03F.PSVOllOlSC 
.PSVOllOB.((IVPOllOFO.IVPOllOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOPB.lVPOllOS.IVPOllOL 
+CTOllOT.lVPOllOFC.lVPOllOB.lVPOllOPB.lVPOllOS.IVPOllOL.CTOllOF) 
.(POl03PB.P0103B.P0103F.P0103L + P0104PB.POl04B.P0104F.P0104L 
+POl05PB.POl05B.POl05F.P0105L + POl06PB.P0106B.P0106F.P0106L 
+P01l3PB.i'OlTIB.POil3F.POff3l': + P01l4PB.P01l4B.POIT4F.l'OiT4L 
+ BPOllOPB.BPOllOB.BPOllOL)) + IVPOllOPB. CTOllOT.IVPOllOFC."IV7po.O"'I'I"'OBo.iiIV7po.O"'I'I"'OF"'O".IVPOllOS 
.lVPOllOL.CTOllOF.POlOlB.P0101F.P0102B.P0102F.POI15B.POI15F.P01l6B.POI16F.POI17B.P0103F 
.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB).(DORMANT.ACTIVE)) 
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Number Prime Implleants 
I) P0103PB.P0103F. P0103B.P0103L.POIOIB.P0101F .POI02B.P0102F .POI15B.POlI5F .POI16B.POI16F .POI17B 
· IVPO llOFO. P POllOFSO. PSVO lIOISC. PS VO 11OB. CTO IIOT 
2) POI 04 P8. PQTIi4'lo"'. POI04i3. POii54L. P01OIB. POiOTF. POI02B. P0102 F . PO 103F .PO 1158 . PO 115F . POlI6B. P0116F 
.POI178.IVPOllOFO.PPOllOFSO.PSV0110ISC.PSVOllOB.CTOIIOT 
3) P0105PB. POi05F. POIOSB. POI05i:':pQIOIB. POfOIF .POI02B. PO 102F . PO I 03F . PO 115B. PO II5F . PO 1168. PO 116F 
· POll 7B .IVPOll OFO .PPO 11 OFSO .PSVOIl OISC .PSVOl108. CTOllOT 
4) POI06PB.POTI}6F .PiIT06B.POI06i:.POT5IB .POIOTF.POTIi2B. POI02F . P0103F . PO 1158 . POl15F . POl16B . POl16F 
.POII7B.IVPOllOFO.PPOllOF So.PSVOII0ISC.PSVOIIOB.CTOIIOT 
5) POl13P8, POi13F. POTI3B ,PQIT3I;' ,PQT61B, P6TIiIF. POI02B. PO 1 02F .PO 103F . POll5B . POl15F . PO 1168. POl16F 
· POll78 .IVP011 OFO. P POll of SO. PS VOII OIsC. PS VO 11OB. CTOllOT 
6) PO 114PB. POfT4F . PiITi4i3. POTI4L.P01OIB. PDIiITF. J5Oi02i3. P0102F . PO 103F . PO 1158. PO 115F . POII6B. PO l16F 
.POlI7B.IVPOlIOFO .PPOIlOFSQ.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB.CT0110T 
7) IVPO 11 OS. IVPO II OFO. IVPO llOB .IVPOIl OFC.I VPOllOP B .IV POlIOL.POI 01 B . PO 101 F . PO 1 02B. PO 1 02F . PO I 03F 
· PO 1158. POI15'F. P5TI6i3. POI'i6F. POII7B. P POllOFSO. PSVOlIOISC. PSVOll 08 . CTOllQ I' 
8) IVPOII OPB. IV POll OFO .IVPOU OFO .IVPO 11OS. IVPOll 08. IVPO IIOL. POlO lB. PO 10 1 F . POl 02 B . PO 102F .PO 103F 
.POI15B.POl15F.POll6B.POlI6F.P0117B.PPOllOFSO.PSVOlIOISC.PSVOllOB.CTOllOl 
9) BPOllOPB .8POII0L .BPOIlOPB.P01018.POlOI F .P01028 .P0102F. P0103F .POl158.POl15F .P0116B.P0116F 
· PiITi7B'.IV PO 11 OFO P POlIOFSO. PS VOU DIsC. PS VO 11 OB. CTOIlOT 
Table 0.37: Prime implicants for partial flow at PSVOllO when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
Number Prime Implieants 
1) P0103B.P0103F .POI03PB.P0103L 
2) P0104B.P0104F .P0104PB.P0104L 
3) POI05B.P0105F .P0105PB.P0105L 
4) POI06B.P0106F .POI06PB.POl06L 
5) POl13B.POU3F.P0113PB.POI13L 
6) P01l4B. POfi4F .P<iiT4PB'. POTI4I: 
7) IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOFO.IVPOl10B 
.IVPOlIOPB.IVPOllOS.IVPOl10L 
8) 
9) 
IVPOll OB .IVPOll OFO .IVPO llOFC 
.IVPOllOPB.IVPOIIOS.IVPOlI0L 
BPOIIOB.BPOIIOPB .BPOllOL AND 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
2) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
POlOIP8.POlOIB.POlOI F .POI01L 
POlOIL.POlOlB .POIOIF .P010IPB 
POI02PB.POI02B .POI02F .P0102L 
POl 02L. PO 1 02 B. PO 1 02F . PO 102P 8 
POI15PB.POl15B.POI15F .POII5L 
POl15L.POI15B.POl15F .POII5PB 
POII6PB.POI16B .POI16F .POl16L 
POI16L.POII6B .POI16F .POI16PB 
POlI7PB.POI17B.POI11F .POlI7L 
PSVO 11 OS. PSVOllOISC. PSVO 11 OISO. PSVOll 08. PS VO 1 lOPB. PSVO 11 ot 
P5VOll OP B.P5VO 11 OISC .PS VOIl OISO. PSVO 11 OB. PSVO 1105. PSVOll oC 
P5VOIIOL. PSVOllOISC. PSVO 11 DISO. PSVOllOB. PS VOl i UPB. PSVOll OS 
PPOllOFM.PPOIIOFSO .PPOllOFO.PPQiTOI:; 
PPOllOL.PPOlIOFSO.PPOllOFO.PPOllOF M 
POl 03L. PO 103 B. PO 103F . PO 103P B 
P0104L. PO 1 04 B .PO 104F . POI 04P B .POI 038 .IVPOllO B .IV POll OFC. CTOII OF 
P0105L. Piffi)5]j. POI 05F . POI05P B .POl 03B. PO 1 04B. POI04 F . IVPO llOB 
.IVPOlI0FC.CTOIIOF 
POI06L.POi06B'.POI1i6F.PoI06PB.P0103B.POl04B.P0104F.POI05B 
.POI05F .IVPOllOB .IVPOIIOFC.CTOllOF. BPOll0B 
POl13 L. PO 113 B. PO 113F . PiiTI3'PB.POT03B'. POI04i3. P0104 F .POI05B 
. P0105F . PO 1 06B. P<iTIi6F .IVPOllOB .IVPO llOFC. CTOIIOF . BPOIIOB 
BPOllOL .BPOllOB ,BPOllOPB.P0103B.POl04B.P0104F .P01058 
.P0105F .IVPOllOB.IVPOIIOF C.CT01IOF 
Table 0.38: Prime implicants for partial flow at IVPOllO when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
275 
Fault and Success Trees for the Fuel Rig when ACTIVE or DORMANT Fault Trees 
Number Prime Ilnpllcants 
1) P01l5PB.PP011OFO.POl15F .POl15B.POl15L.P0101B.P0101F .P0102B .P0102F 
.P0103F .POI16B.P01l6F .P0117B.IVPOllOFO .PPOI1UF SU.psvol1UISC. PSVOllOB.CTOIIOT .PP0110FSQ.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
2) PO 115L.P POII0FO. PO 115B. PO II5P B.POIT5F .Pi5iOTB', POIOIF. POTIi2B. 'P'OI"62'F 
· PO 103F . PO 116B. POl16F . POII7B .IV PO llOFO. P PO II OF SO .PSVOll OISC. PSVOllOB. CTOllOT . P POllOFSO. PPO 11 OF M. P POll oL 
3) POI16PB. PPOllOFO. POTI6F. PCiTf6'8. POIi"6'L. POIOIB .POlO IF. POI02B'. 'P'OI"62'F. PQ'i:O"3F. POI15B. POII5F . PO 117B 
.IVPOII0FO .PPOI10FSO.PSV0110ISC.PSV0110B.CTOIIOT .PPOI10F SU.PPOIIOF M.PPOI10L 
4) POI16L. P POll OFO. ~. POI16PB. POTI6F. Pi5iOTB'. POlO IF. 'f>OTIi2B'. POIO:2F. PQ'i:O"3F. PO 115B . P01l5F . PO 11 7B 
· IVPO llOFu . PPOllOFSU. P S VO llOISC. P SVO 11OB. CTOll OT . P POll oFS6. PPOl1 OF M . PPO 11 OL 
5) POI17PB.PPOllOFO.POII'7F.POi"I7'B.POIT7L.'POiOI'e'.POI0IF .~.Po'i02F.POlOaF.~.PO'i"i'5'F.POll6B.P'O'i'I'6F 
.IV P011OFO. P PO IIOFSo. PSVOII OISC. PS VOl1 OB. CTO 11 OT . P POll OFSu. P PO 110FM .PP0110L 
6) POl 01 PB.PPOllOFO.PoIOiF . POIOiB. PO 101 L. POI02B' .POIO:2F. POi03F'. POlI5B. POl15F . PO 116B. PO 116F . PO II 7B. IYPOll OFO 
.PPOllOFSU.PSYOllOISC.PSYOI10B.CT011OT .PPOllOFSO. PPOI10F M.PPOllOL 
7) POl 01 L. PPO llOFO. POIOTB'. PiiTIiIPB. PO 10 1 F . PO'i02'S". ~. POI63F. PO 115B. PO 115F .POI16B. P0116F . POl17B .IVPO 11 OFO 
.PPOllOFSU.PSVOIIOISC.PSVOllOB.CTOllOT .PPOllOFSO.PPOlI0F M.PP0110L 
8) POI02PB.PPOll OFO.P'i5I02F . POi'i52B'. PO 102L. Pi5iOTB'. POTIiiF. POI03F. POl15B. PO 115F . PO 116B. PO 116F . POll 7B. IVPOll OFO 
.PPOllOFSO.PSYOIIOISC.PSVOllOB.CTOIIOT .PP0110FSO. PPolluF M. PP0110L 
9) PO I 02 L. P PO 11 OFO."POTIi28' .~. PO 102F . POWIB. POTIiiF. POlO31". PO 115B. PO 115F . POI16B. POl16F . POll 7B .IV PO 11 OFO 
· P POlIOFSU. P SYO 110ISC. PSVO 11OB. CTOll OT . PPOllOFSO. P POll 0 f M. P POllOL 
10) Pot 03L. PPOIl OFO. POlO3B' j 5ci'w3P'B.POi"O'3F .POWTIi .PO 1 0 IF. Piffii2B'. POTIi2F. POTISB. PO 115F . PO 116B. PO 1I6F . POl17B 
.IYPOIIOF U .PPOI10FSU.PSYOlIOISC.PSYOIIOB.CTOITOT.PPOIIOF SO .PPOllOF M.PPOIIOL 
11) PSVO 11 OS. P POll OFO. PSVO 11 OISO. PSY OllOISC. PSYOll OP B. PSYO 11OB. PSVO 11 OL. POlO 1 B .POl 0 1 F . PO 102 B . PO I 02F .P0103F 
· PO 115 B. P 0 115F . P01l6B."P6T'i'6F . PO 1176. IVPO llOFu. P POllOFSO. CTO 11 OT . PPO llOFSO. P PO I lOFM . P PO 110L 
12) PSVOllOP B. PPO llOFO. PSVOIIOISO .PS VO 11 OS. PSVOIIOB. PS YOl i Oisc. PS VO 11 ot. POlO 1 B. POiOfF. Pot 02B. PO 102F . PO I 03F 
· POI15B. P{)115F . PO 116B. 'POT'i6'F. PO 11 7B .IVPOll OFO. PPO 11OFSO . CTOITOT. P PO 11 OFSO. P PO llOF M . P PO 11 OL 
13) PSY011 oL.PPO 11OFO .PSVOll DISO . PSVOll OS. PSVO llOPB. P S VOII OisC. PSVO 1I OB. PO 101 B . PO 10 IF. PO 1 02B .PO 1 02 F . PO 103F 
.P0115B.POlI5F .POU6B .i""OII6'F.POii"'llJ.IVPOllOFO.PPOI10FSO.CTotIOT .PP01IOFSO.PPOII0FM.PPOIIOL 
14) IYPOlIOS. PPOll OFO. P S VO 11 OISC. PSV 0 I lOB .poiOTELP'OTi5TF .POI'02'B . PO 102F . PO 103F .PO 115B .POfi"'5"F .P5II6i3 
.POI16F .POl17B.IVPOIIOF U .IVPOllOf C .IVPOllOB ,IYPOIIOPB .IVP0110L.CT011OT .PPOlIOFso.PPOllOFM .PPOlIOL 
15) IYPOllOFO.POI03PB.PPOIIOFO.IVPOI10FC .IVPOIIOPB.IVPOllOB.IVPOIIOS.IVPOlIOL.P0103B.P0103F .POI03L.POlOIB 
.POIOIF.POl02B.POI02F.POlI5B.~.POI16B.POl16F.POll7B.PSVOIIOISC.PSVOllOB.PPOI10FSO.PPOlIOFM.PPOI10L 
16) IVPOII OFO .POl 04PB. P POlIOFO. IV POll OFC .IVPO 1I OB .IV POllOS. IV PO 11 OL .!VPO 11 OPB. POIQ4'ij .POTIi4'F. POiOlL. POlO 1 B . PO 10 1 F 
.PO 102 B .PO 102F .P 0103F . PO lIS B.~ . PO 116 B.Po'i'i'6'F ."P5IT'li3. PS VO lI01SC. PSVOllOB. PPO 1I OFSO . P POll of M. PPOllOL 
17) IVPO llOFO. POl 05PB.P PO 11 OFO .IYPO 11 OFC .IV POll OB. IV PO llOS. IVPOlIOL.IV PO lIOP B. pOlOsILpoI'05F. POi'155'L. POlOl B .PO 1 0 IF 
.POl02B.P0102F .P0103F .POI15B.PO'IEF'.POI16B.POI16F. POl17B.PSVOllOISC.PSV0110B.PPOIIOFSO.PPOllOF M.PPOlIOL 
18) IVPO 11 OFO. PO 1 06P B. P POll OFO .IV PO 11 OFC .IVPO 1 lOB .IV PO 11 OS. IV PO llOL. IVPOllOPB. powEilLpiITOGF' .POi061:'. POlOl B. PO 10 1 F 
.PO 102B . P0102F . P0103F . PO 1158. POI'iSF. POIT6'B.Po'i'i'6'F. PCiIT7B. PS VO 11 OISC. PSVO 1 lOB . P P011OFSO. P POll OFM . PPO 110L 
19) IYPOllOFO .POl13PB .PPO 11 OFO .IVPQIl OFC .IV PO 1 lOB . IVPO 11OS.IV PO 11OL.IV PO 11 OP B. P0113B. POiT3'F .POIT3i:. PO 10 1 B. PO 1 01 F 
.P0102B.POI02F .P0103F .P0115B.POI'iSF.P01l6B.P01l6F. POI17B.PSVOII0ISC .PSVOIIOB.PP0110FSO.PP0110FM .PPOlIOL 
20) IVPO llOFO. P0114 PB.P POll OFO .IV PO llOFC . IV PO 110B .IVPO IIOS .!VPOllOL.IVPO 11 OP B. PO 114B. PCi'I"I4F. POiT4E'. PO 101 B. PO 1 01 F 
.POI02B.POI02F.P0103F .POlI5B.POl15F.POI16B.POl16F.POl17B.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB.PPOlI0FSO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
21) IVPOllOFO.BPOllOPB.PPOIIOFO.BPOllOB.BP01IOL.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIlOS.IVPOIIOL.IVPOIIOPB.POlOIB.POIOIF 
.POI02B.POI02F .POI03F .POI15B.~.PCiIT613.PoiT6F .POI17B .PSVOIIOISC .PSVOIIOB.PPOIIOFSO.PPOIIOF M .PP0110L 
22) CTOllOT .P0103PB.PPOIIOFO.IVPOl tOf C .IVPOllOB .CTOllOF .'PiIT53B'.PO'I'03F.'i"5TIi'3"L.POIOIB'.POlOIF .P0102B.P0102F 
.POI03F. POI15B.POl15F .P0116B.POITGF'.POl17B.PSVOllOISC.PSVOlIOB.PPOI10f SO.PPOII0F M.PPOllOL 
23) CTOlIQT .P0104PB.PPOllOFO.IVPOIIUF C .IVPOllOB.CTOII0F .POI04B.P0104F .POI04L.PPOI10F SO.PPOllOFM .PPOllOL 
· POl 01 B. POlOl F . PO 102B. POI 02F. POi03F'. POII'5'8. PoII'5F. POII6B. PO 116F . POll 7B. PSVOll OlSC. PSVO I lOB 
24) CTOl10T .P0105PB.PPOIIOFO.IVPOII0F C .IVP0110B .CTOllOF .POI05B .P0105F .POI05L .POIOIB .POlOIF ,POI02B .P0102F 
.P0103F .POI15B.POI15F .POI16B.POl16F. P01l7B.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB .PPOII0FSO.PPOlI0FM .PP0110L 
25) CTOIIOT .POI06PB.PPOl10FO.IVPOlIOFC .IVPOIlOB.CTOllOF .POI06B.POI06F .P0106L .POIOIB'.POlot F .POI02B.POI02F 
.POl03F .P0115B.POl15F .POU6B.POiT6F.POl17B .PSVOlIOISC.PSVOllOB.PPOlI0F SU.PPOllOFM .PPOllOL 
26) CT0110T.P01l3PB.PPOllOFO .IVPOI tbF C .IVP011OB .CT01IOF. POI13B.POl13F .POU3L.POIOIB.POIOIF .P0102B.P0102F 
.P0103F .POl15B .P01l5F .POl16B.P6TI6F'.POI17B.PSYOllOISC.PSYOlIOB.PPOllOF SO.PPOllOl' M .PPOIIOL 
27) CTO I lOT . POl14 PB. P POll OFO .IVPO 11 Of C .IVPOl1 OB. CTO 110F . POIT4B. PCii'T4"F. POII4L. POTIiTB'. PO 10 1 F . POI02B. PO 1 02F 
.POI03F .POlI5B.POI15F .P0116B.POI16F .P01l7B. PSYOlIOISC.PSVOIIOB.PP0110FSQ.PPOllOFM .PPOI10L 
28) CTOIIOT. BPOl1 OPB. PPOIIOFO .B POlIOB . BPO II OL. IVPOll OFC . IVPO 11 OB. CTOITiW. P<iTIiTB. POIOIF. POI 02B. POl 02F 
.P0103F .P0115B.POl15F .POlI6B.PQIi6F".POl17B .PSVOllOISC.PSVOlIOB.PPOl!OF SU.PPOIIOf M .PPOIlOL 
29) CTOl10T.IVP0110PB.PPOlI0FO.IVPOIIOFC .IVPOIIOB.IVPOllOS.IYP011OL.IVP0110FO.CTOIIOF .POIOIB .POIOI F .P0102B 
.P0102F .P0103F .P0115B.POl15F .POI16B .P0116F .POlI7B.PSVOllOisC.PSVOlIOB. PPOllOFSO.PPOlIOFM.PPOl10L 
Table D.39: Prime implicants for partial flow PSVOllO 
when low flow is required in the DORMANT operating mode 
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D.1.20 Partial Flow at IVP0120 when Low Flow is Required 
PFPSV0120LFA 
PFPSV0120LFD 
P6107B.POTIi'iF.POf58lj.PiIT08F.POTIBB.PliIT8F.POI19B.POI19FB.P0120B.P0109F.1VPOI20FO 
.PPOI20FSO.PSVOI2OJSC.PSVOI20B.CTOI20T.(P0109PB.P0109B.P0109L 
+P01IOPB.P01IOB.POllOF.P0110L + POlllPB.P01IOF.P0111B.P0111F.P0111L 
+POI12PB.POllOF.POll1F.POI12B.P01l2F.P0111L 
+POI13PB.P01IOF.POll1F.POI12F.POI13B.P01l3F.PO113L 
+ POI14PB.l'lllTIiF.POTITF.POIT2F.PliIT3F.POII4B.POTI4F.POI14L 
+IVPOI20S.1VPOI20PB.1VPOI20FC.1VPOI20B.IVPOI20L 
+IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20S.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.IVPOI20L + BPOI20PB.BPOI20L.BPOI20B) 
+(POI09B.POI09F.POI09PB.POI09L + POlIOB.POllOF.POllOPB.POllOL 
+ POIIIB .POIllF .POIITll.POllIL + POl12B .POI12F.POI12PB.POI12L 
+P01l3B.P01l3F.P0!13PB.P01l3L + P01l4B.POTI4F.P01l4PB.P01l4L 
+IVPOI20S.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20B.IVPOI20PB.IVPOI20FC.IVP0120L 
+IVPOI20B.IVPOI20FO.IVPOI20FC.lVPOI20PB.IVPOI20S.IVPOI2OL 
+IVPOI20FC.IVPOI20FO.IVP0120B.BPOI20B.BPOI20PB.BPOI20L) 
.(POI07PB.POI07B.POI07F.POI07L + POI07L.POl07B.PO!07F.POI07L 
+POI08PB.POI08B.POI08F.POI08L + POI08L.POI08B.POI08F.POI08L 
+P01l8PB.P01l8B.P01l8F.P01l8L + P01l8L.P01l8B.P0!18F.P01l8L 
+P01l9PB.P01l9B.P01l9F.P01l9L + P01l9L.P01l9B.P01l9F.P01l9L 
+ POI20PB. PiIT2OB.PDI2liF.POI2OL + POI09L.POW9B.Pi'iI09l'.POTIi9L 
+PP0120FM.PPOI20FSO.PP0120L + PPOI20L.PP0120FSO.PP0120FM 
+(PSV0120S.PSV0l20PB.PSV0120L + PSV0l20PB.PSVOI20S.PSV0120L 
+PSVOI20L.PSVOI20PB.PSV0120S).(PSV0120B.PSV0120ISC.PSV012OJSO) 
+(POI09B.POllOB.POllOF.JVPOI20B.JVPOI20FC.CT0120F).(POllOL.POllOPB 
+ POII1L.P0111B.POIIIF .POIIIPB + P01l2L.POI12B.P01l2F .POl12PB.POlIIB.POIIIF 
+P01l3L.P0TI3i3.POiT3F.P01l3PB.POlllB.POllIF.P01l2B.P01l2F.BP0120B 
+BPOI20L.BPOI20B.BPOI20PB.POIIIB.POII1F)).(ACTIVE.DORMANT) 
PPOI20FO.PPOI20FSO.PP0120FMPP0120L.(POI07B.POTIi'iF.POI08li".PiIT08F.PO118B.POI18F.POl19B 
.POI19F.PiIT2OB.POI09F.PSV0120ISC.PSVOI20B.(IVPOI20FO.CT0120T + POI18PB.POI18L 
+P01l8L.P01l8PB + P01l9PB.PoTIliL + P01l9L.P01l9PB + POI20PB.P012OL 
+POI07PB.POI07L + POl07L.POI07PB + POI08PB.i'OI08L + POI08L.POI08PB 
+POI09PB.POTIi9L + POl09L.PO!09PB + PSV0120S.PSV0120ISO.PSVOI20L 
+PSV0120L.PSV0120ISO.PSVOI20S + PSVOI20ISO.PSV0120S.PSV0120L 
+IVP0120S.JVPOI20FC.IVP0120B.IVP0120PB.IVP0120FC.IVP0120L) 
+(P6107B.P0107F.P0108B.PiiI08F.POIT5B.PliIT8F.POIT9B.POl19F.POI2OB.Pi'iI09l'.PSV0120ISC 
.PSV0120B.«IVPOI20FO.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.IVP0120PB.IVPO120S.IVP0120L 
+CTOI20T.IVP0120FC.JVP0120B.lVP0120PB.IVP0120S.IVP0120L.CT0120F) 
.(P0109PB.P0109B.POI09F.P0109L + POllOPB.POllOB.POllOF.P01IOL 
+POIIIPB.POIllB.POlllF.POlI1L + POlI2PB.P0112B.POl12F.POl12L 
+ P01l3PB.POIT3il.PoII3F.POTI3L + P01l4PB.P01l4B.POTI4F.P01ill 
+BP0120PB.BP0l20B.BP0l20L)) + IVPOI20PB.CT0120T.JVP0120FC."IV"'P"O"I"20"'BD."IV""P"'O"'1"2'"OF"'O".IVP0120S 
.IVPOI20L.CT0l20F.POl07B.POl07F.POI08li".POI08F.P01l8B.P01l8F.POll9B.P01l9F.P0120B.POI09F 
.PSV0120ISC.PSVOI20B.(DORMANT.ACTIVE)) 
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Number Prime Impllcants 
1) P0109PB.POI09F .P0109B.P0109L.P0101B.P0107F. P0108B.POI08F .POI18B.POI18F .POI19B.POI19F .POI20B 
.IYP0I20FO.PPOI20FSQ.PSYOI20ISC.PSYOI20B.CTOI20T 
2) POllOPB.POITOF"".P1ITTIiB.PoiTIi"L.~.POTIi'7F.POTIi8B.P0108F .POI09F .POII8B .POl18F .P0119B. POl19F 
.P0120B.IYP0120FO.PPOI20FSO.PSYOI20ISC.PSYOI20B.CTOl20T 
3) POIIIPB.POITIF.POTIIB.POTITI:".~.POTIi'7F.POTIi8B.POI08F.P0109F.POI18B.POI18F.POI19B.P0119F 
.P0120B .IYP0120FO .PP0120f SO.PSY0120ISG.PSV0120B.CTOI20T 
4) POI12PB.POIT2F.POIT2B.POIT2"L.~.POTIi'7F.POI08B.POI08F .POI09F .POI18B.POI18F .P0119B.POI19F 
.POI20B.IYP0120FO.PPOI20FSO.PSYOI20ISC.PSY0120B.CTOl20T 
5) P0113PB. PCiTI"3F . P6Ti"3"B.POiT31:".~. POTIi'7F. POTIi88. PO 108F . P0109 F . POl18B . PO 118F . POl19 B . POl19F 
· PO 120B. IYPO l20FO. P P0120t< SO. PSYOI20ISG. PS YOI20B. CTO 120T 
6) POl14PB .P5TI"4F .POI""i"4B.POi"I"4E".POiO'fB.POi07F .POI08B. PO 108F . PO 109 F .POI18B. PO ll8F .P0119 B. POII9 F 
.P0120B.IYP0120FO.PP0120FSO.PSY0120ISC.PSY0l20B.CT0l20T 
1) IYPO 1208. IVP0120FO .IVPO 1208 . IVPO 120FC .IYPO 120P B .IYPOI20L.POl 01B . POI 07F . POI 08B . POI 08F . PO 109 F 
· PO 118B. POIT8F". POIT9B. i'iCi'lTIi"F. PO 120B. P PO l20FSO. PS YO 120ISC. PSY0120B. CTO 120 I 
8) IYPOI20PB. IYPO 120FO. IYPO l20FO. IVPO 120S. IV POI20B .IVP0120L. POI 07B. PO 101F . PO 108B. PO 108F .PO 1 09 F 
.POl18B.P0118F .POI19B.POiT9F .P0120B .PP0120FSO .PSY0120I8C.PSV0120B.CTOI20 r 
9) BPOI20PB.~.BPOI20PB.POI07B.P0107F .P0T08i3.POI08F .P0109F .POI18B.POlI8F .POl19B.POI19F 
· P0120B .IY pal 20FO P P0120FSO. PS VO l201SC. PS YO l20B. CT0120T 
Table D.40: Prime implicants for unexpected partial flow at IVP0120 when low flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode -Table 2 
Number Prime Impllcants 
1) P0109B.P0109F .P0109PB.P0109L 
2) POllOB.POIlOF.POllOPB.POllOL 
3) POll1B.POllIF.POlllPB.POlllL 
4) P01l2B.POU2F .P0112PB.P01l2L 
5) P0113B.POlI3F.POl13PB.POlI3L 
6) P01l4B."PiITT4F.POTI4PBj5OTill 
1) IYPOI20FC.IYP0120FO.IYP0120B 
. IYPO 120P B . IV PO 120S. IY PO 120L 
S) IYP0120B.IVP0120FO.IYP0120FC 
.IYPOI20PB.IYPOI20S.IYP0120L 
9) BPOI20B.BP0120PB.BP0I20L AND 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
2) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
ll) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
POI01PB. POl07B.P0107F. P0101L 
POI01L.POI01B.POI07F .P0101PB 
POI 08PB. PO 1088 . PO 1 08F . P0108L 
POI OSLo P0108B . PO 1 08F . POI 08PB 
POllSPB.POIISB.P0118F .POllSL 
POllSL.P6Ti8B".POI18F .POlI8PB 
POI19PB.POl19B .P01l9F. P0119L 
P0119L.POlI9B .POI19F .P01l9PB 
POl20PB .POI2OB."POT2OF . PCii"2CiL 
PSY0120S.PSV012018C.PSY0120IS0.PSV0120B.PSY0120PB.P8YOl20L 
PSYOI20PB.PSYOI20ISC.PSYOI20ISO.PSY0120B.PSV0120S.P8Y0120t 
P8V0120L.PSY0120ISC.PSY0120ISO.PSY0120B.PSY0120PB.PSYOl20S 
P POI20FM. P PO l20FSO. P P0120FO. PPi'i"I2OI:; 
PP0120L.PPOI20FSO .PPOI20FO .PP0120f M 
POI09L. POi"Ci9l3". PO I 09F . P0109PB 
POll OL. POll OB. PO 110F . PO 1lOP B. P0109B . IYPO 120B .IYPO 120FC. CTOl20F 
POI11L.POITIB".POITi"F.POllIPB.POI09B .P01IOB .POI10F .IYP0120B 
.IVP0120FC.CT0120F 
POI12L.P01T2B"."POiT2F .PoIT2PB.P0109B .POllOB .P011OF .POIll B 
.POlllF .IVP0120B.IYP012oFC.CTOI20F .BP0120B 
P01l3L.POlI3B.POII3F .PQii3i513.POW9B.P6IT0i3.POllOF .POl1lB 
.POI1IF .PiITI"2B".PCiII2F.IYPOI20B .IYP0120FC.CT0120f .BPOI20B 
BP0120L.BP0120B .BPOI20PB.POI09B.POllOB.POlIOF .POlll B 
.POl11 F .IYP0120B.IYPOI20f G.CT0120F 
Table D.41: Prime implicants for unexpected partial flow at IVP0120 when low flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode -Table 2 
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Number Prime Implicants 
1) POI18PB. PPOI20FO.POl18F .POI18B.POI18L. POI07B.P0107F .POI08B.POI08F 
· PO 109F . P0119 B. PO 119F . P0120B .IVP0120FO . PPO 120FSO. PS VO 1201SC. PSVO 120B. CT0120T . P PO 120FSO. P PO 120FM . P PO 120L 
2) POlI8L. P P0120FO. P'Oi18Ef. PO 118P B.POTI'8F. POI07S'. P<iTO'fF. 'POili8"B' .POI'58F 
· PO 1 09F . P0119 B .PO 119F . P0120B .IVPO 120FO . PPO 120F SO. PSVO 1201Sc. P S VO 120B. CT0l20T . P P0120F SO. P P0120F M. P PO 120L 
3) POl18PB. PPO 120FO. PiiTi9F . POIT§"B.P<iTI9L. POi"O'fB'. PO 107F . POf{j8"S'. POI'58F. POTIi9F. POI18B. PO 118F .PO 1208 
.IVPO 120FO.P P0120FSO. PSV0120ISC. PSV0120B. CTO 120T . P P0120FSO. P P0120F M . PPO 120L 
4) PO 118L. P P0120FO. POIIm.PQTI915'B.PO'I'I'9F. P0107B. PO 1 07F . POI08lJ. POI'58F. POTIi9F. PO 118B. PO 118 F . P0120B 
· IVPOI20FO. PPOI20FSO. PS VOI20ISC. PS VD 120B. CT0120T . P PO 1201 so. PPOI20FM. P PO 120L 
5) POl18PB. PP0120FQ. PiJI'2OF . POI2OB.PiIT2OL. PO 107B. PO 107F . POTiJ8B'. POTIiSF. PoT09F. POI1SB . PO liSP'. PO 119B. PO 119 P' 
.IV PO 120FQ.P PO 120FSO. PSVO IIOISC. PS VO 120B. CTO 120T . PPOllOFSQ. PPO 120FM .PP0120L 
6) POl 07P B. PPO 120FO. POI07F. i"5"f57B .PO 107L. 'j5(j"fij8j3. POTIi'8F. POf5§'F. POl18B. P0118F .POl19B. PO 119 F . PO 120B. IVPO 120FO 
· PP0120FSO. PSVO 12018C. PS VO 120B. CT0120T .PPO 120FSO. PPO 120F M. P PO 120L 
7) POI07L.PPOI20FO.pi5Io;nLpoTIi7PB.P0107F.POTIi8B.POTIi'8F.~.P0118B.PO118F.POI19B.POI19F.P0120B.IVP0120FO 
· P PO 120FSo. PS VOI20ISC. PSV0120B. CT0120T . P POI20FSO. PPO 1201 M . PP0120L 
8) PO 1 08PB. PP0120FO. P<iT'68F . Pi5I08B .PO 1 08L. PO'iO'f]3'. POI'07F'. PO'i09F. POl18B. PO 11SF . POlIOB . PO 119F .PO 120B. IVPO 120FO 
· P POI20FSO. PSVO 1201S C. PS V01208. CT0120T .P PO 120FSQ. PP0120FM. P PO 120L 
9) POI08L. PP0120FO.'POI'58'B.P'0'I08Pi3 .PO 1 08F . P1iTIi'fi3. P<iTO'fF. POTIi9F .P01188 .POI18F . PO 119B. POl19 F . PO 120B .IVPO 120FO 
· PPO 120FSO . P5 V01201SC. PSV0120 B. CTO 120T . P POI20FSO. P PO 120FM . P PO 120L 
10) PO 1 09L. P PO 120FO. P(ilQ9'g. PoI09PB. Pi5TIi9F'. PO 1 01B.P0107F . 'POT08B'. P'OTIi8F. POi'"iSB. POl18F . PO 1198 .PO 119F . PO 1208 
· IVPO 120F O. P P0120FSO. PSVOlOISC. P SV0120B. C'TOt2O'f. P P01201< So. PPO 120F M. P PO 120L 
11) PSVOI20S .PPO 120FO. PSVO 120150. PSV 0 120150. PS VO 120PB. PSVOI20B. P5V0120L. POl 07B. Poi.07F. PO 108B .PO 108F . PO 109 F 
· PO 118B. POl18F .PO 119 B .'POII9F.Pi5I2OB' .IVP0120FO . PP0120FSO . CTOI2OT. PPO 120FS O. P PO 120F M . P PO 120L 
12) PSVOI20PB. PPOI20FO. PSVO l20lS0 .PSV0120S. PSV0l20B. PS VO 1201SC. PSVO 120L. PO 1 018. P0107F . POl 08B. PO 1 08F . POl 09 F 
.POlI88. POl18F .POl19B.POfi'9F.~.IVPOI20FO.PP0120FSO.CT0120T .PPOI20FSO.PP0120F M .PP0120L 
13) PSV0120L. PP0120FO. pS VO 120150 . pS VO 120S.PS VO 120P B. PSVO 1201SC. PS VO 120B. PO 101 B. POl 07F . PO lOS 8 . PO 108F . POl 09F 
· PO 118B. P 0 118 F . POl198 . Pi5Ii'9F. POl2CiEf.IV POI20FO.P PO 120FSO. CTO 120T . P PO 120FSO. PPO l20FM . PP0120L 
14) IVP0120S. PPO 120FO. PS VO 120150 . PS VO 120B.'POI07Ef.POI'07F'.POITi81J.P6T'6"8F . PO 1 09F .'POiT8§' .POi"i"S'F .POTTIi1J 
· PO 119 F . PQ120B .IVPO 1201< Q .IVPO l20FC .IV P0120B. IVP0120PB .IVPOI20L. CTOT2OT. P P0120FSO . PP0120F M. P P0120L 
15) IVP0120FO. POI09 PB. P PO 120FO .IVPO 120FO . IVPO 120P B. IVP0120B .IVPO 120S. IVPO 120 L. PCiIiWB' .POTIi9'F. 'P(iTIi9E'.PO 1078 
· P0107F . PO 1 08B. P0108F . PO 118B.P(i'i'i8l:" .PO 119 B. Poi"i'9F. PO 120B. PS VO 1201SC. PSVO 120B. PPO 120FSO.P POI20FM. P P0120L 
16) IVPO 120FO. P011OPB. P P0120FO .IVPO 120FC .IVPO 120B . IVPOllOS.IVP0120L. IVPO 120P B. PQiT01j. POIf1iF'. PQi101:;'. POTIi'ffi' 
.P 0 107F . PO 108B .PO lOSF' . POl 09 F .PCiiI8EJ. PO lI8F . POIT9B.P1iIT9F.POI2Oi'i. PSVO 1201SC. PSVOI20B. P POI20FSO. PPO 120F M . PPO 120L 
11) IVP0120FO. PO 111 P 8. P P0120FO .IV P0120FC .IVP0120B . IV PO 120S. IVPOI20L. IV PO 120P B. PO'fIT'Ij .POIT'i8F. PiITIIL. POTIi7B .PO 1 07F 
· PO 108B. P0108F . PO 1 09F . PO 118 8.POI1"8'F'. PO 119B . POl18F . PO 120B. PS VO 1201S0. P S V0120B. PP0120FS O.P P0120FM. P PO 120L 
IS) IVP0l20FO. POI12PB. PP0120FO .IVP0l20FC .IV PO 120B .IVP01205. IV PO 120L. IVPO 120P B . POI12B. PO 112F . POII2i:'.POl 01B . PO 1 07F 
· POTIiBB. PO 1 08F . POl 09F . PO 118B. PiiTfB1:". PO 119 8. Pi)i"TIi"F. POI20B. PSV 0120150. PSVO 1208. P PO 120FSO. P P0120 FM. P POI20L 
19) IVP0120FO .P0113PB.PP0120FO.IVPOI20FC .IVPOIlOB.IVP0120S.IVPOllOL.IVPOIIOPB.~.'POTi3'F .POIT3L.POI078.POI07F 
.P0102B .P0102F .P0109F .POl15B.POiT5F.POIl9B .POI16F .POl17B.PSVOI20IS0.PSVOI10B.PPOlIOFSO.PPOI20FM.PPO110L 
20) IVPOI20FO. PO ll4P B.P P0120FO .IV POll OFe . IVPOllO B .IV PO 120S .IVPOll OL. IV POll OP B.~. POi'I'4F'. PiJTi4L. PO 107B. PO 1 01F 
.P0102B.POl02F .P0109F .POI15B.P0115F .P0119B .POl16F .POl17B.PSVOI20ISC.PSVOI10B. PP011OFSO.PP0120F M.PPOllOL 
21) IVP0120FO. B P0120PB. P P0120FO. 8PO 11 OB . 8PO 11 OL.IVPO 120FO. IVPOlI OB. IVPOll OS .IV PO 120L.IVPOll OP B. POlO 1 B.PO 101F 
.POI02B.POI02F .POI09F .P0115B .'POII5'F'.POI19B .P0116F .POII78 .PSV0120ISC .PSVOI10B.PP011OFSO .PPOI201< M .PPOIIOL 
22) OT0120T .POI 09PB. PPO 120FO. IV POll OF C .IVPO 11 OB. C'1"OT25'F. POI03B. POI03F. PCiTIi9L. P'O'fOI'B. POlO IF . POl 08 B .PO 102F 
· PO 109F . POl158 .PO 1151' . P0119 B. POIT6'P'.J5CiIT7B. PS V0120ISC. PSVOl1 OB. P POll OFSO. P PO 1201< M. P POll OL 
23) CT0120T.POI10PB.PPOlIOFO.IVPOltOF C .IVPOII0B .CTOII0F .P0104B.POI04F .P0110L.PPOI10f SO.PPOII0FM .PP0120L 
.POI01B.POlOIF.P0102B.P0108F.~.P0Tf5i3.P011SF.P0116B.P0116F.P0120B.P5VOlI0ISC.PSVOlIOB 
24) CT0120T.POII1PB.PPOI20FO.IVPOI tOF C .IVPOllOB .CTOI20F .P0105B .P0105F .POiTIL.POTOTIf.POI01F .P0108B .P0102F 
· P0109 F . POl15B. POl15F . PO 119 8. POiT6'F. J5CiIT7B. PSVO 1201SC. PSVO 11 OB. P POll OFSO. PPOI20FM. P POll OL 
25) CT0120T .PO 112PB. P PO 120FO. IVPO 11 OFe .IVPO 11OB. CT0120 F . PO 106B. 'POi'06F.P'OIT2"L . POTIiTB'. PO 101 F . POI OSB. PO 102F 
· PO 109F . POl15B .PO I1SF . PO 119 8. POTI'6F.POi'I7B. PSVO 1201SC. PSVOIlOB.P PO 11OFSO. PPO 120F M. P POll OL 
26) CT0120T.POl13P8.PP0120FO.IVP0110FC.IVPOl10B.~.~.'POIT3'F.Pi5I'i'3i:'.P51OIIf.POIOIF.POI08B.P0102F 
· PO 109 F .POl15B. PO lI5F . PO 119B. PiITT6F'. PO 117B. PSVO 1201SC. PSVO 1108. P POll OF So .P PO 120FM .P POllOL 
21) CT0120T.P0114PB.PP0120FO.IVP01 lOF e .IVPOlIOB.CTOI20F .POIl4B.POIT4F.POTI4I:.Pi5TIiIi!.P0101F .~.POI02F 
.POI09F .POlI5B.POI15F .POl19B.POl16F .POI17B.PSV0l20ISC.PSVOllOB.PP0110f SO .PPOI20F M.PPOlI0L 
2S) CT0120T .BP0120P8. P P0120FO. BPoITOi3 . i3P"Oi"iOL.IV PO 120FC .IVPOll OB. CTOIT5F. POTIi7B'. PlIT5IF. P01 02B. P0107F 
· PO 109 F . P0l1SB. PO 115F . P0119B. POTI6F'. POTI7B. P SVO 1201SC. PS VO 1 lOB . P PO 11 OFSO. P PO 120FM. PPO 11 OL 
29) CT0120T. IVPO 120PB.P POI20FO. IV PO 11 OFO . IVPO 11OB. IVP0120S. IV POllOL.IVPO 110 FO. CTO'i"2OF .PoTIITB .PO IOIF . P0108B 
· POl 08F .POl 03F . PO 1158 . PO 118F . POiTiJ'B'. PO 116F . PO 120B. PSVO 11 OISc. PSVO 1108 . PP0120FSO. PPO 11 OFM . P PO 11 OL 
Table D.42: Prime implicants for partial flow at PSV0120 when low flow 
is required in the DORMANT operating mode 
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D.1.21 Partial Flow at PSVOllO when Flow is Required 
PFPSVOIIOF (P0I0fi3.POIOfF.J5iIT02jj.POI02F.POI15B.POIT5F.POIT6B.POI16F.POI17B.POI03F 
.PSVOlIOISC.PSVOllOB.PPOllOFSO.(IVPOllOFO.CTOllOT.(PPOllOFM.PPOllOFO 
+PPOllOL.PPOllOFO.PPOlIOFM.PPOllOFSO + P01l5PB.P01l5L + P0115L.P01l5PB 
+P0116PB.P0116L + P01l6L.P01l6PB + P01l7PB.P01l7L + POIOIPB.POIOIL + POIOIL.POIOIPB 
+POI02PB.l'OIli2L + POI02L.POl02PB + POI03PB.POIli3L + POI03L.POI03PB 
+PSVOIIOS.PSVOIIOISO.PSVOIIOL + PSVOlIOL.PSVOllOISO.PSVOllOS 
+ PSVOIIOISO .PSVOlIOS.PSVOllOL + IVPOIIOS.IVPOllOFC.IVPOIIOB.iiIV"'P"'Oiil"IO"'p5iB".iiIV"'P"'O"'I'IO"'F"""C.IVPOllOL) 
+(POIOfil.PiiIliTF.P0102ll.POI02F.P01l5B.POI15F.POI16B.P01l6F.P0117B.PO103F.PSVOllOISC 
.PSVOlIOB.PPOIIOFSO).((IVPOIIOFO.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOL 
+CTOIIOT.IVPOIIOFC.IVPOIIOB.IVPOIIOPB.IVPOIIOS.IVPOIIOL.CTOIIOF) 
.(POI03PB.POI03B.POI03F.POl03L + P0104PB.POI04B.POI04F.POI04L 
+POI05PB.POI05B.POI05F.POI05L + POI06PB.POI06B.POI06F.POI06L 
+P01l3PB.P5IT3B.J5OIT3F.POIT3L + P01l4PB.P01l4B.POII4F'.POTI4L 
+BPOllOPB.BPOllOB.BPOllOL)) + IVPOllOPB.CTOllOT.IVPOIIOFC."IV"'P'"O"'ll"'O"B.IVPOIIOFO.IVPOllOS 
.IVPOlIOL. CTOllOF .POIOIB.PiiIliTF.POI02B.POI02F.i'OIT5l3.POI15F.POI16B.POI16F .POI17B.POI03F 
.PSVOllOISC.PSVOlIOB.PPOlIOFSO).(ACTIVE.DORMANT) 
.POI16F .POI17B.IVPOI1OFO .PSVOI1OISG.PSVOIlOB.CTOI10 r 
2) PPOIlOL .PPOllOFO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOf SO.POI0IB.POlOn .P0102B .POI02F .POl03F .POI15B .P01l5F .POIl6B 
.P01l6F .POI17B.IVP01lOFQ.PSVOIlOIsc.PSVOUOB.CTOIlOT 
3) POl15PB.POI15F .POU5B .POI15L.POTO'I"S'.POTIi'iF.P'5"i'02i3.PiIT02F 
· POI 03F . P0116B. PO ll6F . PO 117B. IVPOll OFO. PPOI1OFSO. PS VOllOISC. P S VOllOB. CTOllOT 
4) PO 115L. POll5 8 . POl15P B. PO 115F . POIOTB. POTIi'iF. P'5"i'02i3. PiIT02F 
.PO 103F . PO 1168. PQTI6l:". POl17B . IVPO llOf O. P POll OFSO. PSVO 11 DIS C. PSVO 11 OB. CTO I lOT 
5) POl16PB.POTI6F.POiT6B.POiT6I:':pQIOIH.PO'iOTF.P0102B.P0102F .P0103F .POl15B.POI15F .POI17B 
· IV POllOFO . PPOllOFSO. P S VO 1101SC. PS VO 11 OB. CTO 11 OT 
6) P0116L.POI1"6'B .POT'i6t"Ei.POTI6F.POIOi"'B'.POTIITF.POi"iJ2B.POI02F .POI03F .POlI5B.POI15F .POI17B 
.IVPO 11 OFO. P PO II OFSO. PSVOII DISC. P SVOll OB. CTOII OT 
7) POI17PB.POIT7F.P'0'iT'7i3.PCiTI7L.POi1i'I13.PO'iOTF.P0102B .POI02F .P0103F .POl15B.POl15F .POI16B.POI16F 
.IVPO 11OFO . PPOI1OFso. PS VO II DISC. PS VO 11 OB. CTO I10T 
8) POI01PB.POTIiT'F.P0i0Ti3.POiOiL.P0102B .POI02F .P0103F .POI15B.POl15F .POI16B.P01l6F .POU7B.IVPOIIOFO 
· P POlIO FSO. PSVOllOISC. PSVO 11OB. CTOl1 OT 
9) POI01L.P6TIiTi3 .POTIifl'51J.POfOIF.P0102B.POI02F. POI03F .POI15B.POl15F .POI16B .POl16F .POI17B.IVPOllOFO 
.PPOlIOFSO.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB.CTOl10T 
10) POI02PB. POI02F. Pi5'i"52B. POI02L. PO 101 B. POlO 1 F . PO 103 F . POl15B . PO 11SF . PO 116B. PO 116F .POII7B .IVPOll OFO 
.P POll OFSO . PSVO 11 OlsC. PS VO 11OB. CTO 110T 
11) POI02L.POTIi2B.PQTIi2l5'B.POTIi2F.P0101B .F0101F .POI03F .POl15B.POl15F .P0116B. P0116F .P0117B.IVPOI10FO 
.PPOllOFSO.PSVOllDISC.PSV011OB.CTOllOT 
12) POI03L.POTIi3'B.P5"f03i5'B.POi"03F.P0TIiTI3.P01OIF.P0102B.P0102F .POlI5B.P0115F .POl16B.POI16f .POl17B 
.IVPOl1 OFO . P POll OF SO. PSV Oil OISC. PSVOI1OB. CTOIl OT 
13) PSVO liDS. P SV01101S0. P S V011DISC. PSVOII 0 PB ."P"'S"V"O"l1"O"'B' .• P"S"'V"O"'l"loO"'L. POlOl B. POlO 1 F . POI 02B. PO 102F . PO 103 F 
· POl15B .~. PCiIl6'B'. 'i5iITIifF. PO 117 B .lVPO 11OFO . P PO IIOFSO . CTOl1 OT 
14) PSVOl1 OPB. PSVO 1101$0 . PSVO 11OS. PS VO 110B. PS VO 1101Sc. PSVO 11OL. PO 10 IB. POlO IF. PO 1 02B. PO I 02F . P0103F 
· PO 115B . POI"f5"F. POi'I'6i3. POIT'6F .PO 1178 .IVPO 110FO.P PO IIOFSO. CTOll OT 
15) PSV011 OL. P SVOll OISO. PSVO 11 OS. PS VOll OP 8. PS VO 11OISC. P SVOllOB . PO 10 lB. PO I 01 F . PO 102B .P01 02F . POI 03F 
· POI15B. 'POTI'5F .POII61'J .P5TI'6"F .PO 117B .IVPOll OFO .P POll OFSO .CTO 110T 
16) IVPOI10S.PSVOII0ISC .PSVOlIOB.POIOIB .P0101F .POI02B. P0102F .POI03F 
· P01158. PO I1SF . PO 1166. P5TI'6"F. PO 1178 .lVPO IIOFO . P POlIO FSO ."lvCTp"OFiiI"IOOF"C'''.I'VV'i'P,"OO', "1O"'B .IVPO I lOP B .IV PO 11 0 L. CTO 11 OT 
17) IVPOII0FO.P0103PB.iVPOllOFC.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOB.IVPOIIOS.IVPOllOL.POI03B.~.POiO'3'L 
· PO 10 IB . PO 10 1 F . POI 02 B. POi"02F .POTI'5B. POfi5F.J5'OTI'6B. P0116F . POll 78. PSVOllOISC. PSVOII OB 
18) IVPO 110 FO. POl 04 PB.IVPOl1 OFC . IV PO 1108 .IVPO 11OS.IVPO II OL. IVPO 11 OP B. P0104B .PO 104F . PO'I"54'L 
· POI 01 B _ PO 10 1 F . POI 02B. POTIi2F. POI03F.POT'i"5B. POITSF. P"CiI'i'6B. POIT6F. POll 7B . PSV0110ISC . PS V 011 OB 
19) IVPOllOFO. POI05PB. IVP011 OFC . IVPO 11OB. IVP011 OS. IVP0110L .IVPO 11 OP B. POI 05B. POl 05F . POI05L 
.POI01B.POIOIF.~.P0102F.P0103F.P0115B.P0115F.P0116B.P01l6F.POI17B.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB 
Table D.43: Prime implicants for partial flow at PSVOllO when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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Number Prime Implicants 
D.1.22 
20) IV POIIOFO. pal 06P B.IV POllOFC.I VPO I lOB .IV PO llOS.IV POllOL. IV PO I lOP B. PO I 068. P0106F .POl 06L 
· POW 1 B. PO 1 01 F .POW28. Poi'C52'F. POTIi3'F. P'OII'5'B. POII5F'. POTI'6i3. PO'i'T6F'. PO 117B. PSVOII OISC. PSVO 110B 
21) IVPO 11 OFO. PO 113PB. IVPOll OFC . IVPOI lOB .IV POll OS. IV PO 11OL.JV PO 110P B. POl13B. POTi3F'. 'POTI3L 
· PO 101 B. POiOIF. PO I 02B. Poi'C52'F. POW3F. P'OII'5'B .POi"I5F. POIT6i3. POII6"F. POll1B .PS VOll OISC. PS VO II OB 
22) IVPOll OFO. P0114P B. IV POllOFC . IVPO II OB. IVPO 11OS.IVPOlI OL. IVPO 1I0P B. PO 1148 . POIT4'F. POIT4'L 
· POlO 1 8. PO 1 01 F .PO 1 028. pal 02F . P0103 F . POi'i5B .'i"5'II'5F . 'Pi5i"i'6'B. POITin:' . 'POIT7i3. PSVOll OISC. PSVOllOB 
23) IVPO 11 OFO. B POll OPB. B POll OB. B POll OL. IV POllOFC .IVPOll OB .IVPO 1105 .IVPOll aL. IVPOll OPB 
· PO 10 1 B. POlO IF. PORi2B. Poi'C52'F. POlO3F. PO IlSB. PO IISF . PO 116B. PO 116F .POU1B .PS VO llOISC. PS VO 11 OB 
24) CTOII0T.POI03PB.lVPOllOF C.IVPOl10B .CTOllOF .P0103B.POI03F .P0103L 
.POWIB .POlOlF .PORi2B.Poi'C52'F.PiJi1i3'F.POllSB .POllSF .POII6B .POlI6F .POI17B.PSVOllOISC.PSVOlI0B 
25) CTOIlOT .POl04PB.1VPOllOFC .IVPOllOB.CTOllOF .P0104B.P0104F .POI04L 
· PO 101 B. PO I 01 F . PORi2B. Poi'02"F.POTIi3'F. PO liS B .P0115F . POll6B .POI16F . PO 1118 .PSVOllOISC. PS VO 110B 
26) CTOII OT. PO 1 05PB .IVPOl1 at< C .IV pall OB. eTa llOF . PO 1 058. PO I OsF . PO 105L 
· PO 101 B. POlO IF. PORi2B. Poi'02"F. POlO3F. P0115B. PO IISF . PO 116B. PO 116F . POll 7B. P S VO IIOISC. PSVO II OB 
21) CTOllOT .POI06PB.IVPOIIOFC .IVPOllOB .CTOIIOF .P0106B.POI06F .POl06L 
.POIOIB .POlOIF .PiIT02i3.Poi'02F.P<i1"03F .POIIS8.P0115F .POI16B.P0116F .POI17B.PSVOllOISC.PSVOllOB 
28) CTOIIOT.P01l3PB.IVPOllOFC .IVPOllOB.CTOllOF .POI13B.P01l3F.~ 
· POlO lB. PO 10 1 F . Pii'I'5"2'B. Poi'C52'F. POI03F. P0115B . PO IISF . P01168. PO 116F . PO 111B. PS VOllOISC. PS VO 11 OB 
29) CTOllOT.P01l4P8.IVPOllOFC .IVPOllOB.CTOllOF .POI14B.POI14F .P01l4L 
· POlO I 8. PO 101 F .POI 028. pal 02F . P0103F . POI'I5B.'P6TI5'F'. PO'iT6'8. 'PQINl:'. P01178. PSVOll OISC. PSVOII OB 
30) CTOI10T .BPOllOPB .BPOllOB .BPOllOL.IVPOllOFC .IVPOl108 .CTOII0F 
· PO 10 1 B .PO 1 0 IF. PO 1028 . Poi'02"F. POTIi3F. POi'i5B. POITSF". POIT6i3. P01'I'6F. POll 7B. P SVO 1101SC. PS VO 1108 
31) CTOlI OT .lVPO llOP 8. IVPO llOFC . IVPOll OB. IV POll OS. IVPO llOL.IV PO 11OFO . eTOll OF 
.POIOl B.POIOiF .POI02B.POI02F. P0103F .POlIS8.POI15F .POI16B.POI16F .POI17B.PSYOllOISC.PSVOllOB 
Table D.44: Prime implicants for partial flow at PSV0110 when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Partial Flow at PSV0120 when Flow is Required 
PFPSVOl20LFA (POIO'ffi.I'OI07F.Pof68B.P5I08F.POI18B.PoIT8F.POIT9B.POI19F .POI20B .PliTIi9F 
.PSVOI20ISC.PSVOI20B.PPOI20FSO.(lVPOI20FO.CTOI20T.(PPOI20FM.PPOI20FO 
+PPOI20L.PPOI20FO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOFSO + P01l8PB.P01l8L + P01l8L.P01l5PB 
+P01l9PB.P01l9L + P01l9L.P01l9PB + POI20PB.POI20L + P0107PB."i'liI07L + POIOIL.POl07PB 
+P0108PB.POIli8l: + P0108L.P0108PB + POl09PB.POI09L + P0109L.POl09PB 
+PSVOI20S.PSVOI20IS0.PSV0120L + PSV0120L.PSV0120ISO.PSV0120S 
+PSV0120ISO.PSV0120S.PSV0120L + lVP0120S.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.IVP0120PB.IVPOI20FC.IVPOl201 
+(l'OI07fi.I'OI07F.POI08il.POI08F .POl18B.PoIT8F.P5TI9B.l'Ofi9F.POi2OB.POI09F. PSV0120lSC 
.PSV0120B.PP0120FSO).«lVP0120FO.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.lVP0120PB.lVP0120S.IVP0120L 
+CT0120T.IVP0120FC.IVPOI20B.IVP0120PB.lVPOllOS.IVP012OL.CT0120F) 
.(P0109PB.P0109B.P0109F.P0109L + POllOPB.POllOB.POllOF.POllOL 
+POlllPB.POlllB.POlllF .POlllL + P01l2PB.P01l2B.P01l2F .P01l2L 
+ P01l3PB.POTI3B.POll3F.POIT3L + P01l4PB.P01l4B.POil4F.POIill 
+BP0120PB.BP0120B.BP0120L)) + IVP0120PB.CT0120T.lVP0120FC.lVPOI20B.IVP0120FO.lVP0120S 
.IVPOI20L.CTOI20F.P0107B.POI07F.P0108B.I'OI08F.PoIT8B.P01l8F.P01l9B.P01l9F.POI20B.P0109F 
.PSV0120ISC.PSV0120B.PP0120FSO).(ACTIVE.DORMANT) 
Number Prime Impllcants 
I) PP0120FM.PPOI20FO .PP0120FSO.PP0120L.POI07B.POI01F .P0108B .P0108F .P0109F .POlI8B .P01l8F .POI19B 
. PO 116F . PiIT2Q'Ef. IYPO 120FO . PSVQ 120ISC. PS VOI20B. CT0120T 
2) PP012QL.PP0120F O.PPOllOFM .PPOI20FSO.POl07B.P0107F .P0108B .POI08F .P0108F .POI18B.POI18F .POl19B 
. PO 119 F . PO 120B .IVPO 120FO. PSV0120ISC. PSVO 120 B. eTO 120T 
Table D.45: Prime implicants for partial flow at PSVOllO when flow 
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3) P0118PB.POllSF .POlISB .POllSL. P0107B. POlO8F .P0108B.POIOSF 
· P0109F . PO 119 B .PO 119 F . PO 120B. IVPO 120FO.P PO 120FSO .ip"siv~O~1~20ii11~S~C'. P"'S"V~O:;-12~OTIB'. CTO 120T 
4) POl18L.POllSB.POllSPB.POlISF.POT07B.POi"5TF.POI081'i.~ 
· PO 1 OW . P0119 B. P0119F . P0120B . IV PO 120FQ . PPO 120FSQ. PSVO l201SC. PSV0120B. CTO 120T 
5) POl19PB. POTI"9F. POi19B.".POIT9L. POT07B. POW7F. POIOSB. PO 108F . PO 1 09F . POIISB. PO 118F . P01208 
.IVPOI20FO.PPOII0FSO.PSVOI20ISC.PSVOI20B.CTOI20T 
6) P0119L .P0TI9i3.i>Qil915B.POIT9F.POT07B.POW7F.POI0SB.POlOSF .POl09F .POllSB.POl18F .PCH20B 
.IVPO 120FQ. PP0120F so. PSVOI201SC. PS V0120B. CTO l20T 
7) P0120PB. POi2OF. POIT7i3. P012OL. POf57B. POT07"F. POI 08B. Po 108F .PO 109F . Poi'i"SB. PO 11SF . 'Poi'i9i§". PO 119F 
.IVPOI20FQ.PPOI20FSQ.PSV01201SC.PSVOI20B.CTOI20T 
8) POl07P B. P5I"157""F. POIO'fB. POTIi7E". PO lOS8 . PO IOSF . PO 1 09 F . Pi5Ii8Ei. POl18F . PO 119B . POl19F . PO 120B .IVPO 120F U 
.PPOI20FSO.PSVOI20ISC.PSVOI208.CTOI20T 
9) POI07L.PiiT07B.PoiO'fi5B.PiIT07F.POlOS8.POI08F .POl09F .POllS8.P01l8F .P0119B.POI19F .PO 120B.IVPOI20F 0 
.PPOI20FSO.PSV01201SC.PSV0120B.CTOI20T 
10) POI OsP B. Pili02"F.POI08B. P"i5"i08"L. PO 1078 . PO 107F . POI 09F . POlI88 . PO 11SF . PO 119B. POl19 F . PO 1208 .IV PO 120FO 
· P P0120F80. PSVO 1201sc. PS VOI20B. CTO 120T 
11) P01 08L.Pii"i02i3.Polci8Pi3 .~ . POI 078. P0107F . PO 109F . PO 11SB. P0118F . P0119 B .PO 119 F . PO 120B. IVP0120f'O 
.PPOI20FSQ.PSV0120ISC.PSVOI208.CTOI20T 
12) P0109L.POi03§".POi"09PB.~."P0T"67i3.POW7F.P0108B.POlOSF.POI188.POI18F.POI198.P0119F.POI20B 
· IV POI20FO. P P0120F so. PSV0120ISC. PS VOI20B. CTO 120T 
13) PSV0120S. PSVO 11 OIs0 .PSVO 1201SC. FSVO 120P 8. PS V01208. P SVO 120L. PO 1 07B. PO 107F . FOl 08B. PO IOS F . PO 1 09 F 
.PO 11SB .POI"i8F .PiiTf9"B.POiT9"F . POI20B. IVPOI20FO. PPOI20FSo. CTO 120T 
14) PSVO 12 OPB.PS VO 120180. PS VOI20S.P S VO 1208. P SVO 1201SC. PS VO 120L. PO 1 07B .POl 07F .PO 1 08B. PO 1 OSF . PO 109 F 
· PO 11SB."P15II"8F. PciIT9i3. POIT9F. PO 11 OB .IV PO 1IOFU. P PO 120FSO. CTO IIOT 
15) PS V0120L. PS VOIlOlSU .PS VO 11 OS. PSV0120P B. P SVO IIOISC. PS VO IIOB. PO 1078. PO 107F . PO 1 OSB. PO 108F . POI 09 F 
· PO 118B. POTi8F.PiiTf9"B. POiT9"F. POl20B .IVPO 120FU . PPO 120FSo. CT0120T 
Fault Trees 
16) IVPO 1205. PSVO 1201$C .PSVO 120B. PO 1 07B .PiITO'7F.POIOBB.POI08F . P0109F 
.PO 11sB. POllS F . POl19 B. PO 119 F . PO 1208 .IV PO 1201' O. P PO 120FSO ."lV~P;;;'O~12~OrtF~c'.rlv,,"p"O~12~O~B>.rlV=P"O·12~O~P~B~. IVPO 120L. CTO 120 l' 
17) IVPOI20FO. PO 109PB. IYP0120FC .!VPOI20P B.IV PO 120B .IVPOI20S.IV PO 120L. PO 1 09B .l"OI93F". POTIi91:" 
· PO 1 07B .PO 107F . POl OS8. POTIi8F. POff8B. Pi5"iT8F. POIT9B". PO 119F . PO 120B. PSVO 1201SC. PS VO 1208 
18) IVP0l20FQ .POlIOP 8 .IVPO 120FC . IVPO 1208. IV PO 120S.IV P0121 OL. IVP0120 P8 . PO 1108 . POff6"F" .P5TIO[ 
.POI07B.P0107F.POI088.~.POI09F.POi18i3.PCiTI"BF.POI"i9"S".POII9"F.POI20B.PSV0120ISC.PSVOI20B 
19) IVP0120FO. POIU PB. IVP0120FC. IVP01208 .IVPO 1208. IV P0120L.IVPO 120P B. PO 111 B. POIT"iP". POTITI:" 
· POl 01 B. PO 107F . PO 1 OSB. POTIi8F."POTi59F. POIT8§"."POII"SF. POI"i9"S". POiT9F. P0120B . PSVO 1201SC. PSV0120B 
20) IVP0120FO. PO 112PB.IV PO 120FC . IVP0120B .1VPO 120S.IV PO 120L.1 VP0120P B. PO 112B . POi"i:2F". POIT2L" 
· PO 1 07B . PO 1 0 1 F .POl 028. POTIi8F.POI09F. POTiSB.l"5II9F. P"i5TI"9"B". POTi.""6F. PO 120B .PS V0120ISC. PSVOll OB 
21) IVP0120FO .POlI3P8 .lVP0120FC .IVPOII0B .IVPOI2OS .IVP0120L.IVPOI20P8.POI13B .POl13F .POI13L 
· POlO 1 B. P0107F . PO 1 088. Pili02"F. POT03F."Pi5fi"8"B. POTI5F. P5Ii6B. POT"i9F. POll 7B . PSVO 1101SC. PS VO 130B 
22) IVP0120FO. PO 114PB. IVPOIlOFC .IVPOI30B.l VPO 1205. IV POll OL.IVPO 130 P B. PO 114B. POl14F .PO 114L 
· PO 107B. POlO 1 F . PO lOSB. POl OSF . POl 09 F . J5"CiII8B. POI"iSF. POTI69. POT"i9F. POI2OB". PSV01201SC . P S V0l30B 
23) IVP0l20FO. B P0120P B. B PO 120B . 8 PO 130L .IVP0120FC. IV PO 120B. IV PO 130S.IV POI20L. IVPO 120P B 
.P0101B .POIOIF .PcilO2"B.POTIi8F.POT03F.POl15B .POllSF .POI16B .POI16F.~ .PSVOlIOISC.PSVOlI0B 
24) CT0120T .POl09PB.IVPOllOFC .IVPOllOB.CT0120F .POI03B.POI03F .POI09L 
.POI07B .P0107F .PO"i"08B.POTIi""SF."Pi5I"09F.POI18B.POlISF .POlI9B.POI19F .P0120B .PSVOI20ISC.PSV0120B 
25) CT0120T.POlI0PB.IVP0120FC .IVPOI20B.CT012UF .POlIOB.P0120F. POllOL 
· POl 07B . POl 07F .PO"i"08B. POTIi""SF."Pi5I"09F. POIISB. P0118F . PO 119B. PO 119F . POi2Oi3 .PSV0l201SC. PSVOl20B 
26) CT0120T .POIllPB.IVPOI20FC .IVPOI20B.CTOI20F .POll1B .P0111F .POlIIL 
.POI07B .POI07F .PO"i"08B.~."Pi5I"09F. POI18B.P01l8F .P0119B .POI19F .P0120B .PSV0120ISC.PSVOI20B 
27) CT0l20T .POI12PB.IVPOI20FC .IVP0120B.CTOI20F .POlI2B.P01l2F .P0112L 
· POI07B . PO 1 07F . POlOBB. fi"OI08F.POi09F. POI18B. PO lISF . PO l19B. PO 119F . PO 120B. PSVO 12018b . PSVO 120B 
28) CTOI20T.POl13PB.IVPOI20FC .IVPOI20B.CTOllOF .POlI3B .POlI3F .P0113L 
· PO 107B . POI 07F . POlOBB. POIOSF.POi09F. POI18B. POl18F . POlI9B. PO 119 F . P0l20B. PSV0120ISC .PSVOI20B 
29) CT0120T .POl14PB.IVPOI20FC .IVP0120B.CTOI20F .P01l4B.P01l4F .POU4L 
· PO 107B . PO 107F . PO 1 OSB. POIOSF . PO 1 09 F . j'iQ""ff8j3. POI"iSF. POTI9i3. POll9F . PO 120B . PSVO 1201SC .PSVO 120B 
30) CT0120T.BPOI20PB.BPOI20B .8P0120L.IVPOI20FC.IVPOI210B .CT0120F 
· POI 07B . POl 07F .POI OSB. POTIi""SF. POf59F". PiITiBB. POTI"8F. POTi9B". POT"i9F. PO 120B. PSVOI20ISC. PSVO 120B 
31) CTOl20T . IVP0120PB. IVPO 120FC .IV PO 120B .IV POI20S. IV PO 120L. IVP0120FO. CT0120F 
.POI07B .POI07F .POI08B.POI08F .POl09F .POl18B.POllSF .POl19B .POI19F .P01208 .DP~S"V~O;;-1"20ml~s""c.PSV01208 
Table D.46: Prime implicants for partial flow at PSVOllO when flow 
is required in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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Fault and Success Trees for the Fuel Rig when ACTIVE or DORMANT Success Trees 
D.2 Success Trees 
D.2.1 Working Low Flow at IVP0130 
SUCCESSLFIVP0l30 = IVP0130FO.CT0130T.IVP0l30S 
D.2.2 Working Flow at IVPOllO 
SUCCESSHFIVPOllO DORMANT.POlOIB.POlOIF.POlOIPB.POIOIL.POI02B.POI02F.POI02PB 
.P0102L.POI03B.P0103F.P0103PB.P0103L.POI04B.POI04F.P0104PB.""'PO=1"'04"'L 
.POI05B.POI05PB.POI06B.POI06PB.POl13B.POl13PB.POl14B.PO114PB 
.IVPOllOFC.IVPOllOB.CTOllOF.IVPOllOPB.IVPOllOS.IVPOllOL.BPOllOB 
.BPOIIOPB.PPOIIOFSO.PPOllOFM.PPOllOL 
D.2.3 Working Low Flow at IVPOllO 
SUCCESSLFIVPOllO = DORMANT.IVOllOFO.CTOllOT.IVPOllOS 
+ACTIVE.PPOIIOFO.IVOIIOFO.CTOIIOT.nIV"P""O"l"lO"'S 
D.2.4 Working Flow at IVP0l20 
SUCCESSHFIVP0120 = DORMANT.POI07B.POI07F.POl07PB.P0107L.POI08B.POI08F.POI08PB 
.POI08L.P0109B.POl09F.POl09PB.POI09L.POIIOB.POIIOF.POllOPB.""'PO=l""lO""L 
.POIIlB.POIIIPB.POl12B.POl12PB.POl13B.POl13PB.POl14B.POl14PB 
.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.CT0120F.IVP0120PB.IVP0120S.IVP012OL.BP0120B 
.BP0l20PB.PP0120FSO.PP0120FM.PP0120L 
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Fault and Success Trees for the Fuel Rig when ACTIVE or DORMANT 
D.2.5 Working Low Flow at IVP0120 
SUCCESSLFIVP0120 = DORMANT.lVOI20FO.CTOI20T.lVP0l20S 
+ACTIVE.PPOI20FO.IVOI20FO.CTOI20T.IVP0l20S 
D.2.6 Working Flow at IVP0130 
Success Trees 
SUCCESSHFIVP0130 = DORMANT.POI13B.POI13F.POI13PB.POI13L.POlI4B.POlI4F 
D.2.7 Working Low Flow at IVP0130 
SUCCESSLFIVP0130 = DORMANT.lVOllOFO.CTOI10T.lVPOI10S.lVOI20FO.CTOI20T.IVPOI20S 
+ACTIVE.PPOII0FO.PPOI20FO.lVOlI0FO.CTOII0T.lVPOI10S.IVO120FO 
.CTOI20T.lVPOI20S 
D.2.8 Working Flow at IVPOll1 
SUCCESSHFIVPOlll = DORMANT.POI0lB.POI0IF.POIOlPB.POI0IL.POI02B.POI02F.POI02PB 
.POI02L.P0103F.P0103L.POI15B.POI15F.POI15PB.POI15L.POlI6B.POI16F 
.POI16PB.POI16L.POI17B.POI17PB.POI03B.POI03PB.POI04B.PO104PB 
.P0105B.POl05PB.POI06B.POI06PB.lVPOllOFO.lVPOllOS.IVPOI10L 
.PPOII0FSO.PPOII0FM.PPOII0L.PSVOII0B.PSVOIlOL.PSVOIIOISC 
D.2.9 Working Low Flow at IVPOll1 
SUCCESSLFIVPOlll DORMANT.POI03B.POl03PB.POI04B.POI04PB.POI05B.POI05PB.P0106B 
.POI06PB.POI13B.POI13PB.POI14B.POI14PB.lVPOllOFC.IVPOlI0B.CTOII0F 
.IVPOII0S.lVPOI10PB.BPOI10B.BPOllOPB 
+ACTIVE.PPOllOFO 
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D.2.1D Working Flow at IVP0121 
SUCCESSHFIVP0121 = DORMANT.P0107B.POl07F.POI07PB.POlO7L.P0108B.POI08F.P0108PB 
.POl08L.POI03F.P0103L.POl18B.POl18F.POl18PB.POl18L.POl19B.POl19F 
.POl19PB.POl19L.P0120B.P0120PB.POI09B.POI09PB.POllOB.PO110PB 
.POIIIB.POIIIPB.POl12B.POl12PB.IVP0120FO.IVP0120S.IVP0120L 
.PP0120FSO.PP0120FM.PP0120L.PSV0120B.PSV0120L.PSV0120ISC 
D.2.11 Working Low Flow at IVP0121 
SUCCESSLFIVP0121 = DORMANT.P0109B.POI09PB.POII0B.POII0PB.POIIIB.POIIIPB.POl12B 
.POl12PB.POl13B.POl13PB.POl14B.POl14PB.IVP0120FC.IVP0120B.CT0120F 
.IVP0120S.IVP0120PB.BP0120B.BP0120PB 
+ACTIVE.PP0120FO 
D.2.12 Working Decreasing Level at LTOllO 
DecLevelLTOllO DORMANT.TKOII0R.TK0110L.P0121F.P0121L.IVP0130FO.CTO130T.IVP0l30S 
.IVP0130L.POlOIF.POlOlL.PPOllOL.P0107F.P0107L.PP0120L 
D.2.13 Working Constant Level at LTOllO 
ConstLevelLTOl10 = DORMANT.TKOllOR.TKOII0L.POlOIF.POlOIL.POI02F.POI02L.POI03F 
.P0103L.POl15F.POl15L.POl16F.POl16L.PPOII0L.IVP0110L.PSVOII0L 
.POI07F.POI07L.POI08F.P0108L.P0109F.POI09L.POl18F.POll8L.POl19F 
.POl19L.PP0120L.IVP0120L.PSV0120L.P0121F.P0121L.IVP0130FO 
.CT0l30T.IVPOI30S.IVP0l30L.POI07F.POI07L.PP0120L.IVPOII0F0 
.IVP0l20FO 
+ACTIVE."'T"'K""Ol"1"OR".TKOII0L.POlOIF.POI0IL.POI02F.POI02L.POI03F 
.POI03L.POl15F.POl15L.POl16F.POl16L.PPOII0L.IVPO110L.PSVOII0L 
.P0107F.POI07L.POl08F.POI08L.POI09F.POl09L.POl18F.POl18L.POl19F 
.POl19L.PP0l20L.IVP0120L.PSV0120L.P0121F.P0121L.IVP0130FO 
.CT0130T.IVP0l30S.IVP0130L.POI07F.POI07L.PP0l20L.IVPOII0FO 
.IVP0120FO.PPOllOFO.PP0120FO 
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Appendix E 
ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results 
E.1 Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actua.l 
Possibilities 
LTOUO FT0130 FTOlll FTOUO FT0121 FT0120 FTOIO() no ne,: no, 
RL~ tlLtltlLL - p, 
- - - - - 1,4,13:-16, 17:-20, 21:-24, 53~56, 65,-68, 69,-72, 73,-76, 469~ 472-; 481-:- 484-:- 485;-488;-489,-492,-S2i,- - - -
Scenarios 524,533,536,537,540,541,544,677,680,689,692,693, 696, 697, 100, 729, 732, 741, 744, 745, 748, 
749,752,905,908,917,920,921,924,925,928,957,960, 969, 972. 973, 976, 977, 980 
- ~~Lul_~l_~l_Ll_ul_L - - -
S~;arlos Dependent upon patterns on Line Ll. 
1 ~~LL1_LLL1_Ll_Ll_L 27 27 27 
S;e;arlo-; 1777, 1780, 1813, 1816, 2245, 224S, 2281, 2284 
2 ~~L,j712~J, J'-'805~ L, t3~22J J,-22,J69, t,~~2J J~= 18 18 18 S~;arlos 
3 ~~LL1_Ll_Ll_Ll_kl_L 126 126 126 
Scenarios 1773, 1716, 1809, 1812 
4 ~~LL1_Ll_Ll_ul_Ll_L 24 24 30 
Scenario; 1785, 1788, 2253, 2256 
5 ~~_LLLLLLkLLLL 360 47l 360 Scenario; 1797, 1800, 2265, 2268 
6 ~~LL1_Ll_Ll_kl_kl_L 102 102 102 
Scenario; 1793, 1796, 2261, 2264 
Table E,l: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LT0110 FT0130 FT0111 FT0110 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 no nq n 4 i 
RL~ LLilLLL 7 p, 18 18 18 
S;enarlo-; 1621,-1624.' 1657,1660-:- i673, 1676,-1709,' 17i'2, 2089-:- 2'092, 2125~2128," 2141,zi'44-:- 2177, 2180- - -
8 ~i:?L.t6~J, J'-'649~Lt,~~J, J'-'6e8~·t,t~~J.'7l:=- 5 5 5 S~narlo-; 
2077,2080,2081,2084,2113,2116,2117,2120,2129,2132, 2133, 2136, 2165, 2168, 2169, 2172 
9 ;~L.t6~J, J'-'705~·L,t5~~J, J'-212A37,t~2J, 21h 35 35 35 S~narlo-; 
10 ;~L~l-LLbJ_bJ_Ll_L 24 24 24 S~narlo-; 1629, 1632, 1681, 1684, 2097, 2100, 2149, 2152 
11 ~~L~l-LLbJ_b.l_Ll_L 351 351 405 S~narlo; 1641, 1644, 1693, 1696, 2109, 2112, 2161, 2164 
12 ;~L~l-LLo.l_b.l_b.l_L 27 27 27 S;enarlos 1637, 1640, 1689, 1692, 2105, 2108, 2157, 2160 
13 ;~L~l-LLb.l_Ll_Ll_L 126 126 126 S~narlo; 1725,1728,1761,1764,2193,2196,2229,2232 
14 ~~ L.t~J, J'-'753~ L.t,~2J, J'-2~~-L,Lo~~J, J~ 35 3S 35 S~narlo; 
15 ~L~l-LLb.l_Ll_b.l_L 49 49 49 S~narlos 1721, 1724, 1757, 1760, 2189, 2192, 2225, 2228 
16 ;~LL1_Ll_b.l_o.l_Ll_L 168 196 168 
S;enarlos 1757,1760,2225,2228 
17 ;~LL1_Ll_b.l_b.l_b.l_L 49 49 49 
Scenarlo; 1741,1744,2209,2212 
18 ;~L.~1_o.1_Ll_Ll_Ll_L 24 24 30 S~narlo8 
19 ;~L~1-o.LL1_Ll_o.l_L 24 24 24 Scenarlos 1869, 1872, 1873, 1876, 1905, 1908, 1909, 1912 
20 ~LL1_o.1_Ll_Ll_b.l_L 168 196 168 
Scenarlos 1877, 1880, 1913, 1916 
21 ;~l_Ll_o.l_Ll_b.l_Ll_L 24 34 24 
Sc?enarlos 1901, 1904 
22 ;~l_Ll_o.l_Ll_b.l_b.l_L 136 136 136 
Scenarlos 1897, 2000 
23 ;o~LL1_b.l_Ll_Ll_Ll_L 47l 360 360 
Scenario; 2037, 2040, 2073, 2076 
Table E.2: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW LI FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n, nc" na. 
2. ::~LbL _L J~J~ _L 351 351 .05 S~harlo; 2025,-2028,' 2029,2032:- 2'061, 2064,-2065~ 2068 - - - -
25 ;~l_Ll_b.l_Ll_bJ_Ll_L 2. 24 ,. 
Sce~arlo; 2045, 2048 
2. ;~LL.l-b.Lb.l_Ll_Ll_L 102 102 102 S~~arlo-; 1985, 1988, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016, 2021, 2024 
27 ;~LLJ_b.Lb.l_Ll_bJ_L 27 27 27 
Sce~arlo; 1973, 1976, 1977, 1980, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016 
28 ~~L,bJ_b.l_b.l_Ll_kl_L 49 49 49 
SCe~arlo-; 
29 ~~l_Ll_b.l_b.l_bJ_Ll_L 136 13. 136 
S~~arlo8 
30 ;~l_Ll_b.l_b.l_b.Lb.l_L 16 I. I. 
Sce~arlo8 2001, 2004 
Effectiveness Index I R 0.933 
Table E.3: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 3 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW LI FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOI10 FT0130 FT0111 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 ., nc. na, 
RL~ 
p, rr L rr rr L L 
- - - -- 1,4,13:-16,17:-20',21:-24, 53:-56, 65~68, 69~72. 73;-76: 469, 472~ 48i; 484:- 48S:-488:-489;-492,-52i,- - . -
Scenarios 
__ ,_=_M1,_,~ _____ , ____ n1,_,_, _ 
___ ,~W~_=, _______ ~, __ ~ 
. :;~LuL~l_~l_Ll_ul_L . . . 
S~~arlo8 Dependent upon patterns on Lme Ll. 
1 ~~LL.I-Ll-Ll_Ll_Ll_L 301 301 301 S~~arlo-; 1777,1780,1813,1816,2245,2248,2281,2284 
2 ~~LL1_Ll_Ll_Ll_Ll_u 98 98 98 
Sce~arlo-; 1778, 1814, 2246, 2282 
Table E.4: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOll0 FT0130 FT0111 FTOII0 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 n, ne;: na, 
3 RLh-. L 
_L _L L L J~~~ 49 49 49 S~nBrio-; 1779,-ISiS; 2247,2283- - - - - -- - - - --
• :h~· L.t~J. J.-'805~· L.L3~,J. J'-22.A69.t),j. 22b 120 120 120 S~narlo-; 
5 ~~LL:l_LLL1_Ll_ul_u .2 .2 .2 S~narlos 1766,1770,1802,1806,2234,2238,2270,2274 
6 ~~LL:l-LLL1_Ll_ul_k 21 21 21 S;enarlos 1767,1771,1803,1807,2235,2239,2271,2275 
7 ~~LL1_Ll_Ll_Ll_kl_L 63 63 63 
S~narlo8 1773,1776,1809,1812 
8 ~~LL1_Ll_Ll_ul_Ll_L 380 320 320 
S~narlo-; 1785,1788,2253,2256 
9 ~~l_Ll_Ll_Ll_ul_Ll_u 112 140 112 
S~narlos 1786, 2254 
10 ~~l_Ll_Ll_Ll_ul_Ll_k 56 70 56 
S~narioa 1787, 2255 
11 RLh-.l L 
_L _L 
_kLLLL 229 229 267 S;enarloa 1797,-1800,- 2265,2268--
12 ~~LL1_Ll_Ll_kl_kl_L 17 17 17 
S~;arlos 1793, 1796, 2261, 2264 
13 
:6h2{ L.to~J. J.-,70{ L.L~~o;l. J.'-2128~ t. t.~J. 21b 120 120 120 S~narloa 
" ~~Lhl-LLul_Ll_Ll_u .2 42 42 S~;arlo; 1622,1658,1674,1710,2090,2126,2142,2178 
15 ~~Lhl-LLbJ_Ll_Ll_k 21 21 21 S;enarlos 1623,1659,1675,1711,2091,2127,2143,2179 
16 ~L~LL:l_LLtl:l_LL~l_L 2' 25 25 S;enarloa 1609,1612,1613,1616,1645,1648,1649,1652,1661, 1664, 1665, 1668, 1697, 1700, 1701, 1704, 
2077,2080,2081,2084,2113,2116,2117,2120,2129,2132, 2133, 2136, 2165, 2168, 2169, 2172 
17 
:6k,{ iJ650~J. J~1698,· L.t8~~J. J~211...l30.t)J. 21~ 10 10 10 S;et'i"arloa 
18 :6hlL.t~J J'-'703;-l,9.t~~J. J'-2131~-L.t~~J -k 55 " 55 S~narlos 
19 :6b2O:L.L.~,J. J'-'70lL.L.~~J. J'-212.~·t.t~;,J 21b 45 45 45 S;enarlos 
Table E.5: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FT0100 n, nc. na. 20 RLh- LLb. 
_L J~l=- _u 18 18 18 s~nario; 1618,-Hi54~ 1670,1706:- 2086, 2122,-2138-;- 2174 - - - -21 ~~LL:l-LLul_Ll_kl_k 9 9 9 Scenarios 1619,1655,1671,1707,2087,2123,2139,2175 22 ~~LL:l-LLul_ul_Ll_L 120 120 120 Scenarios 1629, 1632, 1681, 1684, 2097, 2100, 2149, 2152 23 ~~LL1_Ll_ul_ul_Ll_u 48 48 48 
Scenarios 1630, 1682, 2098, 2150 24 ~~LL1_Ll_ul_ul_Ll_k 24 24 24 
Scenarios 1631, 1683, 2099, 2151 25 ~~LL:l-LLul_kl_Ll_L 56 48 48 
seenarios 1641,1644,1693, 1696, 2109, 2112, 2161, 2164 26 ~~LL:l-LLul_kl_kl_L 28 28 28 s~narios 1637, 1640, 1689, 6192, 2105, 2108, 2157, 2160 27 ~~LL1_Ll_bJ_kl_kl_u 8 8 8 
seenarios 1638, 1690, 2106, 2158 28 ~~LLl_Ll_bJ_kl_kl_k 4 4 4 
s~narios 1639, 1691,2107,2159 29 ~~LL:l-LLkl_Ll_Ll_L 63 63 63 S;enaMo; 1725, 1728, 1761, 1764, 2193, 2196, 2229, 2232 30 
:J7ill L. t~.J, J'-'753~' L.t.~21J J'-2~8~' t, Lo~~J, 22b 45 45 45 S~narlos 31 ~~LL:l-LLb.l_Ll_Ul_U 18 18 18 S~narios 1714,1718,1750,1754,2182,2186,2218,2222 32 ~~LL:l-LLb.l_Ll_Ul_k 9 9 9 
sCenarios 1715,1719,1751,1755,2183,2187,2219,2223 33 ~~LL:l-LLb.l_Ll_kl_L 32 32 32 SeenaMo; 1721,1724,1757,1760,2189,2192,2225,2228 34 :7~L,bJ_Ll_b.l_Ul_Ll_L 48 48 48 
sCenarios 35 ~~LLl_Ll_b.l_b.l_b.l_L 14 14 14 
ScenaMos 1741, 1744, 2209, 2212 36 ~~LL1_ul_Ll_Ll_Ll_L 380 320 320 
seenario; 1881,1884,1917,1920 
Table E.6: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 3 
290 
A CTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FT0100 n, nq na. 37 RLh-
_L j~~ _L _L L J~~. 112 12 140 S~~arlo; 1882,-19i8- - - - --38 :~l_Ll_ul_Ll_Ll_Ll_k 56 56 70 
S~narlo; 1883, 1919 39 :~1873,b5' 19tk1912L1-Ll_ ul_ L 120 120 120 Scenario; 40 :~LL1_ul_Ll_Ll_ul_u 48 48 48 
Scenario; 1870, 1874, 1906, 1910 41 :~LL1_ul_Ll_Ll_ul_k 24 24 24 
Scenario; 1871, 1875, 1907, 1911 42 :~Lhl-LLul_kl_Ll_L 48 48 48 S~nario; 1641, 1644, 1693, 1696, 2109, 2112, 2161, 2164 43 :~LL1_ul_Ll_ul_Ll_L 330 330 330 
S;enario; 1889, 1892 44 :~l_Ll_ul_Ll_ul_Ll_u 132 132 132 
S~narlo; 1890 45 :~l_Ll_ul_Ll_ul_Ll_k 726 726 726 
S;enarlo; 1891 46 ~L~l_Ll_ul_Ll_kl_Ll_L 317 317 317 
Scenario; 1901, 1904 47 :~l_Ll_ul_Ll_kl_Ll_u 82 82 82 
S;enarlo; 1902 48 ~9~1_Ll_ul_Ll_kl_Ll_k 41 41 41 S;e~rlo; 49 RLh-1Llb 
_LLLLLLL 229 229 267 S;enarlo; 2037,-2040," 2073,2076- - - - - - -50 :~LL:l-kLL1_Ll_ul_L 48 48 56 
sCenario; 2025, 2028, 2029, 2032, 2061, 2064, 2065, 2068 51 :~1_Ll_kLL1_ul_Ll_L 317 317 317 
:S;enarlo; 2045, 2048 
52 :o~l_Ll_kl_Ll_ul_Ll_u 82 82 82 
SCeilario; 
53 :~1_LLkl_Ll_uLL1_k 41 41 41 
sCenario; 2047 
Table E.7: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 4 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOlI0 FT0121 FT0120 FT0100 n; nq nai 
" 
RL~ 
_L _k _L _k _L _L 161 161 161 
S~;arlo-; 2051,-2060-
55 RL~l Ll b 
_LLbLLLh 2 2 2 
S~;arlo; ----- ----- -----2058 
56 ~~l_Ll_kl_Ll_kl_Ll_b 1 1 1 
Scenarios 2059 
57 ~~LL1_kl_kl_Ll_Ll_L 17 17 17 
Sce;arlo; 1985, 1988, 2021, 2024 
58 ~~LL1_kl_kl_Ll_hl_L 28 28 28 
Scenarios 1973, 1976, 1971, 1980 
59 RL~l Ll b 
_kLLLhLh 8 8 8 
Scenarlos 1974,-1918- - - - - - - - - - -
60 ~~l_Ll_kl_kl_Ll_hl_k • • • 
Scenarios 1975, 1979 
61 ~~LL1_kl_bl_Ll_kl_L I. I. " 
Scenario; 1981,1984,2017,2020 
Effectiveness Index lE 0.972 
Table E.8: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 5 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n; nc. ne. 
- RLt= L t= L t= L L 
- - - - - 1, 4, 13;-16, 17,-20, :21,-24: 151~ i60~ i69:-112;-173;-176,-177,-180, 209,212,221,224, 225, 228~ 229"7 232:- - - -
Scenarios 261,264,213,276,277,280,281,284,1609,1612,1621, 1624, 1625, 1628, 1629, 1632, 1765, 1768, 1717, 1780,1781,1784,1785,1788,1811,1820,1829,1832, 1833, 1836, 1837, 1840, 1869, 1812, 1881, 1884, 
1885, 1888, 1889, 1892 
1 ~~1_Ql_Ll_Ll_Ll_bJ __ L_ 2. 2. 2. 
Scenarios 945, 948, 1037, 1040 
2 :;~1_Ql_Ll_Ql_Ll_LI ___ L_ 2. 2. 2. 
Scenarios 993, 996, 1005, 1008 
Table E.9: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW L1 L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FT0110 FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n, nCi nai 
3 ~ j~~ J= _U L Q. L 4 4 4 Scenarios - - - -- - - - -- - - - --997, 1000 
4 ;~Lul_Ll_ul_Ll_kl_L 40 40 40 
Scenarios 1001, 1004 
5 ;~J_~LL1_~1_~1_Ll_L 2 2 2 
Scenarios 957,960,969,972,973,976,977,980 
6 ;~l_ul_Ll_ul_kl_Ll_L 2B 2B 2B 
Scenarios 981, 984, 989, 992 
7 ~l_ul_Ll_ul_kl_kl_L 24 24 24 
Scenarios 985, 988 
B ;~l_ul_Ll_kl_Ll_ul_L 40 40 40 
Scenarios 1021, 1024 
9 ;~J_utul_Ll_Ll_ul_L 2 2 2 
Scenario; 717,720,821,824,837,840,853,856 
10 ;~Lul_kl_Ll_Ll_ul_L 2B 2B 2B 
Scenarios 869, 87, 901, 904 
11 :;~l_ul_kl_kl_Ll_ul_L 24 24 24 
Scenarios 885,888 
Effectiveness Index 11'1 1.000 
Table E.lO: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOII0 FT0121 FT0120 FT0100 n, nc. na. 
. RLL L t= L t= L L 
- - - --
----- ----- ----- ----- -----~------------
. . 1,4,13,16,17,20,21,24,157,160,169,172,173,176, 177, 180, 209, 212, 221, 224, 225, 228, 229, 232, . 
Scenarios 261,264,273,276,277,280,281,284,1609,1612,1621, 1624, 1625, 1628, 1629, 1632, 1765, 1768, 1777, 1780,1781,1784,1785,1788,1817,1820,1829,1832, 1833, 1836, 1837, 1840, 1869, 1872, 1881, 1884, 
1885, 1888, 1889, 1892 
1 R~bl_Ql_Ll_Ll_Ll_~l __ L_ 164 164 164 
Scenarios 945, 948, 1037, 1040 
2 R~ ~l_ Ql_ L1_L 1_ Ll_ ~I ___ b._ 52 52 52 
Scenarios 946, 1038 
Table E.11: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOIOO n, nc. nai 
3 RL~ 
_h _L _L _L _h _b. 26 26 26 
SCe~ario; 947, 1038-
4 ~hLhl_Ll_hl_Ll_Ll_L 164 164 164 
S~e~ario; 945,948, 1037, 1040 
5 ~~l_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_Ll_h 52 52 52 
Scenarlos 994, 1006 
6 ~~l_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_Ll_b. 26 26 26 
Scenarlo; 995, 1007 
7 ~~l_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_hl_L 20 20 20 
S~erlarlo; 997, 1000 
8 R;9~1_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_hl_h 8 8 8 
S~e~arlo; 9 '~:~l_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_Ul_b. 4 4 4 ScenarlO; 
10 ~~l_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_b.l_L , , 8 
S~e~arlo; 1001, 1004 
11 ~~LAtLl_hl_hl_Ll_L 10 10 10 Sce~arlos 957,960,969,972,973, 976, 977, 980 
12 ~hl_hl_Ll_hl_hl_Ll_h 4 4 4 
S~enarlo; 958, 970, 974, 978 
13 ~~l_hl_Ll_hl_hl_Ll_b. 22 22 22 
Scenarlos 959, 971, 975, 979 
14 ~hLhl_Ll_hl_b.l_Ll_L 144 144 144 
S~enarlo; 981, 984, 989, 992 
15 :,~l_hl_Ll_hl_b.l_Ll_h 64 64 64 
Sce~arlo; 
16 :,~l_hl_Ll_hl_b.l_Ll_b. 32 32 32 
S~enarlo; 
17 :,~l_hl_Ll_hl_b.l_b.l_L 14 14 14 
S~e~arlos 
18 :,~l_hl_Ll_hl_b.l_b.l_h 4 4 4 
Scenarlos 
19 ~~l_hl_Ll_hl_b.l_b.l_b. 2 2 2 
S~enarlo; 987 
Table E.12: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n, nc. na;: 20 RLh-. 
_h. _L _h _L _h. _L 8 8 8 
S;e~arlo; I02i,-1024-
21 ~h.l_QLh.l_Ll_Ll_h.l_L 10 10 10 
S~~arlo; 717,720,821,824,837,840,853,856 
22 ~kl_h.lj~J_Ll_LLh.l_h. 4 4 4 
Scenario; 718, 822, 838, 854 23 ~kl_bJ_bJ_Ll_Ll_ul_h 22 22 22 
Scenario'i 719, 823, 839, 855 24 ~h.l_h.l_hl_Ll_Ll_h.l_L 144 144 144 
S~~ario'i 869, 872, 901, 904 
25 :7~1_ul_hl_Ll_Ll_ul_u 64 64 64 
S;enarlo'i 26 ~~l_h.l_hl_Ll_Ll_ul_h 32 32 32 
Scenario; 871, 903 27 R~~l_ul_hl_hl_Ll_ul_L 14 14 14 
S;e~arlo'i 885, 888 28 ~~l_h.l_hl_hl_Ll_Ul_h. 4 4 4 
Scenarlo'i 886 29 ~~l_h.l_hl_hl_Ll_h.l_b. 2 2 2 
s;enario; 887 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table E.13: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 3 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n, nc. na;: 
RL~ b.. L b.. b.. L L . 
" 
. . 
- - - -- 1, 4, 13~ 16, 17 ~ 20,21;-24, 53;-56, 65;-68, 69,-72, 73;-76, 469;" 412-;- 4si:- 484-;- 485:-488:-489:-492;-52i,-
Scenarios 524,533,536,537, 540, 541, 544, 677, 680, 689, 692, 693, 696, 697, 700, 729, 732, 741, 744, 745, 748, ____ 91~_~1 _,________=_
Table E.14: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LT0110 FT0130 FTOl11 FTOI10 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 n; nq nai 
'L~ b. J= j~l~ _L - --- --- -PS -Sc?e~arlos Depe'iident upon patte;-n;on Un-; Ll:- - - - - --
1 ~Jd. L.t4~:J, lJ'23i L.t7~,J, lJ'60/ Lt)6J J=-=- 24 24 24 Sc?e~arlos 
2 ;~Lh;1-LLL1_Ll_kl_L 42 42 42 Sc?e~arlos 1225, 1228, 1241, 1244, 1605, 1608, 1625, 1628 
3 ;~Lb.l_Ll_Ll_kl_kl_L 42 42 54 
Sc?e~arlos 1229, 1232, 1613, 1616 
4 ~~ L.t2~d J,-,~,~ L,t,).j j'-l49/ L.t8~J, l5b 24 24 24 Sc?e~arlos 
5 ~~ L,t8~:J l1-,!0~· L'~ll),J 11t'!20'-L,j'5),J ll~ 22 22 22 See;;-arlo-; 
1441, 1444, 1445, 1448, 1477, 1480, 1481, 1484, 1493, 1496, 1497, 1500, 1529, 1532, 1533, 1536 
6 ~~ L,t~d, J~1!5i ttAJ J'-'48~-L.t4~:J, l5b 42 42 42 Sceilarlos 7 ~~Lkl-L.1_bJ_Ql_Ll_L 32 32 32 Sc?e~arlos 1081, 1084, 1133, 1136, 1461, 1464, 1513, 1516 
8 ;~Lkl-LLQ1_kl_Ll_L 468 468 468 Sc?e~arlo-; 1093, 1096, 1145, 1148, 1413, 1416, 1525, 1528 
9 ~~Lkl-LLbJ_kl_kl_L 42 42 46 Sc?e~arlos 1089, 1092, 1141, 1144, 1469, 1412, 1521, 1524 
10 ;~Lkl-Ll-b.l_Ll_Ll_L 42 42 42 See;;-arlo-; 1111,1180,1213,1216,1551,1560,1593,1596 
11 ~~t,t,~:J, J'-'205~ L,t~:J, J'-'552~-L.L.~tJ, l5b 42 42 42 S;e~arlo-; 
12 ;~Lkl-LLb.l_Ll_kl_L 49 49 49 Sc?e~arlos 1113, 1116, 1209, 1212, 1553, 1556, 1589, 1592 
13 :~~Lb.l_Ll_b.l_Ql_Ll_L 56 56 56 
Sc?e~arlos 1185, 1188, 1565, 1568 
14 ;~Lb.l_Ll_b.l_kl_Ll_L 819 819 819 
Sc?e~arlo-; 1191,1200, 1511, 1580 
16 ;o~Lb.l_Ql_Ll_Ll_Ql_L 32 32 32 
Sc?e~arlos 1281, 1284, 1291, 1300 
Table E.15: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
296 
ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 n, nCi nao 
RL~ b. _U _L _L b. _L 17 56 56 56 p, 
Sce~arlo-; 1285,-1288-: 1301,1304- - - - - --
18 ;~l_kl_ul_Ll_kl_kl_L 72 72 72 
SCe~arlo-; 1289, 1292 
" ;~Lkl-kLL1_Ll_ul_L 468 468 468 Sce~arlo-; 1409, 1412, 1413, 1416, 1429, 1432, 1433, 1436 
20 :;~Lkl_kl_Ll_Ll_kl_L 81. 81. 81' 
SCe~arlo-; 1417,1420,1437,1440 
21 ;~l_kl_kl_Ll_kl_kl_L 1053 1053 1053 
Sce~arlo-; 1425, 1428 
22 ;~Lkl_kl_kl_Ll_Ll_L 42 42 54 
Sce~arlo-; 1369, 1372, 1405, 1408 
23 ;~Lkl-kLkl_Ll_ul_L 42 42 48 SCe~arlos 1357, 1360, 1361, 1364, 1393, 1396, 1397, 1400 
24 ;~Lkl_kl_kl_Ll_kl_L 4. 4' 4. 
Sce~arlo-; 1365, 1368, 1401, 1404 
25 :_~l_kl_kl_kl_ul_Ll_L 72 72 72 
SCe~arlO-; 1377, 1380 
26 ;~l_hl_hl_kl_hl_Ll_L 1053 1053 1053 
Sce;arlos 1389, 1392 
27 ;~l_kl_hl_kl_kl_hl_L 4' 4. 4. 
Sce~arlO-; 1385, 1388 
Effectiveness Index lE 0.977 
Table E.16: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 3 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTOIlO FT0121 FTOl20 FTOIOO n; nc, na, 
- ::t~~ b.. L b.. b.. L L - - -
- - - - - 1,4,13:-16, 17:-20', 21:-24, 53~56, 65;-68, 69,-72. 13,-76, 469:' 472-; 4si-;- 484-;- 485-;-488:-489~492,-52i,-
Scenarios 524,533,536,537,540,541,544, 677,680,689,692,693,696,697,700,729,732,741,744, 745, 748, 
749,752,905,908,917,920,921,924,925, 928,957, 960,969,972,973,976,977,980 
- :-~L~l-~l_~l_Ll_Ql_L -- -S;e~arlo-; Dependent upon patterns on Line Lt. 
1 
:2b2o." L,t~:J J~123lL,t7~,J, .L'60/ L,t,)J -L 160 160 160 5';-e;arlo-; 
2 :~L~1-LLL1_Ll_Ql_Q 56 56 56 S;e;arlo-; 1218, 1222, 1234, 1238, 1598, 1602, 1618, 1622 
3 :~Lk.l-LLL1_Ll_Ql_k 28 28 28 SCe~arlo-; 1219, 1223, 1235, 1239, 1599, 1603, 1619, 1623 
• :~L~l_Ll_Ll_Ll_kl_L 29. 29. 29. S;e;arlO-; 1225, 1228, 1241, 1244, 1605, 1608, 1625, 1628 
5 :~Lb.l_Ll_Ll_Ll_b.l_Q 126 126 126 
SCe;arlos 1226, 1242, 1606, 1626 
6 :~Lb.l_Ll_Ll_Ll_b.l_b. 693 693 693 
S;e~arlo-; 1227, 1243, 1607, 1627 
7 :~Lb.l_Ll_Ll_b.l_b.l_L 36. 468 364 
SCenarlo'; 1229, 1232, 1613, 1616 
8 :~l_b.l_Ll_Ll_b.l_b.l_Q 98 126 98 
S;e;arlO-; 1230, 1614 
9 :~l_b.l_Ll_Ll_b.l_b.l_b. 49 49 63 
SCe~arlo-; 1231, 1615 
10 :J~~7lt,t~:J, J,-'16.:L,L)J, J'-'492~·L.t8~J, J~-=- 160 160 160 SCe;arlos 
11 :~Lk.l-Ll_Ul_Ll_Ll_U 5. 56 56 S;e;arlo"i 1074, 1110, 1126, 1162, 1454, 1493, 1506, 1542 
12 :~Lh:l-L.l_Ul_Ll_Ll_b. 28 28 28 SCEularlos 1075, 1111, 1127, 1163, 1455, 1491, 1507, 1543 
13 :~L~1-L.l-Ql-LLQ1-L 110 110 110 SCe;arlos 1061,1064,1065,1068,1097,1100,1101,1104,1113,1116,1117, 1120, 1149, 1152, 1153, 1156, 
1441, 1444, 1445, 1448, 1477, 1480, 1481, 1484, 1493, 1496, 1497, 1500, 1529, 1532, 1533, 1536 
14 :oh.lL,t~d, J'-'160~L.L),4J J'-'482~·Lt)5J 15~ 44 44 44 Sce;arlo"i 
Table E,17: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW L1 L. FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LT0110 FT0130 FTOU1 FT0110 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 n; nc. nai 
15 RLh- b. L Q. L Q. b. 32 32 32 
S~R"arlo-; 1063,-1067," 1099,1io3:-1115, 1119,-li5i-:- 1155,1443:-1445, 1479,-1483-: 1495,14997'"1531, 1535 - - -
16 :1::~2~·t,t~lJ,J'-115~·L,t~l4J,J'-'488~L.t4~IJ,J~ 222 222 222 S~R"arlo-; 
17 :~Lb:l-L.1_bJ_Ll_kl_h. 108 108 108 S;eR"arlos 1010, 1106, 1122, 1158, 1450, 1486, 1502, 1538 
18 :~Lkl-Ll-h.l_Ll_kl_k 54 54 54 S;enarlo8 1071, 1101, 1123, 1159, 1451, 1487, 1503, 1539 
I. :~Lb:l-L.1_h.l_h.l_Ll_L 160 160 160 S~R"arlo8 1081, 1084, 1133, 1136, 1461, 1464, 1513, 1516 
20 :~Lkl_Ll_h.l_h.l_Ll_h. 64 64 64 
S~R"arlo8 1082, 1134, 1462, 1514 
21 :~Lkl_Ll_h.l_o.l_Ll_h 352 352 352 
S~R"arlo8 1083, 1135, 1463, 1515 
22 :~Lkl-LLh.l_kl_Ll_L 64 64 64 S~;arlo-; 1093, 1096, 1145, 1148, 1413, 1416, 1525, 1528 
23 :~.l-kl-LLh.l_kl_hl_L 294 294 322 S;e;arlo8 1089, 1092, 1141, 1144, 1469, 1472, 1521, 1524 
24 :~Lkl_Ll_h.l_hl_hl_h. 84 84 92 
S~;arlo8 1090, 1142, 1410, 1522 
25 R~~Lkl_Ll_h.l_bl_bl_k 42 42 46 
S;e;arlo8 1091, 1143, 1471, 1523 
26 :~Lkl-LLhl_Ll_Ll_L 294 294 294 S~R"arlo-; 1117,1180, 1213, 1216, 1551, 1560, 1593, 1596 
27 :~Lkl_Ll_bl_Ll_Ll_h. 126 126 126 
S~;arlo8 1178, 1214, 1558, 1594 
28 :~Lkl_Ll_hl_Ll_Ll_h 693 693 693 
S~;arlo8 1119, 1215, 1559, 1595 
29 RLh-l ~l L b. L Q. L 222 222 222 
S~;arlo8 1545,-154s""; 1549,15527"1581, 1584,-1585-: 1588,11657"1168, 1169,-1112-:- 1201,12047"1205, 1208 - - -
30 :~Lkl-LLkl_Ll_o.l_h. 108 108 108 S~;arlo8 1546, 1550, 1582, 1586, 1166, 1110, 1202, 1206 
31 :~LkLL_kLLLh.Lh 541 54 54 S;eR"arlo8 1547, 1551, 1583, 1581, 1167, 1171, 1203, 1207 
Table E,18: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Lt L. FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOII0 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 n, nc. na. 
32 RLh-. b L b J~-=-=- _6. J~-=-=- 277 277 277 S~;arlo-; 1173,-1176: 1209, 1212~ 1553,1556,-1589--;- 1592 - - - -
33 ~~L6.1_Ll_6.1_Ll_6.1_0. 162 162 162 
S~;arlo-; 1176, 1210, 1554, 1590 
34 ~~Lk1_L1_h1_L1_b.1_b. 81 81 81 
S;e';-arlos 1175, 1211, 1555, 1591 
35 ~~Lb.l_Ll_b.l_Ul_Ll_L 296 296 296 
S~';-arlos 1565, 1568, 11S5, 1188 
36 ~ ~1_ 6.1_ L1_ 6.1_ 0.1_ L1_ 0. 144 144 144 
S~;arlos 1566, 1186 
37 ~~1_b.l_Ll_6.1_0.1_Ll_b. 72 72 72 
SC'"e;arlo-; 1567, 1187 
38 ~~L6.1_0.1_L1_Ll_0.1_L 160 160 160 
S~;arlo-; 1281, 1284, 1297, 1300 
39 ~~1_6.1_0.1_Ll_Ll_o.l_0. 64 64 64 
SC'"e;arlo'i 1282, 1298 
40 ~~1_b.l_ul_L1_LLo.l_6. 352 352 352 
S~;arlos 1283, 1299 
41 ~~L6.1_0.1_Ll_Ll_6.1_L 296 296 296 
SC'"e;arlo'; 1285, 1288, 1301, 1304 
42 ~~l_b.l_ul_Ll_Ll_b.l_o. 144 144 144 
S~;arlos 1286, 1302 
43 ~~1_6.1_0.1_Ll_Ll_6.1_6. 72 72 72 
SC'"e;arlo-; 1287, 1303 
44 ~~1_6.1_0.1_Ll_b.l_6.1_L 504 504 504 
S~;arlo-; 1289, 1292 
45 ~~1_6.1_0.1_L1_6.1_6.1_0. 144 144 144 
SC'"e;arlos 1290 
46 RLh-
_kLu _L b _b. J~=- 72 72 72 S~;arlo-; - - - -- - - - --1291 
47 ~~1-b:1-6.1-Ll_Ll_0.1_L 64 64 64 SC'"e;arlo-; 1409,1412,1413, 1416, 1429, 1432, 1433, 1436 
48 ~~.L6.1_6.1_6.1_L1_Ll_L 364 364 468 
S~;arlos 1369, 1372, 1405, 1408 
Table E.19: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 3 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actua.l 
Possibilities 
LTOUO FT0130 FTOlll FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n, nCi nai 
.9 RL~ J~=- _h _h J~= _L _h- 98 98 126 S;e~ario-; 1370.-1406 50 :~1_bl_hl_hl_LLL1_h .9 .9 63 
S~~ario-; 1371. 1407 
51 :~L~l-hLhl_Ll_h-l_L 29. 29. 322 S~~arlo'i 1357, 1360, 1361, 1364, 1393, 1396, 1397, 1400 52 :~Lhl_hl_hl_Ll_h-l_h- 8. 8. 92 
S~narlo. 1358, 1362, 1394, 1398 
63 :~Lhl_hl_hl_Ll_h-l_h '2 .2 .6 S~~arlos 1359, 1363, 1395, 1399 
54 ~3bl_hl_bJ_hl_h-l_Ll_L 60' 50. 50. 
S~~arlo-; 55 ~3~1_hl_hl_hl_h-l_Ll_h- ,.4 144 144 
Sc?enarloa 
56 ~3~1_hl_hl_b.l_h-l_Ll_h 792 792 792 
Scenarlo8 
Effectiveness Index 1 R 0.967 
Table E.20: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 4 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actua.l 
PoeeibilitieB 
LT0110 FT0130 FTOl11 FTOlI0 FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n, nc,: na, 
. RLL L 1= L 1= L L 
- - - -- 1, 4, 13;-16, 17;-20, 21,-24: 157-; iso-; i69:-1~2:-173;-176,-177,-180, 209, 21~, 221, 224, 225; 228:' 229-; 232:- . - . 
Scenarios 261,264,273,276,277,280,281,284,1609,1612,1621, 1624, 1625, 1628, 1629, 1632, 1765, 1768, 1777, 
1780,1781,1784,1785,1788,1817,1820,1829,1832, 1833. 1836, 1837, 1840, 1869, 1872, 1881, 1884, 
749,752,905,908, 917, 920, 921, 924, 925, 928, 957, 960, 969, 972, 973, 976, 977. 980 1 :;~L6J_Ll_Ll_Ll_bJ_J~~_ 96 9. 96 
S~narlo8 1481, 1484, 1621, 1624 2 :;~Lbl_Ll_Ll_Ll_6J_l-~~_ 240 240 240 
S;enarlo'i 1485, 1488, 1625, 1628 
Table E.21: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FT0110 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 no nc. nai 
3 ::~ b _L _L _b _b _L 192 192 192 
S';-e;arlo-; 1469,-1412-: 1613,1616- -
4 ~~Lbl_Ll_ul_Ll_Ll_L 96 9B 9B 
S~;arlo-; 1529, 1533, 1541, 1544 
5 ;~l_bl_Ll_ul_Ll_bJ_L • 4 4 
S';-e;arlos 1533, 1536 
6 ~Lkl-Ll_ul_ul_Ll_L 8 8 8 S~;arlos 1493, 1496, 1505, 1508, 1509, 1512, 1513, 1516 
7 ;~Lbl_Ll_ul_bl_Ll_L 112 112 112 
S';-e;arlos 1517, 1520, 1525, 1528 
8 ~Al_hl_Ll_ul_hl_hl_L 12 12 12 
S~;arlo-; 1521, 1524 
9 ;~Lhl_Ll_b.l_Ll_Ll_L 240 240 240 
S~;arlos 1581, 1584, 1593, 1596 
10 ~~Lkl-LLb.l_Ul_Ll_L 125 125 125 S~;arlos 1545, 1548, 1557, 1560, 1561, 1564, 1565, 1568 
11 ;~Lhl_Ll_b.l_bl_Ll_L 280 280 280 
S~;arlos 1568, 1572, 1577, 1580 
12 ;~l_hl_Ll_b.l_bl_bl_L 7 7 7 
Sc;,;arlos 1573, 1576 
13 :;~Lkl-bJ-Ll_Ll_ul_L 8 8 8 S~;arlo; 1101, 1104, 1237, 1240, 1269, 1272, 1297, 1300 
14 ~~Lk.l_Ul_Ll_Ll_bl_L 125 125 125 
S~;arlo8 1105, 1108, 1241, 1244, 1273, 1276 
IS ~ALk.l_ULL1_bl_bl_L 1B 1B 16 S~;arlo; 1089, 1092, 1229, 1232, 1261, 1264, 1289, 1292 
I. ~~Lhl_bl_Ll_Ll_ul_L 112 112 112 
See;arlos 1345, 1348, 1433, 1436 
17 ::~ b _b _LLLLbi_L 280 280 280 
See;arlos 1349,-1352;' 1431,1440--
18 ;~l_bl_hl_Ll_bl_bl_L 224 22. 224 
See;arlos 1335,1427 
Table E.22: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN ReBUItS Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n; nc. na. 
19 ::~ b _b _b _L _L _L 192 192 192 
S~;arlo-; 1393,-13"96",;" 1405,1408- -
20 ;~l_bl_bl_hl_Ll_bj_L 12 12 12 
S~e;arlo-; 1397, 1400 
21 ;~l_bl_bl_bl_Ll_bl_L 7 7 7 
ScenarlO-; 1401, 1404 
n :;~Lh:l-bLhl_ul_Ll_L 16 16 16 
Scenario-; 1357, 1360, 1369, 1372, 1373, 1376, 1377, 1380 
23 ~~.l_bl_bl_hl_hl_Ll_L 224 224 224 
Scenarios 1381,1384, 1389, 1392 
24 ~~l_hl_hl_hl_hl_hl_L 49 49 49 
ScenarioS 1385, 1388 
Effectiveness Index IF) 1.000 
Table E.23: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 3 
LEVEL MAIN REOYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n; no; nai 
- RL1= L 1= L 1= L L 
- - - -- 1, 4, 13;-16, 17,-20, 21,-24, 157-:- 1607 i69:-172:-173;-6-6,-177,-180, 209,212,221.224, 225; 228"';" ii97232:-
- - -
Scenarios 
261,264,273,276,277,280,281,284,1609,1612,1621, 1624, 1625, 1628, 1629, 1632, 1765, 1768, 1777, 
1780,1781,1784,1785,1788,1817,1820,1829,1832, 1833, 1836, 1837, 1840, 1869, 1872, 1881, 1884, 
749,752,905,908,917,920,921,924,925,928,957,960, 969, 972, 973,976,977,980 
1 n~~Lbl_Ll_Ll_Ll_bJ __ L_ 8 8 8 
Sce~arlo; 1481, 1484, 1621, 1624 
3 R~~Lbl_Ll_Ll_Ll_6J __ L_ 7 7 7 
Sce~arlo; 1485, 1488, 1625, 1628 
4 :~Lbl_Ll_Ll_bl_bl __ L_ 121 121 121 
Scenarlo; 1469, 1472, 1613m 1616 
5 R~~l_bl_Ll_Ll_bl_bl __ J~~-_ 26 26 26 
Scenarlo; 1470, 1614 
Table E.24: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FT0110 FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 n; nc" na,; 
6 RLh-. J~=- _L _L _k _k _k 13 13 13 Sc?enarlo-; 147i,-1t3iS 
7 ~~1;:, • .,J41,b.1-L 1_ U 1 - L 1_ L 1_ L S~e;arlos • • • 
• '~~l_kl_Ll_ul_Ll_kl_L • • • 
S~narlos 1537, 1540 
9 ~~L~l-LLul_ul_Ll_L 40 40 40 S~narlo-; 1493, 1496,1505, 1508, 1509, 1512, 1513, 1516 
10 ~~Lkl_Ll_ul_ul_Ll_h 16 I. I. 
Sc?enarlo-; 1494, 1508, 1510, 1514 
11 ~~Lhl_Ll_bJ_hl_Ll_k • • • 
S~narlo-; 1495, 1507, 1511, 1515 
12 ~~Lkl_Ll_bJ_hl_Ll_L I. 16 I. 
S~enarlo-; 1517,1520,1525,1528 
13 ~~Lhl_Ll_hl_Ll_Ll_L 7 7 7 
Sc?enarlo-; 1581, 1584, 1593, 1596 
14 '~~l_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_hl_L • • • 
S~;arlo-; 1585, 1588 
15 ~~l_hl_Ll_hl_Ll_hl_h - - -
S~enarios 1586 
16 R~~L~l_hLhl_ul_Ll_L 118 118 11. 
S~narlos 1545, 1548, 1557, 1560, 1561, 1564, 565, 1568 
17 '~~Lhl_Ll_kl_ul_Ll_u 4. 4. 4. 
S~narlo--; 1546, 1558, 1561, 1565 I. ~~Lkl_Ll_kl_ul_Ll_k 24 24 24 
Scenarios 1547, 1559, 1562, 1566 
19 ~~Lkl_Ll_kl_kl_Ll_L 104 140 104 
Sc?enarios 1569, 1572, 1577, 1580 
20 ~~l_kl_Ll_kl_kl_kl_L 4 4 4 
S~narlo-s 1573, 1576 
21 ~~Lkl-hLL1_Ll_ul_L 40 40 40 Scenarlo-; 1101, 1104, 1237, 1240, 1269, 1272, 1297, 1300 
Table E.25: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L. FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0l30 FT0111 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO n, ne. na,: 
22 RLL b J~~ _L _L j~~~ _h- 16 16 16 S~e~arlo'i 1102,-1238"7 1270,1298- -
23 :~Lb.l_bJ_Ll_Ll_h-l_b. 8 8 8 
S';'~ario'i 1103, 1239, 1271, 1299 
24 :~Lb,1-h-LL1_Ll_b.l_L 118 118 118 Scenarlo'i 1105, 1108, 1241, 1244, 1273, 1276, 1301, 1304 
2' :~Lb.l_bJ_Ll_Ll_b.l_h- 48 48 48 
Scenario'i 1106, 1242, 1274, 1302 
26 :~Lb.l_bJ_Ll_Ll_b.l_b. 24 24 24 
Scenario'i 1107, 1243, 1275, 1303 
27 :~Lkl-hLL1_b.l_kl_L IJ2 IJ2 112 S';'~arlo'i 1089, 1092, 1229, 1232, 1261, 1264, 1289, 1292 
28 :~Lb.l_hl_Ll_b.l_kl_h- 32 32 32 
Sce~arlo'i 1090, 1230, 1262, 1290 
29 :~Lb.l_hl_Ll_b.l_kl_b. 22 22 22 
S;e~arlo'i 1091, 1231, 1263, 1291 
30 :~l_kl_kl_Ll_Ll_hl_L 16 I. I. 
S;e~arlo'i 1345, 1348 
31 :~l_b.l_b.l_Ll_Ll_kl_L 104 104 104 
Scenarlo'i 1349, 1352 
32 :~Lb.l_b.l_Ll_b.l_kl_L 130 130 130 
S~enarlo'i 1333, 1336, 1425, 1428 
33 :~l_b.l_b.l_Ll_b.l_kl_h- 32 32 32 
S;e~arlo'i 1334, 1426 
34 :~l_b.l_hl_Ll_b.l_kl_b. I. 16 16 
Sce~arlo'i 1335, 1427 
3. :~Lb.l_b.l_kl_Ll_Ll_L 121 121 121 
Sce~arlo'i 1393, 1396, 1405, 1408 
3. RLLlblb 
_kLLLLLh- 26 26 2. S~e~arlo'i 1394,-1406- - - - - - - - - - -
37 :~l_b.l_b.l_kl_Ll_Ll_b. 13 13 13 
Sce~arlo'i 1395, 1407 
Table E.26: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 3 
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LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FT0100 n, ne, na. 38 RC~ J~=- _k _k J~= _k _L 4 4 4 S;e~ario-; 140i,-1404-39 :bLkJ-k:Lkl_ul_Ll_L 112 112 112 SCEII~ario-; 1357, 13601369. 1372, 1373, 1376, 1377, 1380 40 :~L6.1_kl_kl_Ul_Ll_U 32 32 32 
S;e~ario-; 1358, 1370, 1374, 1378 41 ~3kL,&J_6.1_kl_Ul_Ll_6. 22 22 22 S~;ario-; 42 :~L6.1_6.1_6.1_6.1_Ll_L 130 130 130 
S~~ario~ 1381, 1384, 1389, 1392 43 :~1_6.1_6.1_hl_6.1_Ll_u 32 32 32 
S;e;arlo-; 1382, 1390 44 :~1_6.1_6.1_kl_6.1_Ll_6. I. I. I. 
S;e;arlo; 1383, 1391 45 :~1_6.1_6.1_k1_6.1_6.1_L 9 9 9 
S~~ario-; 1385, 1388 4. :~1_6.1_kl_6.1_hl_6.1_u 2 2 2 
S~~arlo~ 1386 47 ~3~1-6.1_ 6.1_ h1_ 6.1_ 6.1_ 6. 1 1 1 S;e~arioe 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table E.27: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 4 
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E.2 Results for an Individual Line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
ossibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOllO FTOI00 n, 'lCi 'lai 
1,4,5,8 Q. L Q. L 33,36,37,40 RL~ -- 53, 156, 157, 16C -PS 89, 192, 193, 196 
1 65, 168, 201, 20 RLL L L L L 53 53 53 
2 173,176 RLL L 1= L L 10 10 10 
3 185, 188 RLL L b L L 80 80 80 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table E.28: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a constant 
level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
~ossibiIitie8 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOUl FTOllO FTOI00 n, 'lq 'lai 
1,4,5,8 Q. L Q. L 33, 36, 37, 40 RL~ - -- 153, 156, 157, 160 -PS 189, 192, 193, 196 
53, 156, 157, 160, RL~ L L Q. L 1 189, 192, 193, 196 3 3 3 PS 
RL~ L b. b. L 2 181, 184 17 17 17 PS 
3 161, 164, 197, 200 :~ L L b. L 21 21 21 
RL~ L L L L 4 165, 168, 201, 204 • 3 3 PS 
RL~ L Q. L L 5 173, 176 8 0 I. PS 
RL~ L b. L L 185, 188 117 53 53 • PS 
Effectiveness Index lE 0.659 
Table E.29: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly 
decreasing level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
ossibilitie!l 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOII0 FTOIOO n; nc. na. 
1,4,5,8 
b. L b. L 33,36,31,40 RL~ - -- 153, 156, 151, 160 -p, 189, 192, 193, 196 
1 165, 168, 201, 204 RLh- L L L L 58 58 " 
2 166, 202 RLh- L L L b. 14 14 14 
a 161,203 RLh- L L L b 77 77 77 
153, 156, 151, 160, RLh- L L b. L 24 24 24 4 189, 192, 193, 196 
5 154, 158, 190, 194 RLh- L L b. b. 6 6 6 
6 155, 159, 191, 195 RLh- L L b. b 33 33 33 
7 161, 164, 191,200 RLh- L L b L 174 174 174 
• 162, 198 RLh- L L b b. 54 " 54 
9 163, 199 RLh- L L b b 297 297 297 
10 
113, 116 RLh- L rr L L 80 80 80 
11 174 RLh- L rr L b. 20 20 20 
12 175 RLh- L rr L b 110 110 110 
13 185, 188 RLh- L b L L 1258 1258 1258 
I. 18. RLh- L b L b. 348 348 348 
15 187 RLh- L b L b 1914 1914 1914 
16 181, 184 RLh- L b b L 170 170 170 
17 182 RLh- L b b b. 34 34 34 
I. 183 RLh- L b b b 187 187 187 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table E.30: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and no flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
ossibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTOllO FTOI00 n, nq nai 
1,4,13, 16, RLt= L 1= L L 33, 36, 37, 40, - -153, 156, 165, 168, -169,172,173,176 
RL~ b. L L L 85, 88, 97, 100 24 24 24 
" RL~ b. L b. L 89,92 2 2 2 PS 
RL~ b. b. L L 9,52,61,64,65,68,69,7 36 36 36 
" 
RL~ b. b L L 73,76,81,84 2 2 2 
" RL~ b. b b L 77,80 28 28 28 
" 
RL~ b. L b L 57, 60, 93, 96 24 24 24 
" Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table E.31: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
rossibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOIII FTOllO FTOI00 n; nc. 'la. 
1,4, 13, 16, RLL L t= L L 33,36, 37, 40, -153, 156, 165, 168, -169, 172, 173, 176 
1 85, 88, 97, 100 RLh-. a. L L L 164 164 164 
2 86,98 RLh-. a. L L a. 52 52 52 
3 87,99 
"h-. a. L L b 286 286 286 
4 
89,92 RLh-. a. L b.. L 16 16 16 
5 90 
"h-. a. L b.. a. 4 4 4 
6 91 RLh-. a. L b.. b 22 22 22 
T 57, 60, 93, 96 RLh-. a. L b L 36 36 36 
49, 52, 61, 64, RLh-. a. b. L L 10 10 10 8 65, 68, 69, 72 
Table E.32: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Lt FLOW Actual 
!Possibilities 
LT0110 FT0130 FTOlll FT0110 FTOIOO n, nc. na. 
> 0,62,66,7 RLL a. a. L a. 4 4 4 
10 1,63,67,71 RLL a. a. L b 22 22 22 
11 3, 76, 81, 84 RLL a. b L L 144 144 144 
12 74,82 RLL a. b L a. 64 64 64 
13 75,83 RLL a. b L b 352 352 352 
14 
71,80 RLL a. b b L 168 168 168 
15 78 RLL a. b b a. 48 48 48 
16 7> RLL a. b b b 264 264 264 
Effectiveness Index I fi) 1.000 
Table E.33: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
fossibilities 
LT0110 FT0130 FTOl11 FTOllO FTOlOO n, nCi nai 
1,4,5,8 
a. L a. L 33,36, 37,40 RL~ . . . 153, 156, 151, 160 . p, 189, 192, 193, 196 
01, 104, 105, 108, RL~ b L a. L 1 4 4 4 137, 140, 141, 144 p, 
2 109, 112, 145, 148 :~ b L b L 7 7 7 
RL~ b b b L 3 129, 132 9 9 > p, 
RL~ b a. L L 4 121, 124 24 0 296 p, 
RL~ b b L L 5 133, 136 351 0 117 p, 
RL~ b L L L 113, 116, 149, 152 6 0 222 6 p, 
Effectiveness Index he 0.500 
Table E.34: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for an Individual Line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number oC 
FLOW L1 FLOW Lt FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FT0110 FTOI00 n, nc" na. 
1,4,5,8 
b- L b- L 33,36,37,40 RL~ . . 153. 156, 157, 160 
" 189, 192, 193, 196 
101, 104, 105, 108, RLh-. b L 1 137, 140, 141, 144 b- L 32 32 32 
2 102, 106, 138, 142 RLh-. b L b- b- 8 8 8 
3 103, 107, 139, 143 RLh-. b L b- b " 44 44 
, 109, 112, 145, 148 RLh-. b L b L 58 58 58 
5 110, 146 RLh-. b L b. b- 18 18 18 
6 111, 147 RLh-. b L b b 99 99 99 
7 
129, 132 RLh-. b b b L 90 90 90 
8 130 RLh-. b b b b- 18 18 18 
9 131 RLh-. b b b b 99 99 99 
10 113, 116, 149, 152 RLh-. b L L L 58 0 '3 
11 
121, 124 RLh-. b tl L L 21. 0 3. 
Effectiveness Index lE 0.818 
Table E.35: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Lt FLOW Actual 
ossibilities 
LTOll0 FT0130 FT0111 FTOll0 FT0100 n, ne, nai 
1, 4, 13, 16, RLL L t= L L 33,36,37,40, . . . 153, 156, 165, 168 . 169,172,173,176 
1 137, 140, 149, 152 :~ b L L L 44' 44' 44' 
101, 104, 113, 116, RL~ b tl L L 2 37 37 37 117, 120, 121, 124 PS 
Table E.36: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE Fuel Rig Results Results for an Individual Line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOUO FT0130 FT0111 FTOllO FTOlOO n, nc, na. 
RL~ b b L L 3 125, 128, 133, 13 51. 51. 51. PS 
4 
141, 144 RL~ 
PS b L b- L 132 132 132 
RL~ b L b L 5 145, 148 125 125 125 
" RL~ b b b L 6 129, 132 16 16 16 PS 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table E.37: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOWLl FLOW Actual 
tpOSSibllities 
LTOll0 FT0130 FTOII1 FTOllO FTOI00 n, ne. na. 
1,4, 13, 16, RL1= L 1= L L . 33,36,37,40, . . 153, 156, 165, 168, . 169,172,173, 176 
1 137,140, 149, 152 RLh- b L L L IS. IS. IS. 
2 138, 150 RLh- b L L b- 26 26 26 
3 139, 151 RLh- b L L b 13 13 13 
101, 104, 113, 116 RLh- b Q. L L 191 191 191 4 117,120,121,124 
5 102, 114, 118, 122 RLh- b Q. L b- .2 .2 .2 
6 103, 115, 119, 123 RLh- b Q. L b 51 51 51 
7 125, 128, 133, 136 "Lh- b b L L 236 236 236 
• 126, 134 "Lh- b b L b- 32 32 32 
9 127,135 RLh- b b L b 16 16 16 
10 
141,144 RLh- b L Q. L 64 64 64 
Table E.38: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 1 
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ACTIVE FUel Rig Results Results for an Individual Line 
cenarlo LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTOllO FTOlOO n, nc. nai 
11 142 RL~ b L b- b- 16 16 16 
12 143 RL~ b L b- b 8 8 8 
13 145, 148 RL~ b L b L 118 118 118 
14 146 RL~ b L b b- 48 48 48 
IS ,.1 RL~ b L b b 2. 24 2. 
16 
129, 132 RL~ b b b L 160 160 160 
11 130 RL~ b b b b- 32 32 32 
18 131 RL~ b b b b 26 26 26 
EifectiveneSB Index I R 1.000 
Table E.39: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and partial flow out of the tank in the ACTIVE operating mode - Table 2 
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Appendix F 
DORMANT Fuel Rig Results 
F.l Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results 
FLOW Ll FLOW Lt L2 FLOW L2 FLOW 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOlll FTono FT0121 FT0120 FTOIOO n, ne,: 
-
RC L L L L L L L 
- - - --
----- ----- -----~-----------------------1,4,13,16,37,40,49.52,157,160,169,172,193,196, 205, 208, 469, 472, 481, 484, 505, 508, 517, 
- -
Scenarios 520,625,828,631,640,661,664,673,676, 1609, 1612, 1621, 1624, 1845, 1648, 1657, 1660, 1765, 1768, 
1777,1780,1801,1804,1813,1816,2077,2080,2089,2092, 2113, 2116, 2125, 2128, 2233, 2236, 2245, 
2248, 2269, 2272, 2281, 2284 
1 :~~L~.lo-kl.-LI~-kL-OJ-L 2 2 Scenario; 681,684, 717, 720, 801, 804, 821, 824, 909, 912, 945, 948, 1029, 1032, 1037, 1040 
2 :~~L~J-Ll,-~I~-LJ-LJ-L 2 2 SCEIIlarlo; 729,732, 741,744, 765, 768, 777, 780, 957, 960, 969, 972, 993, 996, 1005, 1008 
3 :~~LbJ_Ll_bJ_bJJ-~~I __ L 2 2 
S~~arlos 745, 748, 749, 752, 973, 976, 977, 980 
4 :~~L~J_~l_LI __ LLJ~l-J_L 2 2 
S~~arlos 829,832, 837, 840, 845, 848, 853, 856 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table F.1: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode 
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Number of 
Actual 
Possibilities 
nai 
-
2 
2 
2 
2 
DORMANT FUel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW L1 L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT0111 FTOllO FT0121 FT0120 FTOI00 n, nCi na. 
· RLt= L L L L L L 
- - - - -
----- -----~,-----~-----------------------1,4,13,16,31,40,49,52,151,160,169,112,193,196, 205, 208, 469, 472, 481, 484, 505, 508, 511, . . 
Scenarios 520,625,628,631,640,661,664,673,676,1609,1612, 1621, 1624, 1645, 1648, 1657, 1660, 1165, 1768, 1117, 1180, 1801, 1804, 1813, 1816,2017, 2080, 2089, 2092, 2113, 2116, 2125, 2128, 2233, 2236, 2245, 
2248, 2269, 2272, 2281, 2284 
1 R~hLb-J_hl._LI~_LLJ~~J_L " " " S';'~arlo; 681,684,117,720,801,804,821,824,909,912,945, 948, 1029, 1032, 1037, 1040 
2 R~hLQl_Ll_LI __ LI_J:l-J_~ 4 4 4 
S~e;;-arlo; 832, 840, 848, 856 
3 R~hLQl_Ll_LI __ LI_J:l-J_b 2 2 2 
S';'~arlo; 831,839,841,855 
• R~hLQ1_kl,_~I"_h'-_L-'-_L " 16 I. S';'~ario; 729,132, 741, 744, 765, 768, 777, 780, 957, 960, 969, 912, 993, 996, 1005, 1008 
5 ~hLQl-Ll-~I __ LI __ LI __ ~ • 4 4 SZe~arlo; 746, 750, 975, 978 
• R~hLQl_Ll_bJ_LI __ LI __ b 2 2 2 
S~~arlo; 747,751,916,979 
Effectiveness Index I g 1.000 
Table F.2: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Lt FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FT0110 FT0121 FTOl20 FT0100 n, nCi na. 
· RLt= L L L L L L 
- - - -- 1, 4, 13,-16, 37,-40-: 49,52-; 1577 i60-;-169;-172,-193,-I96,205, 208,469,472, 481: .i8( 5057 5087517;- - . 
Scenarios 520,625,628,637,640,661,664,613,676, 1609, 1612, 1621, 1624, 1645, 1648, 1651, 1660, 1765, 1768, 
1777,1780,1801,1804,1813,1816,2077,2080,2089,2092, 2113, 2116, 2125, 2128, 2233, 2236, 2245, 
2248, 2269, 2272, 2281, 2284 
1 :;t;; t, L.,-.J ,,1, 123J4o, L",.JJ 148.,~t~ L, ~J'62~ 8 8 8 S';'~arlo; 
2 
:ivt:? t, L"-.J,,.t, 12.J49, L",.JJ "Os,~t~ L, T.J -L 11 11 11 S~~arlo; 
3 :~~L~t-LL-LI--bJ-bJ--L 12 12 12 S';'~arlo; 1089,1092, 1229, 1232, 1469, 1471, 1613, 1616 
Table F.3: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 1 
316 
DORMANT Fuel Rig Results Results for Both Lines 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW LI FLOW Ll L. FLOW L2 FLOW Actua.l 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOIll FTono FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO ., nc, Ra. 
RL~ hLrrLLL 4 
" 
8 8 8 
Sc?e~arlo-; 1113,-1116: 1125, li28~ 1149, 1152.-1Ml: 1164,1493:-1496, 1505,-1508"7 1529,1532:-1541, 1544 - - -
5 
:;:t;.; tJ,80~ d, J'-'2'3~ L.t~:5J J'-'560~· L. L.~ J, 151== 11 11 11 S';-e;arlo'i 6 ;~Lkl_bJ_Ll_kl_kl_L 1 1 1 
Sc?e;arlos 1261, 1264, 1289, 1292 
7 ;~L~l-hLbJ_Ll_Ll_L 12 12 12 SZe;arlos 1357, 1360, 1369, 1372, 1393, 1396, 1405, 1408 8 ;~Lhl_hl_kl_bJ_Ll_L 1 1 1 
See;arlos 1373, 1376, 1377, 1380 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table F.4: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 2 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW LI FLOW Ll L. FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOUO FTQI30 FTOlll FT0110 FT0121 FT0120 FTOlOO ., nc, nai 
RL1= L L L L L L 
- - - -- 1, 4, 13,-16, 37,-40: 49,52-;-157-:- i60:-169;-172,-193,-196,205, 208,469, 472. 48i; 484-;- 505-:- 508:-517;- -
- - -
Scenarios 
520,625,628,637,640,661,664,673,676,1609,1612, 1621, 1624, 1645, 1648, 1657, 1660, 1765, 1768, 
1777, 1780, 1801, 1804, 1813, 1816, 2077, 2080, 2089, 2092,2113,2116,2125,2128,2233,2236,2245, 
2248, 2269, 2272, 2281, 2284 1 R~h72~L, t25,-:J".t, 1244~t L"4J41'60s,~t~ !'25' iJ -L 2 2 2 S~~arlo8 2 R~~L~LLLLI __ bJJ~J_L 9 9 9 
S~~arlo8 1089, 1092, 1229, 1232, 1469, 1471, 1613, 1616 3 R~~L~l_Ll_LI __ bJJ~J_Q 2 2 2 
S~~arlo; 1090, 1230, 1470, 1614 4 R~~L~l_Ll_LI __ bJJ~J_~ 1 1 1 
S~~arlo; 1091, 1231, 1471, 1615 5 R;,h8~t, Lo~:J ,,1 1213~16, L,~JJ, 1560,~t14' J~IS;~ 2 2 2 S~~arlo; 
Table F,5: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 1 
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DORMANT Fuel Rig Results Results for an Individual Line 
LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll L2 FLOW L2 FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOIlO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOllO FT0l21 FT0120 FTOlOO n, nco 'la. 
6 RLh-. b b b 
_L _L _L 9 9 9 
SCe~arios 1357,-1360":' 1369,1372~ 1393,1396,-1405-:-1408 - - - -
1 ~~Lkl_kl_kl_Ll_Ll_u 2 2 2 
S~e~arlos 1358, 1370, 1394, 1406 
8 ~~Lkl_kl_kl_Ll_Ll_k 1 1 1 
S~enar1os 1359, 1371, 1395, 1405 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table F.6: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode - Table 2 
F.2 Results for an Individual Line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
~osaibilitie8 
LTOUO FT0l30 FTOl11 FTOllO FTOI00 n; nc. nai 
1, 4, 13, 16 fiLL L L L L - 33, 36, 45, 48 - - -53, 156, 165, 168 89, 192, 201,204 
49, 52, 61, 64, RL~ b.. L L L 1 2 2 2 85,88,97, 100 PS 
RL~ b.. L b.. L 2 53, 56, 89, 92 2 2 2 P' 
RL~ b.. b.. L L 3 65, 68, 69, 72 2 2 2 PS 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table F.7: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode 
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DORMANT Fuel Rig Results Results for an Individual Line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FT01l1 FTOll0 FTOI00 n, ne. na. 
1, 4, 13, 16 RLL L L L L - 33, 36, 45, 48 - - -53, 156, 165, 168 89, 192, 201, 204 
1 49, 52, 61, 64, 85, 88, 97, 100 
RLL. tl L L L I. 16 I. 
2 50, 62, 86, 98 RLL. tl L L tl 4 4 4 
3 51,63,87,99 "LL. tl L L h 2 2 2 
4 53, 56, 89, 92 "LL. tl L tl L 1. 1. I. 
5 54,90 "LL. tl L tl tl 4 4 4 
• 55,91 "LL. tl L tl h 2 2 2 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
Table F.8: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW L1 FLOW Lt FLOW Actual 
/Possibilities 
LTOIIO FT0130 FTOll1 FTOI10 FTOlOO n, nq na. 
I, 4, 13, 16 
"LL L L L L - 33, 36, 45, 48 - - -153, 156, 165, 168 189, 192, 201, 204 
1 101, 104, 113, 116, RL~ 
137, 140, 149, 152 PS h L L L 31 31 31 
"L~ h L tl L 105, 108, 141, 144 8 8 8 2 
" "L~ h L h L 3 109, 112, 145, 148 11 11 11 PS 
4 129, 132 :~ h h h L ,. I. I. 
Effectiveness Index lE 1.000 
-
Table F.9: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a linearly decreasing 
level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode 
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DORMANT Fuel Rig Results Results for an Individual Line 
Scenarios LEVEL MAIN RECYCLE STREAM DRAIN Results Number of 
FLOW Ll FLOW Ll FLOW Actual 
Possibilities 
LTOllO FT0130 FTOl11 FTOI10 FTOlOO 
" 
nc, nai 
1,4,13, 16 RL1= L L L L 0 33, 36, 45, 48 0 0 153, 156, 165, 168 189, 192, 201,204 
1 
101, 104, 113, 116, 
131, 140, 149, 152 
RL~ b L L L 11 11 11 
2 102, 114, 138, 150 RL~ b L L b.. 2 2 2 
3 103, 115, 139, 151 RL~ b L L b 1 1 1 
4 
105, 108, 141, 144 RL~ b L b.. L 64 64 64 
5 109, 112, 145, 148 RL~ b L b L 2 2 2 
6 129, 132 
RL~ b b b L 9 9 9 
7 130 RL~ b b b b.. 2 2 2 
8 131 RL~ b b b b 1 1 1 
Effectiveness Index I R 1.000 
Table FolD: Flow and level patterns for the main tank when there is a non-linearly 
decreasing level and flow out of the tank in the DORMANT operating mode 
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